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Two dangers can be avoided if this idea of noncomprehensive systematization is kept in mind. One 
is the danger of romantic defeatism, which abandons rational theory because it inevitably leaves 
many problems unsolved. The other is the danger of exclusionary overrationalization, which bars 
as irrelevant or empty all considerations that cannot be brought within the scope of a general system 
admitting explicitly defensible conclusions. This yields skewed results by counting only measurable 
or otherwise precisely describable factors, even when others are in fact relevant.  
The alternative is to recognize that the legitimate grounds of decision are extremely various and 
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This PhD thesis investigates ethical, social, and political questions raised by new 
reproductive technologies. Within this study, debates on the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies and on how these should be regulated in democratic 
societies are approached as debates on the ethics of eugenics. Eugenics has a bad 
reputation due to its tainted history, and 20th century eugenic policies and practices 
are often referenced to condemn new technologies. This study seeks to go beyond 
a negative understanding of eugenics to approach debates on the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies in terms of considerations of who should come into 
existence, and on how to distribute the burdens and benefits of such decisions.  
This study consists of four parts. In the first part, I analyse and reflect on debates on 
the ethics of new reproductive technologies and show how these are characterised 
by moral disagreement and frequent references to 20th century eugenics. In the 
second part, I turn to ethical questions pertaining to new reproductive technologies 
more specifically. I discuss the ethical standing and implications of satisfying the 
preference to have genetically related children in connection with two technologies: 
genome editing and mitochondrial replacement techniques. In the third part, I 
discuss questions related to the governance of these technologies considering the 
plurality of ethical views and beliefs held by authors participating in these debates 
and members of the public. In the final part, I move from individual reproductive 
decisions and preferences to the far-reaching and cumulative effects of these 
decisions on third parties. I assess the strengths and weaknesses of the individual-
centred framework that underpins reproductive freedom and of alternative 
frameworks that seek to account for the broader effects of procreative decisions.   
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When I started this PhD project, twin souls were living inside me. I was the moral 
philosopher, proud to be one of only two women in my moral and political 
philosophy master’s programme. I had been in love with philosophy since my first 
encounter with it in high school: finding consolation, challenge, and immense 
satisfaction from the questions it raised. I was also someone with a deep interest in 
applied ethics and bioethics. My philosophy soul and my bioethics soul got on well. 
My philosophical knowledge and skills, acquired after reading and studying 
philosophy for five years and spending an almost equal amount of time at the pub 
with friends discussing philosophical questions (can identity persist over time?); 
ethical dilemmas (should one be held equally responsible for drunk driving if nothing 
happens and if a bystander is killed?); and political problems (should there be 
conditions for registering to vote?1), seemed to be very useful for conducting 
research in bioethics. After all, I had always admired those in bioethics who 
combined sharp reflections and knowledge about the technologies, practices, and 
dilemmas at hand with philosophical skills, theories, and sound philosophical 
arguments. In short, I was a happy moral philosopher ‘doing’ applied ethics and 
bioethics. Then, I joined the Department of Global Health & Social Medicine 
(GHSM) at King’s College London.  
I had a bigger culture shock than when I first landed in Jakarta the summer before 
starting my PhD. It was a similar experience, though: very few colleagues spoke my 
language (the language of moral and political philosophy); very few of them seemed 
to think the way I did or were interested in the questions that kept me up at night, 
and many of them found it really amusing (in the best case) or thought it completely 
misguided (in the worst) that what interested me were the normative implications of 
what we discussed. I felt alien. I sometimes felt that the respect for my work and for 
                                                 
1 As is shown in the third part of this thesis, I stopped being so democracy-sceptic. The self-
indulgence on the question of democratic governance was largely due to youth, love for Plato’s 




my ideas that should be encouraged in multidisciplinary environments was lacking. 
At other times I was smug about the superiority of my own background, feeling like 
the 21st century heir of Diogenes. Luckily, smugness goes away with time. It also 
dissipates thanks to exposure to new ideas, ways of thinking, books, articles, and 
other sources that I would have never been exposed to if I had lingered, comfortably 
numb, in my cave. Discussions about social inequalities, mental health, ageing, and 
‘genetisation’ in the meeting room of the fourth floor of the East Wing of the Strand 
Campus replaced my philosophical disquisitions. After countless lunch breaks, 
Foucault had almost replaced Plato and critical thinking had almost taken over from 
moral philosophy. Or more precisely: philosophy was forced to make space for all 
these new inputs and, believe me, at first it did not take this intrusion well. All the 
discussions I had, works I read, and lectures and talks I attended contributed to the 
emergence of a new tiny soul, the most alien to me and the one that was and is still 
in perpetual struggle against the two happily cohabiting souls described above.   
As a result, this thesis is a hybrid. It combines normative and philosophical 
reflections on new reproductive technologies with reflections on bioethics as a field 
of inquiry and on debates about new reproductive technologies. It combines doing 
bioethics with reflecting on bioethics. And this is not all. I started this project 
concerned about people’s (reproductive) rights: not in the legal, but the deeper sense 
of this word. What interested and concerned me were people’s moral rights. Women 
with fertility issues, homosexual couples, single people, older women, and couples 
with a history of genetic conditions were all categories of people whose moral right 
to reproduce was curtailed. Sometimes these restrictions came from the state, in 
other instances from the Catholic Church (I am Italian, after all) and its reactionary 
beliefs, while at other times the responsibility lay with those who within the debate 
on the ethics of human enhancement came to be labelled ‘bioconservatives’. These 
were the enemies of these people, and as a result my enemies.  
Conducting research in the U.K., a country with a much more liberal outlook to 
assisted reproduction than Italy, and in a multidisciplinary department like GHSM 
taught me a lesson: namely that what I have just described is possibly the narrowest 
approach to take to reflect on these issues. By this, I mean that questions related to 
xiv 
 
assisted reproduction and procreation more generally are much more complicated 
that I had thought. They are not only about moral rights. My supposed enemies are 
not the only (nor probably the biggest) obstacles to building a just society, and the 
people whose rights I was and to a certain extent am still so concerned with are likely 
to be those at the ‘top one per cent’ (Chomsky 2012). This means on the one hand 
that they are privileged people whose reproductive rights may well be curtailed in 
significant and unjust ways, but they are probably neither the most discriminated 
against nor the ones suffering the most; on the other, that the obstacles to a more 
just society from the perspective of reproductive rights needs to be built on 
something more than attacking conservatives and the Catholic Church. The take-
home message of these three years and of the emergence of my new tiny critical soul 
was that the whole picture is much more complicated than it had seemed. I am 
talking Kandinsky’s Composition VII-complicated, while initially I thought of it as a 
Delacroixian Liberty Leading the People sort of complexity.  
 
 
This PhD thesis is hence the result of three (philosophy, bioethics, and social 
sciences) souls battling each other, challenging each other and by doing so, I hope, 
enriching the depth and quality of the outcomes. It is, as David Pizarro (2016) once 
put it (unfortunately not about my work), “the sneaky manifesto of a moral pluralist 
who believes that ethics are fundamentally messy” (Pizarro 2016: XIII). If it feels a 
Eugène Delacroix, Liberty Leading the 
People (1830) 





bit schizophrenic at times, or even just not harmoniously consistent, well, I blame 
you, GHSM.  
However, as Thomas Nagel once (as so often) beautifully put it:  
My own philosophical sympathies and antipathies are easily stated. I believe 
one should trust problems over solutions, intuition over arguments, and 
pluralistic discord over systematic harmony. Simplicity and elegance are never 
reasons to think that a philosophical theory is true: on the contrary, they are 
usually grounds for thinking it false. (Nagel 1979: X) 
What will be the result of these considerations on people’s reproductive rights and 
on bioethics scholarship? My hope is that they will contribute to debates on the 
ethics of new reproductive technologies by enriching them with data and sources 
testifying to the complexities of the social realities in which these technologies are 
debated, developed, implemented, and regulated. In my view, however, 
contributing to a field of inquiry should be just one of the many aims of academic 
endeavours. The aim of improving people’s lives and, as John Harris (2016a) said, to 
“lighten the burden of human existence” (Harris 2016a: 16) is what needs to guide 
academic research and praxis2. This is easier said than done, but, in my view, 
debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies are first steps towards 
developing and regulating technologies that can tackle obstacles to the satisfaction 
of people’s procreative projects. The subject matter of this PhD thesis, namely an 
investigation of the ethical questions raised by these technologies and by procreative 
decisions, is then aimed at providing a way to deal with such obstacles. 
                                                 
2 An interesting way to articulate these aims is Jonathan Glover’s distinction between writing about 





This PhD thesis brings together sources from numerous academic disciplines. This 
is reflected in the body of this thesis and in its separation into different papers, which 
I describe briefly in this introduction together with the thesis’ leading thread, aims, 
methodology, sources, and scope.  
This thesis is fundamentally about eugenics3, but with some caveats. ‘Eugenics’ is 
synonymous with inhumane ideologies and despicable practices carried out during 
the 20th century4. It is identified with genocide; forced sterilisation; infanticide; 
discrimination against disabled people, minorities and women, and the 
institutionalisation and segregation of vulnerable subjects. Despite these 
associations, eugenics does not have entirely pejorative connotations. It permeates 
history and geography, defying simplistic explanations, clear depictions, and 
straightforward condemnations. While the knowledge of inhumane and despicable 
practices associated with it is widespread, eugenics encompassed a multiplicity of 
conflicting ideologies and heterogenic practices (Lombardo 2018; Meloni 2016; Paul 
1984, 1998). The complexity of the past is often overlooked within accounts of 
authors participating in debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies 
(Bashford 2010). Their appraisals of the morally troubling and acceptable features of 
20th century eugenics vary and often result in conflicting assessments of the morality 
of the present. The multifaceted nature of 20th century eugenics (Meloni 2016; Paul 
1998) and concomitant ethical assessments of this history make eugenics a ‘handle-
with-care’ tool in debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies. 
Intrinsically, a comparison between past and present that is not mindful of the 
                                                 
3 For now, I follow Stephen Wilkinson’s (2010) approach and rely on a ‘working definition’ of 
eugenics, which I define as ‘the attempt to influence the genetic endowment of future generations’. 
I return to the question of the definition of eugenics in the first part of this thesis, where I discuss the 
multiple definitions of the word ‘eugenics’ and the implications for debates on the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies of using a certain definition.  
4 While for some eugenics is synonymous with past inhumane and despicable practices, for others it 
is not, as it were, ‘a thing of the past’, but alive and well thanks to contemporary reproductive 
technologies and practices. I discuss these two views in Paper 1 (Cavaliere 2018d).  




complexities of the history of eugenics and of new reproductive technologies risks 
being epistemically and normatively problematic. It risks flattening the ethical 
questions raised by new reproductive technologies into binary thinking of ‘analogous 
to eugenics’ versus ‘disanalogous to eugenics’. This risks making only partial ethical 
assessments of new reproductive technologies and thereby failing to contribute in 
meaningful ways to users, policy-makers, and to bringing forward ethical debates.  
Eugenics is not only associated with inhumane and despicable practices but also with 
adverse emotional reactions caused by the memory of these practices and of the 
policies enacted in its name (Wilkinson 2008). Authors discussing the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies have argued against employing the word ‘eugenics’ within 
these debates (Camporesi 2014; Wilkinson 2008), and against its use as a cautionary 
tale to warn against potential negative externalities of such technologies (Paul 1992). 
According to this understanding, eugenics casts a shadow on debates on new 
reproductive technologies, and its emotive power risks circumventing “people’s 
rational-critical faculties” (Wilkinson 2008: 471). Indeed, eugenics has been 
depicted in pejorative terms as a shadow, a ghost, and a conversation-stopper. 
Despite these negative depictions, one of my arguments throughout this thesis is 
that debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies, and of procreative 
decisions and procreation more generally are debates about what kind of people should 
come into existence5, and about how to balance the burdens and benefits of such 
decisions. These debates are, ergo, about the ethics of eugenics. They are about 
what the prefix ‘eu’ (good) in eugenics amounts to; what are and are not favourable 
traits; and what weight, if any, should be granted to people’s preferences in 
procreative matters. They are also about intentionally and technically intervening 
in the type and number of people who will inhabit our planet, and about how to 
distribute the burdens and benefits of these decisions.  
                                                 
5 This deliberately echoes Jonathan Glover’s (1984) question “What sort of people should there be?” 
(Glover 1984). This question is the title of Glover’s book on “the future of humankind” and “the 
ethics of genetic choices” (these descriptions are  from Glover’s website, at: 
http://www.jonathanglover.co.uk/books/what-sort-of-people-should-there-be (last accessed: 11 




In addition, another overarching argument of this thesis is that 20th century eugenics 
does not only cast shadows but can also shed light on some of the complexities of 
the present. In other words, reflecting on the meanings of the word ‘eugenics’, and 
on the implications of its use in debates on the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies and on procreative decisions allows us to uncover certain tensions and 
complexities in these debates, and of the technologies and practices at their heart. 
It allows us to see how the complex negotiation of conflicting values and tensions 
“between social good and individual liberties” (Buchanan et al. 2001: 30) that 
characterised eugenics is still part of today’s discourses and negotiations of values 
(Löwy 2015). To give an example, the tensions which Allen Buchanan and his co-
authors (2001) identify are alive and well in contemporary discourses and rationales 
of whether to offer prenatal screening (Löwy 2015: 199). Within these discourses 
and rationales co-exist “incommensurable moral economies” (Löwy 2015: 199), 
namely tensions between individual-centred measures and practices on the one hand 
and public health concerns and population-wide measures and practices on the 
other6.  
In the following sections I present the aims, the questions, the methodology that 
guided the research that led to this thesis, and the sources that informed it. The main 
contribution to the bioethics literature on the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies of this thesis lies in its multidisciplinary outlook, and on its bringing 
together a multiplicity of sources and reflections from authors belonging to different 
disciplines. In addition, reflecting on ethical questions raised by new reproductive 
technologies in terms of eugenics (as I have just discussed, and as I discuss further in 
Parts I and IV) allows for the uncovering and unpacking of existing tensions and 
pluralistic understandings of the ‘good’ within debates on the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies and procreative decisions.  
                                                 
6 Ilana Löwy (2015) argues that “the generalization of PND and its transformation into screening 
technology was strongly affected by two events: the recognition of the right of women at high risk 
of giving birth to severely handicapped children to terminate their pregnancies; and the aspiration of 
reducing the prevalence of a specific congenital condition, Down’s syndrome” (Löwy 2015: 199). 
According to this understanding, the tension between focusing on the individual and on the 
population is part of 20th century eugenics that survives in contemporary reproductive technologies.  




1  Aims, Questions, Methodology, and Sources 
The questions discussed in this study are informed by my training and work in both 
philosophy and bioethics, and are also influenced by my knowledge of social 
sciences. The heterogeneity of my background is reflected in the variation between 
meta-reflections on debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies and 
procreative decisions, and reflections on the ethics of new reproductive technologies 
and procreative decisions. It is also reflected in the aims of this project, its guiding 
questions, and the methodology employed to address these questions, which are 
discussed in the following sections. 
This project has two overarching aims; both concern questions of who should come 
into existence, and of how to balance the burdens and benefits of these decisions. 
As I discuss in the methodology section, in the past two decades bioethics has been 
subjected to several critiques which have given rise to a series of related proposals 
to change this field of inquiry7. This project takes as a point of departure these 
critiques and subsequent proposals to make bioethics more grounded in ‘the real 
world’, but it seeks to go beyond them. The first aim of this project is hence 
methodologically oriented as this thesis endeavours to provide an example of how 
debates on new reproductive technologies can be enriched by an attention to the 
complexities of social realities and by being more inclusive in terms of disciplinary 
sources. To achieve this, I use debates on who should come into existence as case 
studies and examples8: I observe, analyse, and evaluate them to work towards this 
aim.  
                                                 
7 Here, I follow Daniel Sulmasy and Jeremy Sugarman’s (2010) definition of discipline as “a 
department of learning or knowledge, a community of scholars who share common assumptions 
about training, modes of inquiry, the kind of knowledge that is sought, and the boundaries of the 
subject matter proper to the discipline” (Sulmasy & Sugarman 2010: 5); and field of inquiry defined 
as “a subject matter or set of phenomena or questions addressed by a scholar of scholars” (Sulmasy 
& Sugarman 2010: 5). Considering the diversity in terms of methodology, and types of knowledge 
and training within bioethics, I am inclined to describe it in terms of a field of inquiry that is of “great 
interest to many disciplines rather than a discipline in its own right” (Sulmasy & Sugarman 2010: 5).  
8 While the conclusions and recommendations for future debates concern debates on the ethics of 




The second aim of this project concerns more specifically the question of who should 
come into existence, and of how to balance the burdens and benefits of decisions 
made in light of it. It seeks to provide an analysis and evaluation of these questions 
and to this effect is subdivided into three specific goals. The first goal is to provide 
arguments and to produce ethical assessments which contribute to making new 
reproductive technologies more widely accessible to people who suffer from 
infertility due to medical and/or social reasons; to non-heterosexual couples, and to 
people who carry inheritable genetic conditions who wish to pursue parenthood 
projects. The second goal is to provide arguments for implementing new 
reproductive technologies and for organising procreation in ways which fairly 
distribute their burdens and benefits. The third goal is to provide arguments for 
making these technologies implemented in ways which respect the plurality of 
values and world-views concerning them; to ethically balance the burdens and 
benefits of satisfying people’s procreative preferences, and to take into consideration 
the wide-reaching and cumulative effects of procreative decisions. 
*** 
Several questions guided the research that led to this thesis. The first set of questions 
pertains to debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies and procreative 
decisions. 
• What is the role of the reference to eugenics within debates on the ethics of 
new reproductive technologies?  
• What are the argumentative strategies pursued by authors participating in 
these debates considering the moral disagreement that surrounds these 
technologies? 
• Which ethical frameworks other than the individual-centred framework of 
reproductive freedom can be employed to discuss the ethics of procreative 
decisions?  
A second set of questions relates more specifically to the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies and procreative decisions. 




• How should the preference for genetically related children be weighed 
against other considerations (such as those pertaining to resource allocation 
and negative externalities of new reproductive technologies)?  
• What limits if any should be imposed on the satisfaction of people’s interests 
and preferences in procreative matters?  
A third set of questions pertains to the governance of new reproductive 
technologies. 
• How much weight should competing values and world-views on new 
reproductive technologies be granted in practice?  
• What criteria can assist in attributing priority to values and world-views in 
practice?  
• How can a respect for values and world-views be reflected in regulatory 
strategies? 
Each part of this thesis attempts to address one or more of these questions.  
1.1 Methodology: Critical Bioethics and Beyond  
Methodology is not an easy matter for philosophers. One of the recurrent jokes 
about my PhD project within my social sciences department was that I, contrary to 
most of my colleagues, ‘did not collect data’. As a result, or this is how the friendly 
teasing went, I did not have a methodology: I could not have the standard methods 
chapter in my thesis describing how I collected original data; which theory I used to 
analyse it; which software aided me in the coding; and how I then wrote-up my 
findings chapters. This idea of an un-empirically-informed analysis of the subject is 
not limited to friendly teasing among colleagues, it is also an inside joke among 
philosophers.  
In addition to philosophers and my colleagues, others criticise the effects of the 
philosophical foundations of bioethics9 and the lack of empirical grounding of this 
                                                 




field of inquiry. The so-called “social science critique of bioethics”10 (Hedgecoe 
2004: 121) stems from the idea that bioethics, due to its philosophical foundations, is 
overly formal, deductive, and rational (Bosk 2000; Fox 1999); that ethical analyses 
transcend people, time, and place (Bosk 2000); and that the complexities of social 
and cultural factors are sacrificed in the name of “universal ethical principles” (Fox 
1999: 9). In other words, the social science critique of bioethics charges research in 
this field of inquiry with a lack of attention to empirical data: its meanings, 
implications, and value. Importantly, following these authors, this flaw can be traced 
to bioethics’ foundation in philosophy. This cluster of critiques inspired Adam 
Hedgecoe’s (2004) idea of “critical bioethics” (Hedgecoe 2004: 120), which, as the 
author points out, seeks to go “beyond the social science critique” of bioethics 
(Hedgecoe 2004: 120).  
Despite the teasing, the social science critique of bioethics and this project being 
indeed informed by desk-based philosophical research, there is a methodology 
behind this study and a multiplicity of sources inform it. My methodology is inspired 
by Hedgecoe’s (2004) and others’ (Árnason 2015; Ives & Dunn 2010; Twine 2005) 
calls for bioethics to become critical bioethics. I firstly present and discuss these 
authors’ proposals and show how my overall methodology both builds on and 
                                                 
10 For instances of authors putting forward this critique, see Renée C. Fox (1999) and Charles L. 
Bosk (2000). Adam Hedgecoe (2004) aptly summarises the main tenet of the social science critique 
as follows: “bioethics, founded on philosophy, gives a dominant role to idealised, rational thought; it 
tends to position individuals as the sole judge in ethical decision-making, in that it relegates social 
and cultural aspects to the status of at best, curios, and worst irrelevancies; the applied ethics model 
assumes that social reality cleaves down neat philosophical lines, with theoretical categories matching 
those in social reality: i.e. that what a philosopher says is the doctor-patient relationship actually 
represents the relationship between doctors and their patients in all settings. Consequently, bioethics 
does not have the right tools to resolve substantive moral problems, external to these categories 
themselves” (Hedgecoe 2004: 130). On this issue, see also Alan Cribb and John Owens (2017) on 
“sociological bioethics” and “philosophical bioethics” (Cribb & Owens 2017: 103-104). An appraisal 
of the social science critique of bioethics is beyond the scope of this project. What I instead discuss 
in the following section is Hedgecoe’s (2004) and others’ (Árnason 2015; Ives & Dunn 2010; Twine 
2005) proposals to move towards ‘critical bioethics’. I discuss this proposal instead of the specifics of 
the social science critique of bioethics, as I believe that it is more up-to-date with respect to the 
sources that it appraises and true to current bioethical debates more generally. It is not solely critical 
of bioethics, but it attempts to provide some recommendations on how bioethics can be brought 
forward and it captures several elements of the social science critique of bioethics whilst attempting 
to offer constructive suggestions rather than a mere assessment of the discipline (on this issue, see 
also De Vries 2004).  




departs from these proposals. I then move to the sources that I relied upon for this 
project and that I believe need to be integrated into bioethics more generally.  
Hedgecoe is arguably the father of critical bioethics, as he outlined and explained 
for the first time which conditions need to be met for bioethics to be ‘critical’. The 
expression ‘critical bioethics’, however, comes from Lisa Parker (1995), who coined 
it to describe her approach which “critically interrogate[s] the normative and conceptual 
schemes within which ethical considerations about such [breast cancer genetic] 
screening protocols are framed” ([emphasis added] Parker 1995: 313). 
What critical bioethics more generally stands for is the need to take empirically 
informed approaches to discussions of bioethical questions, technologies, and 
practices; for the critical self-reflection that authors conducting research in bioethics 
should exercise with respect to their own assessments, judgments, and to the 
decisions they support, as well as for favouring breadth and depth rather than only 
analytic clarity and consistency within ethical assessments (Árnason 2015; 
Hedgecoe 2004; Ives & Dunn 2010; Twine 2005). More specifically, to become 
‘critical’, bioethics needs to be empirically rooted, theory challenging, reflexive, and 
politely sceptical (Hedgecoe 2004). Critical bioethics is “empirically rooted” and 
“bottom up” in that it uses as “first port of call” empirical data collected by social 
scientists rather than “standard bioethics debates” (Hedgecoe 2004: 136). It needs 
to avoid blind reliance on moral theories as the principal source of action-guiding 
ideas, especially when the preferred moral theory does not fit the complexities and 
structures of the social world in which it seeks to intervene11. It should also not take 
                                                 
11 This reliance on theories in ‘applied philosophy’ is also criticised from within (i.e. from 
philosophers). An instance of this is in Jonathan Wolff (2018). There, Wolff is concerned with how 
moral and political philosophy can be used in the context of public policy and with the role of 
philosophers in advising on these policies. He argues that those who seek to apply theories in political 
and moral philosophy to public policy face a number of difficulties: dogmatism, under-determination, 
implausibility of recommendations, theory of the second best, blindspots, and conceptual inadequacy 
(Wolff 2018). An analysis of each of these elements is beyond the scope of this thesis, but many of 
them echo social scientists’ critiques of bioethics. Another instance of criticism in this direction (again 
‘from within’) is in Allen Buchanan (2002a). Buchanan explains that “applied ethicists tend to focus 
exclusively on two tasks: identifying valid moral principles and constructing arguments in support of 
them. This constructive enterprise is often preceded by the critique of rival principles, either by 
showing that the rival principles are incompatible with widely shared considered judgments (moral 
intuitions) or by exposing the unsoundness of the arguments offered in support of the principles” 




traditional moral theories’ practical utility for granted and blindly apply them to 
specific dilemmas and cases. Instead, it needs to use empirical data and research in 
the social science field to challenge these theories and to test their practical utility. 
Critical bioethics also requires self-reflection on the cultural, political, and social 
realities which shape bioethicists’ reflections and that play a role in the formation of 
their moral judgements. Building on Hedgecoe (2004), Jonathan Ives and Michael 
Dunn (2010) emphasise the social- and cultural-embedded nature of bioethics12. 
They argue that bioethicists need to explicitly address and reflect on their biases, 
assumptions, motivations, conflicts of interests, and other aspects which may 
influence their moral assessments of certain technologies or practices13. In other 
words, critical bioethics demands similar practices to those performed by social 
scientists and emphasises that there is a need to conduct “a critical interrogation of 
the relationship between the researcher, the world she is studying and her 
experience and awareness of that world” (Ives & Dunn 2010: 261). 
Lastly, critical bioethics should challenge epistemic scientism (Mayes et al. 2015) 
and be politely sceptical: ready to challenge and be critical of claims made by other 
bioethicists, scientists, and healthcare professionals, especially about the reliability 
and promises of scientific research and findings, and thereby emulating an attitude 
typical of the critical traditions of the social and political sciences. 
1.1.1 Beyond Critical Bioethics 
My methodology seeks to incorporate these features and strives to be empirically 
rooted, theory challenging, reflexive, and politely sceptical, with some caveats. My 
research, and the methodology that underpins it, is empirically informed (rather than 
rooted, a difference that I qualify further on in this section) and context-aware. It 
                                                 
epistemologically false and morally problematic beliefs if it is not paired with what he refers to as 
“social moral epistemology”, namely the “study of the social practices and institutions that promote 
(or impede) the formation, preservation, and transmission of true beliefs so far as true beliefs facilitate 
right action or reduce the incidence of wrong action” (Buchanan 2002a: 126). 
12 For a discussion and problematisation of the communitarian self and of human beings as socially 
embedded, see Michael Parker (2005a).  
13 See also Parker (2007) on reflectivity and bioethics (Parker 2007: 190).  




pays attention to the social character of bioethics and its unfolding in a certain period 
of time and geographical space within certain political, cultural, and social contexts. 
It recognises, therefore, that moral, social, cultural, and political values contribute to 
deciding which questions are addressed, which technologies are developed, and 
which lines of inquiry are considered worth pursuing (Kitcher 2001, Ch. 7). It draws 
upon empirical data that can, on the one hand, shed light on how such values shape 
moral beliefs about new reproductive technologies and bioethicists’ ethical 
assessments of such technologies. On the other, they can show how such 
technologies shape or, borrowing from Sheila Jasanoff (2004), co-produce these 
values (Jasanoff 2004). From this perspective, the difference between empirically 
informed and empirically rooted is both a matter of degree and nature14. It is a matter 
of degree in that my research contains elements of a bottom-up approach (what I 
believe an ‘informed’ approach entails) rather than being entirely bottom-up (what a 
‘rooted’ approach would entail). It is also different in nature as it includes both 
elements of bottom-up as well as top-down approaches, and as it dynamically moves 
between these extremes15. 
What my methodology entails is a sort of reflective equilibrium16 between empirical 
data, reflections of authors with different disciplinary backgrounds (which I discuss 
below), and moral theories. ‘Reflective equilibrium’ describes both a moment as well 
                                                 
14 Here, it is worth noting a distinction that Eve Garrard and Stephen Wilkinson (2005) draw 
between data that are ‘part of the ethical debate’ and ‘relevant’ to such debate. According to the 
authors, being part of the ethical debate entails that empirical data determine the rightness and 
wrongness of a given situation or a set of different courses of action, while being relevant to a certain 
debate entails that data play a more ancillary role to such debate. Following this distinction, an 
empirically informed approach would take empirical data as relevant to rather than part of the debate. 
15 My methodology does not consist in systematising and generalising empirical findings. It also does 
not consist in what is sometimes identified with applied ethics, namely the process of: formulating (or 
selecting) the ‘right’ moral theory, showing how it could resolve the moral dilemma that is under 
consideration, and developing arguments to show the utility of such theory in real-life dilemmas and 
cases. It is this kind of approach that is criticised by Hedgecoe (2004), but also by Wolff (2011) in the 
context of the role of philosophers in public policy. Such an approach is precisely what social 
scientists who criticise bioethics would find wanting, overly deductive and abstracted from the 
cultural, political, and social contexts where the dilemma arises. 
16 The process of reflective equilibrium was first introduced by Nelson Goodman (1955) with respect 
to the justification of rules of inference in inductive and deductive logic. It was John Rawls (1971), 
however, who brought this concept to moral and political philosophy and who made it well-known 




as a process in moral reasoning whereby one’s considered moral judgements about 
specific actions, institutions or policies form a coherent whole with a set of general 
moral principles which serve to ground these judgements. Within the process of 
reflective equilibrium, revision cuts two ways: the principles can be revised or 
abandoned altogether if they do not match one’s stable and reliable considered moral 
judgement about the case at hand, and the considered moral judgement has to be 
revised or dismissed altogether if it is at odds with the relevant set of principles 
proven to be applicable to a wide range of alternative cases. My methodology 
implies a sort of reflective equilibrium, in that additional elements are introduced to 
this balancing process. As Ghislaine J.M.W. van Thiel and Johannes J.M. van 
Delden (2017) nicely summarise, the beliefs relevant to reflective equilibrium are “(i) 
considered moral judgements or moral intuitions (ii) morally relevant facts (iii) moral 
principles (iv) background theories or ideals” (van Thiel & van Delden 2017: 160).   
What instead inspires my research and grounds my methodology is a reflective 
equilibrium whose elements include: 1) empirical data from different disciplines 
(which would be part of the morally relevant facts described by van Thiel & van 
Delden [2017]) that can challenge and question the reliability of our considered 
moral judgements and of the intuitions that underpin them; 2) theories and ideals 
which do not only drawn on moral philosophy but on a wealth of methodological 
and conceptual sources. These theories and arguments are hence revised in light of 
the empirical findings I draw upon and, in turn, the interpretation of such empirical 
findings is revised in light of a new theoretical understanding enriched by the 
different disciplinary sources I bring in.  
As a result, my research (and the methodology that underpins it) is also theory 
challenging: despite having my own sympathies and beliefs in terms of a preferred 
moral theory (and preferred meta-ethical theory), my research strives to avoid 
dogmatic applications of abstract theories. It also strives to avoid what Thomas 
Nagel (1979) describes as the “danger of exclusionary overrationalization”17, which 
                                                 
17 Nagel (1979) warns against two dangers: the danger described in this sentence and the danger of 
“romantic defeatism, which abandons rational theory because it inevitably leaves many problems 
unsolved” (Nagel 1979: 137). 




“bars as irrelevant or empty all considerations that cannot be brought within the 
scope of a general system admitting explicitly defensible conclusions” and which 
may yield “skewed results by counting only measurable or otherwise precisely 
describable factors, even when others are in fact relevant” (Nagel 1979: 137). 
Sacrificing complexities, nuances, and the messiness which inevitably characterises 
moral and social realities in the name of elegance and of a universally applicable 
moral theory needs to be avoided. An elegant theory that does not match these 
complexities and nuances will be limited in terms of both analytical validity and 
practical utility. It will be limited in its capacity to properly describe, understand, 
and evaluate social and moral realities, and it may end up prescribing rules and duties 
which are partial at best and damaging at worst. At the same time, even granting 
that critics of bioethics faithfully depict it as overly rational, deductive, and rooted 
in analytic philosophy, as well as blindly applying moral theories to social realities18, 
for bioethics to remain a normative enterprise19 then moral theories are necessary 
(Garrard & Wilkinson 2003). Theories function as both analytical and normative 
tools for reasoning in bioethics. What these moral theories need is to be aided by 
empirical observations and data which can challenge ethical assessments of 
technologies and practices that risk yielding the skewed results mentioned above.  
                                                 
18 I am (politely) sceptical with respect to the social science critique of bioethics and to some of the 
evidence presented in support of its portrayal of bioethics. First of all, it is unclear, and largely an 
empirical question, as to whether bioethics really is as deductive, overly rational, and blindly applied 
as they state. While it is true that bioethics has its origins in North America and in the U.K. where 
analytic traditions are perhaps more prominent than in Continental and critical traditions, bioethics 
is a rather heterogenic field. In recent years, the influence of hermeneutic, phenomenological, and 
other Continental traditions in bioethics has been growing, and – with respect to debates on the 
ethics of genetics and new reproductive technologies – the work of authors such as Jürgen Habermas 
(2003); Catherine Mills (2011); Barbara Prainsack (2017); Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx (2011); 
and Jackie Leach Scully (2008) are just a few examples of this influence. Similarly, empirical bioethics 
is a growing methodology within bioethics, as is testified by the growing number of papers, research 
projects, and debates around this issue. See, for instance, Jonathan Ives, Michael Dunn and Alan 
Cribb (2017); Cribb and Owens (2017); John McMillan (2017); Mark Sheehan (2017); and others in 
Ives, Dunn and Cribb (Eds.) (2017). In light of this, I believe that one could say that the burden of 
proof should fall on those who criticise bioethics to provide evidence for their claims that is not 
cherry-picked, and that does not oversimplify and misrepresent bioethics scholarship.  
19 See also Cribb and Owens’ (2017) helpful discussion of prescriptive and descriptive methodological 




My methodology also contains elements of self-reflection on the nature of my 
assumptions and on the contextual elements contributing to their formation20. These 
concern the following observations: I am an Italian philosopher who was raised 
Catholic and then became agnostic; I was born and raised in the West, and I 
emigrated to the U.K.; I have worked closely not only with philosophers but also 
with social scientists and medical doctors; I have not fully decided which meta-
ethical views I subscribe to; and I have a certain inclination to be a contrarian. As 
such, I strive to be as reflective as possible on how disciplinary backgrounds, 
experiences, contexts, and other elements influence my reasoning and might 
influence the reasoning of the authors who influence my work. For instance, I am 
aware of how my highly critical perspective on the interference of the Roman 
Catholic Church in the Italian governance of new reproductive technologies can be 
a source of negative bias towards religious positions in these debates. In addition, 
being a philosopher in a social sciences department has helped to widen the scope 
of my reflection, and to allow me to perceive the contribution that scholarship in this 
field can offer to bioethics. I am cognisant, though, of the issues with this integration 
and on different disciplines’ assertions of superiority over others (see also Cribb & 
Owens 2017: 103-107). All these elements help me to be politely sceptical about 
claims made not only by bioethicists but also by scientists who develop new 
reproductive technologies and by policy-makers who seek to implement these in 
practice. 
*** 
In sum, the aim of this project is twofold. Its methodology-oriented aim is to provide 
an example of how debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies can be 
enriched by attention to the complexities of the ‘real world’ and by being informed 
by different disciplinary sources. Its content-oriented aim is to analyse and evaluate 
claims on the ethics of these technologies in order to make these technologies more 
accessible and regulated in ways which take into account the aforementioned 
                                                 
20 In what follows, I shamelessly borrow both style and methodology (autoethnography) from Ives 
and Dunn (2010).  




complexities. Both these aims concern debates on the ethics of eugenics, i.e. they 
concern the question of who should come into existence and how to balance the 
burdens and benefits of these decisions. The methodology employed builds on many 
elements of the critical bioethics endeavour. Despite this, it seeks to go beyond such 
endeavour. It seeks to be empirically informed, theory challenging, reflexive, and 
politely sceptical, and to bring together in a reflective equilibrium a variety of 
theories, data, and other sorts of sources to avoid the two dangers described above: 
“romantic defeatism” and “exclusionary overrationalization” (Nagel 1979: 137). 
I now turn to the sources that are part of this reflective equilibrium. 
1.2 Sources  
In addition to the methodological observations just described, this research is 
informed by and builds on a variety of sources. In this section, I provide examples 
of sources which have informed my research on the ethics of eugenics and argue that 
they should be integrated into bioethics scholarship more generally.  
1.2.1 Social Sciences and History  
The first set of sources to inform my research, as I mentioned above, is from the 
social sciences. Empirical data on the experience of prospective parents using 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) (Franklin & Roberts 2006) and on women 
affected by mitochondrial disorders (Herbrand 2017; Herbrand & Dimond 2018) 
might not settle the question of whether PGD and mitochondrial replacement 
techniques (MRTs) are ethically acceptable technologies. Similarly, public attitudes 
concerning the extension of the 14-day statutory limit to conduct research on human 
embryos might not settle the question of whether the 14-day limit should be 
changed. Alone, these data and sources do not tell us whether these technologies 
and embryo research ought to be allowed or banned, or publicly or privately funded. 
What they can do is inform assessments concerning public policy decisions on the 
governance of new reproductive technologies. These data and sources are, following 




PGD, MRTs, and embryo research. Integrating them into bioethics would allow for 
an ethical debate and for ethical assessments which are mindful of the tangible 
effects of technologies and practices on users, on other members of society, and of 
the less tangible effects on people’s values and beliefs. It would allow for debates 
informed by the social and political context in which technologies and practices are 
developed and discussed, thereby avoiding assessments that over-generalise and 
dogmatically offer one-size-fits-all solutions.  
Another set of sources to inform my research comes from the work of political 
scientists, historians, and science and technology studies (STS) scholars who 
challenge certain assumptions that underlie debates in bioethics. For instance, 
historians have questioned the dominant views on the solely coercive nature of 20th 
century eugenics, which permeate debates on the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies and of human enhancement. Accounts of historians, such as Alison 
Bashford (2010, 2014); Matthew Connelly (2008); Diane B. Paul (1992, 1998); Paul 
A. Lombardo (2011, 2018); and Daniel Kevles (1985), and STS scholars such as 
Maurizio Meloni (2016), help to shed light on the complexity of the history of 
eugenics. Their assessments also reveal the fallacy of equating 20th century eugenics 
with coercion and population-level interventions, and contemporary technologies 
and practices with freely-chosen and individual-level interventions (Bashford 2010; 
Meloni 2016; Paul 1992). Such an equation, as they show (and as I discuss further in 
Paper 1, Cavaliere 2018d), is neither supported by sound historical analysis nor, one 
could argue, by an adequate understanding of the complexities of the present.  
The work of STS scholars such as Jasanoff (2011) and J. Benjamin Hurlbut (2017) 
bring to light how biases, values, incentives, power relationships, and other external 
influences can play a role in scholars’ assessments of reproductive technologies and 
of their social and public value. In Hurlbut’s (2017) account of the history of the 
debate on human embryo research in the U.S., he effectively shows that scientists 
occupied a privileged position in the debate due to their recognised epistemic 
authority to settle ontological questions of what the embryo is. Contrary to those of 
other participants in the debate, scientists’ views were not subjected to similar 
critical scrutiny. They also became a sort of extra-political entity serving as a 




foundation of the public debate over embryo research rather than as one of the many 
aspects of this debate (Hurlbut 2017). As I argue in a review of Hurlbut’s Experiments 
in democracy: Human embryo research and the politics of bioethics (Cavaliere 2018b), 
bioethicists can learn more about their own role as active participants in the debate 
on embryo research from his account of this debate: 
According to Hurlbut, we should keep in mind that science and democracy are 
mutually constituted human institutions. Hence, we are asked by the author to 
subject science to the very same tests of legitimacy that are usually performed 
to democracy. If we believe that democratic political authority is not naturally 
given and hence not unquestionable, by the very same token we should 
question science, its authority, and its power. (Cavaliere 2018b) 
Another useful account for fostering critical and politely sceptical analyses, and for 
uncovering complexities of the subject matter of bioethics, is Barbara Prainsack’s 
(2017) work on personalised medicine. Building on Peter E. Digeser (1992) and the 
work of Michel Foucault, Prainsack shows how the optimistic idea that medicine 
empowers patients through technologies is built on a simplistic account of power and 
of the “material capabilities that an actor has at her disposition and assume[s] that 
actors exercised their power rationally” (Prainsack 2017: 84). Instead, what the 
author proposes is a more nuanced account of power and of its several faces (Digeser 
1992), which permeate the interplay of medicine and society. Such analyses 
(together with the work of Nikolas Rose, see Rose [2007] and Hurlbut, see Hurlbut 
[2015, 2017]) help bringing to the fore power relations which traditional dichotomies 
such as autonomy/paternalism, exploiting/liberating are too simplistic to account 
for. Lastly, the work of social scientists and feminist scholars such as Dorothy E. 
Roberts (1997), Catherine Mills (2011), and Michelle Murphy (2017); the work of 
those arguing for reproductive justice21 (Ross 2006); and the work of those 
discussing stratified reproduction22 (Colen 1995; Ginsburg & Rapp 1995; Mamo & 
                                                 
21 I return to reproductive justice in Part IV. This label describes a cluster of theories and activists’ 
claims seeking to reconcile the work of reproductive rights activists and those concerned with  social 
justice. 
22 The term ‘stratified reproduction’ was originally introduced by Shellee Colen (1995) to describe 




Alston-Stepnitz 2015) challenge dominant narratives on the value of reproductive 
freedom, and on its potential to redress past wrongs with state neutrality and non-
interference in procreation.  
1.2.2 Moral and Social Psychology 
Studies in moral and social psychology on the formation of moral judgements are 
analytically and epistemologically helpful for understanding and challenging 
assumptions about the rationality of certain assessments versus others (Haidt 2012). 
They are also analytically and epistemologically useful for debates characterised by 
deep moral disagreement (Greene 2014; Haidt 2012). Integrating studies on moral 
judgements and on moral and political disagreement can enrich understandings of 
the causes of disagreement and foster the adoption of a self-reflective attitude in 
authors participating in normative debates. For instance, studies on framing effects, 
i.e. on how words’ type and order, context and phrasing can influence people’s 
decisions and judgements in a given situation (Lakoff 2004; Petrinovic & O’Neill 
1996; Tversky & Kahneman 1981), are relevant to debates in bioethics. Framing 
effects can influence people’s moral intuitions and moral assessments of a given 
situation, dilemma, or, I would argue, technology, depending on how it is described 
and presented. As I discuss in Paper I (Cavaliere 2018d), people’s moral beliefs 
regarding specific reproductive technologies can be subjected to word-type framing 
effects. Thus, their beliefs about the technology depend on the way the technology 
is described and on which words are used to do so rather than on specific 
characteristics of the technology in question. Considering the literature on framing 
effects can not only increase awareness of one’s own uses of language in bioethics 
debates but also foster self-reflection with respect to the sources of one’s own moral 
beliefs concerning new reproductive technologies.  
 
                                                 
nurture and reproduce while others are disempowered” and “arrangements by which some 
reproductive futures are valued while others are despised” (Ginsburg & Rapp, 1995: 3). 




1.2.3 Moral Philosophy and Meta-Ethics 
Moral philosophy and meta-ethics also inform my work and, I contend, need to be 
integrated into bioethics scholarship more generally. Moral philosophy, and 
especially the analytic tradition, influences my reasoning and how I structure my 
arguments on the ethics of new reproductive technologies and procreative decisions. 
As mentioned above, empirical data can provide information and analyses which are 
relevant for debates in bioethics. What it cannot do (alone) is settle the question of 
whether a certain reproductive technology should be implemented or not, whether 
its features are ethically permissible, what this entails, and so on. It is thanks to moral 
theories that technologies, actions, institutions, and their social and political 
implications can be ethically assessed. Moral theories need to be fed in with other 
information and sources to generate action-guiding principles and prescriptions 
(Garrard & Wilkinson 2003), but they are necessary in the exercise of balancing 
conflicting assessments, data, values, and beliefs. For example, moral theories can 
assist in the reflection on and assessment of the ethical challenges raised by new 
reproductive technologies such as MRTs. As argued above, data on users and usages 
of MRTs play an important role in making debates on the ethics of these 
technologies more mindful of the context in which they are developed, discussed, 
regulated, and implemented. Similarly, a discussion of the rightful limits that can be 
imposed on people’s procreative preferences cannot be settled solely with the aid of 
empirical data. Bioethics is about how to act at the individual, social, and 
institutional level. It is about normative judgements and assessments. It is about the 
subject matter of moral theories.  
Secondly, I contend that bioethics needs meta-ethics23. Within debates on new 
reproductive technologies and perhaps within bioethics debates more generally, 
authors tend to talk past each other and to focus on pointing out the fallacies and 
inconsistencies of each other’s arguments in favour of or against new reproductive 
technologies24. Sometimes, however, disagreement not only arises from conflicting 
                                                 
23 I am not alone in contending this; see, for instance, Garrard & Wilkinson (2003).  




moral beliefs but also from conflicting (and often unacknowledged) meta-ethical 
commitments. A case in point (further discussed in Paper 5, Cavaliere 2017) is the 
early days of the debate on whether embryo research should be allowed. The chair 
of the committee established to discuss this and other matters relevant to assisted 
conception, Mary Warnock, opted for an approach that would grant respect to the 
different moral feelings and beliefs represented on her committee, and, she believed, 
in society more generally. John Harris (1985), among others (see for instance Wilson 
2014, Ch 4), criticised Warnock’s approach and argued that not all feelings should 
be considered moral feelings. Colouring Warnock’s and Harris’ normative views on 
whether human embryo research should have been allowed was not only a 
disagreement on this question. Rather, this disagreement rested on a differing meta-
ethical commitment to which views and beliefs should be rightly included in the 
ethical debate on embryo research and on how to appraise these views and beliefs. 
It was a disagreement about meta-ethics prior to being a disagreement about 
normative ethics. Another example from the U.K. debate over embryo research 
concerned the role of moral philosophers in public policy, the question of moral 
expertise, and how to solve moral disagreement. Peter Singer (1972) and Richard 
M. Hare (1977) championed the role of philosophers as those able to provide 
authoritative answers to contested ethical matters. However, Warnock believed 
that bioethics was a sort of enterprise where “representatives of different groups and 
professions sought ‘a middle way’ between competing interests” (Wilson 2014: 161). 
Her role as chair of the committee appointed to deliberate over embryo research and 
assisted conception, but also as a philosopher, was to facilitate this process. At the 
heart of that debate on moral expertise and moral disagreement25 were different 
meta-ethical views. In addition to these examples of the importance of underlying 
meta-ethical views among those who participate in bioethics debates, as argued by 
Garrard and Wilkinson (2003):  
[M]uch of "folk" ethics is itself theory-laden. In other words, ordinary people's 
thoughts about morality are often driven by metaethical assumptions and so, in 
                                                 
25 At the heart of contemporary debates on these questions, see for instance David Archard (2011), 
Sarah McGrath (2008), and Madison Powers (2005). 




order to engage with these first-order views, it is necessary to engage with the 
metaethical assumptions lying behind them. (Garrard & Wilkinson 2003: 42) 
In my view, all the sources I have described can enrich ethical reflections on new 
reproductive technologies. Some of these sources, such as empirical data on the 
experiences of couples whose embryos are undergoing PGD or philosophical 
reflections on well-being and political freedom, bring in something of direct 
relevance to the ethical assessments of new reproductive technologies and to how 
they should be regulated. Other sources are relevant to the debate in a more 
tangential and indirect manner: they may bring in the complexity described and 
welcomed by Nagel (1979); they may challenge certain assumptions of those 
participating in these debates; they may help to reconsider certain views and values; 
or, something I would hope for, foster the mutual understanding of and respect for 
those holding different moral beliefs. Hence, while I find Hedgecoe’s (2004) and 
others’ pledges for a critical bioethics very important, I do not agree that all bioethics 
needs is the social sciences and the adoption of a critical attitude. Debates on who 
should come into existence and how to balance the burdens and benefits of such 
decisions do need insights from the social sciences but also a lot more input from 
philosophy26, moral and social psychology, STS scholarship, and history. My hope 
is that the research that led to this thesis and to the papers incorporated into it 
represents a small step in that direction.  
2 Scope: Which Technologies  
Before moving to the outline of this thesis, a word is due on what I mean by ‘new 
reproductive technologies’ and which technologies I discuss in this thesis. I must be 
candid about this: not all the technologies discussed in this thesis are reproductive, 
not all of them are new, and not all of them are technologies. This is not some sneaky 
                                                 
26 Together with Garrard & Wilkinson’s (2003) and Julian Savulescu’s (2015) pleas for bioethics’ need 
of moral philosophy, another interesting ‘argument for’ philosophical engagement is in Tim Lewens 
(2015). There, Lewens recommends an assessment of “the biological foundations of bioethics” 
(Lewens 2015: 3) and the incorporation of ethical analysis reflections and conceptual analyses from 
the philosophy of biology scholarship (Lewens 2015: 2-8) as “ethical discussion often draws on 




way to violate Aristoteles’ principle of non-contradiction, but to say that throughout 
this thesis I rely on a broad understanding of the terms ‘reproductive’, ‘new’, and 
‘technology’. Please allow me to explain.  
I would usually define reproductive technologies, as the term suggests, as 
technologies that allow people to reproduce. More specifically, they give the 
opportunity to people that would not, that would not want to, that could not 
reproduce otherwise to try to reproduce. In this sense, the reproductive technology 
par excellence is in vitro fertilization (IVF): thanks to IVF, people suffering from 
infertility, those who need donor gametes due to infertility or hereditable conditions, 
who have frozen their oocytes to have children later in life, and others can have the 
chance to try to have genetically related (or partially genetically related) children. 
IVF is not new: the first person born through this technology is now giving talks, 
publishing books and, at the time of writing, has just turned 40. Since the birth of 
Louise Brown, IVF has gone a long way. By February 2015, when I was beginning 
my project, a quarter of a million babies had been born in the U.K. due to IVF since 
its implementation in this country in 1978 (Press Association 2016). Despite its long 
history, this and other technologies that I discuss in this thesis can be employed for 
purposes hitherto not possible or that they were not originally designed to serve. 
When IVF was first brought into the fertility clinics, it was meant to help couples 
experiencing fertility issues to become parents (Wilson 2014). Since then, though, 
its uses have changed significantly: now IVF is employed by single reproducers 
relying on gamete donors to become parents; by same-sex couples to have children 
who are genetically related to one of the couple (and sometimes gestationally related 
to the other, in the case of lesbian couples); it is employed to transfer embryos to the 
wombs of women acting as gestational surrogates; and to implant previously frozen 
embryos in the wombs of the genetic grandmothers of future children. So, while 
IVF itself is not new, some of its uses are.  
Another technology that features in this thesis is PGD. The first clinical births 
following the application of PGD to in-vitro human embryos date back to 1990 
(Handyside et al. 1992), and PGD is now being increasingly allowed in countries 
such as Italy that banned it for decades (for a discussion of the Italian context, see, 




for instance, Biondi 2013). Despite this, the list of conditions eligible for PGD in the 
U.K. is frequently updated27. As the section of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) website dedicated to PGD reads: “PGD is an area 
of medicine that’s changing very quickly”28 due to progress in genetic knowledge 
and technical capacity. In this thesis, the label of ‘new’ attached to reproductive 
technologies may refer to the novelty of the technology (as in the case of MRTs); 
to the novelty of uses of a technology (as in the case of PGD), or to the novelty of 
a debate on a certain technology that has been hitherto used (as in the case of 
genome editing technologies).  
Now that I hope I have settled what I mean by ‘new’, I turn to the meaning of 
‘reproductive’ within the ‘new reproductive technologies’ label. PGD can be 
conceived of as a technology, but is PGD a reproductive technology? PGD is a 
technology that allows people who are known carriers of genetic conditions or who 
are directly affected by genetic conditions to test their IVF-produced embryos. 
Testing these embryos can reveal whether they have mutations that can give rise to 
the prospective parents’ condition(s). Many of the conditions eligible for PGD are 
not incompatible with life, i.e. the embryos could go on to develop into foetuses and 
subsequently children. Hence, PGD seems to be a testing technology rather than a 
reproductive technology in the same sense as IVF. In a broader understanding of 
the term, however, PGD contributes to the satisfaction of people’s procreative 
projects by allowing them to have children who are genetically related to them (or 
to one of them) and that do not carry their own genetic mutations. Some people 
may not want to reproduce knowing the risk of passing their conditions to their 
children or may be less willing to do so, making PGD instrumental to their 
procreative projects. Something similar can be said about genome editing 
technologies, which I discuss in several of the papers incorporated into this thesis 
(Cavaliere 2018a, 2018c; Cavaliere et al. 2019). Genome editing technologies such 
                                                 
27 The list is available at: https://www.hfea.gov.uk/pgd-conditions/ (last accessed: 06 June 2018). 
28 Retrieved from the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) website at: 
https://www.hfea.gov.uk/treatments/embryo-testing-and-treatments-for-disease/approved-pgd-




as CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats) could be 
employed to ‘edit’ the genome of early embryos in order to ‘correct’ harmful genetic 
mutations29. Genome editing technologies are not reproductive in the strict sense of 
the term outlined above, but arguably they are technologies that allow, directly and 
indirectly, people to fulfil their procreative projects. It is for this reason that I refer 
to them as reproductive technologies30. 
An object of this study is also research involving human embryos, the practice that 
departs the most from the ‘new reproductive technologies’ label. Despite needing 
the aid of technologies to be carried out, embryo research is best understood in terms 
of a practice that, as Warnock declared31, allows for the development and the 
improvement of other reproductive technologies such as IVF and PGD. It is once 
again instrumental to procreative and parenthood projects and is hence, albeit 
indirectly, a reproductive technology. 
What then do these ‘new reproductive technologies’ have in common? What 
justifies treating them as a unified, though heterogenic category? They have two 
main common features which serve as inclusion criteria: firstly, they are often 
labelled ‘eugenic’ within debates in bioethics and they indeed are, in my 
understanding of the term, eugenic technologies. Secondly, they create moral 
disagreement, sometimes “deep moral disagreement”: namely, the kind of 
disagreement persisting “even in ideal conditions, among fully informed, fully 
rational discussants” (Doris & Plakias 2008: 305). These technologies are eugenic in 
that they play a role in decisions concerning who should come into existence and 
about how to balance the burdens and benefits of such decisions. As is made clear in 
                                                 
29 This is currently not possible, but it is a possibility that I discuss in detail in Paper 3 (Cavaliere 
2018a). 
30 Contrary to genome editing, MRTs are more faithful to a traditional understanding of the label 
‘new reproductive technologies’. They were developed in the last few years; they have recently 
received the green light for clinical applications in the U.K., and they allow women who are known 
carriers of mtDNA mutations and conditions to have children who are genetically related to them 
without risking transmitting faulty mtDNA to these children. Paper 4 (Cavaliere & Palacios-
González 2018) focuses in detail on these technologies.  
31 As I discuss in the third part of this thesis, Warnock argued that there could not have been IVF 
without embryo research as only the latter would have guaranteed that the former would be safe and 
efficacious (Wilson 2014).  




the first, second, and third parts of my thesis, moral disagreement, and sometimes 
deep moral disagreement, surrounds them.  
3 Structure and Outline of the Thesis  
This is a cumulative PhD thesis that incorporates several published papers32.  Parts 
I, II, and III incorporate two papers each. Of these papers, five have appeared in 
peer-reviewed journals and one is a chapter in an edited volume.  
Other than these two papers, Parts I, II, and III each consist of an introduction and 
a conclusion that expands on the arguments developed in the papers and that brings 
together the reflections, claims, and assessments embedded in them. Part IV is a 
significantly edited and expanded version of a paper that, at the time of submission 
of this thesis (November 2018), I had just submitted for review to Monash Bioethics 
Review. The thesis ends with a general conclusion outlining how the research 
questions presented in this introduction have been addressed.  
This thesis begins with an analysis of authors’ discussions of the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies within bioethical debates on them, which is the object of 
Part I. There, I firstly focus on authors’ ethical assessments of new reproductive 
technologies which explicitly refer to eugenics. I discuss the implications of 
employing the word ‘eugenics’ and of referring to this phenomenon within debates 
on new reproductive technologies. My argument is that competing assessments of 
the ethics of today’s reproductive technologies mirror some of the disagreements 
and the competing assessments of the past. I then move on to survey and evaluate 
the strengths and the weaknesses of some of the argumentative strategies employed 
by authors participating in debates on the ethics of genome editing. Two papers 
                                                 
32 The publications’ formatting, footnote numbering, and reference styles have been changed to 
match the style of the rest of the thesis. Other than that, the text has not been changed. As a result, 
some cross-references (in footnotes or in the body of the papers) may refer to sections or footnotes 
whose numbering has been changed. The original versions of each of the publications are enclosed 




(Paper 1, Cavaliere 2018d, and Paper 2, Cavaliere 2018c) are incorporated into this 
part of the thesis, and each of them explores one of the themes just outlined.  
Part II of this thesis focuses on ethical questions raised by new reproductive 
technologies and, in particular, by MRTs and genome editing technologies applied 
to early human embryos. I discuss whether these technologies can be considered 
eugenic in the sense described in this introductory section and then move to two of 
the most debated issues in relation to these and reproductive technologies more 
generally: reproductive freedom and the preference to have genetically related 
children. These issues are dealt with in Paper 3 (Cavaliere 2018a) and Paper 4 
(Cavaliere & Palacios-González 2018), which focus respectively on employing 
genome editing instead of PGD and on the use of MRTs to allow lesbian couples to 
have children who are genetically related to both parties. I conclude Part II with a 
reflection on the normative implications of satisfying people’s preference to have 
genetically related children.  
I then move from ethical questions raised by new reproductive technologies to 
ethical questions raised by the governance of these technologies. I begin Part III of 
the thesis with a discussion of the deliberative democracy framework. I then outline 
some of the ethical questions that become relevant when we move from theoretical-
ethical debates to debates about the governance of new reproductive technologies. 
Two papers are incorporated into this part of the thesis (Paper 5, Cavaliere 2017, 
and Paper 6, Cavaliere et al. 2019). Paper 5 addresses the question of extending the 
statutory time limit to conduct research on human embryos, while Paper 6 focuses 
on ethical questions of regulating genome editing applications to human embryos 
within a framework informed by deliberative democracy.  
In the last part of this thesis, I broaden my discussion from social, ethical, and 
political questions concerning new reproductive technologies to questions 
concerning the ethics of procreative decisions and procreation more generally. 
Within this thesis, I use the adjective ‘reproductive’ and the noun ‘reproduction’ to 
refer to activities aimed at bringing children into existence with the aid of 
technologies. I use these terms when these activities are carried out by and oriented 
towards individuals and when the rights, preferences, and interests of individuals are 




at stake. In contrast, I employ the adjective ‘procreative’ and the noun ‘procreation’ 
to refer to these activities more generally, i.e. not only when they are carried out 
with the aid of reproductive technologies. I also employ them to refer to the 
cumulative and wide-reaching aspects of these activities and to the resulting broader 
rights, preferences, and interests at stake33. In Part IV, I show that debates on new 
reproductive technologies are often informed by an individual-centred framework, 
such as that underpinning reproductive freedom. This framework focuses chiefly on 
individual (i.e. the procreators’ and their close networks’) interests. Authors with 
different ethical concerns and different proposals to address these concerns criticise 
reproductive freedom and its individual-centred framework. I argue that while the 
individual-centred framework may be inadequate to discuss ethical questions raised 
by procreative decisions, these authors’ arguments and proposals present a number 
of epistemic and ethical shortcomings.   
4 Coda 
Before bringing this introduction to a close, I wish to briefly return to some of the 
key themes of this thesis and of the research that led to it. The real protagonist of 
the thesis is eugenics in the broad understanding of this concept outlined above. A 
study of 20th century eugenics and especially of the role of this history and of 
references to this history within debates on the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies (Parts I-III) and of procreative decisions (Part IV) can help to shed light 
on authors’ competing assessments of today’s technologies and, I will argue, 
eugenics can reveal more than it obscures. Today’s debates on new reproductive 
technologies and on procreative decisions re-enact some of the complexities, 
themes, and ethical dilemmas that were part of 20th century eugenics. Many of these 
debates revolve around questions pertaining to the quest to improve the human gene 
pool, to have children who are healthy and who are genetically related to their 
parents, to the ethical standing of this preference, to the role of the state, and of 
                                                 
33 With respect to reproductive freedom instead, I use this expression throughout the thesis and I do 
not distinguish between reproductive freedom and other expressions used to refer to this concept: 




third parties’ interference in such decisions. It may be tempting to dismiss the 
relevance of the analogies between past and present or to make too much of them. 
This thesis seeks to find a middle-ground between these two endeavours. It seeks 
on the one hand to find ways to contribute (methodologically) to debates on these 
questions, and on the other to find ethical ways to address questions concerning the 





PART I  
Discussing the Ethics of New Reproductive 
Technologies  
1 Introduction to Part I 
The object of this part of the thesis is a reflection on and an analysis of the arguments, 
claims, and assessments of authors participating in debates on the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies. Hence, my focus here is on discussions about the ethics of 
new reproductive technologies rather than on ethical questions raised by new 
reproductive technologies proper (the object of Part II). As I mentioned in the 
introduction to this thesis, debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies 
share two features: the first is that they can be conceived of as debates on the ethics 
of eugenics due to these technologies’ instrumental role in decisions concerning who 
should come into existence; the second is that these debates are characterised by 
moral disagreement among a relatively wide and diverse range of actors34. The 
present analysis hinges on these two issues and focuses respectively on the 
references to eugenics within debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies 
(in Paper 1, Cavaliere 2018d) and the different argumentative strategies employed 
by authors participating in debates characterised by moral disagreement (in Paper 2, 
Cavaliere 2018c).  
This part of the thesis incorporates two papers. Paper 1 (Cavaliere 2018d) is a single-
author paper published in Monash Bioethics Review titled ‘Looking into the Shadow: 
The Eugenic Argument in Debates on Reproductive Technologies and Practices’. 
In this paper, I use references to the history of eugenics within debates on the ethics 
                                                 
34 Although my analyses and reflections concern debates among bioethics scholars, moral 
disagreement does not only arise within this group. Moral disagreement arises among scientists 
developing these technologies, journalists reporting on them, members of the public directly involved 
as users, members of the public tangentially involved due to the potential effects on societal norms 
and values of their introduction, policy-makers, and members of ethics committees. 




of new reproductive technologies as a case study. I reflect on and analyse the 
arguments, claims, and assessments which authors employ in normative discussions 
on these technologies. Paper 1 introduces several of the key themes of this thesis, 
including the controversy over the use of the word ‘eugenics’ and the relevance of 
the history of eugenics within ethical debates on new reproductive technologies. It 
also shows how authors juxtapose new reproductive technologies with past eugenics 
and the implications of this for their assessments of these technologies’ ethical 
standing. Finally, Paper 1 addresses the first of the two research questions that 
guided my analysis of debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies, 
namely the question concerning the role of the reference to eugenics within debates 
on the ethics of new reproductive technologies. 
Paper 2, also incorporated into this part of the thesis, is titled ‘A Path Through the 
(Moral) Morass: Genome Editing, Reproduction and Broad Conversations’ 
(Cavaliere 2018c). It is a chapter of a volume titled Between Moral Hazard and Legal 
Uncertainty. Ethical, Legal and Societal Challenges of Human Genome Editing (edited by 
Matthias Braun, Hannah Schickl, and Peter Dabrock). In this paper, I use the 
debate on genome editing as a case study for my analysis of arguments, claims, and 
assessments advanced within debates on the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies. As I argued in the introduction to this thesis, I consider genome editing 
technologies an instance of reproductive technologies due to their role in allowing 
prospective parents to pursue their procreative projects. Paper 2 addresses the 
second research question concerning debates on the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies by analysing the argumentative strategies employed within these 
debates and by reflecting on ways to tackle the moral disagreement that surrounds 
these technologies.  
Both papers exemplify how competing values and beliefs inform authors’ 
assessments of the ethics of new reproductive technologies, and how references to 
eugenics cut across such assessments. Part I thus sets the foundations to investigate 
the central question of this thesis: who should come into existence? New 
reproductive technologies confront us with this question and raise several ethical 
challenges. Analysing normative debates on these technologies represents a first step 




towards addressing the question of who should come into existence and towards 
thoroughly assessing these challenges.  
Turning back to the two aims of this project outlined in the introduction, in this part 
of the thesis I seek to pursue the methodology-oriented aim to contribute to making 
these debates more inclusive in terms of different disciplinary sources and to adopt 
a critical and reflective gaze on some of the argumentative strategies employed in 
these debates. This analytic work also seeks to lay the groundwork for addressing 
the other aim of this project, which pertains more specifically to the question of who 
should come into existence35.  
1.1  Underlying Causes of Moral Disagreement: A Matter of Values 
Reproductive technologies raise questions which, for many, are strictly linked to 
deep-seated values and moral beliefs36. The disagreement that surrounds them is 
hence ‘moral’ in that it pertains to these values and beliefs. Following John M. Doris 
and Alexandra Plakias (2007), this disagreement can often be characterised as ‘deep’ 
because authors discussing under ideal conditions (namely “fully informed and fully 
rational discussants”, Doris & Plakias 2008: 305) may still disagree.  
In the three years of my work on the project that led to this thesis, two new 
reproductive technologies, MRTs and genome editing technologies’ applications to 
early human embryos, have attracted ethical interest and controversy. They have 
been at the centre of heated debates on questions concerning their ethical standing 
                                                 
35 To recap, the second aim of this project is to provide arguments and to suggest strategies to make 
new reproductive technologies more widely accessible, regulated in ways which fairly distribute the 
burdens and benefits of decisions of who should come into existence, and implemented in ways which 
consider the plurality of values of those directly and indirectly affected by these technologies. 
36 Just to name a few, these technologies raise ethical questions concerning the value of early human 
life and personhood (Harris 1985); the value of genetic relatedness (Overall 2012; Rulli 2016b); the 
just allocation of scarce resources (Rulli 2016a), among others. These technologies have the potential 
to redefine the meaning of personhood (Novas & Rose 2000); the ‘future of kinship’ (Franklin 2013); 
the desire to have genetically related children (Lesnik-Oberstein 2007) and the wish to enact different 
‘ethical futures’ (Dimond & Stephens 2018b, Ch 7).    




and how to regulate them37. In 2015, the U.K. became the first country in the world 
to approve the clinical use of pronuclear DNA transfer (PNT) and mitochondrial 
spindle transfer (MST), which I collectively refer to as MRTs38. MRTs give women 
carrying mtDNA mutations the theoretical possibility to have children who are 
genetically related to them and will not inherit the mutations that they carry, which 
can often lead to harmful conditions39. Authors have debated the ethical standing of 
employing these technologies and focused on questions such as whether women 
carrying mtDNA mutations should explore alternative avenues to pursue their 
parental projects (e.g. Baylis 2017a; Rieder 2015a; Rulli 2016a); whether clinical 
research and applications of MRTs should be prioritised over other medical 
endeavours in terms of resource allocation (Rulli 2016a); whether access to these 
technologies should be granted only to women carrying mtDNA mutations or also 
to other women (Cavaliere & Palacios-González 2018); whether they were and are 
‘safe’ or ‘safe enough’ to proceed (Harris 2016a; de Melo-Martín 2017b); how they 
should be labelled (Baylis 2017a, 2018; Dimond & Stephens  2018a; Ravitsky  et al. 
2015; Cavaliere & Palacios-González 2019); whether they should be classified as 
instances of germline gene therapy40 (Newson & Wrigley 2017); whether there are 
significant moral differences between PNT and MST (Palacios-González 2017a; 
Wrigley et al. 2015); whether one or both of these technologies amount/s to 
eugenics and what ethical implications this distinction entails (Wrigley et al. 2015), 
among other ethical questions41.  
                                                 
37 For an excellent account of the U.K. debate on MRTs, of the key actors involved in this debate 
and of the steps that have led to the approval of these techniques in the U.K., see Rebecca Dimond 
and Neil Stephens (2018b).  
38 Below, I return to this label (and abbreviation) and show that is contested within debates on the 
ethics of these technologies.   
39 Other techniques which can be used to the same end are: first polar body transfer and second polar 
body transfer. At the time of writing, however, the only techniques allowed were PNT and MST.  
40 See also Rosamund Scott and Stephen Wilkinson (2017) for a discussion of the label ‘germline 
genetic modification’ within policy debates and reports in the U.K. and the U.S. 
41 Other ethical questions are discussed throughout the thesis or referenced in footnotes. Questions 
which I do not explicitly address include: whether mtDNA donations should be anonymous 
(Appleby 2017; Brandt 2016); whether they worsen potential and actual harms to egg providers 
(Baylis 2013) and whether only male embryos should be selected (Appleby 2015). For an overview 
and discussion of ethical questions raised by MRTs, see for instance: John Appleby (2015); Annelien 
Bredenoord et al. (2011); Annelien Bredenoord and Peter Braude (2010) and Ainsley Newson et al. 




Advances in genome editing technologies and the application of one of them 
(CRISPR) to non-viable human embryos sparked a debate on the ethical standing 
of inserting inheritable changes into the genetic makeup of early embryos, and on 
questions concerning regulatory and public engagement strategies42. Despite the 
differences between MRTs, genome editing technologies43 and other new 
reproductive technologies discussed throughout this thesis, the ethical debates and, 
to a certain extent, the arguments advanced by authors who took part in these 
debates have been remarkably similar. Within the ethical debate on synthetic 
biology, Hurlbut (2015) has negatively characterised this apparent lack of ethical 
imagination as “patterned and institutionalized” (Hurlbut 2015: 115). Echoing this 
view and writing about the ethical debate on genome editing, Nathaniel C. Comfort 
(2015) has described such debate as “familiar to a historian” and following “the classic 
arc of breakthrough methods in genetics and biotech”, where: 
[F]irst come millennialist debates over the new eugenics; then, calls for caution. 
A few cowboys may attempt rash experiments, which often fail, sometimes 
tragically. Finally, the technology settles into a more humdrum life as another 
useful tool in the biologist’s kit. (Comfort 2015)  
Historians such as Comfort (2015) and Hurlbut (2015) correctly show similarities 
among these debates across time and technologies (in terms of recurrent modes of 
reaction to new technologies). Despite this, my analysis of debates on the ethics of 
new reproductive technologies shows that the problem is not that authors discussing 
the ethics of new reproductive technologies have exhausted all the arguments and 
with them their ethical imagination. What makes reactions to new (reproductive) 
technologies similar across different debates is that the disagreement stems from the 
different underlying values and ethical views held by authors participating in these 
                                                 
(2016). See also Erica Haimes and Ken Taylor (2017) for a discussion of the debate on MRTs and a 
problematisation of the claims concerning the benefits of these techniques.  
42 The recently published (July 2018) Nuffield Council on Bioethics report Genome editing and human 
reproduction: social and ethical issues contains a discussion and assessment of both these questions 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2018). I discuss these questions in Paper 6 (Cavaliere et al. 2019).  
43 The ethical debate around genome editing technologies is described and assessed in Paper 2 
(Cavaliere 2018c) and Paper 3 (Cavaliere 2018a).  




debates. These competing values and ethical views are, as it were, carried from 
debate to debate, as there is no agreement across authors and members of society 
concerning what Derek Parfit (2011) aptly defined as ‘what matters’. Debates about 
new reproductive technologies certainly revolve around the ethical questions briefly 
outlined above and discussed in the papers incorporated into this thesis. Despite this, 
these debates are also concerned with values such as people’s freedom, equality of 
opportunity, justice and the value of ‘accepting the given’ (Cohen 2004); they are 
concerned with what, if any, of these values should be given priority in practice, and 
with what acting upon these values entails.  
Examples of the negotiation of competing values and world-views emerge from an 
observation and an analysis of the arguments advanced by authors concerning the 
relationship between 20th century eugenics and new reproductive technologies. As 
I discuss in Paper 1 (Cavaliere 2018d), authors who refer to eugenics within debates 
on these technologies often do not ground their arguments about both condemnable 
features of the past and condemnable and justifiable features of the present in in-
depth historical analyses (Bashford 2010; Paul 1998). In their accounts, eugenics is 
condemned and considered as something that ought not to be repeated but this is 
often without any (or little) engagement with the complexities of its historical 
unfoldings. Another common feature of authors’ references to eugenics within 
debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies is that they broadly agree 
that 20th century eugenics was ethically troubling (Bashford 2010; Buchanan et al. 
2001). They also agree that if new reproductive technologies, their application and 
the rationale guiding their development and implementation embody ethically 
troubling features such as those that characterised eugenics, then, all else being 
equal, there are good reasons to condemn them. The problem, and the 
disagreement, arises on the one hand with respect to which features of 20th century 
eugenics these authors consider more ethically troubling than others and, on the 
other, with respect to whether they consider these features ethically troubling at all. 
For instance, while many authors condemn the coercive character, the focus on the 
population rather than on the individual and the violation of bodily integrity of 20th 
century eugenics (Agar 2008; Glover 2006; Savulescu & Kahane 2009), others 




consider its chief moral wrongs to reside in its quest for genetic improvement44 and 
perfection (Garland-Thompson 2012; Sandel 2004a). These diverging assessments 
of the ethics of 20th century eugenics result in disagreement about which features of 
the present (i.e. of new reproductive technologies) are problematic and which, in 
turn, are not problematic or are less so45. Those focusing on the problem of coercion, 
population-wide interventions and violation of bodily integrity see new reproductive 
technologies as a positive development as they can be freely chosen by prospective 
parents. By contrast, those who see the problem with eugenics as the quest for 
genetic improvement and perfection condemn new reproductive technologies as 
they regard them as embodying and being motivated by similar aims.  
In short, the moral disagreement about what went wrong (and what went, to a 
certain extent, right) in the past mirrors authors’ views of what is troubling or 
acceptable in the present. My view is that these diverging assessments of past and 
present can be explained by the conflicting values which motivate these 
assessments. What authors disagree about are the ethical standing of values and 
beliefs grounding eugenics and which ground the developments, implementations 
and rationales for new reproductive technologies. In other words, what authors 
disagree about is not only whether new reproductive technologies embody 20th 
century eugenics’ ideas, practices and policies and should hence be considered 
morally troubling; rather, what divides them is whether during the 20th century as 
today the negotiation of values involved in the idea of deciding who should come 
into existence and in the implications of these decisions withstands ethical scrutiny. 
Without an explicit and comprehensive account of the history of eugenics, the 
process whereby conflicting values and world-views about new reproductive 
technologies are discussed and weighed-up cannot be obtained.  
                                                 
44 For an ethical appraisal of this aim, see for instance Wilkinson (2010, Ch 6) and Buchanan et al. 
(2001, Ch 2).  
45 As I show in Part IV, the disagreement about the troubling nature of certain features of 20th century 
eugenics matters also for debates on the ethics of procreative decisions and procreation more 
generally. Within these debates, authors who single out 20th century eugenics’ coercive character 
and its population-level modus operandi as eugenics’ most despicable features, often find in reproductive 
freedom and non-interference on the part of the state a possible solution to avoid re-enacting past 
wrongs.   




1.2 Moral Disagreement, Terminology, and Argumentative Strategies  
The disagreement about the values underpinning eugenics and new reproductive 
technologies extends to disagreement about the appropriate terminology to describe 
these latter. For instance, authors discuss whether the word ‘eugenics’ should be 
used at all in reference to reproductive technologies (see for instance: Camporesi 
2014; Koch 2004; Wilkinson 2008). Similarly, within the debate on the ethics of 
MRTs part of the disagreement that surrounds these technologies revolves around 
the question of the appropriate terminology (and abbreviation) to refer to them 
(Baylis 2017a, 2018; Loike 2014; Palacios-González 2016; Cavaliere & Palacios-
González 2019; Ravitsky et al. 2015) and around the mobilisation of emotions 
through emotive language46 (Dimond & Stephens 2018a; Ravitsky et al. 2015). Both 
whether the word ‘eugenics’ should be used at all, and the terms and language which 
should be employed to describe MRTs can be interpreted as disputes47 whose 
implications are normative48. As Simon Blackburn (1998) argues, certain words: 
[A]re contested because they illustrate attitudes, and have other consequences, 
and these can rightly cause concern. […] Words typically nudge people, with 
more or less subtlety, towards attitudes to the things they pick out. (Blackburn 
1998: 15) 
Individual words, expressions, metaphors, discourses and other syntactic and 
rhetorical tools have the potential to redirect people’s interests (Stevenson 1937), to 
                                                 
46 Dimond and Stephens (2018a), for instance, describe how the MRT debate features ‘vivid 
imaginaries’, including: ‘dystopian predictions’ about ‘slippery slopes’ and ‘crossing a line’ (Le Page, 
2015), ‘designer babies’ (Hills, 2012), ‘Frankenstein science’ (McKie, 2014) and emotive themes such 
as ‘playing god’ and stopping children suffering (Driscoll, 2015)” (Dimond & Stephens 2018a: 6). 
They also argue that “language and representations matter because their use can be political” 
(Dimond & Stephens 2018a: 6) and how using the metaphor of a battery to describe mitochondria is 
“an important component of the discourse surrounding mitochondrial donation, as it performs the 
important work of enabling the technology to be positioned as unproblematic” (Dimond & Stephens 
2018a: 6). See also Sarah Chan (2016); Ilke Turkmendag (2018) and Dimond and Stephens (2018b: 
52-54) on this issue.  
47 These are disputes in which I have been caught-up too. See Françoise E. Baylis’ (2018) reply to 
Paper 4 (Cavaliere & Palacios-González 2018) and César Palacios-González’s and my subsequent 
reply (Cavaliere and Palacios-González 2019). 
48 See also: footnote 47 on how the use of certain language and metaphors can be used for political 
ends (Dimond & Stephens 2018a). 




“mediate public understanding of the innovations” (O’Keefe et al. 2015: 3), to “win 
the allegiance of large groups of people” to specific policies (Schön & Rein 1994: 32) 
and a “capacity to act” (Dimond & Stephens 2018b: 53). Moreover, within debates 
on new reproductive technologies studies have shown a correlation between the 
words employed to describe screening technologies such as PGD (Wilkinson 2008), 
MRTs (Ravitsky et al. 2015) and gene editing technologies (O’Keefe et al. 2015), 
and the normative position of the person who employs them. Those who oppose 
these technologies are more likely to use terminology which emphasises the risks, 
the uncertainties and the resemblance to widely condemned practices such as 
eugenics; whilst those in favour of these technologies are more likely to use 
expressions and wording that emphasise the benefits while dismissing potential risks 
and harms49.  
The literature on ‘framing effects’50 shows why the decisions to employ certain 
terminology has normative implications. As I discuss in Paper 1 (Cavaliere 2018d), 
studies in social and moral psychology reveal that people’s (moral) judgements can 
be influenced by employing a certain word rather than another (or by ordering the 
wording in a sentence in different ways). Following this idea, people’s judgements 
are subjected to word-type framing effects if their ethical assessments of a given 
reproductive technology depend on the way the technology is described, on which 
kind of words are used to describe it, rather than on the technology and its 
applications. Describing a technology as eugenics (considering what eugenics is 
often associated with) frames people’s judgement regarding the technology in 
question and may influence their ethical assessment of it51.  
                                                 
49 See also Brian P. Bloomfield and Theo Vurdubakis (1995) on this issue.  
50 See for instance Jonathan Haidt and Jonathan Baron (1996); Jonathan Haidt and Friedrik Björklund 
(2007); George Lakoff (2004); Lewis Petrinovich and Patricia O'Neill (1996); Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong (2007).  
51 ‘Frames’ and ‘framing’ are concepts used within policy interpretation and analysis too. Within this 
context, framing is intended as a “way of representing knowledge, and as the reliance on (and 
development of) interpretative schemas that bound and order a chaotic situation, facilitate 
interpretation and provide a guide for doing and acting” (Laws & Rein 2003: 173). For an 
interpretation and an overview of ‘policy frames’ see for instance Martin Rein and Donald A. Schön 
(1996). 




Normative questions pertaining to the appropriate use of rhetoric in political 
debates, and argumentative and persuasive strategies date back to the work of Plato 
(especially in Gorgias and Phaedrus) and Aristoteles (who discussed the role of 
passions in rhetoric in his treatise On Rhetoric). A review of their work and of those 
others in philosophy who have attempted to set out rules and prescriptions of what 
should be rightfully part of rhetoric is beyond the scope of this thesis52. What I 
discuss in reference to eugenics and new reproductive technologies is instead 
whether the word ‘eugenics’ should be employed at all within debates on these 
technologies, considering the potential of the word to elicit negative emotional 
responses53. 
With respect to the normative question of whether employing the word ‘eugenics’ 
and other instances of emotive language should be avoided in debates on new 
reproductive technologies, I occupy a middle ground. In my view, the terminology 
employed in these debates should strive for conceptual clarity and descriptive 
accuracy. As I discuss in Paper 1 (Cavaliere 2018d), the reference to eugenics within 
debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies is often employed without 
thorough engagement with the history of eugenics and devoid of an exercise of 
unpacking and clarifying its negative connotations (Paul 1992). Hence it often reads 
as the expression of unease, refusal and undetermined condemnation. It lacks both 
descriptive and normative elements which allow authors who participate in debates 
on the ethics of new reproductive technologies to engage with each other’s 
arguments and with the values driving them. In my view (and as I argue in Paper 1), 
the problem with ‘loaded words’ such as ‘eugenics’, then, is not that they represent 
an obstacle to sound and impartial reasoning due to their emotive components. 
Within moral psychology, studies on emotions and intuitions show that it is a 
                                                 
52 For a recent discussion of the role of passions in rhetoric in relation to the work of Aristoteles, see 
Jamie Dow (2015). Another discussion of Aristoteles’ work on rhetoric is in Herbert Gottweis and 
Barbara Prainsack (2006). Gottweis and Prainsack are concerned with debates on regulating human 
embryonic stem cell research in the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Israel in light of Aristoteles’ 
categories of ethos, pathos, and logos.  
53 As discussed above, similar terminological/normative questions arise in debates on MRTs and on 
other reproductive technologies; see for instance Brigitte Nerlich, Susan Johnson, and David D. 
Clarke (2000).  




combination of both calculating rationality and intuitions/emotions that is needed 
for moral cognition and reasoning54 (Greene 2014; Haidt 2001, 2012). The use of 
words which arouse emotional reactions is not problematic per se, but it is if these 
words are employed misleadingly55, i.e. following the Oxford Dictionary definition 
of the adverb: ‘causing someone to have the wrong idea or impression’ of for instance 
the technology in question, and deceptively, i.e. ‘deliberately causing someone to 
believe something that is not true’, again concerning the technology that is 
discussed. Lastly, what would make the use of loaded words problematic is what 
Alberto Giubilini (2015) argues with respect to the debate on the ethics of human 
enhancement. According to him: 
[M]aking reasons and underlying concerns explicit so that the ultimate moral 
or philosophical issues at stake […] can be detected, unpacked, and rationally 
discussed, instead of remaining hidden and unexamined in intuitive and 
emotive responses. (Giubilini 2015: 46)  
Deception, misleadingness and purely emotional appeals are what make the use of 
loaded words problematic: not necessarily their potential to arouse emotional 
reactions. 
*** 
In Paper 2 (Cavaliere 2018c), I address the question of the potential strategies to 
tackle moral disagreement within debates on the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies. I firstly present and discuss two hypotheses as to what the causes of 
moral disagreement on the ethics of genome editing (and, to a certain extent, on 
MRTs) could be. These two hypotheses trace the emergence and persistence of 
moral disagreement to factual disagreement and lack of philosophical skills. Rather 
                                                 
54 In recent years, findings in moral psychology have begun to show that moral judgements are 
informed by intuition and that the ideal of forming moral judgements with only the aid of a purely 
cold, calculating rationality is an illusion (Greene 2014) and perhaps a dangerous one (Damasio 1994). 
In particular, moral psychologists (Greene 2014; Greene et al. 2001; Pizarro 2000; Haidt 2001, 2012), 
neuroscientists (Damasio 1994) and philosophers (Nussbaum 2003) have provided empirical and 
theoretical evidence in support of the thesis that gives intuitions and emotions a role in the formation 
of moral judgements and, in certain cases, of the desirability thereof.  
55 Wilkinson (2008) discusses reasons to avoid words within the context of whether there are good, 
non-partisan reasons to avoid using the word ‘eugenics’ in debates on the ethics of PGD.  




than representing my own views on the emergence and persistence of moral 
disagreement, these two hypotheses are inferred from my analytical and reflective 
work on argumentative strategies employed by authors participating in debates on 
the ethics of new reproductive technologies. These hypotheses capture what some 
of the authors participating in these debates seem to consider the causes of the 
disagreement as they channel time and energy in trying to persuade authors holding 
different ethical views that they are mistaken on factual and/or philosophical 
grounds.  
The first argumentative strategy that these authors employ focuses on eliminating 
or reducing epistemically flawed understandings of the safety and efficacy of new 
reproductive technologies such as genome editing and MRTs. As I argue in Paper 
2, while this is a worthy and important part of what authors should aim for, 
assessments of the facts of the matter are often informed by our own ethical views 
and values, and by the position in society that we find ourselves in. For these reasons 
(and others discussed in Paper 2), it seems that this strategy neither goes to the heart 
of the disagreement nor seems a good place to start to settle conflicting assessments 
of the ethics of new reproductive technologies. The second strategy is to construct 
arguments which are consistent, valid, and sound (in the philosophical sense of the 
terms), and at the same time to point to the fallacies of other authors’ arguments. 
This also presents difficulties. While philosophical arguments and systematic 
reasoning can assist in the process of clarifying and refining the concepts, ethical 
challenges and values at stake, this analytical work is often not sufficient to settle 
the moral disagreement that characterises debates on the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies. Other than the procedural challenges I discuss in Paper 2 (Cavaliere 
2018c), this strategy may engender undesirable normative implications. Authors 
such as Katrien Devolder (2015), with respect to the debate on the ethics of 
embryonic stem cell research, Dan W. Brock (1987) and Jonathan Wolff (2011), with 
respect to the role of (moral and political) philosophers in public policy, have argued 
that there could be good epistemic, practical and moral reasons to avoid this strategy 
when we move from theoretical-ethical debates to debates which have policy-
oriented aims and implications. According to them, policies could be based on 
arguments which are philosophically flawed, do not progress towards the search for 




truth and on ethical views that are widely shared and accepted rather than what 
would amount to the ‘right’ ethical view. This is not to say that arguments in debates 
on the ethics of reproductive technologies should not strive to be consistent, to be 
valid and sound, and to be grounded in what each author considers the right ethical 
view. Similarly, pointing to the fallacies of other authors’ arguments is an endeavour 
that should be pursued. What I argue in Paper 2 is that aiming for philosophical 
validity, soundness and consistency, and criticising other authors’ views for lacking 




2 PAPER 1: Looking into the Shadow: The Eugenics Argument in Debates on 
Reproductive Technologies and Practices 
Paper 1 is a single-authored paper published in Monash Bioethics Review. 
The original version of this paper is enclosed in Appendix 1.  
Cavaliere, G. (2018d). Looking into the shadow: The eugenics argument in debates 
on reproductive technologies and practices. Monash Bioethics Review, 36(1), doi: 
10.1007/s40592-018-0086-x 
2.1 Abstract 
Eugenics is often referred to in debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies 
and practices, in relation to the creation of moral boundaries between acceptable 
and unacceptable technologies, and acceptable and unacceptable uses of these 
technologies. Historians have argued that 20th century eugenics cannot be reduced 
to a uniform set of practices, and that no simple lessons can be drawn from this 
complex history. Some authors stress the similarities between past eugenics and 
present reproductive technologies and practices (what I define throughout the paper 
as ‘the continuity view’) in order to condemn the latter. Others focus on the 
differences between past and present practices (what I define throughout the paper 
as ‘the discontinuity view’) in order to defend contemporary reproductive 
technologies. In this paper, I explore the meanings of the word ‘eugenics’ and the 
relationship between its past and present uses in terms of contemporary debates on 
reproductive technologies and practices. I argue that moral disagreement about 
present technologies originates in divergent views of condemnable and justifiable 
features of the past. 
Keywords: Eugenics | Reproductive technologies | Coercion | Stigmatisation | 
Disability.  
 





New assisted reproductive technologies such as mitochondrial replacement 
techniques (MRTs), reproductive screening technologies such as pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD), pre-natal diagnosis (PND) and non-invasive prenatal 
testing (NIPT), as well as gene editing technologies such as CRISPR (clustered 
regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats) incite ethical controversies56. They 
do so because procreating and raising children, and influencing the type and number 
of people who will inhabit our planet in the future, touch upon people’s core moral 
beliefs and values. Partly for this reason, assisted reproductive technologies and 
practices engender moral disagreement and give rise to many highly controversial 
debates in bioethics. Examples of the questions discussed within these debates 
include whether or not technologies will bring about better or worse states of affairs 
compared to the status quo; whether their introduction will cause increased 
injustice, discrimination, sexism, ableism and racism or whether they will make our 
lives (or our children’s lives) happier, healthier and/or longer. Some arguments focus 
on the consequences, and other s concern the intrinsic goodness or wrongness of 
these technologies and their applications.  
While the ethical questions discussed in these debates in academia, the media and 
other public fora are fairly diverse, one set of these questions has a common and 
recurrent feature: eugenics. This set of questions includes whether a given 
technology is eugenic; whether it might bring eugenics back and whether this 
possibility is something to be feared or welcomed. What is referred to as the “shadow 
of eugenics” (Buchanan et al. 2001: 27) – namely the collective memory of 
condemned practices such as forced sterilisations as well as the condemned science 
of heredity, shared systems of belief, policies and ideas of different actors – continues 
to permeate today’s ethical debates on reproductive technologies and practices. As 
I show in this paper, some authors stress elements of discontinuity between past 
eugenics and contemporary reproductive technologies and practices, while others 
                                                 
56 Throughout the paper, if I am not referring to a specific technology or practice, I refer to all of 
them collectively as ‘reproductive technologies or practices’.  
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focus on elements of continuity between past and present. Both groups agree on the 
wrongness of past eugenics, but they have different views on the relationship 
between past and present, and especially on the ethical standing of present 
technologies and practices. Authors who hold what I refer to as the “discontinuity 
view” between past and present defend reproductive technologies and practices, 
grounding some of their arguments in the differences between the latter technologies 
and the eugenic past, while those holding what I refer to as the “continuity view” 
condemn these technologies and practices, their arguments grounded in similarities 
with the past.  
The content of the arguments underlying the discontinuity view varies slightly, but 
their form can be summarised as follows:  
“Eugenics was intrinsically wrong because it entailed x, y, z; other things being 
equal, reproductive technologies and practices are not wrong because they lack x, 
y, z”. 
Similarly, the content of the arguments of scholars who hold the continuity view 
varies slightly, but their form is homogeneous:  
“Eugenics was intrinsically wrong because it entailed x, y, z; other things being 
equal, reproductive technologies and practices are wrong because they have 
elements of x, y, z”. 
Considering that arguments drawing on the discontinuity and continuity between 
past and present are subsumed in the ethical assessments of reproductive 
technologies and practices, one would expect a knowledge of both the past and the 
present to play an important role in such assessments. In other words, considering 
that both arguments heavily rely on ‘x, y, z’, i.e. on problematic features of past 
eugenics to ground their condemnations or absolutions of reproductive technologies, 
one would expect their assessments to be supported by sound and detailed historical 
analyses57. However, this is not entirely the case. As I show in this paper, what 
                                                 
57 In addition to being informed about these technologies and practices’ technical characteristics, their 
potential applications, safety, efficacy, etc. 




authors consider the capital sins of past eugenics vary greatly and many of their 
arguments about both the past and the present are not based on in-depth historical 
analyses (Bashford 2010; Paul 1998). Past eugenics is assumed to be something 
despicable that ought not to be repeated, but those who participate in debates on 
the ethics of reproductive technologies and practices often fail to explicitly refer to 
what was wrong with eugenics and why58. Furthermore, these arguments rely on 
accounts of the history of eugenics often limited to the practices carried out during 
Nazism, and to racist and coercive dimensions of eugenics policies and practices 
(Bashford 2010). Why is this the case? One potential answer is that there is a division 
of “cognitive labour” among academics ([emphasis in original] Kitcher 2011: 193), and: 
“a group of investigators, addressing a common problem, pursues different 
approaches to that problem” (Kitcher 2011: 193). Those who participate in debates 
on the ethics of reproductive technologies and who employ the arguments outlined 
above are often philosophers, theologians, sociologists, biotechnologists and so 
forth; they are rarely historians.  
Before delving into the work of historians of eugenics and their influence on debates 
on reproductive technologies and practices, it is necessary to give a short statement 
on the structure of the paper. In the next section, I present the work of historians of 
eugenics and discuss how they have tried to bring to light the multiplicity of 
practices, policies and actors that characterised 20th century eugenics. Next, I focus 
on the meanings of the word eugenics and present some of the definitions which are 
used in debates on reproductive technologies to describe this phenomenon. I 
identify different strategies to describe eugenics and criticise the use of definitions 
that presuppose its moral wrongness. I then turn to what I define as the discontinuity 
and continuity views of the relationship between past and present. I discuss both 
views and show that they rely on different assessments of what was wrong in the 
past and that these assessments of the past play an important role in authors’ 
assessments of the present. My hope is that reflecting on the meanings of ‘eugenics’, 
on the relationship between past and present, and on the roles and the 
                                                 
58 With notable exceptions. See for instance: Buchanan (2007); Buchanan et al. (2001); Camporesi 
(2014); Gyngell and Selgelid (2016); Selgelid (2000); Wikler (1999). 
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understandings of eugenics will shed some light on its shadow and contribute to 
debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies and practices.  
2.2.1 Where Are Historians When We Need Them? 
In the comparison of reproductive technologies and practices to a historical 
phenomenon, eugenics, historians could help settle at least some of the questions that 
cause the moral disagreement among scholars participating in debates on their 
ethical standing, such as whether the similarities between past and present are so 
significant that the comparison is warranted. Many historians have indeed tried to 
make sense of the history of eugenics and to reconstruct it while taking into account 
its complexities, divergences and multifaceted aspects. It is therefore surprising that 
in debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies, the comparison with this past 
phenomenon is often made without reference to studies of the history of eugenics, 
and that the homogeneity of this past phenomenon is often taken as a given. For 
instance, Bennett (2014) calls Harris’ and Savulescu’s arguments in favour of using 
PGD to create the best possible child a ‘eugenic vision’. Despite this, she fails to 
specify what she means by ‘eugenic’, to refer to the historical unfolding of this 
phenomenon and to its relationship with PGD and with the work of both Harris and 
Savulescu. Similarly, Savulescu and Kahane (2009), in their seminal work on 
procreative ethics and PGD, refer to eugenics in terms of ‘moral atrocities’ and of 
‘the collectivist, coercive and often racist projects of the 20th century’ and conclude 
that the procreative principles that they have discussed ‘bear little resemblance’ with 
eugenics. Again, eugenics as a historical phenomenon is a point of reference devoid 
of its historical unfolding. As Koch (2004) argues:  
[T]he witless reference to ‘eugenics’ with no further specification is empty and 
more often a function of our own projections and intentions than a reference to 
history. (Koch 2004: 329) 
Historians and science and technology scholars have shown how eugenics, 
throughout history, cannot be easily reduced to a uniform set of practices and to a 
univocal ideology (Bashford 2010; Bashford & Levine 2010; Ekberg 2007; Kevles 
1985; Koch 2006a; Meloni 2016; Lombardo 2008, 2011; Paul 1984, 1992). Eugenics 




encompassed a diverse set of practices that included not only race-based 
segregations and the institutionalisation and (at worst) the killing of the ‘feeble-
minded’, but also the development of public health and sexual hygiene programmes 
aimed at improving environmental conditions (Gyngell & Selgelid 2016), education 
programmes aimed at spreading eugenic ideas through education (in the UK); 
contests for the ‘fittest’ American family and campaigns for women’s right to 
abortion and access to contraception (Roberts 1997). It encompassed a wide range 
of policies such as the Immigration Restriction Act in the US and sterilisation laws 
in the US, Scandinavian and other countries, but also the legalisation of abortion in 
some of these countries (with the exception of for instance Norway) (Koch 2006a); 
it involved a variety of actors belonging to different political parties and embracing 
different ideologies (Kevles 1985; Meloni 2016; Paul 1984; Roberts 1997), from 
conservative defenders of the status quo to feminists campaigning for reproductive 
rights and from socialists and liberal democrats to racist right wingers. It was 
grounded in “epistemically pluralistic” theories of heredity, with both Lamarckian 
and Mendelian views influencing eugenic thinking (Gyngell & Selgelid 2016; 
Meloni 2016: 74; Schneider 1990), and both “soft” and “hard” theories of heredity 
justifying its principles (Meloni 2016: 65). It also involved the creation of different 
institutions such as the British Eugenics Society, the US Eugenics Record Office 
and the Mexican Eugenics Society. Contemporary historians (Adams 1990; 
Bashford 2010; Bashford & Levine 2010; Ekberg 2007; Kevles 1985; Koch 2006a; 
Lombardo 2008, 2011; Paul 1984, 1992) have set out not only to trace this history 
but also to show that eugenics was not confined geographically to Germany and 
North America and historically to the years immediately before, during and after 
World War II, but rather to a much more encompassing period of time and to 
diverse geographical areas: including Latin America, Central, Eastern and Northern 
Europe, and China. Differing views of the science of heredity (Gyngell & Selgelid 
2016; Meloni 2016) and socio-political contexts (Roberts 1997) gave rise to a differing 
set of concerns, interventions and policies among geographical regions. For instance, 
as Roberts (1997) shows, in North America, eugenicists and feminists such as 
Margaret Sanger who advocated for birth control measures formed allegiances as 
the former “gave the birth control movement a national mission and the authority of 
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a reputable science” (Roberts 1997: 72), thereby inspiring policies in line with North 
America’s focus on controlling reproduction. Lamarckian and soft theories of 
heredity inspired eugenics programmes in Latin America and the ideas of British 
thinkers from the left (Gyngell & Selgelid 2016; Paul 1984, 2006), giving rise (in 
Latin America) to programmes aimed at “improving environmental conditions that 
influence transmissible (acquired) traits” (Gyngell & Selgelid 2016: 148). 
Despite the differences among policies, actors, countries and periods of time, some 
of the features of 20th century eugenics common across time, space and political 
affiliations tend to emerge in contemporary discourses on these technologies and 
practices. These shared features of eugenics59 are best identified in eugenics as an 
ideology (i.e. a set of ideas and beliefs) rather than in eugenics as a practice (i.e. laws, 
institutions and eugenic education). Eugenics as a practice was a rather 
heterogeneous phenomenon but it is possible to identify a core: one that it is shared 
over time, space and political affiliation60. This core was a concern with improving 
the quality of the population by preserving some human features considered 
beneficial for the collective and to avoid, or at least reduce, the transmission of 
negative features61. The etymological definition of eugenics and the definition 
formulated by Sir Francis Galton, the “father” of eugenics, capture these shared 
features. Etymologically, eugenics is composed of the Greek prefix ‘eu’ that 
translates as ‘good’ and the Greek word ‘genos’ that means ‘birth’ or ‘ancestry’. 
Galton’s original definition dates back to 1883, when he defined eugenics as:  
                                                 
59 For an interesting analysis of eugenic ideas throughout Western philosophical and political thought, 
see Häyry (2008).  
60 Concerning this, Meloni (2016) argues that “the varieties of eugenics in the first decades of the 
twentieth century were united less by direct politicization of a particular theory of heredity than by 
a common ethos, which crossed over the linguistic and aesthetic borders dividing eugenic approaches” 
([emphasis in original] Meloni 2016: 66). The author identifies four main features of this “common 
ethos”, namely: radical biologism, utopian social engineering, “unlimited empowerment of scientific 
experts”, and the primacy of the race over the individual (Meloni 2016: 66-67). 
61 In this paper, I do not focus on or assess historical features of eugenics as my aim is to reflect on the 
relationship between past and present, and on how past eugenics is used in contemporary ethical 
debates. For detailed accounts of the history, see for instance: Adams 1990; Bashford and Levine 
2010; Kevles 1985; Lombardo 2008, 2011. 




The science of improving stock – not only by judicious mating, but whatever 
tends to give the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of 
prevailing over the less suitable than they otherwise would have had. 
([emphasis added] Galton 1883)  
These few features of eugenics as an ideology taken together represent the core of 
eugenics or, following Meloni (2016), the ‘common ethos’ of eugenics, but it is still 
difficult to draw lessons on which to base ethical assessments of reproductive 
technologies and practices (Bashford 2010; Paul 1998). When critics and proponents 
of reproductive technologies and practices warn that we should be wary of ‘going 
back’ to eugenics or that we should be very careful not to duplicate it, it is not always 
clear what they mean; as Paul (1998) puts it: “We’re warned against nothing in 
particular” (Paul 1998: 98).  
Due to this complexity, and the emotional power that eugenics has, Wilkinson 
(2008), Camporesi (2014) and others working in the field of bioethics have suggested 
that reference to it ought to be abandoned, or at least significantly limited, in debates 
on reproductive technologies and practices. Their pleas, as well as contemporary 
efforts to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of eugenics, have not really 
changed current discourses on assisted reproduction as “the identification of a policy 
or practice as eugenic remains highly stigmatizing” (Paul 1998: 261) and references 
to eugenics in this context continue to abound.  
So, historians are there and we need them. They have significantly helped to shed 
light on the history of eugenics and on the understanding of this phenomenon, on 
its complexity and multifaceted character. Depending on which aspects of this 
multifaceted history contemporary authors, policy-makers, journalists, activists and 
other members of the public look at, different lessons can be drawn and different 
strategies can be used to discuss, report, regulate, reject or defend reproductive 
technologies and practices. If eugenics is only depicted in terms of coercion or a 
quest for perfection (and assuming that both these practices are really ethically 
troubling), then what today’s technologies and practices need to avoid is to be driven 
by the latter and organised in terms of the former. If, instead, eugenics was really 
characterised by differing views of heredity, ideologies, objectives, policies and 
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practices then its lessons are much less straightforwardly derived (Buchanan et al. 
2001). Despite this, I would regard knowing a comprehensive account of the history 
of eugenics as an ethical practice62. It is an ethical practice as on the one hand such 
knowledge can foster approaches, debates, interventions and policies that are not 
only mindful of what went wrong in the past, but also try to prevent (and perhaps 
redress) similar unfoldings. On the other, it can foster debates that are critical of and 
reflexive towards the social and political contexts in which they take shape and 
considerations of how both good and bad intentions can lead to undesirable states 
of affairs63. 
What all the historical analyses have not managed to do is put to rest contemporary 
disagreement on what present technologies and practices count as eugenics and 
whether the similarity between past and present is a sufficient condition to settle the 
question of their ethical standing and value (Wilkinson & Garrard 2013). What role 
does the shadow of eugenics play within debates on reproductive technologies and 
practices? The reference to eugenics cuts across competing assessments of 
reproductive technologies and is used in different ways to create ethical boundaries 
between acceptable and unacceptable technologies, and their acceptable and 
unacceptable uses. Within these debates, recurrent questions are whether these 
technologies and practices amount to eugenics and/or whether they will lead us back 
to eugenics. However, if we aspire to move towards fruitful debates on the ethics of 
these technologies, I argue that our attention should be directed elsewhere rather 
than being channelled towards these questions. An alternative strategy to use in 
debates on the value and ethical standing of reproductive technologies is to look into 
the shadow of eugenics and uncover the relationship between past and present, how 
diverging interpretations of past practices inform our understanding of the present, 
and how they influence the contemporary disagreements concerning the ethics of 
                                                 
62 For an interesting discussion of the relationship between history and bioethics and of how these 
scholarships can be mutually beneficial, see Wilson (2013).  
63 Relatedly, Buchanan et al. (2001) concur that different accounts of the history have different 
implications for today’s policy debates and that if today’s genetics is “eugenics under a different 
name”, then “we must achieve a clear understanding of the morality of both” (Buchanan et al. 2001: 
40). See also Wikler (1999) and Gyngell and Selgelid (2016) on the lessons of eugenics.  




reproductive technologies and practices. Looking into the shadow could, in other 
words, help those who participate in these debates to ask the right questions in order 
to collectively make progress both in the ethical assessment of these technologies 
and practices as well as in ethical debates on these technologies more generally.  
Foucault, and Socrates before him, taught us that it is worth bearing in mind the 
importance of taxonomy and of reflecting on meanings as powerful analytical tools 
to interpret the complexities of reality. Looking into the meanings of eugenics is of 
interest as a conceptual tool to interpret the present. As Paul (1992) argued:  
Eugenics is a word with nasty connotations but an indeterminate meaning. 
Indeed, it often reveals more about its user’s attitudes than the policies, 
practices, intentions, or consequences labelled. ([emphasis added] Paul 1992: 
665).  
In the remainder of this paper, I will explore two questions: the role of the meanings 
and the uses of the word eugenics in debates on reproductive technologies and 
practices, and the role of assessments of the history of eugenics (and the lack thereof) 
in these debates. It is informed by an extensive review of publications that refer to 
eugenics to strengthen and ground arguments on the ethics of such technologies and 
practices. 
2.3 What’s in the Name Eugenics? 
In contemporary debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies and practices, 
the word eugenics is defined in a multiplicity of ways. The disagreement regarding 
the meaning of eugenics is not limited to what definition is the most appropriate and 
why, but rather it centres on “what counts as eugenics” (Wilkinson and Garrard 
2013: 2), i.e. on which reproductive technologies and practices can be classified as 
eugenics, and whether this classification can settle the ethical questions that they 
raise. This section of the paper focuses on the role of the meanings, descriptions and 
definitions ascribed to eugenics in contemporary debates on reproductive 
technologies and practices.  
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One strategy to define the word ‘eugenics’ or to describe this phenomenon64 within 
these debates would be to rely on a definition that is as descriptively accurate as 
possible, i.e. one that goes beyond the multiplicity of practices, ideologies and actors 
to capture the shared features of this multiplicity and that strives for neutrality in 
that it tries not to presuppose any explicit negative or implicit built-in value-
judgment65. An example of such a definition of ‘eugenics’ would be: “the attempt to 
influence the genetic endowment of future generations”66. Many of the authors who 
refer to eugenics in debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies adopt this 
strategy and rely on this type of definition of eugenics67. For example, Anomaly 
(2014) describes eugenics as “any attempt to harness the power of reproduction to 
influence the genetic composition of future people” (Anomaly 2014: 179). Similarly, 
Glover (2006) argues that eugenics can be understood “broadly”68 as “any decisions, 
including parental decisions, about what sort of child will be born” (Glover 2006: 
                                                 
64 Whether the word ‘eugenics’ should be referred to at all is discussed in the following section. I do 
not explicitly discuss the proposal of Agar (2008) and others who share his view of rehabilitating the 
term eugenics by adding the adjective ‘liberal’. While this use of the term eugenics differs from the 
uses of many other authors, those who speak about ‘liberal eugenics’ too have to decide which 
strategy among the ones described in this section they would adopt.  
65 A detailed discussion of the question of whether definitions can be entirely neutral, i.e. whether 
they can avoid any implicit or explicit value judgement is beyond the scope of this paper. I am 
personally sceptical with respect to the possibility of complete value-neutrality in definitions and 
descriptions of technologies and practices that are so fraught with emotive meanings, if only because 
definitions are formulated by ‘moral animals’ (Wright 1994): human beings with values and moral 
beliefs. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to say that whilst complete neutrality might be 
unattainable (Lakoff 2004; Stevenson 1937), the degree to which this can be attempted varies greatly, 
and one could opt for a definition that is as descriptively accurate as possible.  
66 This sentence captures the core of different definitions found in the literature which rely on the 
strategy described above, but the exact terminology might vary from publication to publication. 
67 What I would consider a subset of this group is made by authors who rely on a definition that 
captures shared features of eugenics (its core) and that is hence descriptively accurate, but which 
employs the word ‘improvement’ to describe attempts to intervene in and influence the genetic 
endowment of future generations. For instance, Selgelid (2014) defines eugenics “broadly” as: “a 
practice that aims to improve human lives by employing an understanding of heredity in the exertion 
of control over who gets born or who reproduces” (Selgelid 2014: 3) and Glover (2006) adopts the 
same strategy (see note below). Defining eugenics in terms of improvement entails remaining true to 
Galton’s original definition, which is arguably an instance of descriptive accuracy. Despite this, 
defining eugenics in terms of improving the gene pool (or with its terminological sibling ‘producing 
“fine children”’, Harris 1993: 178) may be interpreted as sneaking in a positive connotation and a 
built-in value judgement and hence failing the ‘strive for descriptive accuracy and neutrality’ test. I 
am indebted to César Palacios-González for bringing this to my attention. 
68 According to Glover (2006), eugenics can be also understood “narrowly” as: “social policies aimed 
at improving the gene pool” (Glover 2006: 28). 




28). As I discuss in the next section, most of the authors that adopt this strategy (and 
most authors in general) do condemn eugenics, but they are also broadly in favour 
of reproductive technologies69.   
A second strategy adopted by those who refer to eugenics in debates on 
reproductive technologies and practices is to rely on a definition or description of it 
that incorporates background ethical assumptions on the (negative) ethical standing 
of eugenics. For instance, Garland-Thompson (2012) describes “eugenic logic” as 
aiming to “eliminate disability and, by extension, disabled people from the world” 
(Garland-Thompson 2012: 340). Authors who oppose the use of CRISPR for 
germline editing and of MRTs associate eugenics with these practices (Brokowski 
et al. 2015; Darnovsky 2013). Similarly, in authors who condemn human 
enhancement, eugenics becomes synonymous with enhancement (and equally 
condemned) and the antonym of treatment (Habermas 2003; Sandel 2004a). 
Whether disability should be eliminated, or whether germline editing and human 
enhancement should be pursued, is a matter of contention in bioethics, as debates 
on the ethics of human enhancement70, on the ethics of screening technologies that 
allow to select against disability71 and on the ethics of germline editing72 show. My 
claim here is that these descriptions and definitions incorporate background ethical 
assumptions against germline editing, enhancement or against building a disability-
free world and on the – related – ethical standing of eugenics. Hence, they opt for a 
different strategy to define and describe eugenics from the first group of authors 
described above73.   
Therefore, even if authors tend to agree on the negative connotations of ‘eugenics’, 
they opt for different strategies to define this word. But which strategy should be 
                                                 
69 Other than the authors mentioned above, examples of authors in favour of new reproductive 
technologies that define eugenics in descriptively accurate terms are manifold. Just to mention a few 
of these authors: Agar (2008); Gyngell and Selgelid (2016); Robertson (2005).   
70 See for instance Buchanan (2011); Harris (2007); Sandel (2004); Savulescu and Bostrom (2009). 
71 See for instance Edwards (2004); Parens and Asch (2003); Shakespeare (2006). 
72 See for instance Gyngell et al. (2017); Cavaliere (2018a).  
73 I am very thankful to one of the anonymous reviewers for raising important questions about this 
section and for pressing me to improve it. 
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preferred? Should we opt for descriptive accuracy or for a definition that conveys a 
message that expresses one’s own moral beliefs on the wrongness of eugenics? Or, 
again, should the word ‘eugenics’ be employed at all? As often in life, the answer to 
these questions depends on what one wants to achieve by using this word. 
2.3.1 Descriptive Accuracy or Conveying a Message? 
Many who refer to eugenics in debates on reproductive technologies either use a 
comparison with the past to show that such technologies are similar to eugenics and 
hence as morally problematic (the argument underlying the continuity view) or to 
show that these technologies are different from eugenics and hence not as morally 
problematic as eugenics was (the argument underlying the discontinuity view). In 
both types of arguments, the reference to eugenics is used to support one’s position 
on the ethics of the reproductive technology or practice in question. It has, in other 
words, a normative role. Considering that both proponents and critics of 
reproductive technologies and practices agree on the negative connotations of 
eugenics, it may seem prima facie that it does not matter which definition they 
employ. They can say that eugenics is an attempt to improve the human gene pool 
or that it is an attempt to eliminate disabled people, and it would not matter for their 
arguments on contemporary technologies because that is where the moral 
disagreement lies. But words, metaphors and rhetoric matter greatly in these debates 
(O’Keefe et al. 2015; Ravitsky et al. 2015). As Blackburn (1998) argues: “Words 
typically nudge people, with more or less subtlety, towards attitudes to the things 
they pick out” (Blackburn 1998: 15), and they can redirect people’s interests 
(Stevenson 1937). Employing the word ‘eugenics’ and a certain definition of it has 
normative implications: as Wilkinson (2008) shows and as others argue (Camporesi 
2014; Gillon 1998; Paul 1998), the use of the word eugenics in contemporary debates 
on reproductive technologies has significant implications due to its emotive power 
and negative connotations. 




Studies in moral psychology have provided evidence for how wording, context and 
order have framing effects74, namely they influence people’s moral judgements on 
different matters (Haidt & Baron 1996; Haidt & Björklund 2007; Lakoff 2004; 
Petrinovich & O'Neill 1996; Sinnott-Armstrong 2007). A person’s (moral) beliefs 
would be subjected to a word-type framing effect when “whether [or not] the person 
holds the belief depends on which words are used to describe what the belief is about” 
([emphasis added] Sinnott-Armstrong 2007: 52) rather than on what the belief is 
actually about. So, a person’s intuitions are subjected to framing effects if their moral 
beliefs regarding a given reproductive technology depend on the way the 
technology is described, on which kind of words are used to describe it rather than on 
the technology and its applications. Choosing one type of definition over another 
matters normatively because it can influence people’s moral judgements concerning 
reproductive technologies and practices, and hence the decision to employ one type 
of definition or another is not per se neutral (Lakoff 2004).  
Wilkinson (2008) argues that the word ‘eugenics’ should not be used in debates on 
the ethics of selective reproductive technologies due to its emotive power and 
negative connotations. According to this author, the word eugenics has the potential 
to unleash negative emotions that can “circumvent or neutralise people’s critical-
rational faculties” (Wilkinson 2008: 470) and cloud their judgement about the 
reproductive technology or practice being discussed75. Hence the word eugenics 
should not be brought up because it fails to respect the autonomy of those who 
engage with these debates76 (Wilkinson 2008), because it is descriptively inaccurate 
                                                 
74 Word-framing effects have been studied most notably by Petrinovich and O’ Neill (1996) and by 
Haidt and Björklund (2007). Petrinovich and O’ Neill (1996) observed the effects on people’s 
judgements on a given question being formulated in two different ways (one including the word ‘kill’ 
and the other including the word ‘save’) to describe two situations which would generate the same 
consequences. The consequences of the action entailed a certain number of people being killed and 
a certain number being saved in both situations, but participants were consistently much more likely 
to act when the word ‘save’ rather than when the word ‘kill’ was employed in the question. They 
judged the action more morally problematic (and hence they were not keen to act) when the word 
‘kill’ appeared in the question. This is a typical example of a word-framing effect, one that works 
towards redirecting people’s interests as in the case of eugenics and reproductive technologies and 
practices. 
75 Wilkinson (2008) discusses this phenomenon in the context of PGD.  
76 According to Wilkinson (2008), the word ‘eugenics’ should be avoided regardless of one’s own 
moral beliefs on reproductive technologies and practices as “there are some ways of communicating 
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and because it does not add anything in terms of conceptual clarity (Camporesi 2014; 
Gillon 1998). I am sympathetic to such analyses and certainly in favour of conceptual 
clarity and of avoiding misleading and factually wrong77 references to historical 
events. ‘Eugenics’ is indeed used as the ‘reductio ad Hitlerum’ described by Strauss 
(1953) whereby a person or a practice becomes guilty by virtue of their association 
with the Nazis (Strauss 1953). The comparison between reproductive technologies 
and historical eugenics is often used to condemn by association these technologies.  
Despite this, it seems odd that the best strategy to protect people’s rational 
capacities is to deliberately avoid the use of a word, even a heavily emotively-loaded 
word. There are different reasons why the word eugenics features in association with 
reproductive technologies: it may be that the user believes that these technologies 
are similar to eugenics or at least that they are comparable to it in meaningful ways; 
or it may be that the user is motivated by eugenics’ persuasive power and its potential 
to elicit negative assessments of reproductive technologies. In the former case, what 
matters is whether the user is factually wrong or not; in the latter, it matters what 
rules of moral argumentation are set in debates on reproductive technologies and 
practices.  
As the stakes are high (we are talking about the ethical assessment of reproductive 
technologies and practices), it is reasonable to state that one should be careful about 
how to use the word ‘eugenics’ and how one chooses to define it. Hence I would 
suggest that contrary to what Wilkinson (2008) and others argue we should aim to 
adopt a reflective approach to the use of the word eugenics rather than to make it 
taboo. We should aim for conceptual clarity, for definitions that are as descriptively 
accurate as possible, that fairly represent what eugenics encompassed, and that are 
informed by the work of historians of eugenics. A description-oriented definition of 
                                                 
that, without lying or misleading, fail to respect people’s autonomy: methods of communication that 
circumvent or neutralise people’s critical-rational faculties” (Wilkinson 2008: 470). Following this 
view, which Wilkinson considers “non-partisan” and defines as “the Autonomy argument” against 
using the word eugenics, both those in favour of and against reproductive technologies have an interest 
in not referring to the word ‘eugenics’ as both camps should aim for a “rational” debate. 
77 With the term ‘factually wrong’, I mean references to the past that do not describe documented 
events of the past or that deny that certain documented events have taken place. 




eugenics would allow us to start with a common ground to discuss both the history 
of eugenics and the ethics of reproductive technologies.  
There are different reasons why those who participate in debates on the ethics of 
reproductive technologies should, where possible, avoid definitions of eugenics 
which are fraught with negative connotations and that conflate descriptive and 
evaluative elements. These definitions serve the normative goal of critics of 
reproductive technologies (i.e. elicit negative judgements of these technologies), but 
do not improve the ethical debate insofar as they turn the attention to whether these 
technologies are eugenics rather than on relevant moral aspects of these 
technologies. They pre-determine the moral questions and hence shape the debate 
by deciding beforehand which aspects should be given attention and which are 
irrelevant (Jasanoff et al. 2015). They pre-determine what ethical questions should 
be discussed and what direction the ethical debate should take, thereby excluding 
views that do not fit within the pre-established framework. They add ethical 
complexity to already complex questions, and they do not provide those 
participating in the debate with a way to make sense of this complexity. Regardless 
of one’s normative goal, then, intellectual honesty would call for definitions, 
meanings and uses of the word ‘eugenics’ which are as descriptively accurate as 
possible. Only in this way can we really assess whether the comparison with past 
and present is warranted and make steps forward in the ethical debate on 
reproductive technologies.  
2.4 The Discontinuity and Continuity Views 
Let me take a moment to recall the form taken by two commonly used arguments 
within debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies and practices which 
involve references to eugenics. The first set of arguments that stress the 
discontinuity between past and present goes something like this:  
1. x, y and z are morally wrong acts; 
2. eugenic practices entailed x, y, and z; 
∴ old eugenic practices are morally wrong. 
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3. a (a reproductive technology or practice) does not entail carrying out x, y, 
and z; 
∴ other things being equal, a is not morally wrong. 
The opposing set of arguments, which stress elements of continuity between past 
and present, runs something like this:  
1. x, y, and z are morally wrong acts; 
2. eugenic practices entailed x, y, and z; 
∴ old eugenic practices are morally wrong. 
3. a (a reproductive technology or practice) entails carrying out x, y, and z 
∴ other things being equal, a is morally wrong. 
Throughout the rest of the paper, I refer to these two views as the discontinuity 
view and the continuity view of past and present. My argument is that the 
understanding of the history of eugenics and the features of the history upon which 
one focuses are deeply interlinked with the claims that one makes about the ethics 
of reproductive technologies. 
2.4.1 The Discontinuity View  
Those who hold the discontinuity view condemn characteristics of eugenics 
concerning its scientific foundations. More specifically, they hold that eugenics was 
informed by a limited knowledge of the science of heredity (Epstein 2003; Glover 
2006), that it did not meet appropriate ethical and scientific standards of research 
(Appel 2012; Tong 2013), and that it mistakenly relied on the belief that social, 
behavioural and ethnic features could be flattened and reduced to mere biological 
dimensions (Buchanan et al. 2001; Scott 2006). A second problematic feature of 
eugenics is identified in its underlying racist and discriminatory beliefs, and in the 
policies that these beliefs inspired (Agar 2008; Buchanan et al. 2001; Robertson 
2005; Savulescu & Kahane 2009; Scott 2006). The authors defending this view 
largely focus their attention on North American immigration policies designed to 
restrict incomers from certain ethnic groups (i.e. Southern and Eastern Europe),  on 




American sterilisation policies that targeted people with physical and mental 
disabilities and members of lower socio-economical classes (Appel 2012; Crossley & 
Shepherd 2003), and on Nazi eugenics aimed at creating a ‘master race’ through the 
elimination of people with disabilities (Blackford 2005; Glover 2006; Walker 2010).  
In addition to bad science and discriminatory beliefs, coercion, in debates on 
reproductive technologies and practices, becomes the capital sin of past eugenics78 
(Agar 2008; Bruni et al. 2012; Caplan et al. 1999; Crossley & Shepherd 2003; Glover 
2006; Robertson 2005; Santosuosso et al. 2007; Savulescu & Kahane 2009). While 
agreeing that coercion was one of the most problematic elements of eugenics, 
authors discussing this feature focus on slightly different features of it: some criticise 
state interference in the realm of reproduction and the denial of what today is 
defined as ‘procreative liberty’79 (Robertson 2005). Others mainly address the 
question of exercising control over biological features of the population (Bouffard et 
al. 2009; Dolgin 2004), whereas another group sees in coercion a denial of the 
respect for individuals’ bodily integrity (Appel 2012; Santosuosso et al. 2007). A final 
reason why eugenics is perceived as despicable is that its policies and aims were 
oriented towards the improvement of the wellbeing of the population rather than 
the good of the individuals (Fenton 2006; Glover 2006; Robertson 2005; Savulescu 
2005; Scott 2006). In all these references to the past, despite some internal 
differences concerning the most contemptible elements of eugenics, old eugenics is 
unanimously condemned. What varies is the weight that should be assigned to ‘x, 
y, z’, i.e. to each of the features of eugenics on which scholars participating in 
debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies focus. The discontinuity view 
underlines the idea that if reproductive technologies and practices do not entail ‘x, 
y, z’, namely coercion, bad science, discriminatory beliefs and a precedence of 
population-concerns over individual-concerns, then they are not ethically troubling 
in the same way as eugenics.  
                                                 
78 This is also shown by the number of publications which address the question of coercion. In spite 
of this, most of the authors do not define what they mean by coercion and which features make 
eugenic policies and practices coercive.  
79 Or, alternatively: “reproductive freedom” (Brock 2005; Harris 1992; Cavaliere & Harris 2018). 
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Authors relying on the discontinuity view to support their disanalogy between the 
past and present argument make slightly different claims about the present and 
about the relationship between past and present. For instance, some argue that past 
eugenics and reproductive technologies do not share any significant feature (Bourne 
et al. 2012; Savulescu & Kahane 2009). These authors argue that reproductive 
technologies are guided by values and inspired by moral beliefs that have nothing to 
do with those of eugenics: while eugenics was discriminatory and exclusionist, 
reproductive technologies are value-neutral with respect to race, gender and class, 
and oriented towards the welfare of the future child or designed to enhance 
autonomous decision-making (Glover 2006; Harris 2007; Savulescu & Kahane 
2009; Robertson 2005). In their accounts, past and present differ in terms of both 
the underpinning values and the means employed: while eugenics was coercive, 
violent, and entailed forced sterilisations and mass killings, today’s reproductive 
technologies are freely chosen, do not entail gruesome methods and are available to 
those who wish to use them (Appel 2012; Bourne et al. 2012; Robertson 2005; 
Savulescu & Kahane 2009).  
Other authors allow that although these technologies share features with past 
eugenics, they are still free of the characteristics that made eugenics morally wrong 
(Agar 2008; Camporesi 2014; Fenton 2006; Harris 1993; Scott 2006; Wilkinson 
2010). For instance, Wilkinson (2010) reflects on the question of whether “the very 
idea of ‘genetic improvement’ is a mistake” (Wilkinson 2010: 159) and concludes 
that the answer to that question, once we add some qualifications (which he offers 
in his book), is negative:  
There have been many versions of ‘eugenics’ that have incorporated 
dangerously flawed ideological and pseudo-scientific beliefs, such as Nazi racial 
‘science’. However, there is no need to assume that all attempts to improve the 
‘gene pool’ will be similarly flawed […]. So perhaps (for example) improving the 
gene pool in ways that improve future public health would be morally 
acceptable (and even desirable). ([emphasis added] Wilkinson 2010: 166) 
Similarly, Harris (1993), in addressing the question of whether gene therapy should 
be considered a form of eugenics, argues that if one relies on an understanding of 
eugenics akin to the understanding that its father, Francis Galton, had, then the 




answer is positive. Eugenics and gene therapy have a common aim: they both seek 
to produce “fine children” (Harris 1993), an aim that, in the eyes of the author, is 
considered worthwhile. This aim is worth pursuing both in the case of attempting to 
“remove or repair dysfunction” and in the case of “measures designed to enhance 
function”80 (Harris 1993). These authors (and other sharing their view such as Agar 
2008) rely on a broader understanding of eugenics as the attempt to improve the 
gene pool of the population and argue that what was problematic in the past was how 
eugenicists tried to achieve human improvement, i.e. the relying on coercive and 
violent measures, rather than on the aim of eugenics and its underpinning values per 
se.  
2.4.2 The Continuity View  
The authors who defend the continuity view broadly agree with those defending 
the discontinuity view with respects to the condemnable features of eugenics. For 
instance, some scholars criticise its faulty scientific foundations and the quest for 
singling out biological components of social characteristics (Jeffreys 2012); others 
focus on the coercive character of eugenics’ policies and practices (Epstein 2003), 
their incorporation into the political agenda (Hampton 2005; Roberts 2009), their 
violation of bodily integrity and of reproductive freedom (Epstein 2003; Roberts 
1997). Despite the similarities between those defending the discontinuity and the 
continuity view in terms of the condemned features of eugenics, the degree to which 
these features are considered problematic and the moral weight given to each feature 
differ substantially. Contrary to those who defend the discontinuity view, most of 
the authors defending the continuity view do not see in coercion and state-driven 
practices the capital sins of eugenics. They instead focus on eugenics’ discriminatory 
attitudes, on its morally wrong underpinning values, on the policies that were 
designed following these values, and on the effects on minorities and vulnerable 
groups of these attitudes, values and policies (Garland-Thompson 2012; Hampton 
                                                 
80 Harris here relies on a critique of the existence of significant moral differences between therapy 
and enhancement. I will not enter in this debate here, but Harris, among others, does so throughout 
his work (Harris 1992, 2007). 
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2005; MacKellar & Bechtel 2014; Roberts 1997, 2009; Rosen 2003; Sparrow 2011a). 
They also stress eugenics’ ‘unhealthy’ preoccupation with perfection (Bashford 
2010), and argue that eugenic practices of the past were ultimately driven by the 
purpose of perfecting the population. This aim is considered problematic not 
because – as the defenders of the discontinuity view would argue – their efforts were 
directed at the population rather than at the individual, but because of the 
immorality of the aim itself (MacKellar & Bechtel 2014; Rosen 2003; Sandel 2004a).  
Commentators agree on the wrongness of most practices within 20th century 
eugenics, on the aberrant means used to pursue its aims and on the need to avoid 
repeating these mistakes, but they draw different lessons from these analyses, and 
they develop competing assessments of contemporary reproductive technologies 
and practices. The reason for this, I argue, is that their views diverge on the 
underpinning values of eugenics (such as the desirability of improving the human 
gene pool) and to the weight that is given to each condemned feature of 20th century 
eugenics. The moral disagreement on the present has roots in a disagreement about 
the past81, and past and present are profoundly interlinked in these accounts.  
Authors supporting the continuity view present a number of reasons to draw 
attention to the meaningful similarities between contemporary technologies and 
practices, and features of 20th century eugenics. For instance, some stress that the 
(cumulative) effects of these practices match some of the effects sought by 
eugenicists or some of the effects eugenic policies sought to engender. Screening 
technologies such as PGD and PND, but also new reproductive technologies such 
as MRTs, will contribute to a decrease in the number of disabled people and to 
members of ethnic minorities (Hampton 2005; Garland-Thompson 2012; de Melo-
Martín 2017a; Roberts 2009). This decrease is considered by these commentators to 
be not only ethically troubling in itself, but also for consequentialist reasons, i.e. for 
the effects that it will have on these groups. The fear is that members of certain 
ethnic groups (Roberts 1997, 2015; Russell 2010); women (de Melo-Martín 2017a; 
                                                 
81 As argued above, the past must be known in all its nuances and complexities in order to assess it 
from an ethical point of view and for it to be of any interest in present debates.  




Epstein 2003); and disabled people (Garland-Thompson 2012) will be increasingly 
stigmatised, as they were in the past, and publicly funded services available to them 
will be reduced (Garland-Thomson 2012; Scully 2008; Sparrow 2008, 2011b).  
While authors defending the continuity view do not see in coercion one of the chief 
wrongs of eugenics, they still condemn it and argue that some elements of coercion 
survive in contemporary reproductive technologies and practices. Unlike supporters 
of the discontinuity view, these authors stress that the alleged diminished 
intervention of the state in matters of procreation is either a misrepresentation of the 
present situation or a sign that coercion is understood in an unduly narrow sense. 
For instance, Sparrow (2008) argues that the fact that certain screening technologies 
are “made available” signals the continuity of state interventions in matters of 
procreation. Not only that, but according to other critics of reproductive 
technologies and practices that refer to eugenics, coercion is an element of today’s 
technologies and practices even if the state does not have an active role in promoting 
them (Mehlman 2011; Mittra 2007; Sparrow 2011b). Following these authors, other 
than from direct state interventions, coercion may result from the pressure to use 
reproductive and screening technologies exercised by healthcare professionals 
(Ekberg 2007; Koch 2006b), scientists (Darnovsky 2004; Ekberg 2007), and 
bioethicists (Koch 2006b). Other than coercion, what troubles defenders of the 
continuity view about eugenics is the quest for perfection that it entailed. In their 
view, this quest is embodied by reproductive technologies and practices (Sandel 
2004a).  
2.5 Learning and Moving Forward  
I started this paper by arguing that historians have reconstructed the unfolding of 
eugenics and brought to light the multiplicity of themes, policies, actors and values 
which it encompassed. Learning from history in order not to repeat the mistakes of 
the past is a noble, and some would argue a necessary, endeavour. But to learn from 
history, history must be known. Partial or inexistent historical accounts make it 
extremely difficult to learn from the past and, as Bashford (2010) puts it:  
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Selective understandings of the history of eugenics may seriously mislead 
contemporary efforts to regulate reproductive and genetic technologies, and be 
a questionable basis for policy decisions. (Bashford 2010) 
As I showed in the previous sections, despite unanimously condemning eugenics, 
defenders of the discontinuity and continuity views focus their attention on slightly 
different ethically troubling features of the past. While defenders of the 
discontinuity view see coercion and population-wide eugenic policies and practices 
as the most problematic feature of 20th century eugenics, defenders of the continuity 
view see the callous attitudes towards disabled people and other minorities, and the 
drive towards improving the gene pool of the population as the most despicable 
feature of eugenics. These differing ethical assessments of the past are linked with 
differing ethical assessments of the present: defenders of the discontinuity view 
stress how reproductive technologies and practices both promote and protect 
reproductive freedom and individual welfare (as opposed to population-wide 
approaches) and individual autonomy (as opposed to coercion). They see in the 
promotion and protection of these values the most salient characteristics of 
reproductive technologies and practices, and the reasons why they should be 
welcomed. On the contrary, defenders of the continuity view stress how 
reproductive technologies and practices both embody and play a role in the 
persistence of the drive towards perfecting the population and of the discriminatory 
attitudes towards women, disabled and black people, and the reasons why they 
should be condemned. They see in this condemnation and problematisation of these 
technologies and practices a means to promote different values. These differing 
ethical assessments of the past can also explain why proponents of the discontinuity 
view often dismiss concerns about the present expressed by those who support the 
continuity view. They dismiss them as signals of conservative attitudes towards new 
reproductive technologies and practices and of a poor understanding of today’s 
effects and uses of these technologies and practices. However, in reality, the two 
groups condemn and justify different features of the past and of the present.  
Historians and critical theorists have warned of the risk of focusing excessively on 
the coercive character of eugenics whilst ignoring the patterns of coercion and 
discrimination present in reproductive technologies and practices (Bashford 2010; 




Ekberg 2007; Roberts 1997). On the one hand, eugenicists advocated voluntary 
forms of eugenics; on the other, social pressure, discriminatory attitudes and barriers 
to fully exercise and to have respected one’s reproductive freedom may be (in 
different ways) features of today’s reproductive technologies too (Bashford 2010; 
Koch 2006a; Paul 1992). The discontinuity view’s underlying arguments draw a line 
between historical eugenics as coercive and reproductive technologies as freely 
chosen by autonomous individuals, but the reality is much more blurred than 
advocates of such technologies make it out to be. At the same time, authors focusing 
on the callous attitudes towards disabled people, women and ethnic minorities, and 
on persisting biases and forms of discrimination enacted within and by reproductive 
technologies and practices may risk overlooking significant differences from the past 
in terms of the political and social context in which reproductive technologies and 
practices are developed. While it is undoubtedly true that despicable attitudes still 
exist and that they should be resisted, efforts and steps towards fostering respect for 
these groups, to guarantee them public assistance and to develop means for greater 
integration, are being made. Additionally, empirical data have shown that parents 
who make use of reproductive technologies are not driven by a quest towards 
perfection or by discriminatory beliefs (Franklin & Roberts 2006; Kerr 2004). 
Once history – in all its complexities, nuances, peculiarities – is known, we can learn 
from it. We can start with a common ground that avoids misleading assessments and 
misleading conclusions. Despite this, such knowledge about history cannot solve is 
the moral disagreement concerning what underpinning values are worth pursuing 
and what others are worth dismissing. It cannot answer, in other words, the question 
of which aims and values reproductive technologies and practices should serve. 
History can tell us that coercion was not the only nor the most distinctive feature of 
eugenics, but it cannot tell us whether trying to improve the gene pool of the 
population and trying to increase the number of babies born without disabilities are 
worthy aims (as most defenders of reproductive technologies argue). Similarly, it can 
tell us about eugenic policies and how those policies contributed to an increased 
stigmatisation of disabled people and of the perceived need to wipe them out, but 
what it cannot tell us is whether allowing gene editing technologies will lead 
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prospective parents to select blond blue-eyed babies and whether this is something 
that should be opposed. 
For these reasons, while it is important to learn about the history of eugenics and 
learn from the history of eugenics, this is probably all that eugenics should contribute 
to contemporary debates on reproductive technologies. Mainly focusing on eugenics 
and on analogies/disanalogies between past and present risk jeopardising 
contemporary debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies and shifting the 
focus away from relevant questions about the value of reproductive technologies and 
practices.  
2.6 Conclusions: Looking into the Shadow 
In this paper, I have discussed how the word eugenics and the history of eugenics 
are used in debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies and practices. I have 
showed that some commentators employ definitions of ‘eugenics’ which are 
descriptively accurate while others opt for definitions which immediately bring to 
the fore the negative connotations of this phenomenon. I have argued that, when 
possible, the former type of definition should be preferred over the latter. I then 
moved on from a discussion of the uses of the word to the uses of the history of 
eugenics and showed how authors who focus on certain problematic characteristics 
of the past tend to have views on contemporary reproductive technologies and 
practices that are symmetric with, and a response to, these characteristics.  
The shadow of eugenics extends to contemporary reproductive technologies and 
practices and it is a legacy that will probably be hard to eradicate, and it might not 
even be desirable to do so. Scholars who participate in debates on these technologies 
should learn about the historical unfolding of eugenics in order to avoid repeating 
the same mistakes that were committed in the past.  
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3 PAPER 2: A Path Through the (Moral) Morass: Genome Editing, Reproduction 
and Broad Conversations 
Paper 2 is a single-authored chapter published in an edited volume titled Between 
Moral Hazard and Legal Uncertainty. Ethical, Legal and Societal Challenges of Human Genome 
Editing (edited by Matthias Braun, Hannah Schickl and Peter Dabrock). 
The version of this chapter enclosed in Appendix 2 is the chapter’s published 
version.  
Cavaliere, G. (2018c). A Path through the (moral) morass: Genome editing, 
reproduction and broad conversations. In M. Braun, H. Schickl & P. Dabrock 
(Eds.), Between moral hazard and legal uncertainty. Ethical, legal and societal challenges of 
human genome editing (pp. 203-225). Wiesbaden, DE: Springer VS 
3.1 Abstract 
In this chapter, I discuss the possibility of using genome editing technologies in the 
context of assisted reproduction. I present the most prominent arguments in favour 
of and against this use of genome editing technologies, and explore two strategies 
used in bioethics in the event of moral disagreement to analyse the questions at hand 
and to develop morally sound policies. These strategies are: the clarification of the 
facts regarding a new technology and the formulation of the best philosophical 
argument. I contend that both approaches are theoretically flawed and might result 
in states of affairs that fail to promote peoples’ well-being. I then argue that we 
should focus instead on finding at least some common ground in order to move 
forward in the debate on genome editing, building a regulatory framework that 
lightens “the burden of human existence” (Harris 2016a), whilst still accommodating 
opposing views as much as possible. Furthermore, I argue that insights from moral 
psychology and democratic governance can assist us in these challenges. 
Keywords: Assisted reproduction | Deliberative democracy | Moral judgment | 
Pluralism | Safety  
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3.2 Genetic Technologies and (Moral) Disagreement  
New reproductive technologies and screening technologies allow couples who are 
at risk of transmitting genetic diseases to their offspring to reduce the risk of 
transmission while still being able to have genetically related (or partially genetically 
related) offspring. Most of these technologies and their applications are 
controversial. There is no consensus regarding the legitimacy of their use and 
whether or not they are a morally acceptable means in the pursuit of parenthood 
projects. Some people oppose pre-natal and pre-implantation screening technologies 
because of their discriminatory nature and because they express – or strengthen – 
negative attitudes towards people with disabilities (Parens & Asch 2003). Others 
contest that these technologies could bring about increased inequality as well as 
sexist and racist attitudes (Roberts 1997). Others criticise them for violating human 
dignity and for tampering with human nature (Kass 1997), while still others are more 
concerned with the reinforcement of certain beliefs about the importance of genetic 
parenthood and the traditional family (de Melo-Martín 2017a). If there were 
agreement regarding these criticisms, bioethicists would be out of a job (together 
with the scientists developing them, the healthcare professionals working in the 
fertility clinics, and the policy-makers regulating their use). 
Fortunately (I am a bioethicist and I do not want to be out of a job), these 
technologies are also welcomed by many, since they allow people to pursue their 
preferred life plans, to have children that are genetically related to them, and who 
are healthier than they otherwise would have been. They, as Harris (2016a) puts it, 
help “lighten the burden of human existence” (Harris 2016a: 16). In this chapter, I 
focus on genome editing technologies and on their applications, in the context of 
assisted reproduction, for the correction of genetic abnormalities in embryos created 
with in vitro fertilization (IVF). I discuss this possibility, presenting some insights 
from the literature on moral psychology which can be considered a starting point for 
a debate on the challenges of institutional design.   
Gene editing technologies have been around for over a decade now (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2016). Despite this fact, one new gene editing technique in 
particular sparked a heated debate early in 2015, and to date, the debate has yet to 




be settled. Calls for a moratorium on the use of this particular technique as well as 
for international bans and joint efforts to prevent its applications in the clinic abound 
(Baylis 2017b, 2017c; Baltimore et al. 2015; Lanphier et al. 2015; UNESCO IBC 
2017). The technique in question is CRISPR (Clustered regularly interspaced short 
palindromic repeat), an RNA-guided tool that makes use of a naturally occurring 
defence mechanism employed by bacteria to avoid harmful infections caused by 
pathogenic organisms (e.g. viruses). The RNA tool (CRISPR) functions as a guide 
for other systems (Cas9, CPF1 and others) to target specific parts of the genome, 
which are subsequently cut by the Cas proteins. These cut strands can be exploited 
to modify the nucleotide sequence of DNA and to insert DNA sequences at the cut 
site. The application of this technique to human embryos and human gametes (i.e., 
oocytes and sperm cells) has been widely criticised for a number of reasons, but 
chiefly for its potential to introduce inheritable changes in the human genome. The 
question of consensus has catalysed the attention of many scientists and ethicists 
and has transformed CRISPR into one of the most discussed technologies of the 
past years (Brokowski et al. 2015; Lander 2015; Lanphier et al. 2015). The 
technique’s precision, effectiveness and relatively limited cost, together with its 
potential to edit the human germline in a targeted manner, which elevates it above 
many other genome editing technologies, have led ethicists, scientists, reporters and 
members of the public to call for international solutions to what is perceived to be 
an international challenge (Baylis 2017b, 2017c; National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering and Medicine 2015).  
3.3 Broadening the Conversation  
One of the proponents of these international solutions and broad conversations is 
Baylis (2017b, 2017c), who writes:  
Why struggle? Because although all humans have a common interest in the 
human genome, much work is needed to identify other common interests that 
might rightfully guide policy deliberations. Hence, there is merit in […] 
embracing the challenge of seeking broad societal consensus on this ethically 
controversial issue. (Baylis 2017b: 3)  
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Elsewhere, she continues defending the view that citizens should work towards 
broad societal consensus, because: 
We are talking about nothing less than the future of the human species. No 
decisions about the modification of the germline should be made without broad 
societal consultation. (Baylis 2017c)  
Similarly, the statement produced after the International Summit on Human Gene 
Editing in December 2015 states that:  
It would be irresponsible to proceed with any clinical use of germline editing 
unless and until […] there is broad societal consensus about the appropriateness 
of the proposed application. (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and 
Medicine 2015) 
The problem with international and broad solutions is that we, members of Homo 
sapiens, often disagree. We disagree about everything: from climate change to 
national health services, from redistribution of income and wealth to genetically 
modified organisms, from vaccinations to sustainable diets. Our disagreements span 
from the evaluation of scientific methods to ethics and policy. They occur between 
and within countries, depending on personal and collective values, beliefs and 
practices, and – importantly – political and cultural frames (Jasanoff 2011). We tend 
to see the world through “different moral lenses” when it comes to values we hold 
dear (Greene 2014: 68).  
In the face of all these disagreements, we can adopt different strategies, including 
throwing in the towel and not attempting to build such broad social consensus, or 
forcing the view held by the majority on the minority. Broad societal consensus 
might be unachievable and perhaps even undesirable. It may be unachievable due 
to our differing moral world-views and our tribal tendencies to defend them (Greene 
2014; Haidt 2012). It may also be undesirable inasmuch as it requires those 
participating in the debate on the ethics of genome editing to relinquish at least some 
of these moral views, or to restrict them to the private sphere and not bring them to 
the fore/um. It requires doing ethics, not inside the cave and among philosophers 
and ethics experts, but in the public square, where different moral views and 
“competing rationalities” coexist (Häyry 2010: 48). This is what commitment to a 




deliberative conception of democracy would encourage us to do (Cohen 2003; 
Gutmann & Thompson 2009). It would encourage us to engage in a process of 
public reasoning, where we collectively discuss contrasting moral views and engage 
in “visions of progress that are collectively defined, drawing on the full richness of 
democratic imagination” (Jasanoff et al. 2015: 48). As we move from bioethics 
journals to institutional design and public policy, we need to be able to create an 
inclusive space for discussion of the ethical, political and social challenges raised by 
genome editing. We need to be able to develop policies that take account of these 
challenges and the competing moral views and values that underpin them.    
For this reason, I side with Baylis’ general intuition and with her plea for broad 
conversations on genome editing82. My view on the importance of an inclusive 
dialogue is motivated by a commitment to a deliberative understanding of 
democratic decision making, but also, as Peter Mills (2017) puts it, because we are 
in the field of “geo-ethics”, where what matters are the: 
[I]nteractions of formal institutions, organisations and polities that recognise the 
potential for the spatiotemporal diffusion of genome editing technologies across 
political geographies and legal jurisdictions. (Mills 2017: 69) 
It is within and between such diverse and broad contexts, within and between 
‘different social and cultural realities’, that these technologies will be in play (Mills 
2017).  
What then should we do with genome editing? Should we take such competing 
moral views into account? Should we take all of them into consideration, or are there 
some views which should not be accepted in the public arena? Despite people’s 
tendency to favour the moral views that resonate with their own and to discard 
opposing views as flawed, immoral, unacceptable etc., when it comes to developing 
policies, there are very good reasons to try to find certain overlaps among differing 
                                                 
82 I am not convinced by Baylis’ idea of ‘broad societal consensus’. I see the rhetorical appeal of such 
a proposal, but I think that aiming for “broad conversations” and trying to resolve, even partially, the 
disagreement is a) more feasible and b) more desirable. My argument then hinges more on the idea 
of ‘partially overcoming the disagreement’, and trying to have ‘broad conversations’ (i.e. as inclusive 
as possible), than on Baylis’ idea of ‘broad societal consensus’.     
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‘moral tribes’ (Greene 2014). I return to these questions (and to a tentative response 
to them) in section 3. Before that, I briefly explain how genome editing could be 
used in the context of assisted reproduction and then delineate some of the 
arguments put forward against and in favour of this possibility.  
3.4 Reproductive Options and Genome Editing as a New Possibility 
Couples who do not rely on assisted reproduction, and who wish to reduce the risk 
of transmitting a genetic mutation to their offspring, could refrain from having 
genetically related children and turn to adoption83. Alternatively, prospective 
parents can rely on reproductive technologies, such as IVF with gamete donations 
(third-party reproduction), or screening technologies, such as pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD), to decrease the risk of having children with the genetic 
mutation they carry. In some cases, PGD is not an option as none of the embryos 
created through IVF is free from the undesirable genetic mutation (Vassena et al. 
2016). For instance, when one of the prospective parents is homozygous for a 
dominant genetic disorder, the risk of transmission to offspring is as high as 100%, 
and hence no mutation-free embryos can be obtained. When prospective parents 
are both heterozygous for a dominant genetic disorder, the risk of transmission is as 
high as 75%, making the chances of finding mutation-free embryos significantly low. 
Another case where PGD is not effective is when both parents are homozygous for 
a recessive genetic disorder (the risk of transmission to offspring is as high as 100%), 
meaning that they both carry two variants of the disease-causing gene (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2016; Vassena et al. 2016). In such cases, genome editing could 
be employed directly on the embryos created with IVF to ‘correct’ mutations which 
potentially lead to monogenic diseases, and to correct mitochondrial DNA 
                                                 
83 I do not discuss this option in this chapter. Rather, I focus on the available options granted by 
existing and new assisted reproductive technologies. For a discussion of adoption, and why it is a 
morally preferable alternative to assisted reproduction, see for instance: de Melo-Martín (2017a) and 
Rulli (2016b).  




mutations which lead to mitochondrial DNA diseases (Vassena et al. 2016)84. Using 
genome editing on early embryos could give to prospective parents, who are at risk 
of transmitting genetic mutations to their offspring, a chance at having children who 
are genetically related to them, while decreasing the risk of transmitting the parents’ 
genetic mutations85. 
3.4.1 Genome Editing: Proponents and Critics 
Research on human embryos with CRISPR technology is still in an early stage and 
only a few experiments have been carried out thus far (Vassena et al. 2016). Despite 
this, the possibility of allowing clinical research has been discussed recently (Chan 
et al. 2015; Gyngell et al. 2017; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and 
Medicine 2017; Reyes & Lanner 2017; Vassena et al. 2016). Critics advance two 
related, precautionary reasons against clinical applications of genome editing on 
human embryos or gamete cells: that these applications would lead to germline 
modifications and that assessing the safety of these applications would be either 
problematic or impossible. Those who worry about germline modifications view 
them akin to an (ethical and biological) ‘line that should not be crossed’ (Collins 2015; 
UNESCO IBC 2017)86. The worry about germline modifications expresses two 
underlying types of concern: deontological concerns about the intrinsic wrongness 
of introducing inheritable changes in the human genome, and consequentialist 
concerns about unforeseen effects for future generations, technology’s running 
astray and the possible resurgence of eugenics (Lanphier et al. 2015; MacKellar 2017; 
Pollack 2015). 
The first type of concern, which I refer to as ‘deontological’, implies a principled 
position against germline modifications, regardless of the morality of the outcomes 
                                                 
84 Currently, the U.K. is the only country where mitochondrial DNA replacement techniques are 
allowed and regulated. Such techniques represent the only existing method for couples in which one 
member is affected by a mitochondrial condition to have genetically related children.   
85 I do not discuss alternative forms of procreation, that do not entail genetic parenthood, in this 
chapter. I discuss the ethics of using new technologies to have genetically related, healthy babies and 
the broader societal implications of such decisions in Cavaliere (2018a). 
86 For a discussion of this claim, see Camporesi & Cavaliere (2016). 
Who Should Come into Existence? 
74 
 
of such practices87. For instance, the 2017 statement of the UNESCO International 
Bioethics Committee (IBC) reads:  
Interventions on the human genome should be admitted only for preventive, 
diagnostic or therapeutic reasons and without enacting modifications for 
descendants. The alternative would jeopardize the inherent and therefore 
equal dignity of all human beings and renew eugenics. (UNESCO IBC 2017)  
Sometimes this principled objection echoes concerns regarding the intrinsic and 
inviolable value of human dignity and of what is ‘naturally’ produced (Kass 1997; 
Sandel 2007), as opposed to what is technically designed.  
The second type of concern, which I define as ‘consequentialist’ due to its focus on 
the state of affairs possibly effected by genome editing, encompasses objections 
related principally to the unforeseen effects of modifying the human germline, and 
the impossibility of thoroughly assessing the safety of these technologies (Baylis 
2017b; Lanphier and Urnov 2015). At the current stage, safety is indeed an issue, 
and the efficiency of genome editing on embryos is still low, with mosaicism in 
edited embryos (i.e., edited embryos showed a mixture of edited and unedited cells) 
being the main known drawback of these technologies (Vassena et al. 2016).  
3.4.2 The Case for Genome Editing  
Those who argue in favour of the use of genome editing in the context of assisted 
reproduction agree that safety concerns must be thoroughly assessed before 
proceeding. Indeed, even the most vocal proponents of genome editing, and new 
reproductive technologies more generally, defend their clinical uses via the 
important caveat of assessing the risks that these technologies may pose to future 
children88 (and the children of these children) (Chan et al. 2015; Harris 2016a; 
Savulescu et al. 2015). For instance, Savulescu and colleagues (2015) argue that there 
                                                 
87 It also encompasses the objection to so-called enhancing uses of technologies, i.e., uses that are not 
aimed at treating genetic conditions, but at changing non-diseased traits (such as height, eye-colour 
or intelligence).  
88 A position that represents a de facto argument in favour of gene editing research (Savulescu et al. 
2015). 




is a moral imperative to continue gene editing research on human embryos in order 
to reduce off-target mutations and other safety issues, since “[a]dvanced and precise 
gene editing techniques could reduce the global burden of genetic disease and 
potentially benefit millions worldwide” (Savulescu et al. 2015: 476). Gyngell and 
colleagues (2017) focus on the clinical application of genome editing (especially in 
the context of assisted reproduction) and state that there is a “significant medical 
case for pursuing GGE [germline gene editing]” to prevent the occurrence of genetic 
diseases in future generations (Gyngell et al. 2017: 499). Two sets of arguments have 
been advanced in favour of using genome editing technologies on embryos to correct 
genetic abnormalities, provided that safety concerns are properly addressed 
(Gyngell et al. 2017; Reyes & Lanner 2017). The first argument is grounded in the 
importance of procreation for individuals’ well-being and for their flourishing. The 
argument of reproductive freedom states that people should be free to decide in 
matters of procreation and that no third-party should interfere with such freedom (if 
no harm is foreseen) (Harris 1992; Robertson 1994). Genome editing would enhance 
prospective parents’ reproductive freedom as it would allow them to pursue their 
preferred life plan (i.e., having children) in the way that most resonates with their 
wishes and desires (i.e., having genetically related children who are free from the 
genetic mutation they themselves carry). Another argument in favour of genome 
editing focuses on the benefits of using this technology in the context of assisted 
reproduction for the offspring and for future generations in general. For instance, 
Harris (2015) argues that:  
All of us need gene editing to be pursued, and if possible, made safe enough to 
use in humans. Not only to pave the way for procedures on adult tissues, but 
to keep open the possibility of using gene editing to protect embryos from 
susceptibility to major diseases and prevent other debilitating genetic 
conditions from being passed on through them to future generations. (Harris 
2015)  
Genome editing would allow for the editing of the genetic makeup of IVF embryos 
in vitro, who would consequently develop into mutation-free offspring. Genome 
editing would prevent the occurrence of genetic diseases both in the first generation 
offspring as well as in future generations, while PGD can sometimes only prevent 
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the occurrence of genetic diseases in the child who develops from the implanted 
embryo (Gyngell et al. 2017).  
3.5 How Do We Argue About New Technologies?  
Let me take stock of what I have said so far. There are certain arguments against 
the use of genome editing (where germline modification and concerns with the 
safety of this technique are concerned) as there are arguments in favour of its use 
(where prospective parents’ reproductive freedom and children’s welfare are 
concerned). What then? How are we going to find a path through what Greene 
(2014) describes as the “morass of competing moral values” (Greene 2014: 185) 
(henceforth simply ‘the morass’ or the ‘moral morass’) and move towards a debate 
on new technologies that can constructively foster institutional design?  
In this section, I focus on what I see as deep disagreement regarding both the moral 
standing of genome editing and the regulatory approaches that can be put in place. 
I explore different strategies that could be employed to overcome this deep 
disagreement, while indicating the foreseeable obstacles to the completion of this 
task. The first two options (and the related strategies) are what I see as the business 
of bioethics, or at least the business of many scholars working in bioethics. One 
option is to focus squarely on the disagreement by politely pointing out to those who 
hold a different moral view or by leveling the accusation at them that they are 
committing factual mistakes: they have failed to grasp how science and technology 
really work. The second option for dealing with existing disagreement is to try to 
persuade them of, or (at worst) to force onto them certain moral views by using 
sound philosophical arguments.  
In my view, both options and the related strategies to overcome the deep 
disagreement are theoretically flawed and may result in states of affairs that do not 
promote our well-being. In the first two sections I explain why I believe these two 
strategies will not bring us through the morass. Then, in the last section, I provide 
some insights from moral psychology and argue that that literature can help us going 
forward to build a debate that can constructively aid the development of policies for 
the regulation of new technologies. 




3.5.1 Option 1: It’s All a Matter of Facts 
One possible interpretation of the disagreement is to think about it in terms of a 
misunderstanding of the relevant facts of genome editing. This is an appealing 
interpretation as it could offer a potential strategy (the path through the morass that 
we are seeking) for overcoming the disagreement: getting the facts straight. 
This interpretation is implicitly and, in certain instances, explicitly endorsed by 
those who criticise the arguments of other scholars for holding a different moral view 
concerning a new technology. Both groups often hint at the incapacity of 
‘opponents’ to understand how policy-making, scientific research, or the respective 
technology work. Consider the questions of uncertainty and safety. Both sides 
(those in favour of continuing genome editing research and those who oppose it) 
agree that, at present, it would be premature to use genome editing in the context 
of assisted reproduction and that the primary application of genome editing should 
be research-oriented. The problems (and the disagreements) arise when future 
applications are speculatively considered, and when the question is posed 
concerning when, if ever, genome editing applications on human embryos will 
become more successful (e.g., when they might have fewer off-target effects, or 
cease to give rise to mosaic embryos). For proponents of human genome editing the 
questions of uncertainty and safety are seen as contingent, rather than fundamental, 
impediments. For them, conducting experiments genome editing will lead to 
overcoming impediments such as mosaicism, to decrease the off-target effects and 
to increase the reliability of the technology. They focus on when (rather than if ever) 
genome editing will be safe enough to proceed. On the contrary, those who are 
sceptical about the benefits of the technology, or who oppose it in principle, consider 
questions of safety to be the end of the debate rather than the beginning, a reason 
not to carry out potentially dangerous research rather than a reason to further pursue 
technical knowledge. They see the impediments described above as evidence for 
current (and often future) unsafety of the technology.  
So, what are the relevant, the right facts? And, especially, can scientists, policy-
makers and ethicists settle once and for all the questions of uncertainty and safety? 
Spoiler alert: I argue that it is highly unlikely that they are able to do so. Other 
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debates about whether new assisted reproductive technologies should be allowed 
can help to illustrate how safety-questions are rarely a matter of factual disagreement 
alone.  
Two techniques for the replacement of maternal mitochondrial DNA in embryos 
created with IVF, using the genetic material of the prospective parents and the 
mitochondrial DNA of a donor, have been recently approved (2015) in the United 
Kingdom. The decision of Parliament to approve these techniques was surrounded 
by a heated debate both within the United Kingdom and abroad. In a lively 
exchange between John Harris and Inmaculada de Melo-Martín, two philosophers 
who work in the field of bioethics, the question of safety was extensively discussed 
(Harris 2016a; de Melo-Martín 2017b). Harris, a known proponent of MRTs and 
other assisted reproductive technologies, argued that the right question to ask was 
not whether MRTs were “safe”, but whether they were “safe enough, given the 
balance of risks and benefits”, adding that MRT “from a safety perspective was 
regarded as good to go” (Harris 2016a: 10-11)89. On this very same point (uncertainty 
and safety) de Melo-Martín responded: “[c]ontrary to Harris, I believe that the 
evidence about the safety of these technologies is at this point completely 
inadequate” (de Melo-Martín 2017b: 161).  
So, are MRTs safe or not? What are the facts of the matter? What does the evidence 
tell us? One possible answer is that either Harris or de Melo-Martín is simply wrong 
and has failed to understand correctly the scientific evidence regarding the safety of 
these techniques. Certainly, Harris thinks so about de Melo-Martín (and possibly 
vice versa), but this is precisely the point. Either one of them is right and the other 
is wrong (factually, that is), or there must be an alternative explanation for the 
disagreement90. And the very existence of such disagreements between two 
                                                 
89 Harris here refers to the multiple reviews of the ‘scientific methods to avoid mitochondrial diseases’, 
carried out in the United Kingdom by the Human Fertilisation and the Embryology Authority 
(HFEA) in 2011, 2013, 2014, and 2016, prior to the approval of MRTs in the U.K. 
90 It is important to note that I believe that Harris is right in considering safety-questions in terms of 
“safe-enough” questions. When I say that one of them is right and the other is wrong I do not refer 
to their assessments of what safety means, but rather to questions regarding the benefits of MRTs. 
These questions, as I explain below, are in my view not entirely matters of fact.  




respectable scholars91, and especially within scientific, bioethical, and political 
communities, should set alarm bells ringing.  
Safety is largely a contextual matter92. As Harris rightly points out, to say that a 
certain technology is “safe” hinges on how its risks and especially its benefits are 
evaluated – and how costs and benefits would be distributed. In other words, risks 
and benefits are contingent on the position of individuals in socio-economic, 
geopolitical, gender related and other aspects, and are very often unevenly 
distributed across the population (Prainsack & Buyx 2011)93. Whether a technology 
is considered safe also depends, crucially, on whether approving the technology in 
question would violate principled positions in favour and against technological 
developments more generally (or principled positions regarding that specific 
technology). Principled positions, positions regarding what is morally right and 
wrong, being derived from higher moral principles94, influence our understanding of 
the science of genome editing and our assessment of the risks that the technology 
may pose to future generations. This does not mean that it is impossible to assess the 
safety, the risks or, more generally, the facts of scientific breakthroughs, nor that we 
should give up trying to do so. It also does not mean that we blindly follow high 
moral principles to the point of drawing conclusions that are independent of previous 
reflections, conversations, and our own intellectual work in general. It simply means 
                                                 
91 I am not saying that respectable scholars are never factually wrong, but I am favouring an 
alternative interpretation to explain this specific disagreement.  
92 Importantly, considering safety a contextual matter does not mean either that it is impossible to 
hold a realist position regarding science and technology, or that we should give up trying to assess 
the safety of new techniques. For a discussion (and defence) of objectivity and realism in scientific 
research, see, for instance, Kitcher (2001).  
93 Additionally, as I argue elsewhere, the ethical assessment of new techniques ought not only to rest 
on a cost/benefit analysis, but also on an evaluation of existing alternatives, including those that do 
not rely on biomedical means. In other words, whether genome editing really represents a worthy 
alternative to existing options (such as PGD) depends on the extent to which the welfare of the future 
child can be put at risk in order to allow couples to have a genetically related child. Regulators and 
ethicists that argue in favour of eventually replacing PGD with genome editing, and couples for 
whom PGD does not represent an option, will have to consider whether reproductive autonomy 
should trump questions about the welfare of the child, in light of uncertainty (Cavaliere 2018a). 
94 When I say that these positions are derived from higher moral principles I do not mean that they 
are consciously derived from these principles, but that peoples’ moral judgements are informed and 
derived by more general principles about right and wrong.  
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that principled positions play a role in these assessments. While not denying that 
some empirical questions will be eventually put to rest, it is nevertheless important 
to note that a consensus on the question of safety will be hard to reach, due to the 
competing values at stake in stakeholders’ assessments. Those who take a 
precautionary stance concerning technological development will favour existing 
technologies over newly discovered ones, while those generally in favour of 
technological development will be ready to accept a higher degree of risk in the 
name of such development and of the potential benefits it may yield for those in a 
position to enjoy such benefits (Prainsack & Buyx 2011).  
In the past two decades, moral psychologists have shown how moral intuitions (i.e., 
intuitions regarding the rightness and the wrongness of a certain practice) play a role 
in the formation of moral judgments, and how the rational argument that follows is 
a post hoc rationalisation of the initial, intuitively formed, judgment (Greene et al. 
2001; Haidt 2001, 2012). These principled positions against or in favour of a certain 
practice (or technology) are not derived after a thorough assessment of the risks, the 
benefits, the safety etc. of the practice, but intuitively and automatically, prior to 
the thorough assessment of the available evidence (Haidt 2012; Greene 2014). 
According Haidt (2001, 2012) and other moral psychologists (Greene et al. 2001), 
moral judgment is not the end point of a rational process in which, like zealous 
judges, people collect the available evidence (for example, regarding the safety of 
genome editing), thoroughly assess it, and only then come to a certain moral 
conclusion (say, a green or a red light for genome editing in the areas of basic 
research or assisted reproduction). When we argue about moral questions and moral 
beliefs people are more akin to lawyers who try to defend their original thesis (i.e. 
genome editing is safe enough or is not safe enough) by constructing a post hoc rational 
justification for it (Baumster & Newman 1994; Ditto et al. 2009; Haidt 2001, 2012). 
As Wright puts it:  
The brain is like a good lawyer: given any set of interests to defend, it sets about 
convincing the world of their moral and logical worth, regardless of whether 
they in fact have any of either. Like a lawyer, the human brain wants victory, 
not truth. (Wright 1994: 280) 




The principled positions that we hold inform our assessment of safety, risks, and 
benefits. They inform, in other words, the facts of the matter regarding a certain 
practice. It is not only that evidence in psychology shows that we are all very good 
at finding evidence that resonates with our principled moral position and with our 
beliefs in general. Studies focusing on the so-called ‘confirmation bias’ (Shaw 1996), 
on ‘motivated reasoning’, and especially on ‘motivated moral reasoning’, show that 
we are much more likely to be sceptical and to question evidence that contradicts 
our principled position than evidence that supports it (for a review of the relevant 
social psychology literature, and a discussion of ‘motivated moral reasoning’, see 
Ditto et al. 2009). Motivated moral reasoning describes situations in which 
“judgment is motivated by a desire to reach a particular moral conclusion” (Ditto et 
al. 2009: 312). Thus, these are: 
[S]ituations in which an individual has an affective stake in perceiving a given 
act or person as either moral or immoral, and this preference alters reasoning 
processes in a way that adjusts moral assessments in line with the desired 
conclusion. (Ditto et al. 2009: 312)  
Even if we have a conscious preference for objectivity in judgment, we often have 
unconscious directional motivations to reach certain conclusions that are preferred 
over others. This, again, does not mean that we are unable to reason ourselves away 
from such conclusions, nor that motivated moral reasoning is a robust and 
unmodifiable characteristic of the moral mind. It just means that we need to be aware 
of our own biases, preferences and moral views when we assess the evidence 
regarding, for instance, the safety of a new technology.  
Harris, Savulescu, and others are known proponents of new technologies. De Melo-
Martín, Baylis, and others who have argued against genome editing and MRTs, 
have held similar position with respect to other new technologies. Moreover, all of 
them are seasoned bioethicists capable of reading scientific papers correctly. Yet, for 
all of them, safety questions are either insurmountable or merely a contingent 
matter. So, who holds the truth of the matter concerning the safety of genome 
editing? The psychological literature on the role of moral intuitions in assessing the 
evidence, as well as the deep disagreement among bioethicists, scientists and policy-
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makers concerning safety questions, seem to provide at least a prima facie reason to 
be sceptical that to overcome the disagreement it would be sufficient to merely 
getting the facts straight. This makes the idea of grounding a broad consensus on 
facts alone a very risky project.    
3.5.2 Option 2: May the Best (Argument) Win 
Another strategy for overcoming the disagreement (which, I hope we have 
established, is at least also a moral disagreement) is to play the philosophers’ beloved 
game and stage a good old rhetorical battle in which the best argument wins. Applied 
to the context of genome editing and assisted reproduction, with the (regrettable) 
impossibility of organising a global debate competition, the strategy would be to 
assess the arguments in favour of and against genome editing. This appears to be a 
good idea, and indeed almost the entire business of certain philosophical and 
bioethical traditions has been about doing exactly this. To assess the arguments in 
favour of and against the use of genome editing in assisted reproduction we could 
check for logical mistakes, for inconsistencies, for the correctness of the premises, 
and for the soundness of the conclusions. Yet, should we then also attempt to 
evaluate moral arguments on the basis of the state of affairs that the normative 
positions will bring about? Or should we focus on the arguments’ resonance with a 
universal moral law? Or on what the arguments say about the moral character of the 
speaker? The appraisal of philosophical arguments, the different methods for 
conducting such an appraisal, and the conditions for an argument to be valid are 
disputed. What matters for the present discussion is that we be able to agree on 
certain minimal standards an argument should meet in order to be considered in the 
debate on genome editing. Nevertheless, I fear we would be left again with sound, 
logically valid, but still contradictory arguments.  
Häyry (2010), for instance, talks about the different moral arguments, in favour of 
and against new genetic technologies, in terms of competing rationalities’95. These 
                                                 
95 Häyry (2011), defines rationality in “nonconfrontational” terms: “A decision is rational insofar as it 
is based on beliefs that form a coherent whole and are consistent with how things are in the world; 




are divergent rational moralities that can be simultaneously held. According to 
Häyry, then, we should resist the temptation to compare such rationalities and 
elevate one of them above the others. Instead we should limit ourselves to checking 
for internal the consistency of the argument and their external consistency with how 
things are in the world (Häyry 2011). So, for instance, it is uncontroversial to reject 
as a fallacy the argument ‘germline modifications are morally wrong because 
yesterday my grandma told me so’ (arguments from authority should set off the 
alarm bells), or equally, arguments that are incoherent and inconsistent. However, 
it may be much harder to likewise reject arguments that defend positions like the 
following ones: ‘germline modifications are morally wrong because they could be 
harmful to the children born as a result of the application of CRISPR’; or ‘germline 
modifications are morally obligatory because they enhance parents’ reproductive 
freedom, which is a fundamental moral right’96.  
Fallacious, illogical arguments can and should be criticised, especially in matters of 
science and ethics (Harris 2011). This is what participants in the debate on the ethics 
of genome editing (and other assisted reproductive technologies) do on an almost 
daily basis. There are two problems with this strategy, if our goal is not to find the 
best philosophical argument (i.e., ‘do moral philosophy’), but to build a space where 
coexisting moral positions are discussed and some degree of common ground is 
found (i.e., to ‘do public policies with insights from moral philosophy’, and, I 
contend, moral psychology)97. In these debates, the best argument – one that shows 
                                                 
and it is aimed at optimising the immediate or long-term impacts on entities that matter” (Häyry 2011: 
43) 
96 Personally, I am very sceptical of deontological arguments appealing to nature, sanctity, or rights. 
What I want to highlight here is that it is a very complex and perhaps unfeasible task to a) find an 
independent way to evaluate these arguments (i.e., an evaluative strategy that is not dependent on 
one’s own moral and meta-ethical convictions), and b) to agree on who should decide which strategy 
is the most appropriate. For a thorough case against appealing to rights, see Greene (2014, Chapter 
11, Part V).  
97 One might say that the business of bioethics is not to build a space for a mutual exchange regarding 
differing moral positions, but to let the “best” moral argument win. Besides the procedural problems 
briefly described above, what we are trying to achieve here (i.e., what I am discussing in this chapter) 
is broad societal consensus as well as finding at least some common ground to move forward in the 
debate on genome editing, and building a regulatory framework that helps to alleviate “the burden 
of human existence” (Harris 2016a), whilst still accommodating opposing views as much as possible.  
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no logical mistakes, while exhibiting internal consistency, relying on valid premises 
and inferring valid conclusions – rarely wins. In other words, even if we agree on an 
independent strategy to establish who should win the prize98, and even if we pursue 
this strategy, we are left with a very good argument that may still fail to convince 
people who hold a different moral view (Camporesi & Maugeri 2011). We are left 
with, as Camporesi and Maugeri (2011) put it: “a cornucopia of ethical perspectives, 
each internally consistent but providing mere philosophical amusement.” 
(Camporesi & Maugeri 2011: 255) This is a common problem in bioethics and in 
moral philosophy in general. An example: the argument that genome editing should 
be allowed, since it is in the interests of prospective parents to choose their preferred 
reproductive method, and to have their freedom in matters of procreation respected, 
is an argument that may be more intuitively appealing for someone who a) holds 
dear reproductive autonomy and freedom in general, and b) is sympathetic to the 
idea that reproductive freedom promotes well-being is an important value that 
should be respected. What I mean is that the pull of this argument may work on 
people who believe that freedom in matters of reproduction should trump other 
considerations, but not on those who, for instance, hold that assisted reproductive 
technologies are a mere commodity, and that research agendas should prioritise 
other, more pressing issues.  
Besides these problems (of persisting moral disagreements and competing values), 
the problem with the “best argument” approach to the ethics of genome editing is 
that, even if it was possible to overcome the procedural challenges in selecting it, we 
may still not win as a community and as individuals. In other words, what we are 
faced with is not a philosophical problem, but a political problem. We may have very 
good arguments, sound and valid philosophical arguments, which still fail to promote 
our well-being and our happiness (broadly conceived, that is: independently from 
one’s own conception of well-being), which is arguably what these technologies, and 
perhaps medicine in general, should promote.  
                                                 
98 See note 16 above for an explanation of ‘independent strategy’ and of the procedural problems that 
we may encounter.  




3.6 Perhaps not Everything is Lost. The ‘Listening Mode’ and the ‘Meta-
Morality’ 
If my arguments (and some of the evidence from moral psychology) have managed 
to convince you, then at this point you should be at least a little sceptical of two 
options for overcoming the disagreement concerning the use of genome editing in 
assisted reproduction: explaining the facts of the matter to those who still fail to 
understand them, and letting the best argument win. Both strategies are, in my view, 
theoretically flawed and may end up bringing about state of affairs that do not 
promote our well-being. The deep moral disagreement surrounding genome editing 
technologies and their applications seems to be an obstacle we cannot ignore, if we 
want to move forward (by either banning or regulating applications of these 
technologies). What then should we do?  
A possible diagnosis of the deep moral disagreement we experience in our everyday 
lives is that we have different moral intuitions and we hold different moral beliefs 
(Greene 2014; Haidt 2012). Religious scholars, feminist scholars, liberal 
philosophers, critical theorists, and lay people who find themselves embedded in 
differing political, socio-economic and cultural context, react in differing ways to 
contemporary (moral) controversies. Gay marriage, redistribution of income and 
wealth, but also debates about abortion and genome editing, stir controversy 
because we hold different moral views, some of which are post hoc rationalisation of 
differing moral intuitions. Moral psychologists Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene 
offer different normative prescriptions for overcoming the disagreements and 
learning to cooperate between different moral tribes. In this final section of my 
chapter I briefly outline their normative prescriptions. My conclusion is that they 
are both illuminating for the way we reflect on genome editing and the way we 
develop strategies to regulate new technologies beyond national borders.  
Haidt’s social intuitionist model (Haidt 2001, 2012) shows that people are good at 
finding evidence that confirms their initial moral judgment (remember the lawyer 
analogy!). What can make us change our minds about our moral beliefs is the 
multiplicity of occasions where we find ourselves challenged by others (what Haidt 
calls “reasoned persuasion”, Haidt & Björklund 2007), and by the social 
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environment in which we are embedded (what Haidt refers to as ‘social 
persuasion’99, Haidt & Björklund 2007). Moral reasoning needs to be understood in 
terms of a social process, in which people embark alone on the search for evidence 
and come together for the appraisal of such evidence. We need to be aware that we 
are self-righteous creatures, with a tendency to form moral beliefs from our intuitions 
and to rationalise them afterwards in our exchanges with others. To better get along 
with each other, and to find a path through the moral morass of genome editing, we 
need to acknowledge that our disagreements do not necessarily and solely stem from 
factual mistakes, wrong arguments, and wrong moral beliefs100, but from our 
competing rationalities and differing intuitions. Haidt’s central normative 
prescription is to be more open towards those who hold views different from ours, 
to be aware that we are all biased by our moral intuitions (all of us, not only those 
who disagree with us), and to be aware that some of our grand arguments may simply 
be post hoc rationalisations of gut feelings. Thus, the Haidtian path through the moral 
morass of genome editing encourages us to abandon the mode of combat, and put 
ourselves in the listening mode, when we discuss the ethics of genome editing, its 
applications, and the regulatory frameworks which should be adopted.  
Greene (2014) accepts Haidt’s premises, shares his evolutionary understanding of 
morality, his view on the role of intuitions in the formation of (only some types of) 
moral judgments, and importantly, his (above outlined) normative prescription. 
However, despite this broad agreement, he argues that Haidt’s normative 
prescription alone will not bring us much further in our moral disagreements. In other 
words, listening and being open to opposing views are all good strategies as far as 
                                                 
99 Social persuasion refers to the fact that persuasion does not only happen when others give us 
reasons, arguments or new evidence, but also simply by virtue of our being “sensitive to and 
influenced by what other people think and feel” (Haidt & Björklund 2007: 192). 
100 By wrong moral beliefs, I mean the moral beliefs that we do not share and that we may have failed 
to understand.   




they go, but they are unlikely to bring us forward, if broad societal consensus101 is 
what we aim for.  
Over the last 20 years, Greene has examined the brain scans of people while they 
were reflecting on moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem102. Greene observed 
that different areas of the brain (the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, VMPFC, and 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, DLPFC) showed more activity depending on 
which variation of the trolley problem was proposed. The footbridge case elicited 
more brain activity in people’s DLPFC, the brain area associated with more logical, 
calculating cognitive capacities. On the contrary, more impersonal dilemmas such as 
the switch case elicited more brain activity in the VMPFC and in the amygdala, the 
brain regions associated with emotions. The only difference between the footbridge 
case and the switch case is whether the man scarified to save five is directly pushed 
down from the bridge to the track (and hence killed to prevent the trolley to kill the 
other five people) or he is killed by hitting a switch that diverts the trolley from a 
track where five people are standing to the track where he is standing. In a series of 
experiments conducted by Greene and others they verified over and over how brain 
activity in the DLPFC was linked to choosing utilitarian solutions (i.e. killing one to 
save five), whilst activity in the VMPFC was linked to dilemmas that involved 
directly pushing and hence killing a person to save the other five. This led Greene 
to formulate the theory of the dual-process brain (or of the two moral minds), 
delineating the process that works in automatic-mode and it is guided by our 
                                                 
101 Greene does not aim at broad societal consensus alone. He has a normative theory in mind for 
how that broad consensus ought to look. However, a discussion of his proposal is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. 
102 The trolley problem describes a cluster of moral dilemmas that are all characterised by the choice 
of sacrificing one person in order to save five. The trolley problem was first discussed by Philippa 
Foot (1967) in an article discussing abortion and the doctrine of double effect. Different version of 
the problem and an analysis of the moral views that underpin them were later discussed by Judith 
Jarvis Thompson (1976). The two variations I am referring to here are the ‘switch case’ and the 
‘footbridge case’. The trolley problem describes a situation in which a runaway trolley is barrelling 
down one track where there are five people tied up and unable to move. On another track there is 
one person, also tied up to the track and unable to move. In the switch case, a bystander could pull 
a lever and divert the trolley onto the track where only one person is tied up. In the footbridge case, 
the trolley is still barrelling down a track where five people are tied up and unable to move, but the 
only way the bystander can stop the trolley and prevent their death is by pushing a fat man (or a man 
with a large backpack) off a bridge. In both cases, the choice is between killing one person to save 
five or do nothing and let these five people die.  
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unconscious, automatic, emotional responses, and the process that works in manual-
mode and has “conscious access to the operative decision rule. The rule that maps 
the relevant features of the situations onto a suitable behaviour” (Greene 2014: 136). 
According to Greene’s dual-process theory:  
Reasoning frees us from the tyranny of our immediate impulses by allowing us 
to serve values that are not automatically activated by what’s in front of us. 
(Greene 2014: 137) 
We still need the input of emotions for decision-making, for evaluating risk 
(Damasio 1994), and for avoiding the conflicts that hinder cooperation among 
members of the same moral tribe, but we also need more than this (Greene 2014).  
Greene’s normative prescription is that we need something more than emotions, 
than the automatic mode, to avoid conflicts between tribes that are moral in differing 
ways. Listening, avoiding self-righteousness and being more open for compromise 
are good steps. However, they are only first steps. We need all this and more to find 
a path through the moral morass. We need to work in manual mode to develop what 
Greene calls a ‘meta-morality’: 
A global moral philosophy that can adjudicate among competing interests of its 
members. A meta-morality job is to make trade-offs among competing tribal 
values, and making trade-offs requires a common currency, a unified system for 
weighing values. (Greene 2014: 15) 
The manual mode, the one that makes us choose to kill one person to save five in 
both the variations of the trolley problem, is the mode that causes us to reflectively 
endorse the greater good. The mode that overrides the emotional rejection of killing 
an innocent person in the name of the greater good (saving five people) is utilitarian 
morality (which Greene calls ‘deep-pragmatism’). Greene’s view that utilitarianism 
is a ‘splendid idea’, one we should all endorse, or at least strive to endorse in order 
to overcome our tribal conflicts, is an interesting view. It is also very controversial 
and has been criticised for a number of reasons, including the fallacy of deriving 
normative conclusions from factual claims (from the brain scans to deep-pragmatism 
as the morality that we ought to embrace), and critiques that are normally put 
forward against utilitarianism in general.  




Despite the criticisms and despite detractors of utilitarianism, I think there is a lesson 
to be learned from Greene’s proposal. What we need is to develop a meta-morality 
that causes us to transcend our tribal disagreements and that allows us to discuss 
together ‘what matters’ (Parfit 2011). The Greenian path through the moral morass 
of genome editing encourages us to find a common moral language, shared values, 
and shared moral beliefs as a starting point for discussing the ethics and policy 
questions of genome editing.  
3.7 Conclusion  
A decision about allowing genome editing in the context of assisted reproduction 
has to rest not only on a thorough assessment of the safety of the techniques, and 
their possible or likely benefits, but also on a democratic process that takes into 
account differing views and values (Cavaliere 2017; Jasanoff et al. 2015; Kitcher 
2001). In this chapter, I have focused on genome editing in the context of assisted 
reproduction, and on the calls for broad societal consensus in tackling this question. 
I presented two main arguments against this possibility: namely, safety and that 
these applications would lead to germline modifications. I then turned to arguments 
in favour of genome editing, such as the welfare of future children and peoples’ 
reproductive autonomy. As many have argued, it may be too soon for a conclusive 
assessment of this possibility, if only for the dearth of empirical data regarding its 
safety and feasibility. Thus, what this chapter offers a basis to begin a discussion on 
the ethics of genome editing that is informed by the literature in moral psychology. 
I argued that we should focus on finding a common currency and shared moral 
values, a meta-morality that goes beyond the deep moral disagreements among us, 
and that allows us to speak a common language that enables a minimum of 
agreement among us.  
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4 Conclusions to Part I 
In this final section of Part I, I present some of the implications of the arguments 
advanced in Paper 1 (Cavaliere 2018d) and Paper 2 (Cavaliere 2018c) and 
recommendations for debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies. These 
papers include sources that go beyond the application of theories in moral 
philosophy to debates on new reproductive technologies, and beyond well-
established dichotomies such as those discussed with respect to eugenics (e.g. 
coercion/freedom, and individual/population; see also Bashford 2010). In these 
papers, I also adopt a reflective and critical attitude to the claims and arguments 
advanced within these debates.  
As many authors have argued, eugenics is a word with manifold negative 
connotations and with the potential to trigger resistance towards new reproductive 
technologies. This happens largely due to the tainted history of policies enacted in 
its name and of condemned practices inspired by eugenic thinking. Referring to 
eugenics within debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies and 
employing other loaded words, metaphors, and expressions can have the effect of 
leading the moral judgements of those who participate in debates on these 
technologies in an author’s preferred normative direction.  
In the introduction to this part of the thesis and in Paper 1, I argued that reference 
to eugenics should be treated as a handle-with-care tool within debates on the ethics 
of new reproductive technologies. While care should be observed, looking into the 
shadow of eugenics and learning about its historical unfoldings continues to be an 
endeavour that in my view needs to be pursued. As Lombardo (2018) argues: 
Although I do not favor the ever-present commercial genetic exuberance, it 
does not help routinely to call that trend eugenics either. We should debate the 
ethical issues that arise in reference to all those new technologies, but we have 
plenty to be concerned about that fits more directly into patterns that mimic 
our troubled history of eugenics, without using that term indiscriminately to 
describe every new phase of genetic research. (Lombardo 2018: 5) 
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Following Lombardo (2018), authors discussing the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies should be especially concerned with ideas and practices that resemble 
problematic features of the history of eugenics. This should not translate into 
employing eugenics as a ‘cautionary tale’ (Paul 1992), but rather as a heuristic to aid 
analytical understandings and normative assessments of the present.  
I have also argued that authors who choose to refer to eugenics should strive for 
conceptual clarity and descriptive accuracy. They should strive to adopt a self-
reflective attitude and to pursue other strategies to persuade others, which would 
involve employing reasonable and philosophically sound arguments in addition to 
emotive language. Descriptive accuracy can be instrumental to the adoption of a 
self-reflective attitude towards one’s own claims. At the same time, it can also 
empower (other) participants to clarify, refine, and question their ethical views, and 
to produce ethical assessments of these technologies. With respect to the reference 
to eugenics in debates on new reproductive technologies, descriptive accuracy 
entails that the historical unfolding, and the different practices, policies, ideologies, 
and beliefs about heredity that characterised 20th century eugenics must be known 
and acknowledged in authors’ depictions of eugenics. Saying that a certain 
reproductive technology is eugenic without having a good understanding of the 
history of eugenics is not only an instance of poor academic practice, but can also be 
misleading in that other participants in these debates could get ‘a wrong idea or 
impression’ (cf. the Oxford Dictionary definition reported above) of the ethical 
challenges raised by new reproductive technologies. In addition, if this history is 
known and, despite this, the word ‘eugenics’ and the definition of it that is employed 
in debates on the ethics of these technologies does not accurately depict 20th century 
eugenics, then the word is used deceptively, namely to ‘deliberatively cause 
someone to believe something that is not true’ (cf. the Oxford Dictionary definition 
reported above). This would amount to another instance of methodologically and 
normatively troubling practice within these debates. Lastly, this lack of explicit 
engagement with the history of eugenics is problematic as it prevents the creation of 
a common ground to discuss ethical questions raised by the technologies being 
compared with this history.  





It can also be the case, however, that the differences in terms of ethical assessments 
of the history do not necessarily mean that one side is (factually) wrong: there can 
be competing assessments of the ‘same’ history. These competing assessments, as I 
argued above, result from diverging values and world-views on the ethical standing 
of decisions at the core of eugenics: namely of who should come into existence, and 
of how to balance the burdens and benefits of these decisions. The second 
endeavour that should be promoted and pursued within debates on the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies, and that, when lacking, may render problematic 
references to eugenics, is self-reflection. If in the eyes of some authors, MRTs, 
genome editing, PGD, and other new reproductive technologies embody wrongful 
and despicable practices such as those carried out in the name of eugenics, then 
these practices and the reasons why they are despicable should still be part of 
debates on new reproductive technologies. Learning from history (even considering 
the different ethical assessments of this history) entails both knowing what happened 
and striving to avoid repeating mistakes. However, as I argued earlier, referring to 
eugenics should be done carefully. Thus, for instance, reflecting on why one believes 
certain new reproductive technologies are eugenic then asking oneself which 
features of these technologies or of their uses engenders the thought of eugenics; 
which features of the past can be seen in the present; what are the emotive and 
intuitive reactions to these technologies, etc. This allows a self-reflective attitude to 
emerge. Being self-reflective entails an awareness of one’s biases, intuitions, and 
emotions, as well as underlying values and beliefs, which could foster attitudes 
seeking to avoid misleading others.  
Lastly, how should one deal with moral disagreement on new reproductive 
technologies? The answer is: it depends. It depends on what bioethics and debates 
on the ethics of new reproductive technologies aim to offer. If the only goal of 
debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies is a quest for truth and to 
present knockdown arguments103, then moral disagreement may not need to be 
dealt with. After all, as Wolff (2011) puts it:  
                                                 
103 For a discussion of knockdown arguments see, for instance, Nathan Ballantyne (2014). 
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[P]hilosophy thrives on disagreement, and there is no pressure to come to an 
agreement. Indeed agreement is unhelpful as it cuts discussion short. (Wolff 
2011: 3) 
Despite this, if debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies are to 
contribute in meaningful ways to policy-making, deep moral disagreement may be 
an obstacle. Focusing on listening to others, abandoning a combative mode, and 





The Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies  
1 Introduction to Part II 
The second part of this thesis involves a shift of focus. Part I was largely concerned 
with a reflection on, and an analysis of debates on the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies. In the two papers incorporated into Part I, I described and discussed 
the reference to eugenics within these debates, the moral disagreement that 
surrounds new reproductive technologies (using genome editing as a case study), 
and the argumentative strategies pursued within these debates. In Part II, I address 
ethical and social questions raised by new reproductive technologies and their 
clinical applications. In particular, I discuss ethical and social questions raised by the 
clinical application of genome editing technologies to early human embryos and by 
MRTs. Besides a change of focus, Part II also entails a shift in terms of aims. In Part 
I, my aim was mainly methodologically oriented and concerned with offering 
examples of how debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies can be 
enriched by including different disciplinary sources. Here, my aim pertains more 
specifically to the question of who should come into existence, and of how to 
balance the burdens and benefits of these decisions.  
In the two papers incorporated into this part of the thesis (Paper 3, Cavaliere 2018a, 
and Paper 4, Cavaliere & Palacios-González 2018), I present some of the main 
arguments in favour of and against MRTs and genome editing and give an overview 
of the ethical debates surrounding these technologies104. In Part I, I laid the 
foundations for assessing the ethical challenges raised by new reproductive 
technologies by analysing normative debates surrounding them. Part II represents a 
step forward to achieve this aim. Here, I specifically discuss the ethical challenges 
                                                 
104 In this part of the thesis, I do not provide an extensive review of debates on the ethics of CRISPR 
(the genome editing technology that I discuss here) and MRTs. Several of the papers incorporated 
into the thesis contain elements of such a review, as it provided a starting point to develop the ideas 
that I present and discuss in this part of the thesis and elsewhere. 
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raised by these technologies and advance my proposal of how they should be 
ethically assessed. My analysis focuses on two ethical questions and corresponding 
challenges, namely:  
a) Do these technologies affect the numerical identity of the embryos to which 
they are applied? What are the implications of considering them identity-
affecting technologies? 
b) How should a person’s preference for genetically related children be weighed 
against other considerations (such as those pertaining to resource allocation 
and negative externalities of new reproductive technologies)? Should new 
reproductive technologies be developed in order to satisfy people’s 
preference for genetically related children? 
As the papers incorporated into this part of the thesis (and the reflections outlined 
in the conclusion to it) show, these questions and their ethical implications are tightly 
interlinked.  
Paper 3, the first paper incorporated into this part of the thesis, is a single-author 
paper published in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy titled ‘Genome Editing and 
Assisted Reproduction: Curing Embryos, Society or Prospective Parents?’ This 
paper provides an ethical assessment of the application of genome editing 
technologies to human embryos to edit potentially harmful genetic mutations105. It 
juxtaposes genome editing with existing technologies such as PGD, which are 
employed to achieve similar aims (i.e. establishing pregnancies with embryos that 
are genetically related to their prospective parents and free from harmful genetic 
mutations) albeit with different means. I consider both genome editing and PGD to 
be reproductive technologies due to their instrumental roles in allowing people to 
pursue their (genetic) parenthood projects. These technologies (and MRTs, which 
are discussed in Paper 4, Cavaliere & Palacios-González 2018) raise the question of 
                                                 
105 Some authors have focused on this question and provided arguments for and against this 
application of genome editing within the broader ethical debate on the ethics of genome editing (see, 
for instance, Bauman 2016; de Wert et al. 2017; Gyngell et al. 2017; Savulescu et al. 2015). In addition, 
several reports on genome editing discuss this question, including the National Academies of Science, 
Engineering and Medicine report (National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine 2017) 
and two reports by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2016, 2018). 





who should come into existence, as their applications influence the genetic 
endowment of future generations. This latter feature, with some caveats that I 
discuss in the next section, fits my proposed definition of ‘eugenics’. Paper 3 directly 
addresses the central ethical question of this thesis, who should come into existence, 
and the implications of this decision. It does so by evaluating whether new 
technologies should be developed and implemented considering existing 
alternatives, and whether respecting prospective parents’ reproductive freedom 
justifies their introduction.  
Paper 4, the second paper incorporated into this part of the thesis, is an article co-
authored with Dr César Palacios-González (CPG) and published in the Journal of 
Medical Ethics. It is titled ‘Lesbian Motherhood and Mitochondrial Replacement 
Techniques: Reproductive Freedom and Genetic Kinship’. In this paper, my co-
author and I discuss the ethical question of extending the criteria of access to MRTs 
to include lesbian couples wishing to have children who are genetically related106 to 
both parties of the couple. MRTs both fit my definition of ‘eugenic’ technologies 
and have been depicted in the literature as such (see, for instance, Wrigley et al. 
2015 for a critical discussion of this claim). This paper returns to the question of the 
reach of prospective parents’ reproductive freedom, and whether just limits can be 
imposed on this freedom. I discuss these aspects in Paper 3 (Cavaliere 2018a) and in 
Part IV of this thesis.  
*** 
Despite the public and academic attention it has received, the clinical application of 
genome editing on human embryos and their subsequent implantation to start a 
pregnancy is not legally permitted in any jurisdiction (for a discussion, see for 
instance Araki & Ishii 2014; Braun & Dabrock 2017; de Miguel Beriain 2017; Scott 
& Wilkinson 2017). At present, the technical challenges of reducing off-target 
mutations and mosaicism make this application of genome editing not clinically safe 
                                                 
106 If MRTs were employed by lesbian couples to this end, the children born as a result of their use 
would inherit the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) of one of the two prospective mothers and the 
nuclear DNA (nDNA) of the other.  
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or effective (Vassena et al. 2016). In addition, as some authors have argued, this 
application may not be necessarily the most pressing from an ethical point of view 
(see, for instance, Caplan et al. 2015; Charo & Greely 2015; Greely 2015). It may 
also not be the most pressing in terms of research agendas (other applications of 
genome editing are already underway) or efficacy and economy of means (other 
applications may produce more reliable outcomes)107. The reasons why I am 
concerned with this application are on the one hand that it generates controversy 
and moral disagreement among scientists, ethicists, authors from other backgrounds 
(such as STS and legal scholars), and members of the public; on the other, that this 
application of genome editing raises once again the question of who should come 
into existence108.  
Moving to MRTs, the technologies discussed in Paper 4, the first country that 
explicitly allowed MRTs was the U.K., which approved two techniques for the 
transfer of mtDNA under a licensed scheme after a parliamentary vote in February 
2015 (Callaway 2015): mitochondrial spindle transfer (MST) and pronuclear DNA 
transfer (PNT). In the U.K., ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015’ of the HFEA rule out, albeit not 
explicitly, other applications of MRTs – such as their use by infertile couples to 
avoid embryonic arrest and by lesbian couples to have a child who is genetically 
related to both parties of the couple. Specifically, the HFEA regulations allow the 
use of MRTs when:  
i) There is a particular risk that any egg extracted from the ovaries of a woman 
named in the determination [or embryo which is created by the fertilisation of 
an egg extracted from the ovaries of a woman named in the determination] may 
have mitochondrial abnormalities caused by mtDNA; and 
                                                 
107 For an overview and discussion of alternative applications, see a paper not incorporated into this 
thesis that I co-authored with Silvia Camporesi: Camporesi and Cavaliere (2016).  
108 I return in the following section to whether genome editing and MRTs can be classified as ‘eugenic 
technologies’ and whether they are identity-affecting. 





ii) There is a significant risk that a person with those abnormalities will have or 
develop serious mitochondrial disease. (Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
2015) 
In Paper 4, I focus on these two conditions and the ethical implications of excluding 
lesbian couples (and other couples where both parties have functioning ovaries) from 
accessing these technologies. 
I now turn to a discussion of the two questions outlined above, which concern both 
genome editing and MRTs: namely whether they are identity-affecting 
technologies and whether a preference to have genetically related children is an 
ethically acceptable reason to ground a positive case for them.  
1.1 Eugenic Technologies: Question Mark 
In the introduction to this thesis, I argued that the reproductive technologies 
discussed throughout are eugenic as they play a role in decisions concerning who 
should come into existence and how to balance the burdens and benefits of these 
decisions. While for technologies like PGD it is clear that this label applies109, within 
debates on the ethics of technologies such as genome editing and MRTs there is no 
consensus as to whether they are therapeutic as opposed to eugenic. The debate 
hinges on a discussion of numerical identity: these technologies would be considered 
unequivocally therapeutic if their applications to early human embryos (or to 
oocytes, in the case of MST) did not change their numerical identity110. This means 
that applying, for instance, genome editing technologies to an early human embryo 
would not give rise to another (numerically different) embryo but to the same 
                                                 
109 What is clear is not whether technologies that play a role in decisions concerning who should be 
allowed to come into existence can be rightfully labelled eugenic. As I showed in the first part of the 
thesis, this is a contested and controversial label. What seems obvious is that technologies such as 
PGD do play a role in such decisions. The same cannot uncontroversially be said about genome 
editing and MRTs, as whether these technologies are eugenic in the sense outlined in the 
introduction to this thesis is part of the debate on their ethical standing. 
110 I discuss what numerical identity is and what it means to change the numerical identity of early 
embryos due to the application of genome editing technologies in the first of the two articles that 
follow this introduction.  
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(numerically identical) embryo, minus the harmful genetic mutation intended to be 
corrected. If this was the case, these technologies would not be very different from, 
for instance, gene-therapy technologies aimed at editing genes responsible for 
conditions such as beta thalassemia or sickle-cell disease111. The only relevant 
difference would be that the latter technologies are applied postnatally while the 
former are employed prior to implantation112. Similarly, MRTs would be considered 
eugenic if their applications to early embryos were going to change their numerical 
identity. If this was the case, these technologies would help to create children free 
from undesired conditions, rather than treating or, following Anthony Wrigley et al. 
(2015), ‘pre-emptively’ treating such children113.  
Whether genome editing and MRTs are eugenic or therapeutic technologies and, 
especially, the implications of this distinction, are questions discussed in Papers 3 
and 4. With respect to genome editing, the ethical implications of this distinction 
are that, were genome editing technologies therapeutic as opposed to eugenic114, 
they would not be subjected to some of the critiques directed against PGD such as 
the expressivist argument (Buchanan 1996; Wilkinson 2010, Ch 6). From an ethical 
                                                 
111 See Emily Mullin (2017) concerning this application of genome editing technologies.  
112 While I do not think that this is an ethically relevant difference per se, one may argue that applying 
a genetic technology to early embryos as opposed to grown-up adults or children matters from an 
ethical point of view. This would be true for those who are opposed to altering the genome of early 
embryos, as this could be considered an instance of germline modification and as it would require 
previous studies on embryos (and potentially also discarding embryos involved in this research). Both 
practices are contested on ethical grounds – I discuss the former in Paper 3 (Cavaliere 2018a) and the 
latter in Paper 5 (Cavaliere 2017). 
113 For a discussion of claims on genetic identity within the U.K. and U.S. policy frameworks, see 
Scott and Wilkinson (2017). 
114 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics report (2018), published after the publication of Paper 3, 
discusses the question of numerical identity and genome editing. It states: “In the case of a serious 
inherited metabolic disorder, as discussed above, the prospective parents might decide to use a 
preimplantation intervention to secure that an embryo to be transferred is not affected by that 
disorder. In this case, if the transferred embryo results in the birth of a child, that child will not have 
the disorder. The prospective parents might, on the other hand, decide to conceive without 
assistance. In this case, there is a chance that their child will be affected by the disorder. These two 
possible children would probably have very different lives. We can also imagine a variation of the 
first of these two cases (preimplantation intervention) in which the child was not affected by the 
condition, but their developmental potential was somehow restricted as a consequence of the 
procedure itself, in a way that did not come to light until after the birth” (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics 2018: 64). 
 





point of view, this would provide a prima facie reason to defend them, to invest 
resources to improve their efficacy, and to legalise them. With respect to MRTs, 
the ethical implications of this distinction are, in my view, broader. As I argue in 
Paper 4, if MRTs are eugenic as opposed to therapeutic, then their therapeutic 
potential could not be invoked to ground a positive case for them and to restrict 
access to them to women at risk of transmitting mtDNA abnormalities to their 
offspring. Other reasons that can be rightfully said to ground a positive case for 
MRTs call for expanding criteria to access them beyond the two stated within the 
HFEA regulations mentioned above. They would call to expand these criteria to 
include lesbian couples who wish to have children who are genetically related to 
both parties of the couple.  
Despite these clarifications (and further clarifications on this issue offered in Papers 
3 and 4), I would still argue that these technologies are, following a broad 
understanding of the term, as the understanding I am proposing, eugenic. An idea 
that underlies the entirety of this thesis is that eugenics is a widely encompassing 
phenomenon that concerns decisions on, following Jonathan Glover (1984), ‘what 
sort of people should there be’ and the implications of these decisions. 
Notwithstanding the conclusions reached on whether genome editing and MRTs 
are therapeutic or eugenic in the sense explained above, I contend that at least the 
decisions to employ them to satisfy one’s own procreative and parental preferences as 
opposed to pursuing alternative routes to parenthood are indeed eugenic in that they 
cause certain types of people to be brought into existence and not others. What 
matters for my analysis, then, is not the label itself, but the ethical standing of such 
decisions and of the technologies which make these decisions possible.  
1.2 Genome Editing, MRTs, and Genetic Relatedness   
Within the debate on the ethics of genome editing, part of the attention has been 
devoted to ethical questions raised by applying this technology to early human 
embryos as an alternative to PGD for prospective parents at risk of transmitting 
genetic conditions to their offspring (see for instance: Bauman 2017; de Wert et al. 
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2017; Gyngell et al. 2017; Mertes & Pennings 2015)115. Some of the authors 
discussing this issue (de Wert et al. 2017; Gyngell et al. 2017) have argued that, once 
safety questions have been addressed and sufficient basic and pre-clinical research 
have been conducted, genome editing could have two comparative advantages over 
PGD. The first is that it could be used in cases where PGD is not effective (de Wert 
et al. 2017; Vassena et al. 2016) and the second is that, unlike PGD, genome editing 
has trans-generational effects in that the changes inserted in the embryos are 
heritable (Gyngell et al. 2017; de Wert et al. 2017). As stated above, genome editing 
does not currently represent a viable alternative to PGD due to laws and regulations 
prohibiting germline modifications and to technical limitations. This means that, at 
present, the question is not whether genome editing should be used in the context 
of assisted reproduction as an alternative to PGD, but rather whether public and 
private resources should be deployed to conduct basic, pre-clinical, and clinical 
research with genome editing. Contrary to other concerns that have been raised 
(see, for instance, Baltimore 2015; Baylis & Ikemoto 2017; Collins 2015; Lanphier et 
al. 2015), regarding human dignity, obtaining informed consent and other 
deontological objections, I am not convinced that these are compelling reasons 
against conducting research with genome editing116. What I contend instead is that 
the question of the opportunity costs of allocating resources to basic, pre-clinical, 
and clinical research with genome editing deserves ethical attention117. While this 
question does not amount to a conclusive reason against conducting research with 
genome editing, it ought to be considered in assessments of the ethical challenges of 
the introduction of genome editing as an alternative to PGD (or within discussions 
of ‘cases for’ and ‘objections to’ this possibility, as in Gyngell et al. 2017).  
                                                 
115 For an overview of the arguments for and against, see Guido de Wert et al. (2017). 
116 For a critical discussion and rebuttal of these concerns, see John Harris (2016a); Guido M. W. R. 
de Wert et al. (2017); Christopher Gyngell et al. (2017). 
117 A similar view is expressed by Heidi Mertes and Guido Pennings (2015) in a brief commentary: 
“Thus, the only plausible way in which germline editing therapies would provide a substantial benefit 
as compared to the current standard of care would be when they turn out to be superior to PGD in 
terms of clinical outcomes, in terms of cost-effectiveness, and/or in terms of ethical concerns” (Mertes 
& Pennings 2015: 53). 





The other few commentators who have compared PGD and genome editing, such 
as Christopher Gyngell et al. (2017), consider (and reject) objections to genome 
editing concerning safety, enhancement, and deontological objections against 
inserting heritable changes in early embryos mentioned above. But these questions, 
and especially safety questions, do not exhaust the debate on the ethical standing of 
a new reproductive technology. Safety is of paramount (ethical) importance, and no 
technology should be approved without a thorough assessment of its risks and 
potentially harmful consequences. At the same time, focusing only on safety (and 
on defeatable deontological objections) can engender undesirable outcomes. A first 
undesirable outcome is that this narrow focus systematically excludes other 
potentially relevant ethical concerns118; another is that it points towards only 
‘technical’ solutions to what are perceived as ‘technical’ problems. This means on 
the one hand that other potential non-technical solutions, such as changing laws 
regulating adoption and gamete donations, may not be considered worth pursuing; 
on the other hand, scientists can retain their authority in ethical debates as they are 
the best placed in assessing safety and efficacy, while other ethically relevant 
concerns may end up being systematically excluded (Hurlbut 2017; Lewens 2015).  
Examples of concerns that may be excluded from ethical debates on new 
reproductive technologies are the opportunity costs of investing resources in 
research with genome editing, considering that people at risk of transmitting a 
harmful genetic mutation to their offspring could pursue alternative routes to fulfil 
their parenthood projects. The question of opportunity costs and alternative 
strategies is strictly interlinked with additional questions, which I discuss in Papers 
3 and 4 and in the conclusions to Part II119. These questions pertain to the ethical 
standing of the preference to have genetically related children, to how far innovation 
                                                 
118 On this point, Jasanoff and Hurlbut (2018) argue: “If the ethical stakes of human germline genome 
editing are limited to questions of physical safety, for example, then the technical evaluation of 
particular biological endpoints (for instance, off-target effects) might offer sufficient answers. But 
such a focus short-circuits the central question of how to care for and value human life, individually, 
societally and in relation to other forms of life on Earth” (Jasanoff & Hurlbut 2018: 437). 
119 In Paper 3, I discuss the question of genetic relatedness with respect to genome editing, while in 
Paper 4 I discuss this question with respect to MRTs.  
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within reproductive medicine should be pushed and to how many resources should 
be deployed in order to satisfy this preference.  
*** 
Recently, the ethical standing of developing and allowing new reproductive 
technologies to satisfy the preference for genetic relatedness has been discussed 
within the context of MRTs, and indeed it has been used as a critique against these 
technologies by several commentators (Baylis 2017a; de Melo-Martín 2017b, Ch 8; 
Griffiths 2016; Petropanagos 2017; Rieder 2015a; Rulli 2016a, 2016b). For instance, 
Françoise Baylis (2017a), following Aristoteles’ distinction of natural versus acquired 
desires, has argued that the preference for a genetically related child is comparable 
to the latter rather than the former, and that it can hence be regarded as a wish rather 
than as a need. According to her, this distinction casts doubts on the benefits of 
MRTs as their primary function would be to satisfy people’s wishes rather than their 
needs and while there are good reasons to satisfy natural desires (needs), the same 
cannot be said for acquired desires (wishes). In Baylis’ words:  
[T]here are different kinds of wants with respect to the acquired desire to have 
a family that includes children, many of which can be met by existing, safe 
alternatives to human nuclear genome transfer [MRTs]. (Baylis 2017a: 14) 
This is the view of other genetic-relatedness-sceptics, such as Tina Rulli (2016a, 
2016b) and Travis Rieder (2015a). For instance, Rulli (2016a) has argued that the 
only real benefit of MRTs is that they allow women at risk of transmitting mtDNA 
diseases to their offspring to have children who are genetically related to them, 
which she sees as an unsatisfactory reason to implement these technologies. 
According to her, the preference to have genetically related children should not be 
satisfied at all costs, as:  
[H]ard-nosed reality means we need more than preference—even deeply held 
preference—to justify our investment of medical dollars into developing a 
technology. We have more strong preferences than dollars available to satisfy 
them. (Rulli 2016a: 42) 





Other concerns pertaining to MRTs and the preference for genetically related 
children are discussed in Paper 4 (Cavaliere & Palacios-González 2018). However, 
there is a difference between the two technologies and how the question of genetic 
relatedness applies to them. At present, one of the central questions with respect to 
genome editing is whether the preference for a genetically related child warrants the 
investment of the resources needed to conduct basic, pre-clinical, and clinical 
research, considering that PGD is an effective and reliable alternative in many cases 
(albeit not all; see, for instance, Vassena et al. 2016). With respect to the ethics of 
MRTs, again at present, the question of genetic relatedness does not only point, as 
Rulli (2016a) argues, in the direction of scarce resources and opportunity costs. 
MRTs have already been developed and implemented (at least in the U.K.). The 
question of genetic relatedness in this context hence points also towards whether 
criteria to access these technologies should be extended to other groups, especially 
in countries such as the U.K. where the safety and efficacy of these technologies has 
been thoroughly assessed by the HFEA and where they have been legally 
permitted. In addition, I am not convinced that arguing that genetic relatedness is a 
wish and not a need or that people should pursue alternative routes to parenthood is 
a conclusive argument against new reproductive technologies such as genome 
editing and MRTs. I return to the question of genetic relatedness and new 






2 PAPER 3: Genome Editing and Assisted Reproduction: Curing Embryos, 
Society or Prospective Parents? 
Paper 3 is a single-authored paper published in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy.   
The original version of this paper is enclosed in Appendix 3.  
Cavaliere, G. (2018a). Genome editing and assisted reproduction: curing embryos, 
society or prospective parents?. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 21(2), 215-225.  
2.1 Abstract 
This paper explores the ethics of introducing genome-editing technologies as a new 
reproductive option. In particular, it focuses on whether genome editing can be 
considered a morally valuable alternative to preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD). Two arguments against the use of genome editing in reproduction are 
analysed, namely safety concerns and germline modification. These arguments are 
then contrasted with arguments in favour of genome editing, in particular with the 
argument of the child’s welfare and the argument of parental reproductive 
autonomy. In addition to these two arguments, genome editing could be considered 
as a worthy alternative to PGD as it may not be subjected to some of the moral 
critiques moved against this technology. Even if these arguments offer sound reasons 
in favour of introducing genome editing as a new reproductive option, I conclude 
that these benefits should be balanced against other considerations. More 
specifically, I maintain that concerns regarding the equality of access to assisted 
reproduction and the allocation of scarce resources should be addressed prior to the 
adoption of genome editing as a new reproductive option.  
Keywords: Genome editing | Assisted reproduction | Genetic kinship | PGD | 
Therapy | Selection  
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2.2 Introduction: Genetic Diseases, Genome Editing and Existing Alternatives 
Different reproductive options are available for couples or individuals at risk of 
transmitting genetic diseases to their offspring who wish to have children. In this 
paper, I explore the ethical and social issues of introducing genome editing as a new 
reproductive technology and, in particular, as a potential replacement of 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).  
Some of the reproductive options available include refraining from having 
biologically related children and/or technologies to reduce or avoid the risk of 
transmission. The first set of options includes adopting existing children or turning 
to third-party reproduction (i.e. relying on a gamete donor). Adoption is currently 
legal in many European countries, but eligibility criteria vary. For instance, in some 
countries, access to this practice is limited to married heterosexual couples (e.g. 
Italy), while other countries have wider access criteria and allow same-sex couples 
(e.g. the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and single parents (e.g. France and 
the United Kingdom) to adopt. In addition, other criteria such as marital status and 
age play a role in the decision to grant adoption.  
Another possibility to avoid transmission of genetic diseases is for individuals to have 
partly genetically-related children and to seek gamete donors. This is commonly 
referred to as third-party reproduction, which allows couples to have children who 
are genetically related to a donor and to the unaffected individual in the couple. 
Third-party reproduction is currently only legal in some countries (e.g. the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain) and usually restricted to heterosexual 
couples. Moreover, the state only subsidises IVF with donor gametes in a few 
countries (Gianaroli et al. 2016).  
Alternatively, prospective parents at risk of transmitting genetic conditions to their 
offspring can seek to reproduce with assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) that 
allow them to have genetically related children free from the condition that affects 
them (or one of them). Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) allows the testing 
of embryos created with IVF for genetic abnormalities prior to their transfer in utero. 
PGD is currently legal in many European countries (Gianaroli et al. 2016), while in 
others it remains restricted to so-called ‘serious’ conditions (e.g. in Italy and 




Germany). It is completely banned in other countries (e.g. in Poland and 
Switzerland; Biondi 2013; Gianaroli et al. 2016). Across Europe, eligibility criteria 
vary. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) periodically revises and updates the lists of 
conditions that are eligible for screening with PGD. Other countries, such as 
Germany and Italy, recently approved the use of PGD, but access to this practice 
remains restricted to a very limited number of severe early onset conditions (Biondi 
2013; Gianaroli et al. 2016).  
Where PGD is legal, it is typically used in cases where both prospective parents are 
carriers of an autosomal recessive mutation. These mutations are responsible for the 
occurrence of autosomal recessive monogenic diseases (i.e. diseases caused by a 
mutation in a single gene) such as cystic fibrosis and sickle cells anaemia120. When 
both prospective parents are carriers of such mutations, future offspring have a 1 in 
4 chance of inheriting the mutated gene and developing an autosomal recessive 
disease, while they have a 1 in 2 chance of inheriting one abnormal gene and thus 
becoming healthy carriers. PGD allows the testing and selection of embryos created 
through IVF to transfer in utero those that are either free from the abnormal gene 
related to the prospective parents’ condition (or that are carriers of such mutated 
gene when no mutation-free embryo is obtained). PGD is also effective in cases 
where one of the prospective parents is heterozygous for an autosomal dominant 
mutation, meaning that they carry two different variants of a gene. Autosomal 
dominant mutations are responsible for the occurrence of diseases such as 
Huntington’s and neurofibromatosis type 1. Future offspring have a 1 in 2 chance of 
developing autosomal dominant diseases even if only one of the prospective parents 
is affected, because it is possible that the embryo would carry the ‘good’ genetic 
variant from both parents. If the embryo inherited the disease-causing variant from 
only one parent, however, the resulting child would be affected by the disease. 
It could be the case, that none of the embryos created through IVF is free from the 
undesirable genetic mutation.  For instance, when one of the prospective parents is 
                                                 
120 Autosomal recessive diseases develop when an individual has two copies of an abnormal gene.  
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homozygous for a dominant genetic disorder, the risk of transmission to offspring is 
as high as 100%, and hence no mutation-free embryos can be obtained. In addition, 
when prospective parents are both heterozygous for a dominant genetic disorder, 
the risk of transmission is as high as 75%, hence the chances of finding mutation-free 
embryos significantly low. Another case where PGD is not effective is when both 
parents are homozygous for a recessive genetic disorder, meaning that they both 
carry two variants of the disease-causing gene (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2016; 
Vassena et al. 2016).  In such cases, genome editing could represent an alternative 
to PGD and a new reproductive option for some prospective parents: mutations 
potentially leading to monogenic diseases would be corrected in embryos created 
with IVF prior to the transfer in utero or directly onto prospective parents’ gametes 
prior to fertilisation. Lastly, gene editing could replace PGD for women at risk of 
transmitting mitochondrial diseases as mitochondrial DNA mutations present in 
oocytes121 could be corrected in the embryo (Vassena et al. 2016).  
In the following paragraphs, I will briefly present the debate on genome editing 
technologies applied to human embryos and I will show how these technologies 
could be used as an alternative to PGD for the aforementioned cases where PGD is 
not effective. In section 2, I will present the moral reasons in favour of and against 
introducing genome editing as an alternative to PGD. In particular, I will present 
arguments in favour of using genome editing instead of, or as an alternative to, PGD, 
and argue that some of the moral arguments against PGD would not be applicable 
to genome editing. I will conclude, ad interim, that such arguments offer a prima facie 
case in favour of introducing genome editing as a new reproductive option, given 
that safety concerns are thoroughly assessed. In section 3, I will turn to other 
arguments on the ethics of introducing genome editing as a new reproductive option 
and argue that there are additional questions that need to be carefully addressed. I 
conclude that introducing genome editing as a new reproductive option would have 
                                                 
121 Currently, the United Kingdom is the only country that has allowed mitochondrial DNA 
replacement techniques. Such techniques represent the only existing method for couples where one 
member is affected by a mitochondrial condition to have genetically related children.   




some benefits, but that concerns regarding the equality of access to assisted 
reproduction and the allocation of scarce resources should be addressed beforehand. 
2.2.1 CRISPR and Assisted Reproduction 
Gene-editing technologies have been around for over a decade. Zinc finger 
nucleases (ZFNs) and transcription activator-like effector nucleases (TALENs), 
two gene-editing technologies, were discovered in 2005 and 2010 respectively. 
ZFNs and TALENs are proteins that contain a module that can be engineered to 
recognise and target specific DNA sequences, and another module that can cut the 
targeted DNA sequence. These proteins are able to cause a double-strand break in 
the DNA, a break in two opposite sites of the two strands of the DNA molecule. 
These breaks are then repaired by the DNA’s repairing machinery of the cell. ZENs 
and TALENs are relatively precise techniques, but have the disadvantage that they 
need engineered proteins to target specific sequences of the DNA, a procedure that 
requires time and resources (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2016).  
A new gene editing technique sparked debate early in 2015 due to its application on 
non-viable human embryos by a group of Chinese scientists (Baltimore et al. 2015; 
Lanphier & Urnov 2015). The technique in question is CRISPR/Cas9, an RNA-
guided tool composed of two parts: clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic 
repeat (CRISPR) and CRISPR-associated protein 9 (Cas9). CRISPR/Cas9 makes 
use of a naturally occurring defence mechanism that bacteria use to avoid harmful 
infections caused by pathogenic organisms (e.g. viruses). The RNA tool (CRISPR) 
functions as a guide for the Cas proteins to target specific parts of the genome, which 
are subsequently cut by the Cas proteins. These cut strands can be exploited to 
modify the nucleotide sequence of DNA and to insert genes at the cut site. The 
application of this technique to human embryos and human gametes (i.e. oocytes 
and sperm cells) has been widely criticised for a number of issues, but chiefly for its 
potential to introduce inheritable changes in the human genome (germline 
modification). Indeed, the issue of germline modification has catalysed the attention 
of many scientists and ethicists (Brokowski et al. 2015; Lander 2015; Lanphier et al. 
2015).   
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This paper focuses on PGD and CRISPR122 applications to the field of assisted 
reproduction. In particular, it focuses on CRISPR as a potential alternative to PGD. 
CRISPR could represent a tool to avoid the occurrence of genetic diseases in future 
children through the modification of the genetic makeup of embryos created with 
IVF from couples with a known risk of transmitting such genetic diseases. Since 
using CRISPR on early embryos could give to prospective parents who are either 
affected by monogenic diseases or who are carriers of them a chance to avoid the 
transmission of these diseases to their offspring, this particular application of 
CRISPR can be considered a new reproductive option for parents who want to have 
genetically related children. 
2.3 Assisted Reproduction and PGD, or Assisted Reproduction and CRISPR? 
Research on human embryos with CRISPR technology is still at an early stage and 
only few experiments have been carried out thus far (Vassena et al. 2016). Despite 
this, the issue of allowing clinical research has been discussed recently (Gyngell et 
al. 2017; Reyes & Lanner 2017; Vassena et al. 2016;). The two main precautionary 
reasons that have been advanced against clinical applications of genome editing on 
human embryos or gamete cells are concerns regarding introducing changes in the 
human germline and safety questions. Many scholars and members of the public 
consider germline modifications unethical and a “line that should not be crossed” 
(Camporesi & Cavaliere 2016). The worry is that edited embryos will pass their 
edited genome on to future generations, thus introducing changes in humanity’s 
gene pool. While it is of fundamental moral importance to consider the impact of 
present actions that could potentially have an impact on future generations, it seems 
reductive to limit this precautionary reflection to changes introduced with genome 
editing technologies on reproductive cells and embryos. In particular, those who 
worry about germline modifications via CRISPR and other genome editing 
technologies maintain that there is something exceptional in changes introduced 
                                                 
122 The arguments made for CRISPR can be extended also to other future genome editing 
technologies. Throughout the paper, I will use CRISPR and genome editing or gene editing 
technologies interchangeably.  




technologically in our genomes via genome editing (and indirectly into the genomes of 
our offspring). This view misrepresents partially the natural history of humankind 
and how past and present humanly introduced innovations shape future generations 
(Buchanan 2011). The introduction of agriculture, for instance, played a role not 
only in shaping our environment, but has fundamentally changed our genomes. The 
same could be said about technologies such as literacy and numeracy, which laid the 
foundations for technological innovations that have significantly changed us 
(Buchanan 2008, 2011).  In other words, from a moral point of view, it seems 
irrelevant which means are used and whether inheritable changes are introduced with 
genome editing technologies or caused by other technological innovations, unless 
one is able to show the moral exceptionality of using genome editing technologies.  
The other argument against allowing genome editing for clinical uses is concern for 
the safety of future offspring. At this stage, safety is indeed an issue and the 
efficiency of genome editing on embryos remains low, with mosaic embryos (i.e. 
embryos that have abnormal numbers of chromosomes in certain cells resulting in 
genetically different cells coexisting in the same organism) being the main known 
drawback of these technologies (Vassena et al. 2016). Despite this, some studies 
have proven the feasibility of gene editing in animals (Heo et al. 2015; Shao et al. 
2014; Yoshimi et al. 2014; Zou et al., 2015), even though the efficiency of genetically 
modifying zygotes with Cas9 ranges between 0.5 and 40% (Araki & Ishii 2014). In 
addition, a recent study demonstrated the feasibility of preventing the onset of a 
genetic disorder such as cataract development (Wu et al. 2013) and the injection of 
Cas9 into primate zygotes led to the birth of genetically modified offspring (Liu et 
al. 2014; Niu et al. 2014). 
2.3.1 The Case for Genome Editing: Two Sets of Arguments  
There are two sets of arguments for introducing CRISPR and other gene editing 
technologies into the clinic, provided that safety concerns are properly addressed. 
In this section I first outline the first group of arguments, which concerns the benefits 
of genome editing for future children (and their children too) and for prospective 
parents (Gyngell et al. 2017; Reyes & Lanner 2017). In the following section, I 
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present additional reasons why genome editing could be a morally preferable 
alternative to PGD: genome editing would not be subjected to some of the critiques 
moved against PGD.   
The moral reasons that ground the case for PGD (the welfare of future children and 
the reproductive autonomy of prospective parents. Pennings et al. 2007; Buchanan 
et al. 2001) can be extended to defend the clinical use of genome editing in 
reproduction. It is widely accepted that reproductive autonomy and respect for 
parental discretion in reproduction are values worth defending123  (Buchanan et al. 
2001; Robertson 1994). With respect to reproductive autonomy, genome editing 
would be comparatively better than PGD: it would offer an alternative to this 
technology for those aforementioned cases where PGD is not effective or for 
prospective parents who wish to increase their chances of having mutation-free 
embryos. In this sense, genome editing could be said to enhance reproductive 
autonomy. With respect to the welfare of the child, the case in favour of genome 
editing seems prima facie stronger than the case in favour of PGD. Unlike the latter 
technology, whereby embryos implanted can be carriers of the parents’ mutated 
gene, genome editing would allow modification of the genetic makeup of embryos 
who would consequently develop into mutation-free offspring. In other words, 
genome editing would prevent the occurrence of genetic diseases in future 
generations, while PGD can sometimes only prevent the occurrence of genetic 
diseases in the child that develops from the implanted embryo (Gyngell et al. 2017).  
There are, however, other arguments in favour of preferring genome editing to 
PGD. PGD is a contested practice as its scopes are not therapeutic (i.e. PGD does 
not treat embryos) but rather selective (i.e. PGD selects the embryos that should be 
transferred in utero. Asch & Barlevy 2012; Parens & Asch 2003). PGD as a means 
to select embryos that have a decreased risk of developing into a child with a genetic 
condition is seen as ethically troubling for two reasons: firstly, because it goes against 
the traditional ends of medicine and ‘selects out’ rather than ‘cures’ persons affected 
                                                 
123 At least when it is about medical conditions, but this is the case in question, so I will not enter into 
a discussion on so-called cosmetic traits and enhancement. 




by genetic conditions (MacKellar & Bechtel 2014), and secondly, because decisions 
on which embryos should be selected are said to embody value judgements 
regarding people living with certain disabilities (Knoppers et al. 2006; Parens & Ash 
2003), a critique of screening technologies that became known as the ‘expressivist 
argument’ or ‘expressivist objection’ (Buchanan 1996; Shakespeare 2006).  
2.3.2  Selection Versus Therapy 
PGD (at the moment) and CRISPR (potentially in the future) are two technologies 
that enable similar ends: in both cases, these technologies increase the chances of 
giving parents genetically related offspring unaffected by specific genetic conditions. 
Despite the similarity of the outcomes (i.e. healthy child), the means used are rather 
different. PGD is a form of genetic testing that allows screening for abnormalities in 
early embryos and to subsequently implant only those with a decreased risk of 
developing a certain condition.  Instead, CRISPR and other gene editing 
technologies are tools for gene therapy that allow the modification of embryos or of 
gamete cells in order to avoid the occurrence of certain conditions in the future child 
(and in future generations).  
Following this distinction of means, there is a sense that while PGD entails the 
selection of embryos, CRISPR is more akin to therapy. At this point, however, it is 
important to note that CRISPR and other genome editing technologies can be 
considered both therapeutic and non-strictly-therapeutic (or, following Wrigley et 
al., “pre-emptively therapeutic”; Wrigley et al. 2015: 636). I am not trying to violate 
Aristoteles’ principle of non-contradiction on the impossibility that contradictory 
assertions can be both true at the same time here. What I mean is rather that whether 
these technologies are therapeutic depends on what sort of factual and moral 
considerations are taken into account. If the focus is on the prospective parents, then 
CRISPR can be considered therapeutic in some instances because it could be used 
for those couples who have infertility-related issues. In this sense, it would represent 
a treatment for the couple’s infertility, which, following the 2009 definition of the 
WHO, can be considered a form of disease (Zegers-Hochschild et al. 2009). 
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If the focus is on the future children, we have two possible interpretations: following 
the view that equates embryos with persons, CRISPR is therapeutic because it treats 
the embryos (i.e. it treats persons), whereas PGD is selective because it selects 
in/out the embryos (i.e. it selects out persons). If, however, we are more inclined to 
think of embryos as beings with the potential to develop into persons (i.e. potentiality 
view, arguably a more widely shared position), then CRISPR is not 
straightforwardly therapeutic, because there is no person to be treated in the 
moment that we use the technology124. Despite this remark, I argue that there is a 
sense whereby genome editing can still be considered therapeutic, or, as mentioned 
above, pre-emptively therapeutic. Currently, ethicists and philosophers involved in 
the debate on reproductive genetic technologies seem to be divided on whether 
genome editing technologies applied to embryos are identity-affecting technologies 
or not, as this largely depends on the circumstances taken into account125. When I 
say “identity-affecting” I refer to the idea of numerical identity and to the 
metaphysical problem of determining how we can rightly refer to one and the same 
person in any different set of circumstances, despite the changes that the person 
undergoes over time. Thus, for instance, there is numerical identity between a 
person X and a person Y only if person X and Y are the same person. To put it 
simply, I am numerically identical to the person that is writing this paper at the 
                                                 
124 This observation is conditional as it relies on the interpretation of therapy as a practice that can 
only be defined as such if there is a person to be treated (Rulli 2017). 
125 I refer here to the debate on mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) and not strictly on 
genome editing with CRISPR, as few commentators have dealt specifically with the question of 
whether genome editing is identity-affecting (for two examples, see: Gyngell et al. 2017; Liao 2017). 
One of the two techniques for the replacement of faulty mitochondrial DNA, pronuclear transfer 
(PNT), arguably represents the most similar case to genome editing as, unlike the other technique 
for the replacement of mitochondrial DNA (maternal spindle transfer –MST), it is applied after the 
oocytes has been fertilised. The contention, in the case of PNT, is whether this technique is identity-
affecting or not, and commentators have presented differing views on this matter (Liao 2017; Palacio-
González 2017; Rulli 2017; Wrigley et al. 2015). While I am aware that PNT and CRISPR are two 
distinct technologies, PNT arguably represents the most similar case to genome editing as both 
CRISPR and PNT are applied after fertilisation. Hence, other things being equal, arguments 
concerning whether PNT is identity-affecting or not can also be considered valid in discussions on 
whether CRISPR is identity-affecting. It must be noted however, that those who explicitly referred 
to genome editing maintained that it is not identity-affecting (Gyngell et al. 2017; Liao 2017). 
Interestingly, authors who speculatively consider the possibility of using gene therapy on human 
embryos before the availability of CRISPR are also divided on this issue (Buchanan 1996; McMahan 
2006; Sparrow 2008). 




moment. The challenge of any account of numerical identity is then to explain what 
determines the entity that we in fact are despite the changes that we undergo over 
time. In this sense, if I grow taller or if I lose an eye due to an accident, I am still 
numerically identical to the entity I was before having that accident or when I was 
shorter. This is the case because changes such as losing an eye or growing taller are 
largely considered contingent to numerical identity, namely they do not change the 
entity that I am.  
Returning to genome editing, those who do not subscribe to the embryos as persons 
view can view the technology in two different ways. The contentious matter is 
whether applying CRISPR on embryo X creates a numerically different entity (call 
it embryo Z, that will eventually develop into person Z) or it just leads to a 
numerically identical entity (call it embryo X*, that will eventually develop into 
person X*) in the same sense that applying gene therapy on adult X does not create 
a different adult Z, but only leads to a numerically identical adult X*. While in the 
first case genome editing would be considered an identity-affecting technology (i.e. 
a technology that by virtue of its use creates an entirely new entity), in the second 
case it would amount to a non-identity-affecting technology126. Following the first 
interpretation, CRISPR cannot be considered a therapy as, by virtue of its use on 
an embryo, it determines the kind of person that is brought into being rather than 
pre-emptively curing the same pre-person. On the contrary, if we are inclined to 
                                                 
126 Despite some challenges, the biological origin (or gametic origin) that a person has is widely 
considered a necessary condition of what determines the human being that we are. This is well 
explained by philosopher Derek Parfit’s ‘Origin View’ (or gametic essentialism): “each person has 
this necessary property: that of having grown from the particular pair of cells from which this person 
in fact grew” (Parfit 1984: 353). In other words, the fact that two gametes came together and 
generated me is, under this view, considered a necessary condition of my identity: I am the entity 
that I am by virtue of my gametic origin. Now, this is linked to the discussion of treatment and 
selection because a technology such as PGD is identity-affecting. In other words, using PGD causes 
a numerically different person to come into being, namely a different person than the person that 
would have come into being had PGD not been used. In the case of genome editing, since the 
intervention takes place after fertilisation, the gametic origin of the genetically modified embryo and 
the gametic origin of the non-genetically modified embryos are identical. In other words, these two 
embryos are numerically identical. The contention, however, is that gametic origin is only a 
necessary and not sufficient condition for having a specific identity. Thus, whether genome editing 
technologies applied to zygotes/embryos cause a different person to come into being or not remains 
an open question. If they do, then such technologies cannot be considered therapeutic because a 
different person comes into being due to the use of genome editing. If they do not, they can be 
considered therapeutic. 
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follow the second interpretation, then CRISPR is therapeutic as it pre-emptively 
cures an embryo that will develop into a numerically identical child that does not 
have the genetic condition that is consciously avoided127. It is only in this second 
sense that it is possible to say that if the genome of an embryo affected by a certain 
genetic condition is modified and this condition eradicated, then this embryo will 
develop into a numerically identical child who, had CRISPR not been used, would 
have been affected by a genetic disease. As a consequence, even if one does not 
subscribe to the embryo-as-persons view, there is a sense whereby genome editing can 
be considered at least more similar to therapy than to selection: genome editing would 
be a pre-emptive treatment for the genetic disease that is caused by the genetic 
mutation at the embryonic stage. 
If the second interpretation about genome editing being non-identity-affecting is 
embraced, then both the teleological objection (i.e. PGD is morally problematic 
because it does not fall within the traditional ends of medicine) and the selective 
attitudes objection (i.e. PGD is morally problematic because it promotes selective 
and discriminatory attitudes) seem to be less applicable to the use of genome editing 
on embryos to prevent the occurrence of certain conditions in future children. As 
explained above, editing the genome of embryos can be considered pre-emptively 
therapeutic and thus falls within (or at least closer to) the traditional ends of 
medicine. From this, it also follows that it would be problematic to consider such 
practice as selective or discriminatory: disability scholars would have to condemn all 
the interventions aimed at treating genetic diseases (Barnes 2014). 
These clarifications have normative implications, namely that, once the safety of 
editing the genome of human embryos is carefully assessed, the latter technology 
should be considered preferable to PGD. In the next section, I will outline some 
                                                 
127 If genome editing is employed before the 14th day after fertilisation (as it is required by embryos 
research regulations in the United Kingdom and in many other countries, Hyun et al. 2016), the 
embryo could still cleave into two (i.e. twinning). In this case, the children that could potentially 
develop from such embryo will be two. However, twinning occurs spontaneously and it is not 
influenced by the use of genome editing on the embryo. As a consequence, the use of the technique 
does not directly affect the numerical identity of the future child/children as it is not the direct 
causation of the embryo splitting.  




additional questions that need to be addressed and explain why preferring CRISPR 
over PGD is not completely cost-free.  
2.4 Curing Embryos, Society or Prospective Parents? 
In the previous sections, two main questions have remained unaddressed. One 
question is on the value and meaning of genetic parenthood. Another, albeit related, 
question concerns the ethics of existing alternatives. I explore these two questions 
in this last section and conclude that they provide at least some prima facie moral 
reasons for carefully considering the introduction of a new reproductive option when 
similar options are already available.  
A peculiar feature of assisted reproductive technologies such as PGD, and possibly 
genome editing, is that they are often offered to prospective parents who are 
affected by a genetic condition in order to conceive (or increase their chances of 
conceiving) healthy offspring. It is in this sense that these technologies represent a 
solution for those prospective parents whose problem is the impossibility of having a 
genetically related and healthy child; or at least healthier than the child that would 
otherwise be brought into the world had these technologies not be employed. As 
explained in the first section of this paper, there are other options than PGD to 
increase the chances of having healthy children, but they entail refraining from 
having biologically related children (for one individual in the couple or, in the case 
of adoption, both parties). Reproductive technologies such as PGD and genome 
editing convey the interests of different groups: the prospective parents, the future 
offspring and the society where these offspring will grow and thrive. Despite the 
importance of all three stakeholders, their interests are not granted equal 
importance: the welfare of future children and the reproductive autonomy of the 
prospective parents are usually considered of greater moral importance than the 
aggregate interests of society in having healthy members, respecting competing 
values on assisted reproduction, and limiting the use of certain technologies against 
a backdrop of scarce resources. This is what I define as the received view on the 
ethics of assisted reproductive technologies. An ethical assessment of whether 
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introducing new technologies in the context of reproduction should thus consider 
these three aspects (with the aforementioned prioritisation in mind) in turn. 
2.4.1 Reproductive Autonomy, Child Welfare and the Interests of Society 
Genome editing, at first sight, seems to score high on the reproductive autonomy 
and welfare of the child fronts: unlike PGD, it allows for more conditions to be 
corrected and the reduction of the occurrence of certain genetic conditions in future 
generations; it also increases the reproductive autonomy of the parents by offering 
not only one more possibility in the geneticists tool-box, but also by allowing those 
couples for whom PGD is not always successful to have biologically related, healthy 
offspring. So far so good. Or maybe not? The idea that more choice leads to greater 
freedom has been challenged (Dworkin 1982; Rose 1999; Rothman 1985). More 
options can also translate into more uncertainties, and greater perceived and actual 
responsibilities for the prospective parents (Dworkin 1982). In this sense, introducing 
genome editing into the clinic as an alternative to PGD may be detrimental for the 
very same prospective parents that it is designed for. While genome editing may be 
more routinely employed in the future, some issues will likely remain. These issues 
include, for instance, reflections upon which conditions should be eligible for the use 
of genome editing and whether parents who fail to employ the most efficient 
technology available could be considered morally responsible (Rothman 1985). 
What about the welfare of the future child? The empirical question of whether 
safety concerns will be put to rest and genome editing will ever be safe enough to 
represent a concrete alternative to PGD divides scholars. The reasons for this are 
twofold: first, no one knows the answer to such questions yet. Secondly, this 
empirical question is strongly influenced by the value judgements of scientists, 
ethicists, policy-makers and the public on the degree of certainty required to move 
forward. Hence, even without denying that such empirical questions will be 
eventually be put to rest, it is still important to note that a consensus on the question 
of safety will be hard to reach due to the competing values at stake in stakeholders’ 
assessments. Those taking a precautionary stance concerning technological 
development will favour existing technologies over the newly discovered, while 




those who are generally in favour of technological development will be ready to 
accept a higher degree of risk in the name of such progress and of the potential 
benefits that it may yield. With respect to the safety and the welfare of the future 
child, whether genome editing really represents a better option than PGD will thus 
divide scholars, scientists and the public (and, as exemplified by the debate on 
embryo-applications of CRISPR, already does). A decision on whether to allow 
genome editing will thus have to rest not only on a thorough assessment of the safety 
of the techniques, but also on a democratic process that takes into account such 
differing views and values (Jasanoff et al. 2015; Kitcher 2001). The ethical 
assessment of new techniques ought to not only rest on a cost/benefit analysis, but 
also on an evaluation of existing alternatives, including those that do not rely on 
biomedical means. In other words, whether genome editing really represents a 
worthy alternative to existing options (such as PGD) depends on the extent to which 
the welfare of the future child can be put at risk to allow couples to have a genetically 
related child. Regulators and ethicists that argue in favour of eventually replacing 
PGD with genome editing, and couples for whom PGD does not represent an 
option, will have to consider whether reproductive autonomy should trump 
questions on the welfare of the child in light of uncertainty. 
Lastly, what role should societal interests and views play in the decision over 
whether genome editing should replace PGD? There are historical reasons why 
some interventions of society or the state in reproductive choices are looked at with 
suspicion, and the shadow of eugenics seems to extend over any discussion regarding 
reproductive technologies and their governance (Paul 1992). Despite these worries, 
the regulation of new reproductive technologies will be influenced by governments’ 
policies and the interests of society will likely play a role in these decisions. There 
are two main ways in which the interests of society might play a role in the decisions 
on whether to allow genome editing technologies and whether they represent a 
valuable alternative to PGD. The first is whether genome editing is ethically 
acceptable for a large segment of society (Kitcher 2001), and second, related, is 
whether existing alternatives warrant the introduction of a new practice and the 
clinical research necessary to safely implement it. Almost every new technology 
introduced or discussed for potential introduction in reproduction seems to stir 
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controversies. The recent debates on genome editing (Camporesi & Cavaliere 
2016), mitochondrial replacement techniques (Appleby 2015) and ‘older’ debates on 
PGD (Scott 2006) are just a few instances of these controversies. However, once 
certain uses are constrained and lines drawn (for instance between therapeutic and 
enhancing uses), these technologies have been approved and, at least in certain 
countries, accepted by large swaths of the population. Thus, even if genome editing 
will be met with controversies and will encounter resistance, it does not prima facie 
translate into the need for banning any research involving it. On the contrary, this 
should translate into support for a democratic and deliberative approach to the 
governance of technological innovation (Jasanoff et al. 2015) and into the respecting 
of competing moral views on these issues.  
2.4.2 The Hidden Costs of Introducing Genome Editing as a New Reproductive 
Option 
At this point, there is, however, there is one last thing to consider: while it is true 
that genome editing could open up new reproductive possibilities for certain couples 
(i.e. enhance reproductive autonomy) and provide heritable benefits to their future 
offspring (i.e. considerations regarding the welfare of future child), these benefits 
ought to be balanced against the costs of introducing a new reproductive 
technology. These costs include the investment of public resources, considering 
both the scarcity of such resources and the existence of available alternatives. 
Emanuel et al. (2000) argue that for clinical research to be ethical, among other 
requirements, it needs to have social value, namely it should be directed at “a 
diagnostic and therapeutic intervention that could lead to improvements in health 
and well-being” (Emanuel et al. 2000). Being of social value is an ethical requirement 
for clinical research to go forward precisely because it operates in a context of scarce 
resources. From this it follows that if the social value of a technology is limited, then 
the investment of public resources for the development and implementation of such 
technology may be unethical (Rulli 2016a). The proposed clinical research (in this 
case that needed in order to implement genome editing as an alternative to PGD) 
needs to be evaluated on two levels: absolute and relative. The absolute level is 




settled once the proposed research is expected to bring about improvements to 
health and well-being. The relative level, however, needs more: the proposed 
research (and the improvements to health and well-being thereof) needs to be 
compared both with other potential uses of those scarce resources and with existing 
alternatives to bring about similar improvements to health and well-being. Two of 
the criteria that are often employed to assess whether to invest resources in certain 
clinical research and whether it will bring about significant improvements to health 
and well-being are the severity of the condition and the number of individuals that 
it affects (Rulli 2016a). If we consider these two criteria, the benefits of the 
introduction of genome editing as a new reproductive option are arguably minor and 
thus may not warrant the investment of public resources. The number of cases for 
which PGD is not an option, as mentioned in the first section, is limited. In addition, 
considering the importance of taking into account future children’s welfare, the 
unresolved questions concerning safety seem to indicate that health improvements 
may not be so significant. An obvious critique to this is the following: clinical 
research is aimed at improving techniques in order to achieve significant benefits for 
future children. This is certainly correct and we would not enjoy the benefits of 
many technologies and drugs if it was not for clinical research. But again: resources 
are limited and not all research can be publicly funded.  
Returning to the relative level to evaluate clinical research, it is important to consider 
that improvements in the health and well-being of future children can also be 
achieved by looking at alternative solutions, for instance third party reproduction or 
adoption. For those limited number of parents for whom PGD is not an option, the 
choice is not between genome editing and a sick child. The choice is much wider 
than that. This does not mean that the choice of adopting or relying on third party 
reproduction comes without a cost, or that prospective parents’ wishes should be 
neglected. It only means that there are other interests at stake and that there are 
other strategies than developing new technologies to tackle health needs. 
These considerations do not lead to the conclusion that public interest (in the form 
of a prudent use of resources) should be prioritised over prospective parents’ 
reproductive autonomy and future offspring’s welfare. On the contrary, the received 
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view, namely the view that considers the interests of these two groups as more 
morally relevant than those of society, ought to be taken as the default position. But 
this position should not prevent us from seeking alternatives. Perfecting existing 
technologies such as PGD, and possibly widening the criteria of access to adoption 
or third party reproduction, would be a less costly and possibly quicker strategy to 
grant future children’s welfare while at the same time respecting prospective parents’ 
wishes. Making existing technologies and practices available via broader state 
funding schemes would allow their use by larger swaths of the population. 
2.5 Conclusions: Context Matters 
In this paper, I have analysed the moral case for introducing genome editing as an 
alternative to PGD.  I have presented the reasons in favour and the two main 
arguments against this possibility, namely safety and germline modifications. After 
presenting some of the available data on the safety of CRISPR, I have argued that 
concerns with germline modifications do not represent a compelling argument 
against the introduction of genome editing into the clinic. I have then turned to 
arguments in favour of genome editing and concluded that there seems to be a prima 
facie case in favour of starting clinical research with CRISPR. In the last section, I 
have focused on the moral reasons that are normally taken into account in debates 
on reproductive technologies, namely the welfare of future children, the 
reproductive autonomy of the parents and the interests of society. I have showed 
that a closer look at genome editing in light of these moral reasons seems to generate 
some additional reasons for caution in accepting genome editing as a new 
reproductive option. These reasons may entail shifting from funding new resources, 
such as CRISPR, and advocating for its introduction in the name of values such as 
reproductive autonomy and the welfare of future children, to focusing on widening 
the criteria of access to existing options and possibly re-thinking resource allocation 
and state funding of assisted reproduction. This paper does not attempt to provide 
decisive arguments in favour of or against the introduction of CRISPR as a new 
reproductive option. As many have argued, it may be too soon to have a conclusive 
assessment of this possibility, if only for the dearth of empirical data regarding its 




safety and feasibility. Rather, this paper offers a basis to begin a discussion on the 
ethics of introducing genome editing as an alternative to PGD and stresses the need 
to consider that scientific research does not happen in a vacuum where the soundest 
theoretical argument wins. Rather, it happens in a context where resources are 
limited, where genetic parenthood is an important value cherished by many, and 
where technical solutions are often given preference over other strategies.  
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3.1 Abstract  
In this paper, we argue that lesbian couples who wish to have children who are 
genetically related to both of them should be allowed access to mitochondrial 
replacement techniques (MRTs). Firstly, we provide a brief explanation of 
mitochondrial diseases and MRTs. We then present the reasons why MRTs are 
not, by nature, therapeutic. The upshot of the view that MRTs are non-therapeutic 
techniques is that their therapeutic potential cannot be invoked for restricting their 
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use only to those cases where a mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) disease could be 
‘cured’. We then argue that a positive case for MRTs is justified by an appeal to 
reproductive freedom, and that the criteria to access these techniques should hence 
be extended to include lesbian couples who wish to share genetic parenthood. 
Finally, we consider a potential objection to our argument: that the desire to have 
genetically related kin is not a morally sufficient reason to allow lesbian couples to 
access MRTs. 
3.2 Introduction 
One of the main purposes of bioethics is to demarcate morally acceptable 
applications of biomedical technologies. For example, in the past decade there has 
been much debate in the field on whether there is a morally significant difference 
between therapeutic and enhancing genetic modifying interventions. 
‘Bioconservatives’ such as Michael Sandel (2007) and Jürgen Habermas (2003) 
maintain that biotechnological practices aimed at curing disease are morally 
acceptable, whereas those aimed at increasing certain traits such as height and 
strength are morally suspicious. Other moral boundaries investigated by bioethicists 
concern morally appropriate versus inappropriate uses of reproductive screening 
technologies – such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) – and of 
reprogenetics technologies – of which mitochondrial replacement techniques 
(MRTs)128 are an example. These techniques help women wishing to become 
mothers who carry mitochondrial DNA abnormalities in their eggs to have 
genetically related offspring free from mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) diseases 
(Vogel & Stokstad 2017). 
MRTs have been at the forefront of bioethical debate since the U.K. began to 
discuss their legalisation in the 2000s. In February 2015, regulations were passed on 
two MRTs: maternal spindle transfer (MST) and pronuclear transfer (PNT). These 
                                                 
128 Even though the name ‘mitochondrial replacement techniques’ is contested here, we use it because 
it has secured a foothold within the academic debate; see Palacios-González (2016). Ainsley Newson 
and Anthony Wrigley (2017) have recently proposed and defended the term ‘mitochondrial targeting 
techniques’ (Newson & Wrigley 2017).  




regulations came into force in October 2015, making the UK the first country in the 
world to explicitly legalise MRTs under a licensed scheme (Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology 2015)129. 
Although these technologies are legal in the UK, at the present time only people at 
risk of transmitting a severe mtDNA disease can access them. The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015 state that 
the permitted circumstances for using these techniques are when:  
There is a particular risk that any egg extracted from the ovaries of a woman 
named in the determination – or embryo which is created by the fertilisation of 
an egg extracted from the ovaries of a woman named in the determination – 
may have mitochondrial abnormalities caused by mitochondrial DNA; and 
there is a significant risk that a person with those abnormalities will have or 
develop serious mitochondrial disease. (Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
2015)  
Part of the rationale for these regulations is to allow couples at risk of transmitting 
mtDNA diseases to have children who are free from them (Scott & Wilkinson 2017). 
In addition, MRTs may aid lesbian couples, and couples where both members have 
functional ovaries (i.e. couples or relationships where one member may be intersex 
or transgender) to have genetically related children 130. It has also been theorised 
that they can be used to increase the chances of avoiding embryonic arrest and thus 
allow couples whose infertility is not related to mtDNA mutations to have 
genetically related children too, but this possibility awaits empirical demonstration 131. 
These two potential applications of MRTs are not at present legal in the UK. 
However, it must be said that it seems that the MRTs regulations were not written 
down with the explicit intention of singling out these possibilities as illegal but rather 
                                                 
129 Interestingly, the first couple of babies born because of MRTs were not born in the UK, but in 
the United States (by means of maternal spindle transfer) and Ukraine (by means of pronuclear 
transfer) (Coghlan 2016; Hamzelou 2016).   
130 Even when in this paper we mainly refer to lesbian couples, our arguments equally apply to all 
couples where both members have functional ovaries or cryopreserved eggs. 
131 Due to space constraints here we do not investigate, or focus on, the ethical aspects of offering 
MRTs to heterosexual couples with non-mtDNA-related infertility problems. We also do not discuss 
other ethical issues related to MRTs more generally, such as risks to egg providers. 
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in the attempt to make MRTs legal in order to avoid mtDNA diseases (Scott & 
Wilkinson 2017).  
Legal scholars, bioethicists and stakeholders participating in the debate on MRTs 
have tried to establish a morally significant boundary between acceptable and 
unacceptable applications of these techniques. For example, the mitochondrial 
disease community (patients, researchers and clinicians) have strongly advocated for 
a therapeutic (i.e. acceptable) and a non-therapeutic (i.e. unacceptable) demarcation 
of MRTs. By doing so they aim, in part, to avoid challenges from slippery-slope type 
arguments that allowing MRTs would then lead to ‘designer babies’.  
In this paper, we argue that lesbian couples who want to have children who are 
genetically related to both of them should be allowed access to MRTs. The paper 
is structured as follows. Firstly, we provide a brief explanation of mitochondrial 
diseases and MRTs. Secondly, we show that MRTs are not therapeutic in nature 
and thus this feature of the techniques cannot be invoked for restricting their use 
only to those cases where an mtDNA disease could be ‘cured’. We then argue that 
a positive case for MRTs is justified by an appeal to reproductive freedom and that 
access to these techniques should hence be extended to lesbian couples. Finally, we 
consider a potential objection to our argument: namely that the desire to have 
genetically related kin is not a morally sufficient reason to allow lesbian couples to 
access MRTs. 
3.3  Mitochondrial Diseases and MRTs 
Mitochondria have been described as the ‘powerhouses’ of our cells. They are small 
structures whose main known purpose is to produce the necessary energy for 
cellular, organ and bodily function (Tachibana et al. 2009). They are inherited via 
the maternal line and have their own DNA (mtDNA), which resides outside the 
cells’ nucleus. Mitochondrial diseases are a cluster of neuromuscular diseases which 
symptoms vary in severity and expression and can develop immediately after birth 
or later in life (Bredenoord & Braude 2010; Reinhardt et al. 2013). Mutations both 
in the nuclear DNA and the mtDNA can cause mitochondrial diseases. Deleterious 
mutations in the mtDNA, in each cell, can happen across all mitochondria (this is 




known as homoplasmy), or they can occur only in certain mitochondria (known as 
heteroplasmy). In this paper, we will only discuss mitochondrial diseases produced 
by problems in the mtDNA, referred to as mtDNA diseases. 
To avoid the transmission of an mtDNA disease, two MRTS have been developed: 
pronuclear transfer (PNT) and maternal spindle transfer (MST). PNT requires the 
creation of two zygotes, through assisted reproductive techniques, one with the 
gametes of the intending parents (or intending mother and a sperm donor) and the 
other with a donated egg and the intending father’s (or donor’s) sperm. In this 
scenario, the first zygote has faulty mitochondria and the second has healthy 
mitochondria. On the first day after fertilisation, the maternal and paternal pronuclei 
are removed from both zygotes. The enucleated cell produced with the intending 
mother’s egg and the pronuclei which were housed in the cell produced with the 
donor’s egg are discarded. Afterwards, the intending parents’ (or intending mother’s 
and donor’s) pronuclei are ferried into the enucleated cell produced with the donor’s 
egg. The reconstructed zygote, which possesses healthy mitochondria, can be 
transferred to the intending mother or a surrogate (Craven et al. 2010).  
In MST, eggs are obtained through assisted reproductive techniques from an 
intending mother and a healthy donor. The nuclear material from the intending 
mother’s egg and the donor’s egg is extracted. The donor’s nuclear material and the 
intending mother’s enucleated egg are discarded, and the intending mother’s nuclear 
material is ferried into the now enucleated donor’s egg 132. Subsequently, the 
reconstructed egg is fertilised in vitro and then transferred to the intending mother 
or a surrogate (Tachibana et al. 2009). The aim of both techniques is for the donor’s 
healthy mitochondria to help in the development of a healthy child and to be passed 
down via the maternal line to subsequent generations. 
At present, approximately 30 mtDNA haplogroups in humans have been described 
(van Oven & Kayser 2009). The fact that there are so many groups is important for 
                                                 
132 Both for PNT and MST, if during the chromosomal transfer there is a large unintentional 
carryover of pathological mitochondria the mtDNA disease could manifest immediately afterwards 
and in subsequent generations (Hyslop et al. 2016; Yamada et al. 2016). 
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our discussion, as there is an ongoing debate regarding mito-nuclear interactions 
after MRTs. Some, for example Edward Morrow, argue that if the mitochondrial 
haplogroup of the egg donor is not matched to that of the intending mother this 
could give rise to mito-nuclear incompatibility, translating into adverse health effects 
for the future offspring (Reinhardt et al. 2013). The last report commissioned by the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) concerning MRTs being 
ready for clinical practice asserted that:  
The panel continues to recommend that consideration is given to mtDNA 
haplogroup matching as a precautionary step in the process of selecting donors 
(…) At present, the panel believes any risks associated with a mtDNA-nuclear 
DNA mismatch remain theoretical; the recent studies examining embryonic 
cells and stem cells generated from MST- and PNT-derived human embryos 
reported no evidence of any complications or compromise of mitochondrial 
function arising from unmatched mtDNA haplogroups. (Greenfield 2016) 
Prior to the advent of MRTs, women at risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease who 
knew about their condition had the following options: firstly, refraining from having 
children; secondly, turning to adoption, embryo adoption or gamete donation; 
thirdly, seeking to have genetically related children after undergoing oocyte 
sampling to assess the risk of recurrence (for couples who have already had an 
affected child), or chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis (and then deciding for 
or against termination), or by using preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). It 
must be noted that while adoption, embryo adoption and gamete donation 
guarantees that future children will not be affected by an mtDNA disease, PGD and 
the other techniques do not always guarantee similar results (Poulton et al. 2009). 
In the specific case of PGD, when the mutations are novel or uncommon there is 
not enough reference clinical data available to guide the couple’s decision (Poulton 
et al. 2009). 
Different reproductive options are currently available for lesbian couples (de Wert 
et al. 2014). Some of them, such as adoption, embryo adoption and gamete donation, 
entail either refraining from having genetically related children (adoption and 
embryo adoption) or having children that are genetically related to only one of the 
couple (third-party reproduction). Recently, another possibility, ROPA (reception 




of oocytes from partner), has gained some visibility (Marina et al. 2010; Zeiler & 
Malmquist 2014). ROPA allows lesbian couples to have a child who is genetically 
related to one mother (i.e. the mother who provides the oocytes which are 
subsequently fertilised with donor sperm) and who is gestationally related to the 
other mother. These options do not allow lesbian couples to have children who are 
genetically related to both of them133. MRTs, on other hand, would allow both 
women in a lesbian couple to share a genetic link with their offspring. Specifically, 
one of them would contribute with nuclear DNA and the other with mtDNA. 
Finally, it is important to mention that worldwide reproductive options for lesbian 
couples (and homosexual couples more generally) are often directly or indirectly 
limited by laws and regulations which restrict access to adoption and third-party 
reproduction.  
3.4 Are MRTs Therapeutic in Nature? 
Debates on the ethics of reprogenetics technologies stir controversies as they touch 
upon values and beliefs on the meaning of parenthood, the moral status of early 
human life and our obligations to future generations. In particular, debates on the 
ethics of introducing a new reproductive technology are characterised by reflections 
on the welfare of children born due to that technology. They are centred on the 
necessity of balancing uncertainties regarding the possible benefits and risks of such 
new technology and on the extent to which the reproductive freedom of prospective 
parents ought to be respected (Cavaliere 2018a). Even though competing moral 
views generate diverging assessments of the importance that should be granted to 
the values and beliefs at stake, concerns related to the welfare of future children are 
often considered more important than the reproductive autonomy of prospective 
                                                 
133 Even when it is true that there are epigenetic influences during pregnancy and that the gestating 
mother could be thought to have genetic ties to the child she bears, here we are using ‘genetic’ in a 
more narrow sense. We understand ‘genes’ as physical tokens of transmission that originate in the 
parent and that could be said to materially overlap between parent and child. We appreciate that 
there are many and important philosophical questions regarding the role of epigenetic influence in 
parenthood, but they are beyond the scope of this paper. We are indebted to one of the anonymous 
reviewers for pointing this out to us. 
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parents. This is so as preventing a child (albeit a future one) from suffering harm is 
considered a morally appropriate reason to restrict prospective parents’ freedom.  
Unsurprisingly, the debate on MRTs is no exception and welfare of the child 
considerations have been at the forefront of the ethical debate concerning these 
techniques. Interestingly, the welfare of children born due to MRTs has been 
employed both as a critique of these techniques and as an argument in favour of them. For 
instance, those who use the welfare of the future child to oppose MRTs maintain 
that these techniques are too risky for the health of future children, that their safety 
has not been thoroughly assessed, and that there may be unforeseen negative effects 
not only for the children conceived due to MRTs but also for these children’s 
children (Baylis 2013; Baylis 2017a; de Melo-Martín 2017a, 2017b; Morrow 2014; 
Newman 2013) For example, Françoise Baylis (2013) asserts that:  
Mitochondrial replacement technology is experimental and there is very 
limited information about safety and efficacy. As with any germline 
intervention, there are significant and legitimate concerns about the health and 
wellbeing of future children and the potential short- and long-term harms to 
them and their progeny. (Baylis 2013: 533)  
According to this view, a concern for the welfare of future children (and those 
children’s children) warrants banning or heavily restricting MRTs until all the 
above-mentioned worries have been dispelled. Interestingly, many of those in favour 
of the techniques have also appealed to welfare of the child considerations and 
maintain that it is such concerns which should motivate their approval, albeit their 
take on the present safety of the techniques is radically different (Caplan 2015; 
Harris 2016a; Johnson 2013; Wrigley et al. 2015). According to such commentators, 
the severity of certain mtDNA conditions and their disabling and life-limiting 
character are sufficient reasons to allow for the clinical use of MRTs. For example, 
Arthur Caplan argues that an MRT procedure “is not without its risks, but it’s 
treating a disease” (Smith 2017). And that: 
These little embryos, these are people born with a disease, they can’t make 
power. You’re giving them a new battery. That’s a therapy (Smith 2017) 




Framed in this way, it is clear that MRTs can be regarded as a therapy for mtDNA 
diseases.  
The argument in favour of MRTs based on their ‘therapeutic’ nature is a powerful 
one: who would dare object to the approval of safe techniques that spare children 
from suffering? This argument runs something like this: we are morally required to 
prevent the suffering and premature death of innocent individuals. MRTs can 
prevent the suffering and premature death of existing innocent individuals. Hence, 
we are morally required to carry out MRTs.  
The framing of MRTs in terms of a therapy for mtDNA diseases for existing 
individuals (in contrast with future ones) allows supporters of these techniques to 
build a moral case in favour of their approval, and, at the same time, to raise a 
supposedly justified moral boundary. The moral line is drawn between uses that are 
therapeutic and hence good, and uses that are ‘beyond therapy’ and thus morally 
suspicious. In order to make our case that lesbian couples should have access to 
MRTs to have genetically related children we first challenge their alleged 
therapeutic nature. Doing so allows us to show the therapeutic / non-therapeutic 
moral boundary does not exist and thus that criteria of access to MRTs must be 
grounded on other considerations. 
Thus far, Wrigley et al. (2015) have carried out the most thorough defence of the 
therapeutic nature of MRTs (or at least of one of the two techniques). The authors 
maintain that “PNT […] is a form of therapy based on embryo modification while 
MST is, instead, an instance of selective reproduction” (Wrigley et al. 2015: 631). 
They draw this conclusion from the fact that the process of PNT (which entails 
enucleation, transfer and reconstitution) does not affect the numerical identity of 
the embryo as it already exists. PNT pre-emptively cures an already existing being. 
Conversely, at the point of the process of MST (which also entails enucleation, 
transfer and reconstitution) it is unknown (in almost all cases) which sperm cell will 
fertilise the reconstituted oocyte, and thus the identity of the future individual has 
not been determined (supposing that our numerical identity is determined by 
specific gametes which fuse). On this basis, Wrigley et al. (2015) conclude that MST 
cannot cure anyone while PNT does. The upshot of their argument is that there is: 
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[A] strong prima facie harm-avoidance rationale for offering PNT to prospective 
parents, and for those parents to accept it; one that is not present in the case of 
MST ([emphasis added] Wrigley et al. 2015: 636) 
Wrigley et al.’s stance has been criticised for a number of reasons (Palacios-González 
2017a; Rulli 2017). One point of contention is that there is no harm-avoidance 
rationale for offering PNT to prospective parents, as at the point of offering it there is 
no-one who could be subject to PNT, and thus no-one who could be cured. When 
the clinical decision to employ PNT is made it affects which sperm and egg will fuse, 
which means that:  
[T]he gametes that will fuse in order for the process of PNT to happen would 
most certainly not have fused in the first place if PNT had not been chosen as the 
course of action. (Palacios-González 2017a)  
This is the case because after the decision to carry out PNT has been made, the 
woman will have to be subject to hormonal stimulation and to the egg extraction 
process. This means that the egg that would have been fertilised the month that 
she/the couple decided to undergo PNT is not the same egg as that which will be 
fertilised prior to undergoing the PNT procedure. And even in the rare case of 
having only one single cryopreserved egg, the sperm cell that will fertilise the egg 
will depend on when the sperm sample is provided, or which sperm from an already 
collected sample is actively chosen, or which sperm happens to fertilise the egg in 
vitro from an already collected sample. All this shows that the clinical decision to employ 
PNT affects the timing of conception and thus who will exist.  
Additionally, Matthew Liao (2017) has argued from an Organism View account that 
the process of MST and PNT is numerically identity-affecting (Liao 2017). According to 
Liao (2017), the enucleation, transfer and reconstitution actions are of such nature 
that both eggs, or both embryos, cease to exist and a third egg, or embryo, is created. 
In order to understand Liao’s argument we must bear in mind that an egg, or 
embryo, is an organism. An organism, as a kind of thing: a) begins to exist when the 
capacity to regulate and coordinate the various life processes (respiration, 
absorption, metabolism, etc.) is there; b) it persists as long as there is a continuing 
ability to regulate and coordinate the various life processes and c) it ceases to exist 




when the capacity to regulate and coordinate the various life processes is 
permanently gone (Liao 2017). The two main reasons why the enucleation process 
permanently disrupts the organismic continuity processes of the eggs, or zygotes, 
are: firstly, that the cytoplasm of an egg, or zygote, contains crucial components for 
regulating and coordinating the various life processes; secondly, that there are life 
processes in the cytoplasm of an egg, or zygote, that the nucleus does not control 
(fully, at least) (Liao 2017). What this means is that an egg’s capacity to regulate its 
metabolism, for example, is destroyed when we enucleate it, and thus a new capacity 
comes into being when we transfer the intending mother’s maternal spindle into the 
donor’s enucleated egg. This metaphysical stance is relevant when morally assessing 
MRTs, as it follows from it that ‘in essence’ neither technique is therapeutic. They 
are not therapeutic because they do not cure anyone; they just bring into existence a 
new organism.  
By maintaining that numerical identity follows the nuclear DNA, Wrigley et al. 
appear to endorse the view that cells are essentially their nuclear genes (or a 
collection of them). But if genes are what establish numerical identity then why is the 
mtDNA not part of what constitutes the numerical identity of a cell, as it also 
contains genes? Why consider only the nuclear genome and not that plus the 
mitochondrial one? And equally, why is it the case that all the chromosomes 
establish numerical identity and not only a subset of them? Wrigley et al.’s (2015) 
view does not offer a compelling case of the notion that cells are essentially their 
nuclear genomes. 
According to the previous arguments neither MST nor PNT are therapeutic and 
hence a moral case for them and, more importantly, for restricting their use cannot 
be based on how the welfare of a particular child will be improved. These 
considerations have two implications: on the one hand, it is necessary to abandon 
the rhetoric of cure and therapy and on the other that additional reasons should be 
presented to ground the moral case in favour of MRTs. Let us now consider another 
argument that could justify the moral acceptability of MRTs: reproductive freedom.  
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3.5 Reproductive Freedom and MRTs 
Those who have advocated the legalisation of MRTs in the UK have frequently 
appealed to the importance of allowing couples at risk of transmitting an mtDNA 
disease the freedom to choose to procreate according to their preferred life plan: 
what is commonly referred to as reproductive freedom or procreative liberty134 
(Brock 2005; Buchanan et al. 2001; Robertson 1994; Robertson 2003) They argue 
that couples should be free to choose whether to have genetically related healthy 
children and that third parties – be them the state, religious institutions or fellow 
citizens – should not interfere with their choices. For example, Andrew Miller, the 
chair of the UK’s Commons Science and Technology Committee from 2010 to 2015, 
argued against the lobbying efforts by religious groups to reject MRTs:  
It is utterly outrageous in a free society for the churches to tell parents who are 
in this painfully difficult position that they cannot undergo procedures like this. 
(Mason et al. 2017)  
Why was Miller angered by the churches’ interference in procreative decisions? In 
this section, we firstly try to make sense of Miller’s (and other defenders of 
reproductive freedom) outrage, and we then show that if MRTs fall within the remit 
of the reproductive freedom of heterosexual couples where women are at risk of 
transmitting an mtDNA disease, then they also fall within the remit of the 
reproductive freedom of lesbian couples.  
In contemporary Western democratic societies, freedom of choice is defended from 
third parties’ interference on political and moral grounds. This has its roots in the 
work of John Stuart Mill and other liberal philosophers. Mill believed that the only 
appropriate moral ground for interference in one’s actions is if one’s free agency may 
cause harm to others (Buchanan et al. 2001; Mill 1979/1859). In On Liberty, he asserts 
that there should only be “one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely 
                                                 
134 Here we do not distinguish between the different expressions used to refer to reproductive 
freedom (i.e. reproductive autonomy and procreative liberty).  




the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control”. 
The principle states that:  
 [T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. (1979/1859)  
The former is commonly known as Mill’s ‘Harm Principle’, a principle that sits at 
the core of our liberal democratic societies, where the presumption in favour of the 
freedom of citizens to make their own choices without interference places the 
burden of proof on attempts to limit freedom (Mills 2013).  
Isaiah Berlin (1969) labelled this Millian understanding of freedom as negative freedom 
or freedom from (Berlin 1969). Elements of this negative understanding of freedom 
survive in defences of the moral right of people to make “autonomous choices in 
matters of procreation”(Harris 1998) or, as John Robertson (1994) puts it: “the 
freedom to reproduce or not to reproduce in the genetic sense” (Robertson 1994). 
John Harris, John Robertson, Dan Brock and other contemporary advocates of 
reproductive freedom strongly emphasise the importance of defending the freedom 
of people to make significant choices in matters of procreation without third parties’ 
interference. They also maintain that this procreative freedom ought to be limited 
only if it becomes incompatible with a like liberty for all or if it may cause significant 
harm to others. Harris’ and Robertson’s theorising of reproductive freedom only in 
negative terms has been criticised most notably by Catherine Mills, who argues that 
reproductive freedom also contains positive elements and who understands it as a 
“practice of self-making”, one that allow prospective parents to “give shape” to their 
lives (Mills 2013). In this sense, reproductive freedom not only incorporates the 
negative elements of the Millian liberal tradition but also some of the positive 
elements that Berlin also identified, those that allow for self-determination and that 
make our actions the product of our own agency (Berlin 1969). 
But why does reproductive freedom matter? Why is it a constant reference and 
point of contention in debates on assisted reproduction? Different authors have 
provided (slightly) different accounts of why reproductive freedom ought to be 
treated as a fundamental moral good, but at the core of all these accounts are two 
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moral bases for its defence: the centrality of reproduction for the development of 
personal life plans (the autonomy argument for reproductive freedom) and for the 
well-being of individuals (the welfarist argument for reproductive freedom). The 
autonomy argument grounding reproductive freedom refers to the morally relevant 
interest of individuals shaping their own lives according to the values or interests 
which are relevant to them (Dworkin 1993; Schaefer & Labude 2017). Reproductive 
freedom is thus important not in itself but due to “the values or interests or standing 
that this particular constraint defeats” (Dworkin 1993). Applied to the MRTs 
debate, the argument of autonomy provides a sound moral defence of the right of 
couples at risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease to their children to reproduce as 
they want and to have healthy children that are genetically related to them. The 
welfarist argument, on the other hand, focuses on the relevance of reproductive 
decisions for individuals’ well-being and understands reproduction as “a core human 
activity” (Robertson 1994) or “fundamental right” (Liao 2015). Failing to respect 
reproductive freedom and placing constraints on its exercise may negatively impact 
individuals’ well-being and their ability to lead a good life (Brock 2005). It is for these 
reasons that reproductive freedom should not be interfered with for trivial reasons 
and that placing limits on reproductive freedom is morally acceptable only for 
significant reasons, such as the occurrence of significant harm to others 135.   
When we take into consideration our previous discussion on the ‘therapeutic’ nature 
of MRTs we realise that Mill’s ‘harm principle’ does not relate to a consideration of 
the created child. What we are maintaining here is that under a personal account of 
morality and a counterfactual account of harm – “if your act harms someone, then it 
makes that person worse off than they would have been had you not done the act” 
(Boonin 2008) – neither PNT nor MST leave created children worse off than they 
would otherwise have been. Such children are not made worse off by MRTs 
because the only other available ‘option’ for them is not to exist 136.  
                                                 
135 For a discussion of the limits of reproductive freedom and of limits other than significant harm to 
others, see Dan Brock and Allen Buchanan et al., chapter six in particular (Brock 2005; Buchanan et 
al. 2001)  
136 Two things must be clear: firstly, that the only case where someone could be harmed here is if 
their life is a wrongful one; secondly, that this is a classic instance of the Non-identity Problem. 




Our premise that MRTs do not inflict harm to future children leads to the conclusion 
that these technologies fall, under a Millian understanding of freedom, within the 
proper remit of the reproductive freedom of women with mtDNA diseases. Given 
the moral importance of reproductive freedom for people’s capacity to be 
autonomous and for their well-being, we can further argue that the current UK 
legislation on MRTs benefits women at risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease (and 
their partners). It benefits them as these techniques represent an additional 
reproductive option, one that allows them to have healthy genetically related 
children (if they wish to do so)137. Then again, (explicitly) legislating against MRTs 
would violate these women’s reproductive freedom by restricting their significant 
range of reproductive options and the possibility of enjoying genetic parenthood. 
The upshot of considering that the moral case in favour of these technologies is that 
they add a significant reproductive option to prospective parents is that the ethical 
focus shifts from mainly taking into account questions of the safety and welfare of 
future children to considering how these technologies have the potential to benefit 
prospective mothers and couples. 
At this point we have reached the crux of the issue: namely, the moral reasons for 
making MRTs available to women at risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease, ceteris 
paribus, also ground their access to lesbian couples as: a) people have a great interest 
in reproduction because of how it shapes their lives according to the values and 
                                                 
Expanding on the Non-identity Problem would require more space than is available here. For a 
compelling case of why children are not harmed, see David Boonin’s work on this issue (Boonin 2008; 
Boonin 2014)  
137 The idea that more choices lead to greater freedom and well-being has been challenged notably 
in the work of Gerald Dworkin, Nikolas Rose and Barbara Katz Rothman (Dworkin 1982; Rose 1999; 
Rothman 1985) They have argued that more options can also have the effect of bringing about more 
perceived and actual responsibilities. Recently, one of us has further elaborated this view in the 
context of genome editing and assisted reproduction (Cavaliere 2018a) In the case of MRTs and 
couples at risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease, however, the range of (reproductive) options 
currently available includes either refraining from having offspring who are genetically related to both 
prospective parents or risking passing on the mtDNA disease. MRTs would allow the additional 
option of having healthy children who are genetically related to both prospective parents. Similarly, 
as shown above, the (reproductive) options currently available to lesbian couples do not allow them 
to enjoy genetic kinship. For these reasons, MRTs could be said to count not only as a mere quantitative 
addition to the range of options currently available to prospective parents but as a qualitatively 
significant new option. We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to our 
attention.  
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interests which are relevant to them, and it is also a very deep personal and private 
project which has a significant impact on individuals’ well-being and b) the fact that 
MRTs cannot be said to harm any child created through their use. Finally, the fact 
that lesbian couples need a sperm donor, in addition to their own eggs, does not 
detract from our stance. It does not do so as sperm donation for family-making 
purposes is morally acceptable (Brandt et al. 2017). 
At this point it would be possible to counter that mitochondria only produce energy 
and only represent .1% of the total amount of genetic material, and thus that lesbian 
couples opting for them would just be embarking on a very expensive vanity project. 
Explaining in detail why these claims, which John Appleby (2017) has named the 
‘qualitative claim’ and the ‘quantitative claim’, are problematic for arguing that 
MRTs cannot establish parenthood would require much more space than we have 
available here (Palacios-González 2017b). What we can state is that, following our 
previous section on how MRTs affect numerical identity, in the case of a lesbian 
couple both mothers would be parents under a causal account of parenthood, at 
least. They would be so because:  
[A]ny [free] action that reasonably foreseeably results in the birth of a child 
generates responsibilities for that child. (Fuscaldo 2006)  
And in this case their free action of seeking MRTs, and the subsequent assisted 
reproductive steps, reasonably foreseeably results in the birth of a child.  
3.6 Reproductive Freedom and Treating Like Cases Alike  
The possible use of MRTs as a reproductive option by lesbian couples has already 
been mentioned in the bioethics literature by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
(2012), Françoise Baylis (2013), Palacios-González et al. (2014), Rebecca Dimond 
(2015), Ishii (2014), and Segers et al. (2017). Furthermore, from a legal point of view, 
Danielle Griffiths (2016) has explored how the UK regulations on MRTs reproduces 
the hetero-normative genetic family.  
However, in such literature, this possible application of MRTs is typically 
mentioned only in passing. A notable exception is Françoise Baylis. In her article 




‘The ethics of creating children with three genetic parents’ she lists this possible use 
of MRTs under the heading ‘Harms to society’. She asserts:  
While the initial goal of mitochondrial replacement technology is ‘therapeutic’ 
insofar as it aims to avoid the birth of a child with mitochondrial disease, this 
technology could be used without therapeutic intent. For example, it could be 
used to pursue non-therapeutic reproductive goals – imagine, a lesbian couple 
where both partners wanted a genetic link to the children they intend to parent. 
(Baylis 2013: 533)  
Why the use of MRTs by lesbian couples would be harmful to society remains 
unclear in her article. With some exercise of imagination, and assuming that she in 
fact believes so, it seems that such harm stems from the fact that this use of MRTs 
would not be ‘therapeutic’, understanding therapeutic in the sense that “it aims to 
avoid the birth of a child with mitochondrial disease” (Baylis 2013). Non-therapeutic 
uses of technologies have been frequently condemned by bioethics scholars because 
they may corrupt values that we cherish (Sandel 2007); they may damage our 
relationships among members of a society of equals (Habermas 2003) and they may 
be instances of eugenics (Sparrow 2011a). However, despite Baylis’ concerns, 
morality demands treating like cases alike: if we accept that the use of MRTs by 
women at risk of transmitting an mtDNA disease neither harms society because a 
child without a mitochondrial disease would be created, nor spare any individual 
from suffering, then we have to accept that the use of MRTs by lesbian couples does 
not harm society because a child without a mitochondrial disease would be created, 
nor spare any individual from suffering. It is true that both types of uses could be 
considered ‘eugenic’, rather than ‘therapeutic’, in the sense that they aim to bring a 
particular kind of individual into existence: healthy people who are genetically 
related to their parents. It is for the above-mentioned reasons that we find Baylis’ 
position wanting. All the more so, denying access to MRTs to lesbian couples is 
ethically unjustifiable in as much as it curtails the enjoyment of certain freedoms to 
a certain group without good reason, whilst allowing others to enjoy the very same 
freedoms. Those who want to prohibit the use of MRTs by lesbian couples need to 
Who Should Come into Existence? 
142 
 
present an argument for showing that them obtaining access to this technology is 
unethical, an argument that so far no-one has successfully presented 138.  
3.7 Genetic Relatedness and MRTs 
Let us take stock of what we have argued thus far. We have presented some 
arguments against the view that MRTs are therapeutic technologies and hence 
concluded that concerns for the welfare of the future child cannot ground their moral 
acceptability nor restrict their use. We have then focused on the other reason that 
may morally justify offering MRTs, namely the reproductive freedom of prospective 
parents. We have argued, contra the position of those who want to restrict use of 
MRTs only to women at risk of transmitting mtDNA diseases, that morality 
demands treating like cases alike; and we maintain that a concern for equality would 
deem immoral a restriction on the use of MRTs based on one’s belonging to a group 
with certain sexual preferences. In this final section, we consider a potential 
objection to our argument: namely that the desire for genetic relatedness is not a 
morally sufficient reason to allow lesbian couples to access MRTs.  
One of the criticisms against MRTs, and against other reproductive technologies, is 
that their sole benefit is to allow parents to have a genetic tie to their offspring, which 
is considered a morally dubious end (Rulli 2016a). In this section, we refer to this as 
the genetic-relatedness objection (GRO) to MRTs. Underlying the GRO are two 
distinct types of concerns, one inspired by deontological concerns and the other 
inspired by consequentialist concerns. Deontological concerns (GRO-d) centre on 
the morally dubious character of those seeking genetic relatedness. This desire is 
suspect, critics argue, because it expresses a non-virtuous parenting attitude, one 
                                                 
138 At this point, someone might claim that the possibility of mito-nuclear incompatibility speaks 
against the use of MRTs by lesbian couples. We can reply to this challenge in the following way. 
Firstly, there can be lesbian couples where both women belong to the same haplogroup, and thus 
even if such interaction-worries materialise for them they would not be a problem. Secondly, at this 
point in time, as the HFEA report mentions, such putative problems are theoretical, and even if they 
were to materialise lesbian couples should still have the option of resorting to MRTs (unless the 
created lives were wrongful ones). This position is not a radical one, but just the same as that that 
postulates that couples should be able to resort to assisted reproduction even when they know that 
their children might be at an elevated risk of having a disability.   




that aims at having particular kinds of children, which is considered by critics ‘a wish 
and not a need’ (Baylis 2013; Sandel 2007). We do not explore further the GRO-d, 
as others have done so (Overall 2012). Other concerns underlying the GRO are 
consequentialist in nature (GRO-c). GRO-c focuses on the negative consequences 
which allowing prospective parents to use MRTs (and other ARTs) may generate. 
The negative consequences identified by the critics include: concerns for the 
resources needed to develop new technologies and how these resources may be 
employed for other more pressing medical needs (Baylis 2013; Rulli 2016a); the 
reinforcement of ideas on the importance of genetic kinship for family-making and 
on the role of genetics more generally to determine our identities (Petropanagos 
2017; Rulli 2016a); the medicalisation of a social preference (Petropanagos 2017; 
Rulli 2016a) and the reinforcement of the two-parent (heterosexual) genetically-
based model of the family (i.e. bionormative conception of the family) (Baylis 2017a). 
At first sight, the initial type of GRO-c concerns, those hinging on the scarcity of 
available resources, seems to be legitimate. In practical terms, what this concern 
means is that, when we argue about the moral permissibility of MRTs, we have to 
factor in the costs of satisfying this preference, even if it is a strongly held one, against 
other medical opportunity costs, for example satisfying the basic medical needs of others. 
According to Baylis, once faced with this choice we have to reach the conclusion 
that research and clinical practice on MRTs is immoral. It is immoral given that it 
uses scarce medical resources that could be better used elsewhere, because, as noted 
by Rulli and others, the development of MRTs requires(-ed) the use of vast 
resources both in terms of budget and personnel (Rulli 2016a). One way to respond 
to this objection is to note that even if we grant Rulli’s and Baylis’ point regarding 
the use of scarce medical resources, from this fact it does not inherently follow that the 
use of medical scarce resources for MRTs is immoral. This is because in order to 
make such a claim we need to prove that when compared against all other medical 
research that is being carried out the use of scarce medical resources for MRTs is 
unwarranted (Palacios-González 2017c). Our concern here is not to examine the 
ethical case in favour of or against MRTs nor to provide an account of the ethical 
issues surrounding these techniques, but rather to stress the need to extend the existing 
criteria of access to these techniques to lesbian couples. Furthermore, concerns related to the 
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necessary clinical research to develop MRTs do not apply in the case of lesbian 
couples, as these techniques are already in place; and in fact the use of MRTs by 
lesbian couples, and possibly by other non-mtDNA infertile couples, should be 
factored in when considering the overall offsetting of the costs of this research.   
Lastly, we consider GRO-c concerns related to the reinforcement of genetic 
deterministic ideas about the importance of genetic relatedness for family-making, 
and the reinforcement of the bionormative family. Many women and couples have 
a strong preference for having genetically related children 139 (Hendriks et al. 2017). 
This former fact is true for both women with mtDNA diseases and lesbian couples, 
and we contend that in a liberal society allowing only heterosexual couples to enjoy 
the satisfaction of their wish, regardless of its philosophical validity, is problematic 
from the point of view of equality. This is akin to only allowing certain ethnic groups 
to access assisted reproductive technologies, for example.  
In addition, gay and lesbian couples’ reproductive choices are already limited: 
depending on the countries’ regulations, these couples are often ineligible for third-
party reproduction and for adoption. Preventing them from using an already existing 
technology due to consequentialist concerns related to the reinforcement of genetic 
determinist ideas on the value of genetic relatedness seems to us akin to further 
restricting their already limited agency with respect to reproductive options 140. 
Hence, even though it is true that we should be attentive to the fact that MRTs 
could contribute to increasing the value attributed to genetic relatedness, to the 
detriment of other forms of family-making, it must be said that it would be morally 
                                                 
139 One may dispute, as previously stated, that MRTs allow couples at risk of transmitting an mtDNA 
disease and lesbian couples to achieve the same end, namely to have genetically-related children. 
While for the first group of couples MRTs allow them to have children whose genetic make-up 
contains genetic information from both nuclei of the parents, for lesbian couples the situation is 
different as one party of the couple would provide the nuclear DNA and the other would provide 
the mitochondrial DNA. The sociological question of whether contributing with ‘merely’ the mtDNA 
would be sufficient for lesbian couples to regard the children born thanks to the aid of MRTs as their 
own is yet to be answered. However, we maintain that the legislature should not a priori rule against 
this, based on the idea that mtDNA contributes less to genetic kinship than nuclear DNA.  
140 From The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015 it is not at all 
clear if in the UK MRTs can only be accessed by heterosexual couples, or if lesbian couples could 
access them if one of the intending genetic parents is at risk of passing on a serious form of mtDNA 
disease. 




problematic to just focus on lesbian couples and their wishes and choices thereof. In 
other words, we believe that it is compatible to hold the view that reproductive 
technologies such as MRTs might have undesirable consequences such as the ones 
described by the critics of these technologies, and the view that genetic relatedness 
seems to be an important good whose enjoyment should not be restricted on an 
arbitrary basis.  
Regarding GRO-c concerns for the preservation of the bionormative family, it must 
be noted that in the case of MRTs being used by lesbian couples this charge does 
not apply. The use of MRTs by lesbian couples in fact defies the current dominion 
of the bionormative family in that it challenges the folk assumption about the correct 
type and amount of shared genes that are necessary for establishing a parental genetic 
link – 50% of the nuclear genes from the father and 50% of the nuclear genes from 
the mother 141 (Palacios-González 2017b). Specifically, what it is asserted here is that 
.1% of an mtDNA genetic connection suffices for establishing genetic parenthood 142. 
Even more so, regulating MRTs so as to include lesbian couples would expand the 
models of state-recognised genetic relatedness and challenge the existing order, and, 
as seen by Griffiths, not doing so would be: 
[A]n example of how science and regulation seek to expand models of 
traditional relatedness in a way that doesn’t challenge the [bionormative] 
existing order. (Griffiths 2016) 
                                                 
141 It must be noted that in the reproductive cloning debate, some authors already acknowledge the 
possibility of becoming a genetic parent through mtDNA. Mary Mahowald, for example, asserted 
that “through use of one woman’s nuclear DNA and another woman’s enucleated egg, a lesbian 
couple may have a child who is biologically related to both without requiring sperm donation” and 
that “the ovum in which that parent’s DNA is inserted represents a significant environmental 
influence on development, and the mitochondrial DNA adds a genetic component to the 
environment of the nuclear DNA” (Mahowald 2000). Others who have commented on this issue are 
Jean Chambers, Timothy Murphy, and Carson Strong (Chambers 2001; Chambers 2002; Murphy 
1999; Strong 1998). 
142 It must be noted that this claim aims at subverting the folk western conception of genetic parenthood, and 
that it is not a claim regarding the metaphysics of reproduction. For an account of why MRT-
conceived children do have three genetic parents see Monika Piotrowska’s Is ‘Assisted Reproduction’ 
Reproduction? (Piotrowska 2017). 




In this paper, we have challenged the view that MRTs are a therapy for 
mitochondrial diseases, and that these techniques can be considered harmful to 
children. We have argued that the rationale for offering these techniques must lie 
somewhere else, namely within concerns for the reproductive freedom of 
prospective parents. Shifting the focus of the moral debate on MRTs from concerns 
for the welfare of the children to other moral justifications for offering them allows 
for the emergence of other issues that require moral consideration. In particular, it 
allows us to consider how an unduly restrictive approach to accessing MRTs to a 
particular group requires arguments that have not been presented thus far. We do 
not want to defend here the wish for genetic kinship as an absolute good that trumps 
other considerations and nor do we believe that reinforcing a family-making process 
that includes a genetic element is without costs. However, we remain convinced 
that these considerations cannot be employed solely to bar access to MRTs by 
lesbian couples, a group with an already limited range of reproductive options, as 
this would be immoral from an equality standpoint.    
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4 Conclusions to Part II: Genetic Relatedness Revisited  
Since the advent of IVF, several assisted reproductive technologies have been 
developed to allow couples, women and men to have children who are genetically 
related to them. One could go as far as to claim that the whole assisted reproductive 
technologies industry – from IVF to in-vitro gametes – is not only driven by people’s 
wish to have children but also by the wish to have children who are (healthy and) 
genetically related to them (Mertes 2014).  
The question of what conceptually counts as genetic parenthood is a matter of 
debate (see, for instance, Douglas & Devolder 2018; Mertes 2014; Piotrowska 2017). 
What divides authors is whether there could be a conception of this parenthood able 
to capture the necessary and sufficient conditions for attributing it. Some, such as 
Heidi Mertes (2014), after assessing different conceptions of genetic parenthood, 
conclude that:  
There is no fixed, scientific, everlasting criterion of genetic parenthood that 
everyone can agree upon. Quite on the contrary, the concept is increasingly 
challenged by new and hypothetical interventions in reproductive medicine. 
(Mertes 2014: 745) 
To this rejection of a unitary account of genetic parenthood, Thomas Douglas and 
Katrien Devolder (2018) have recently responded that even if Mertes (2014) 
correctly rules out certain conceptions of genetic parenthood143, from this it does 
not follow that no plausible account of genetic parenthood can be obtained. They 
propose their own conception of genetic parenthood: ‘Modified Direct 
Proportionate Genetic Descent’ (Douglas & Devolder 2018). According to this 
conception: 
                                                 
143 Mertes (2014) presents two potential conceptions of genetic parenthood. The first is grounded in 
the idea of overlapping genetic material between parent and child. According to this conception: “A 
child is my genetic child when it has 50% of my DNA or when it has 23 of my chromosomes” (Mertes 
2014: 744). The second conception is grounded in the idea of direct descendance. According to this 
conception: “X is a genetic child of Y if X is directly derived from Y’s genes” (Mertes 2014: 744). 
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 P is C’s genetic parent if and only if (i) some proportion X of C’s genes derived 
from P’s genes, and (ii) not through deriving from the genes of some third, 
intervening individual M from whom C derived proportion Y of his genes. 
(Douglas & Devolder 2018: 10) 
Douglas and Devolder’s (2018) conception of genetic parenthood seeks to capture 
folks’ understanding of this term and to establish its theoretical core.  
Other than the question of whether there can be a unitary account of genetic 
parenthood despite the variety of possibilities opened up by new technologies, these 
discussions hinge for instance on whether technological advances such as stem cell-
derived gametes will produce embryos with no genetic parents (Mertes & Pennings 
2008; Sparrow 2012); whether new technologies such as MRTs will change the way 
we think about genetic parenthood (Dimond & Stephens 2018a; Griffith 2016); and 
whether genetic, causal, or other conceptual accounts of parenthood should be 
adopted (for a discussion on this, see Millum 2017). This debate has practical 
implications, as new reproductive technologies provide people with new ways to 
achieve parenthood and as they change the way parenthood is perceived. Notions 
such as ‘social’, ‘genetic’, ‘gestational’, and ‘mitochondrial’ parenthood are becoming 
increasingly disentangled. As Robert Sparrow (2012) puts it, these technologies 
have “provoked and required a proliferation of concepts of the ‘parental’ relation” 
(Sparrow 2012: 174). This conceptual debate is hence linked to the normative debate 
on genetic parenthood discussed in Paper 3 (Cavaliere 2018a) and Paper 4 (Cavaliere 
& Palacios-González 2018), as what (conceptually) counts as genetic parenthood 
has practical implications for debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies. 
A central question within these debates is whether the preference to have 
genetically related children should be satisfied.  
*** 
A number of authors from different disciplinary backgrounds have interrogated the 
ethical standing of the preference for genetically related children (Overall 2012; Rulli 
2016b); unpacked the existential and psychological motivations for ‘wanting an own 
child’ (Lesnik-Oberstein 2007); the potential societal consequences and the costs of 
developing technologies to satisfy it (Petropanagos et al. 2015; Roberts 1997); and 





surveyed people’s reproductive preferences (Hendriks et al. 2017). The normative 
question of whether people’s preference to have genetically related children ought 
to be satisfied continues to divide authors. The debate on MRTs is a case in point, 
as the ethical standing of the preference for genetically related children has been at 
the centre of a controversy within the wider ethical debate on MRTs144. Should, 
then, new reproductive technologies be developed in order to satisfy people’s 
preference for genetically related children?  
If we want to answer this question affirmatively, a fruitful strategy (and indeed, one 
of the most commonly employed strategies to do so) is to establish that people’s 
well-being, sense of identity, and self would be seriously compromised were this 
preference not satisfied. Other things being equal, it seems uncontroversial to 
maintain that it is preferable to protect and promote people’s well-being, sense of 
identity, and self rather than significantly compromise them, if doing so does not 
cause significant harm to others145. Establishing a link between satisfying the 
preference to have genetically related children and well-being, sense of identity, and 
of self, entails showing that such preference is inherent to what Bernard Williams 
(1981) refers to as ‘ground projects’146 (Williams 1981, Ch 1) rather than just a 
contingent or fleeting whim. Establishing such a link entails also that, in turn, not 
satisfying this preference may have negative consequences for people. It is this link 
between personal well-being, sense of self, and identity on the one hand and the 
preference for genetically related children on the other that authors such as John A. 
Robertson (1994, 2003); Harris (1998); Cavaliere & Harris (2018) 147; Brock (2005); 
                                                 
144 See for instance Baylis (2017a) and Rulli (2016a), and Baylis’ (2018) response to Paper 4. 
145 Whether satisfying this preference can be or is harmful to others is discussed below.  
146 Williams argues: “For a project to play this ground role, it does not have to be true that if it were 
frustrated or in any of various ways he lost it, he would have to commit suicide, nor does he have to 
think that. Other things, or the mere hope of other things, may keep him going. But he may feel in 
those circumstances that he might as well have died” (Williams 1981: 13). 
147 In this co-authored paper with John Harris, we discuss reproductive freedom and access to 
abortion within the context of Northern Ireland. Cavaliere & Harris (2018) is not incorporated into 
this thesis.  
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Mills (2013), and others who reflect on and defend reproductive freedom seek to 
establish in order to provide a positive answer to the question outlined above.  
If instead we want to provide a negative answer to this question, different strategies 
can be used. A first set of strategies tries to show that satisfying this preference could 
be harmful for third parties148. Satisfying this preference could, for instance, be 
harmful for future children as parents may then have “unrealistic expectations” for 
them (Overall 2012: 63) and as these technologies may not be entirely safe, a 
discussion that is however complicated by the non-identity problem (Parfit 1984). 
This is what Baylis (2017a); Inmaculada de Melo-Martín (2017a); and other authors 
who are sceptical of both the safety of certain reproductive technologies such as 
MRTs and their value have argued. Alternatively, authors could show that 
satisfying this preference could be harmful to other members of society. It could be 
harmful to the very large number of children who are waiting to be adopted 
(Friedrich 2013; Rulli 2014); it could be harmful due to the opportunity costs of 
investing in new reproductive technologies instead of in the development of 
treatments for people affected by medical conditions that do not receive sufficient 
resources (Baylis 2017a; Rulli 2016a); it could be harmful to members of ethnic 
minorities who are systematically excluded from enjoying the benefits of assisted 
reproductive technologies (Roberts 1997, Ch 7); and to disabled people if these 
technologies are used to have children who are free from genetic or chromosomal 
conditions affecting the prospective parents (Garland Thompson 2012). What all 
these assessments have in common is that they try to establish how satisfying the 
preference to have genetically related children may cause harm (or may risk causing 
harm) to third parties, which provides at least a prima facie ethical reason not to 
develop technologies to satisfy this preference. 
A second set of strategies to offer a negative response to the question of whether 
new reproductive technologies should be developed to satisfy people’s preference 
for genetically related children seeks to undermine the importance of this 
                                                 
148 I return to this issue in Part IV with respect to the actual and potential harms that can result from 
protecting reproductive freedom and individual interests in procreative matters.  





preference. For instance, Baylis (2017a) argues that such a preference, albeit strongly 
held, is just part of “acquired desires (i.e. wants)” as opposed to “natural desires (i.e. 
needs)” (Baylis 2017a: 13). As mentioned in the introduction to Part II, Baylis (2017a) 
states that while natural needs are always good for us and are often necessary to stay 
alive, acquired desires (i.e., wants, wishes, and preferences) are neither necessarily 
good for us nor fundamental to the continuation of our existence. Others argue that 
this preference is determined by political and cultural contexts and it is the product 
of pervasive social pressure (Harwood 2007; Petropanagos et al. 2015; Roberts 1997). 
According to these views, such pressure compels women to use reproductive 
technologies which can be physically, psychologically, and financially costly 
(Overall 1993; Petropanagos 2017; Petropanagos et al. 2015), and that influences and 
distorts people’s preferences. For instance, Angel Petropanagos (2017) argues that: 
As pervasive social biases, pronatalism and geneticism can interfere with 
autonomy by unduly influencing an individual’s reproductive values, 
preferences, and desires or by compromising her capacity for critical reflection or action. 
[…] These social biases might impose values on individuals that are, in some 
sense, not their own because they might not adopt these values in the absence of 
pronatalism and geneticism. ([emphasis added] Petropanagos 2017: 133-34) 
Re-interpreting the preference to have genetically related children as caused by 
external influences, socio-cultural and political pressure, and acquired desires is a 
strategy aimed at questioning the authenticity and the legitimacy of this preference’s 
ascription to the category of ‘ground projects’.  
Providing a detailed analysis and assessment of all the arguments advanced in 
responses to the question outlined above is beyond the scope of this thesis. What 
emerges from an analysis of the literature on genetic relatedness and reproductive 
technologies is once again how different views and responses are the result of 
competing values and ethical beliefs. These competing values and ethical beliefs 
concern, for instance, how far technological innovation should go; what weight 
should be given to people’s preferences; what costs should be tolerated to satisfy 
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these preferences149; whether social preferences should be ‘techno-fixed’; what 
constitutes tangible and intangible harms; and whether such harms warrant the 
curtailment of people’s freedom150. What I have tried to do in the papers 
incorporated into this part of the thesis is to add the question of genetic relatedness 
into the mix of debates on the ethics of genome editing as a reproductive option, 
and to test whether it can constitute a conclusive argument against expanding 
criteria of access to MRTs. In the introduction to Part II, I argued that the question 
of genetic relatedness applies differently to the case of genome editing and MRTs. 
As I hope became clear after reading the two papers incorporated into this part of 
the thesis, however, discussing this question within debates on the ethics of genome 
editing and within debates on the ethics of MRTs brings up different ethical 
considerations. While in the case of genome editing the question of genetic 
relatedness concerns the decision of whether to invest resources to develop a new 
technology that could satisfy this preference, in the case of MRTs these 
technologies already exist and the decision would be whether to restrict or not give 
access to this technology to a group of people based on their sexual preferences.   
*** 
The work of social scientists belonging to the feminist and/or critical thinking 
traditions has produced scholarship that can aid a critical discussion of the preference 
to have genetically related children. This scholarship provides evidence in support 
of the view that women and couples may suffer from a kind of social pressure that 
plays a role in the decision to use new reproductive technologies (Harwood 2007; 
Russo 1976); it has questioned whether these technologies really empower women 
by allowing them to fulfill their true desires (Petropanagos 2017); it has shown that 
‘non-tangible’ harm to third-parties can occur (Roberts 1997); and that competing 
duties might trump the moral right to reproductive freedom (Rieder 2015b, 2016; 
Rulli 2016b). These assessments and data are valuable material for debates on the 
ethics of new reproductive technologies and, even if IVF is routinely used, even if 
                                                 
149 This is discussed in Papers 3 and 4, and Part IV of this thesis.  
150 I discuss this question in Part IV. 





MRTs have been legalised in the U.K., it does not follow that ‘anything goes’ with 
respect to the development of ever newer technologies.  
It is true that people’s value systems can change, that preferences can be readjusted, 
that one can have all sorts of wishes and wants and not all of them should be satisfied. 
Despite this, at present, for some, not having (genetically related) children can be 
experienced as a dramatic event and it could have a significant impact on their well-
being. This might and perhaps should change, but charges of false consciousness and 
of having misguided preferences, and attempts to debunk such preferences do 
nothing to help the people who are suffering from infertility or genetic conditions. 
In addition, changing people’s preferences should not come at a significant cost to 
those who strongly hold such preferences. This is what I find problematic in the 
accounts of those who take as a point of departure for their critiques of new 
reproductive technologies the lack of authenticity and significance of people’s 
reproductive preferences. Whether something is ‘acquired’ or ‘natural’, the product 
of cultural and political contexts or of biology seems less relevant than whether 
something positively or negatively affects people’s well-being and sense of self. 
Reproductive preferences and wishes can be questioned and acquiring data 
concerning their biological, cultural, and political driving forces and origins will likely 
provide important insights to the debate on their ethical standing. But these 
endeavours should go hand in hand with a commitment to respect and promote 
when possible people’s well-being and sense of identity. If this is best achieved by 
lightening the negative effects of the social pressure mentioned above (especially on 
women); by reducing actual and potential harms to discriminated and vulnerable 
groups151; by countering certain stereotypical ideas of what counts as the optimum in 
parenting; by satisfying preferences with technical or non-technical means, seems to 
be ethically irrelevant.  
Does this translate into an imperative to continue to invest our limited resources into 
the development of ever newer technologies? Or that basic research to develop new 
technologies and clinical applications of these technologies should always go 
                                                 
151 I return to this issue in Part IV of this thesis.  
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forward? In my view, it does not. What ultimately matters is to balance the burdens 
and benefits of different courses of action, and to proceed justly in their distribution. 
The question of genetic relatedness, its origins, and ethical standing should feature 
in these calculations, but only as one of the elements to weigh up and consider in 
these assessments. In order to do so, it is necessary to move from an analysis of 
debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies (Part I) and from a discussion 
of the ethical standing of eugenic decisions and of the preference for genetic 
relatedness just discussed, to another set of relevant ethical questions. To 
understand how competing interests are dealt with in practice, it is necessary to 
focus on questions concerning the governance of new reproductive technologies 
(Part III) and to address ethical questions pertaining to the effects of procreative 
decisions more generally (Part IV). I discuss questions of governance and of the costs 




PART III  
Regulating New Reproductive Technologies  
1 Introduction to Part III 
In this part of the thesis, I move from questions pertaining to the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies to questions pertaining to how new reproductive 
technologies should be regulated within democratic societies and who should decide 
how to regulate them. In Paper 6 (Cavaliere et al. 2019), the final paper incorporated 
into this thesis, my co-authors and I refer to questions concerning the governance 
of new reproductive technologies as ‘ethical-political’ questions arising at the 
‘second level’ of ethical analysis. We distinguish them from ethical questions arising 
at the ‘first level’, which pertain to the ethical standing of a given technology and of 
its applications152. In Paper 5 (Cavaliere 2017) and Paper 6 (Cavaliere et al. 2019), 
the two papers incorporated into Part III, I discuss second level ethical questions 
raised by two developments in the field of embryology and genetic engineering. 
This part of the thesis moves to what I argue is another necessary step to providing 
a thorough assessment of the ethics of new reproductive technologies and to 
addressing the question of who should come into existence. To recap: Part I of this 
thesis approached the assessment of the ethics of these technologies by analysing 
and reflecting on the normative debates which surround them. Part II built on this 
analysis and concerned more specifically ethical questions and challenges raised by 
new reproductive technologies. Part III, and the papers incorporated into it, brings 
together several of the key themes of this thesis including how to address the moral 
disagreement arising in democratic societies concerning new reproductive 
technologies; how to negotiate between competing values on the ethical standing of 
these technologies and their applications, and how to deal with competing world-
views on the question of who should come into existence. Contrary to the rest of 
                                                 
152 An example of these ‘first level’ questions was given in Part II with respect to MRTs and genome 
editing technologies.  
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this thesis, here the focus is on how to act in the public sphere in relation to these 
themes and how to address these questions in the realm of public policy. I contend 
that this evaluation and assessment of ethical-political questions surrounding new 
reproductive technologies is necessary to produce a thorough assessment of the 
ethics of new reproductive technologies and to address the question of who should 
come into existence from all its relevant dimensions.  
Paper 5, the first paper incorporated into this part of the thesis, is a single-author 
paper published in BMC Medical Ethics titled ‘A 14-Day Limit for Bioethics: The 
Debate over Human Embryo Research’. There, I discuss whether the 14-day 
statutory limit for human embryo research should be extended153 and defend an 
approach to addressing this question that aims to find a compromise between 
competing values and ethical views. Paper 6, the second paper incorporated into this 
part of the thesis, is published in the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics and titled 
‘Regulating Genome Editing: For an Enlightened Democratic Governance’. It is co-
authored with Dr Katrien Devolder (KD) and Dr Alberto Giubilini (AG). There, I 
discuss different regulatory approaches to the governance of genome editing 
applications to early human embryos. I argue for an approach that my co-authors 
and I dub the ‘enlightened democracy approach’, which is modelled on the 
framework of deliberative democracy and on Philip Kitcher’s (2001, 2011) idea of 
‘well-ordered science’. Both of these papers hence propose and defend strategies to 
address ethical-political questions pertaining to the governance of two technologies 
which cause substantial ethical controversy: embryo research and genome editing. 
The defences of compromise and of the enlightened democracy approach I advance 
need to be interpreted in terms of attempts to consider and respect the plurality of 
people’s ethical views and values in relation to these technologies. These defences 
are motivated, in other words, by a commitment to democratic governance in areas 
of profound ethical controversy.  
Human embryo research and genome editing technologies represent an interesting 
case study to reflect on ethical-political questions. These technologies have been in 
                                                 
153 On this question, see also Sarah Chan (2017, 2018), and Appleby and Bredenoord (2018).  




existence for decades, but during the three years of my doctoral research (2015-
2018) technical potential significantly improved in both respects. Human embryos 
can be now sustained in vitro for longer than ever (Deglincerti et al. 2016; Shahbazi 
et al. 2016); also, genome editing technologies are significantly more precise, 
efficient, and less costly (Brokowski & Adli 2019; Ledford 2015). These 
developments raise old and new ethical questions, many of which have been 
discussed in this thesis. These developments also offer an opportunity to rethink 
existing and new regulatory approaches, and to reflect on ways to deal with the 
plurality of views coexisting in democratic societies. I take advantage of this 
opportunity in the two papers incorporated into this part of the thesis.  
My overarching aim in Part III is to show that ethical-political questions deserve 
ethical attention given the plurality of values and world-views which bioethicists, 
scientists, other scholars, and citizens hold; how these values and world-views give 
rise to deep moral disagreement; and the practical implications of such disagreement. 
Following Hendrik Wagenaar and Sietske Altink (2012), and Wagenaar (2011): 
Politics is thus society’s ways of dealing with the deep pluralism, the inevitable 
conflicts of beliefs, religion, value, and interest that characterize all societies. 
(Wagenaar 2011, Ch 10) (Wagenaar & Altink 2012: 280) 
It is within these inevitable conflicts that new reproductive technologies need to be 
discussed and regulated. It is also within them that my analysis is situated.  
*** 
Moral disagreement and how to deal with it in the public policy arena is something 
that has been the locus of concern for political theorists and philosophers alike. On 
Liberty, John Stuart Mill’s (1979/1859) seminal work on political freedom and free 
speech, as well as John Rawls’ (1993) idea of reasonable pluralism within the 
framework of political liberalism can be seen as part of a tradition that attempts to 
settle this question. In this part of the thesis, I address ethical-political questions 
raised by new reproductive technologies by borrowing from and building on some 
of the arguments advanced within a more recent set of approaches devised to deal 
with moral disagreement within the public policy arena. This set of approaches can 
be collectively identified as the framework of deliberative democracy (Bohman 
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1998; Cohen 2003; Dryzek 2000; Elster 1998; Gutmann & Thompson 1996, 2009; 
Hajer & Wagenaar 2003) which attempts to set out strategies of governance 
considering the existence and, importantly, the persistence of moral disagreement.  
As its label suggests, ‘deliberative democracy’ rests on two tenets: democracy and 
deliberation. Deliberative democracy’s democratic component is achieved through 
involving in decision-making processes those who are directly and indirectly 
affected by the matter in question (Elster 1998). By contrast, its deliberative 
component is achieved through the mutual exchange of reasons and arguments 
among those involved in these processes (Gutmann & Thompson 1996; Elster 1998). 
Capturing these features, James Bohman (1998) defines deliberative democracy as: 
[A]ny one of a family of views according to which the public deliberation of 
free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political decision making and 
self-government. (Bohman 1998: 401) 
A core characteristic of this family of views (as opposed to other approaches to 
democratic governance) is that the preferences of those engaged in deliberative 
processes are not merely aggregated through a vote or a poll but rather transformed 
and refined through mutual exchanges (Elster 1998). Those participating in these 
exchanges should be committed to mutual respect and to seeking “fair terms of 
cooperation” (Gutmann & Thompson 2009: 3). They should also rely on “reason-
giving” (Gutmann & Thompson 2009: 3) and on “persuasion rather than coercion, 
manipulation, or deception” (Dryzek 2000: 1). According to proponents of 
deliberative democracy154, one of the strengths of this family of views is that 
decisions reached following this mutual exchange are more legitimate in that they 
receive “reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those 
subject to the decision in question” (Dryzek 2001: 651). In addition to legitimacy, 
another strength of deliberative approaches to democratic decision-making is that 
decisions may be less subject to epistemic error:   
                                                 
154 For an overview and a discussion of critiques of the deliberative democratic approach, see for 
example Michael Parker (2007); Lynn M. Sanders (1997); Ian Shapiro (1999); Susan Stokes (1999). 




Through the give-and-take of argument, participants can learn from each 
other, come to recognize their individual and collective misapprehensions, and 
develop new views and policies that can more successfully withstand critical 
scrutiny. (Gutmann & Thompson 2009: 40) 
Relatedly, these approaches and the ‘give-and-take of argument’ they entail can 
give rise to new ideas which may not emerge in private deliberation (Fearon 1998) – 
a view that echoes Mill’s (1979/1859) defence of the freedom of ‘thought and 
expression’ (Mill 1979/1859, Ch 2; see also Kitcher 2007). Other than instrumental 
reasons in favour of deliberative democracy, its proponents advance intrinsic or, 
following Michael Parker (2007), ‘expressive’ reasons in favour of these approaches. 
The value of these approaches would lie in their embodiment of: 
[A] recognition of respect for persons, that is, people should be treated not 
simply as the object of legislation but as autonomous, if socially embedded, 
agents capable of taking part in the governance of the societies within which 
they live. (Parker 2007: 186) 
According to this view, then, considering the preferences of citizens, involving them 
in decision-making processes, and ensuring that their views are heard by fellow 
citizens and policy-makers expresses respect for them. 
Within bioethics scholarship, authors have built on this family of views and 
developed proposals for bioethics to learn from and rely upon certain core elements 
of deliberative democracy (for an overview, see for example Gutmann & Thompson 
1997). For instance, Parker (2007) outlines five techniques for the development of 
“a substantive and pluralist model of deliberative bioethics” (Parker 2007: 189), 
which should be: 
[G]rounded in and constrained by: respect for persons, reflectivity, focusing on 
listening to and capturing marginalized voices; modes of expression and 
overlooked narratives; resisting the erasure of difference; the importance of 
‘thick description’; and adopting a critical perspective. (Parker 2007: 189-190) 
Other examples of how bioethics scholarship and debates can learn from democracy 
approaches concern, for instance, the use of PGD for sex selection (Farrelly 2009); 
genetic enhancement in sport (Camporesi & Maugeri 2011); and research ethics 
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(Kim et al. 2009). These authors’ proposals, and more generally the juxtaposition of 
deliberative democracy with matters of concern for bioethics have as a peculiar 
characteristic a shift in the subject matter of what it is to be governed. By and large, 
deliberative democracy concerns the governance of citizens in democratic societies, 
while deliberative democracy within bioethics focuses on, building on Rose (2007), 
the governance of ‘life itself’. This shift is especially evident in the analyses of 
authors who interpret ‘public bioethics bodies’ (see for instance Kelly 2003) as forms 
of (enacted) deliberative democracy. These bodies are “institutions, practices, and 
discourses” (Moore 2010: 715) linking policy-making and ethical considerations to 
improve political decision-making within the governance of life. Some of these 
authors charge public bioethics bodies with embodying ‘technocratic authority’ 
(Evans 2006); reproducing problematic models of ‘expert domination’ (Moore 2010); 
and with creating and reinforcing mechanisms of inclusions and exclusions within 
deliberations on ethical matters (Hurlbut 2017; Kelly 2003); among other critiques.  
In this part of the thesis, I do not attempt to settle the questions this tradition has 
raised and addressed. In this sense, my analysis is limited in scope and depth. What 
I focus on is a much more modest project. I examine and address some of the ethical-
political questions raised by two recent developments in the fields of genetics and 
embryology: the capacity to sustain human embryos in vitro for longer than was 
hitherto technically feasible and is legally possible155 and the application of genome 
editing technologies to human embryos. I then propose two approaches to address 
such questions: favouring a solution of compromise between conflicting ethical 
views (in Paper 5, Cavaliere 2017) and adopting an enlightened democracy approach 
(in Paper 6, Cavaliere et al. 2019). These approaches build respectively on strategies 
devised by Mary Warnock, the chair of the committee established in the U.K. in 
1982 to discuss embryo research and assisted conception; and by the framework of 
deliberative democracy and Kitcher’s (2001, 2007) idea of ‘well-ordered science’. 
Together, they represent attempts to address ethical-political questions arising 
                                                 
155 As further discussed in Paper 5 (Cavaliere 2017), the current statutory limit for conducting research 
on human embryos in the U.K. is set at 14 days after fertilisation. The ‘14-day limit’ or ‘14-day rule’ 
is enshrined in the legislations of 12 countries and embedded in the guidelines of five more (see Hyun 
et al. 2016; Isasi & Knoppers 2006). 




within pluralistic societies. Individually, they represent attempts to address 
questions pertaining to the governance of embryo research and genome editing 
applications to early human embryos.  
1.1 New Developments and Their Relevance for Assisted Reproduction 
As I argued in the introduction to this thesis, I consider genome editing technologies 
and research involving early human embryos as both eugenic and reproductive 
technologies. I do so as, albeit not strictly reproductive, these technologies are 
instrumental to people’s reproductive projects and they raise questions pertaining to 
who should come into existence. People who are at risk of transmitting a genetic 
condition to their offspring may decide not to reproduce without the aid of these 
technologies. At the same time, these technologies could satisfy people’s preference 
to have children who are healthier than they would otherwise have been (were these 
technologies not employed) and genetically related to them (see also: Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2018). One of the arguments used to ground a positive case for 
basic research with genome editing is that such research – albeit not directly 
providing a cure for infertility – could shed light on disorders responsible for early 
miscarriage as well as on genes involved in the early development (and interruptions 
to the development) of human embryos (Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority 2016: 1.18). Basic research with genome editing has been also explicitly 
defended on the grounds that, among other benefits, it could be promising for future 
infertility treatments.  
The focus on potential and future ‘reproductive’ benefits of research with genome 
editing was one of the reasons advanced by the research group led by Kathy Niakan 
at the Francis Crick Institute (based in London, U.K.) in its application to the 
HFEA. With this application, the Crick group sought permission to conduct basic 
research with CRISPR on human embryos. In the HFEA Licence Committee 
minutes, the committee declared itself “satisfied that the activities to be licensed are 
necessary or desirable” as these activities may provide “increasing knowledge about 
the development of embryos” and as they may be able to promote “advances in the 
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treatment of infertility” (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2016: 
1.18). More specifically, the committee declared itself to be:  
[S]atisfied that the genes or proteins the team will be studying may, in the long 
term, be important in understanding human embryo development and in 
developing biomarkers of embryonic health which might be used in clinical IVF 
treatment. (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2016, 1.18)  
In other words, the licensing committee recognised how basic research with genome 
editing on human embryos can be instrumental to people’s procreative projects and 
explicitly endorsed this research for this reason (see for instance Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority 2016).  
As with today’s discourses on research with genome editing technologies, in the 
early days of the debate on human embryo research discourses on whether this 
practice should have been allowed were inextricably tied to assisted reproduction 
(Wilson 2014). Justifications for legalising these two practices were interwoven for 
two reasons. On the one hand, the debate on the ethical acceptability of embryo 
research emerged due to the need to decide the fate of supernumerary embryos 
created with IVF. On the other, Warnock and others defended this practice on the 
grounds that it was needed to make IVF and other assisted reproductive 
technologies safer and more effective (Wilson 2014). Recent developments in 
embryology and the technical capacity to sustain human embryos in vitro for longer 
than was hitherto possible marked what can be interpreted as a ‘second wave’ of the 
debate on human embryo research. Within this debate, the relationship between 
embryo research and reproduction is stronger than ever. One of the most commonly 
employed arguments in favour of extending the statutory time limit to conduct 
human embryo research is that it can shed light on embryo development and on the 
interruptions to such development responsible for early miscarriage. For instance, 
Magdalena Zernicka-Goetz, one of the key scientists behind the recent 
developments in embryology discussed in Paper 5, clarifies: 
Why might society want to follow these events? Largely because these are the 
developmental stages at which many defects in early human development 
occur. The failure to establish a pregnancy or its termination through natural 




miscarriage resulting in the spontaneous death and loss of a baby is a misery for 
many would-be mothers. […] Understanding early post-implantation 
development will enable us to predict when developmental defects are likely 
to arise and, with time, to establish treatments. (Zernicka-Goetz 2017 :53)  
The idea of allowing human embryo research and of extending the limit to conduct 
such research in order to cure infertility is indeed one of the most powerful 
arguments advanced in favour of such research. The strength of this argument 
becomes evident when contextualised within the relevance of reproductive freedom 
and of the preference to have genetically related children discussed in the previous 
part of this thesis. As Charlotte Elves and Sheelagh McGuinness (2017) argue: 
“Embryos exist in a liminal position between reproduction and research” (Elves & 
McGuinness 2017: 26) 156. It is within such a liminal position that my discussion of 
human embryo research and genome editing technologies is situated.  
*** 
Other than being broadly understood in terms of new reproductive technologies, 
the developments157 discussed in the two papers incorporated into this part of the 
thesis are linked in several additional ways. Firstly, as is the case for other 
technologies discussed in this thesis, they have been depicted as eugenic and 
substantial moral disagreement surrounds their ethical standing (first level questions) 
and how they should be regulated considering such disagreement (second level 
questions). Secondly, many of the arguments presented in favour of and against 
them are similar as they appeal to (future) benefits, reproductive freedom, the moral 
status of the embryo, eugenics and ‘slippery-slope’ concerns. Thirdly, the timing of 
the announcements of the results of the experiments showing that embryos could 
be sustained in vitro for 12-13 days (Deglincerti et al. 2016; Shahbazi et al. 2016) and 
of the Francis Crick Institute application to the HFEA is of critical significance, as 
it provided those in favour of extending the statutory limit for embryo research and 
                                                 
156 See also Marie Fox and Sheelagh McGuinness (2015).  
157 As mentioned above, these developments are: the capacity to sustain embryos in vitro for more 
than 14 days after fertilisation (discussed in Paper 5) and the application of genome editing 
technologies to human embryos (discussed in Paper 6). 
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of applying genome editing to human embryos with additional reasons to advocate 
for a green light on both (see Connor 2016).  
Before moving to Paper 5 (Cavaliere 2017) and Paper 6 (Cavaliere et al. 2019), I 
discuss some of the instrumental and intrinsic reasons in favour of considering views 
that differ from one’s own when we move from ethical questions at the first level to 
ethical questions at the second level. The literature on deliberative democracy 
engenders some of these arguments (which are further assessed in the two papers 
incorporated into this part of the thesis), such as those pertaining to the need to 
ensure the ‘generation of trust’ (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003: 12; O’Neill 2002) and to 
legitimacy (Buchanan 2002b; Cohen 2003; Gutmann & Thompson 2009; Parkinson 
2003).  
1.2 Taking Conflicting Ethical Views into Account 
My own theoretical-ethical view of the old question of whether embryo research 
should be allowed and of the new question of whether the 14-day limit for embryo 
research should be extended is that there are good reasons to allow embryo research 
given the benefits that it could yield. I also think that there are good reasons to 
extend the limit – if extending the limit will lead to substantial scientific gains which 
could not be achieved were the limit kept at 14 days158. I hold this view because I 
do not think that embryos at 14, 28, 35 days or so have significant moral status and 
that they should be protected by sparing them from being used for research. It seems 
to me that they have no interests, no preferences, and no ability to experience pain 
or pleasure. They lack, in short, all the characteristics necessary (if not sufficient) to 
be granted moral status and to be spared from being used in research. Similarly, in 
                                                 
158 In a recently published article, Appleby and Bredenoord (2018) outlined scientific reasons (benefits 
for research on synthetic embryos, organoids, genome editing and stem cell-derived gametes); 
regulatory reasons (in their words: “A failure to revise the 14-day rule places the international 
community at risk of losing one of its better examples of international consensus and regulation, 
because the rule itself could be viewed as no longer fit for purpose”, Appleby & Bredenoord 2018: 
4); and ethical reasons (benefitting “science and patients” Appleby & Bredenoord 2018: 4, and as 
they could not find valid ethical reasons against extending the rule to 28 days). This article was 
published after Paper 5 (Cavaliere 2017), but I address within it many of the broader issues these 
authors raise.  




my view, if genome editing could be proven to be safe and effective, there are good 
reasons to allow basic and clinical research to go forward. These good reasons 
pertain to the medical benefits of genome editing: it could correct mutations which 
may lead to harmful genetic conditions. This in turn would allow people that are 
healthier than they would otherwise have been – had genome editing not be used – 
to come into existence. I hold this view because, in addition to my position on the 
moral status (or lack thereof) of human embryos, I do not think that their genetic 
makeup should be granted special protection.  
There may be good countervailing reasons to those I have discussed above, but my 
view is that these reasons are not provided by an appeal to embryos’ full or 
substantive moral status. Such countervailing reasons could, for instance, be that our 
(past) experience with embryo research allows us to predict that extending the limit 
to conduct embryo research is not likely to yield significant benefits in terms of both 
increased scientific knowledge and increased possibilities for clinical applications of 
such knowledge. This would be a (good, prima facie) reason against embryo research 
and against extending the 14-day limit notwithstanding one’s position on the moral 
status of the embryos. Similarly, if genome editing was not safe or effective, if 
allowing people that are healthier than they would otherwise have been to come into 
existence could be pursued via existing technologies (such as PGD combined with 
whole genome sequencing), then these would be (good, prima facie) countervailing 
reasons not to allow basic and clinical research with genome editing. These are my 
ethical views on embryo research, extending the limit to conduct such research and 
genome editing technologies applications to early human embryos. While I am 
convinced of the rightness of these ethical views, regulations should not be 
necessarily based on (or based solely on) these (right) ethical views159. When we 
                                                 
159 In Truth or Consequences, Brock (1987) argues that: “Truth is the central virtue of scholarly work” 
and that philosophers and scholars more generally are “taught to follow arguments and evidence 
where they lead without regard for the social consequences of doing so” (Brock 1987: 786). Despite 
this commitment to seeking truths regardless of consequences, philosophers who lend themselves to 
public policy would be ineffective and may end up failing in their responsibilities if they continue this 
truth-seeking business as usual. This, according to Brock (1987), is due to a sort of necessary division 
of labour between policy-making and academia. Contrary to academia, within policy-making “The 
first concern of those responsible for public policy is, and ought to be, the consequences of their 
actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect” (Brock 1987: 788). In a similar 
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move from theoretical-ethical debates on new reproductive technologies to debates 
on how to regulate these technologies, from theoretical-ethical questions at the first 
level to political-ethical questions at the second level, other considerations come into 
play and additional reasons (in favour of and against) these technologies need to be 
carefully considered, both for practical (instrumental) and intrinsic reasons. I discuss 
some of the instrumental reasons to consider ethical views which differ from one’s 
own and especially from what one considers the right ethical view in both the papers 
incorporated into this part of the thesis. By and large, formulating policies that do 
not reflect nor consider in any way ethical views held by a large swathe of the 
population could engender undesirable outcomes. People may end up becoming 
increasingly distrustful of both scientists developing technologies, and policy-makers 
and committees appointed to regulate them (Calnan & Rowe 2008; O’Neill 2002; 
Resnik 2011)160. They could perceive basic and clinical research as businesses which 
are pursued without constraints and without the (ethical) input of potential users, 
riding roughshod over users’ and society’s values and views. They could become 
increasingly alienated from scientific research and from the products of such research 
(e.g. from the new reproductive technologies I discuss throughout this thesis).  
There may be additional instrumental reasons to consider ethical views which differ 
from one’s own, which can be extrapolated – with some necessary caveats – from 
Mill’s defence of the ‘liberty of thought and expression’ (Mill 1979/1859, Ch 2). Mill 
advances four arguments in favour of such liberty: the first two pertain to human 
fallibility. According to him, suppressed human opinions can be true or they can at 
least contain some portion of truth. Allowing the inclusion and subsequent 
                                                 
fashion, Jonathan Montgomery’s (2013) reflections on doing ‘public ethics’ as opposed to 
academic/scholarly work lead him to conclude that the latter rather than the former “aspires more to 
acceptability rather than to philosophical neatness” and that “members of committees can adopt 
conclusions for a variety of reasons, which may be mutually inconsistent, provided they give a basis 
from which policy can be developed” (Montgomery 2013: 12).   
160 As Maarten A. Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar (2003) argue, within the ‘network society’ (Beck 
1999) “Trust cannot be assumed. Politics and policymaking thus is not simply about finding solutions for 
pressing problems, it is as much about finding formats that generate trust among mutually interdependent 
actors” ([emphasis in original] Hajer & Wagenaar 2003: 12). See also Jack Barbalet (2009) for the 
performative role of trust in situations of uncertainty and Camporesi et al. (2017) for a discussion of 
recent work on trust in healthcare.  




discussion of rival points of view can guard against epistemic errors. The third and 
fourth arguments pertain instead to dogmatism and prejudice. According to Mill, 
received opinion incurs the risk of becoming dogmatically held “in the manner of a 
prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds” (Mill 
1979/1859: 60) and of losing its meaning thereby becoming “deprived of its vital 
effect on the character and conduct” (Mill 1979/1859: 60). Once again, allowing the 
inclusion and discussion of rival points of view can prevent such deleterious 
developments. Following Mill, then, an instrumental reason to take into account 
ethical views which differ from one’s own is that ethical views can be liable to error 
if they are based on empirically and normatively wrong assumptions and premises 
(or just on partially wrong assumptions and premises). Additionally, moral theories 
which inform these ethical views may be held dogmatically. The process of engaging 
with ethical views which differ from one’s own may uncover such dogmatism and 
compel the questioning of one’s own ethical views and the principles underpinning 
them before others. This would mean engaging in a process of rediscovering ethical 
views’ potential to redirect ‘character and conduct’. All these considerations point 
to instrumental reasons to take into account ethical views which differ from one’s 
own. Notwithstanding one’s own ethical view on the permissibility of conducting 
research on human embryos (within and beyond the 14-day limit) and on the 
permissibility of editing the genetic makeup of early embryos, the different views 
held by other authors and citizens on both technologies become relevant for the 
debate on how to regulate them.  
This commitment to reflect on ethical-political questions in ways which do not strive 
to find the ‘right’ ethical way forward was also the approach that Warnock endorsed 
in her role as chair of the committee appointed to deliberate and advise over the 
permissibility of human embryo research. In Warnock’s words: 
An absolutely central consideration in the work of [the] committee… was the 
difference between what one might personally think was sensible, or even 
morally right, and what was most likely to be acceptable as a matter of public policy… 
Time and again we found ourselves distinguishing not between what would be 
right or wrong, but between what would be acceptable or unacceptable. 
(Warnock 2003: 98-99, quoted in Franklin & Roberts 2006: 5) 
Who Should Come into Existence? 
168 
 
Warnock explicitly rejected “the language of right and wrong” (Warnock 2003: 99) 
and focused rather on finding something that was ‘acceptable’. Her methodological 
and normative stance was criticised by philosophers such as Harris (1985, Ch 6), 
Michael Lockwood (1985) and Hare (1987) for lacking philosophical rigour; failing 
to provide defensible reasons in support of its recommendations; not discussing 
fundamental questions concerning the moral status of the embryo and taking into 
account feelings not grounded in moral principles and reason. While this criticism 
was an accurate representation of Warnock’s approach, it was misguided as 
Warnock’s aim was never philosophical rigour and to decide on the right ethical 
view for the regulation of embryo research but rather to: 
[R]ecommend a policy that might allow the sort of medical and scientific 
progress which was in the public interest, while at the same time not riding 
roughshod over the moral scruples of a significant number of the public. 
(Warnock 2003, quoted in Montgomery 2013: 11) 
Warnock’s approach and the idea of considering a plurality of different ethical views 
in developing policies to regulate new reproductive technologies can be also 
defended for intrinsic reasons, i.e. these views would be taken into account for their 
own sake rather than for the state of affairs they may bring about. Moral pluralism 
(or value pluralism), namely the idea that there is an “irreducible plurality of values 
or principles that are relevant to moral judgment” (Wolf 1992: 785), offers both an 
explanation for moral disagreement as well as grounding a normative commitment 
to take into account and respect different ethical views on new reproductive 
technologies161.  
                                                 
161 Other defences and discussions of moral pluralism can be found in, for instance: Isaiah Berlin 
(1969); Bernard Williams (1981); Nagel (1979); William D. Ross (1930). Nagel (1979), for example, 
rejects the possibility of resolving conflicts of values by measuring and outweighing these values 
against one unitary and foundational value, and the possibility of explaining such conflicts in terms 
of one unitary value. This is what utilitarianism seeks to do with utility on the one hand by trying to 
resolve conflicts by prioritising utility over other values and on the other by trying to explain the 
apparent priority of other values in terms of utility. Nagel (1979) rejects both these moves: “My 
reasons for thinking that such explanations are unsuccessful, or at best partially successful, is not just 
that they imply specific moral conclusions that I find intuitively unacceptable (…). Rather, my reason 
for doubt is theoretical: I do not believe that the source of value is unitary – displaying apparent 
multiplicity only in its application to the world” (Nagel 1979: 132).  




Susan Wolf (1992) begins her essay on moral pluralism with a discussion of the 
persistence of moral disagreement. She also expresses dissatisfaction with the 
strategies that are commonly employed to explain away such disagreement, which 
try to establish that at least one of the parties (or both parties) are subjected to some 
kind of cognitive (or moral) error. By contrast, Wolf (1992) sets out to explain how 
moral pluralism “suggests a more tolerant though still antisubjectivist response to 
moral disagreement” (Wolf 1992: 787). According to Wolf: 
In understanding and interpreting moral disagreements, pluralism offers an 
alternative to the relativist position that my views are right for me and your 
views are right for you, as well to the absolutist position that only one of us can 
be right. For the pluralist can understand moral disagreements, at least 
potentially as cases in which the plurality of values don’t add up to a uniquely 
right answer. (Wolf 1992: 788) 
Within a moral pluralist framework, then, the persistence of moral disagreement can 
be traced back to the irreducible plurality of morally significant values and to the 
lack of a unifying principle that can both order and explain them entirely 162.  
Conflicts over the moral status of the embryo and especially over the permissibility 
of human embryo research, extending the 14-day limit and applying genome editing 
technologies to early human embryos can be explained by the sort of ‘first-level 
moral pluralism’ described by Wolf (1992). According to this view, those who 
believe that embryos should be protected and germlines preserved are not 
necessarily subject to some kind of cognitive error (although they may be), but they 
are committed to values which differ from those holding another view on the 
                                                 
162 According to Wolf (1992), value pluralism differs in relevant ways from subjectivism and from 
relativism. Contrary to subjectivism, a commitment to value pluralism does not meta-ethically nor 
normatively entail the view that as far as morality is concerned ‘anything goes’. This view is echoed 
by Nagel (1979), who warns against the danger of embracing pluralism and noncomprehensive 
systematisation as a way to abandon any attempt to provide moral justifications and to formulate 
moral theories. Contrary to relativism, value pluralism does not either necessarily entail the relativist 
position that the truth of an ethical view is relative to the moral standard of some person, society or 
culture. In Wolf’s (1992) words: “Unlike the relativist, who believes that what is right for you is 
different from what is right for me, the pluralist holds that, for each and every one of us, the question 
of what is right in some cases lacks a unique and determinate answer. Rightness, on this view, is not 
relative to anything, it is not a matter of perspective. It is just indeterminate” (Wolf 1992: 189). 
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permissibility of these technologies (including my own). This does not translate into 
the view that any ethical view on embryo research and genome editing should be 
necessarily be held, as irreducibility does not need to translate into the impossibility 
of rational choice between conflicting justifications and views (Nagel 1979, Ch 9). 
In addition, while conflicting justifications and views can be reasonable, not all 
justifications and views are necessarily equally reasonable163. Moving from 
considering conflicting views (or views that differ from one’s own) as the result of 
cognitive errors or morally reprehensible attitudes towards considering at least some 
of them the result of an irreducible plurality of values provides an intrinsic reason to 
consider and respect these views.  
The question of whether rational choice between conflicting values is possible is a 
common challenge to the value pluralism framework. In the papers incorporated into 
this part of the thesis, I do not attempt to settle this question – which has been 
addressed in terms of following Aristoteles’ idea of practical wisdom (Nagel 1979), 
of attempting to rank conflicting values and prioritise some over others (Griffin 1986; 
Stocker 1990) and of accepting that certain conflicts cannot be rationally resolved 
(see, for instance: Berlin 1969; Williams 1981). Instead, in these two papers, on the 
one hand I aim to provide arguments for considering and respecting the plurality of 
ethical views on new reproductive technologies in the context of debates on how to 
regulate these technologies; on the other, I propose two strategies that, in my view, 
can work towards this aim.  
In my view (and as I further argue in Paper 5, Cavaliere 2017, and in the conclusion 
to this part of the thesis), a solution of compromise between the plurality of values 
                                                 
163 To give an example, please allow me to move from moral to aesthetic judgements (and back): an 
aesthetic pluralist answer to the question of who is the best film director would be that there are 
several candidates for such recognition. It would also be that there are several possible and plausible 
justifications for proposing different candidates, but that it may be hard to find non-question-begging 
justifications for one candidate or another. This does not mean that any director can be considered 
the best (think about deciding between Martin Scorsese and Christopher Nolan on the one hand, 
and between Quentin Tarantino and Tommy Wiseau on the other) nor that it is impossible to reject 
certain candidates or justifications. Similarly, a moral pluralist answer to the question of whether 
embryo research should be permitted would allow for contrasting ethical views and justifications to 
be considered as reasonable answers to such a question, but not to any answer (think about the 
difference between a view that defends such permissibility if there are no benefits yielding from such 
research and if embryos are proven to be experiencing pain). 




and conflicting ethical views concerning new reproductive technologies is a strategy 
that considers and respects these values and views. Despite this, defending a solution 
of compromise does not address the question of which values and views should be 
taken into account and respected. Paper 6 (Cavaliere et al. 2019) looks at different 
approaches to answer this question and proposes a process of democratic 
engagement modelled on the framework of deliberative democracy and of the ‘well-




2 PAPER 5: A 14-Day Limit for Bioethics: The Debate Over Human Embryo 
Research 
Paper 5 is a single-authored paper currently published in BMC Medical Ethics.  
The original version of this paper is enclosed in Appendix 5.  
Cavaliere, G. (2017). A 14-day limit for bioethics: The debate over human embryo 
research. BMC Medical Ethics, 18(1), 38, doi: 10.1186/s12910-017-0198-5 
2.1 Abstract  
Background 
This article explores the reasons in favour of revising and extending the current 14-
day statutory limit to maintaining human embryos in culture. This limit is enshrined 
in law in over a dozen countries, including the United Kingdom. In two recently 
published studies (2016), scientists have shown that embryos can be sustained in 
vitro for about 13 days after fertilisation. Positive reactions to these results have gone 
hand in hand with calls for revising the 14-day rule, which only allows embryo 
research until the 14th day after fertilisation.  
Main text 
The article explores the most prominent arguments in favour of and against the 
extension of the 14-day limit for conducting research on human embryos. It situates 
these arguments within the history of the 14-day limit. I start by discussing the 
history of the 14-day limit in the United Kingdom and the reasons behind the 
decision to opt for a compromise between competing moral views. I then analyse 
the arguments that those who are generally in favour of embryo research put forward 
in support of extending the 14-day rule, namely (a) the argument of the beneficence 
of research and (b) the argument of technical feasibility (further explained in the 
article). I then show how these two arguments played a role in the recent approval 
of two novel techniques for the replacement of faulty mitochondrial DNA in the 
United Kingdom. Despite the popularity and widespread use of these arguments, I 
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argue that they are ultimately problematic and should not be straightforwardly 
accepted (i.e. accepted without further scrutiny). I end by making a case for 
respecting value pluralism in the context of embryo research, and I present two 
reasons in favour of respecting value pluralism: the argument of public trust and the 
argument of democracy.  
Conclusion 
I argue that 14-day limit for embryo research is not a valuable tool despite being a 
solution of compromise, but rather because of it. The importance of respecting value 
pluralism (and of respecting different views on embryo research) needs to be 
considered in any evaluation concerning a potential change to the 14-day rule. 
Keywords: Embryo research | Value pluralism | Compromise | Beneficence | 
Warnock Report  
2.2 Introduction 
In August 2016, in a letter in Nature and in an article published in Nature Cell Biology, 
two groups based in different research centres in the United Kingdom (Cambridge 
and London) and in the United States (The Rockefeller University, New York) 
presented the results of their experiments on in vitro human embryos. For the first 
time, the embryos were sustained in vitro for 12-13 days after fertilisation 
(Deglincerti et al. 2016; Shahbazi et al. 2016). Prior to this, scientists were only able 
to sustain embryos in vitro for about seven days (Hyun et al. 2016). 
Many members of the scientific and bioethics communities reacted enthusiastically 
to these advances, due to the novelty of the results and to the potential benefits that 
they could bring about (Connor 2016; Harris 2016b; Hyun et al. 2016). Research 
involving human embryos allows us to increase our understanding of the first stages 
of embryo development and it is considered instrumental to shedding light on the 
causes of early miscarriages, of problems related to infertility and of birth defects 
(Devolder 2015). In addition to this, embryo research has been instrumental to the 
development of human embryonic stem cells, cells derived from embryos have 
proved to be clinically useful to cure certain degenerative diseases (de Wert & 




Mummery 2003; Devolder 2015; Mertes & Pennings 2009). Sustaining embryos in 
vitro for a longer period of time could allow an even greater understanding of the 
causes of embryo defects and early miscarriages, and it could prove especially 
clinically beneficial for women who have experienced multiple early pregnancy 
losses. Due to the current benefits of embryo research and to the potential future 
benefits of it, the positive reactions to these experiments went hand in hand with a 
call for revising and extending the so-called 14-day rule. This rule allows research 
involving human embryos up until the 14th day after fertilisation, a statutory binding 
limit in over a dozen countries (Hyun et al. 2016; Isasi & Knoppers 2006).  
This article explores the arguments for and against extending the 14-day limit for 
research on human embryos. In the following section, I will briefly present the 
history of how the 14-day rule came about in the United Kingdom and the reasons 
behind the decision to opt for a solution of compromise. In section 3, I will discuss 
the arguments that those who are generally in favour of embryo research put forward 
in support of extending the 14-day rule, namely the argument of the beneficence of 
research and the argument of technical feasibility (further explained below). I will 
show how these two arguments played a role in the process that led to the approval 
of mitochondrial replacement techniques in the United Kingdom. In section 4, I will 
discuss why I find these arguments wanting. In the last section (5), I will present two 
arguments in favour of compromise, namely the argument of trust and the argument 
of respect for value pluralism. I will conclude that the importance of respecting value 
pluralism needs to be taken into account in any evaluation concerning a potential 
change of the 14-day rule. 
2.3 The 14-Day Limit and the Warnock Report 
The publication of the aforementioned two articles in Nature and Nature Cell Biology 
triggered a resurgence of the debate on embryo research and on the 14-day limit to 
carry out research on in-vitro human embryos. The 14-day limit came about in the 
United Kingdom at the beginning of the 1980s. Its birth is closely linked to another, 
non-metaphorical, British birth: the first test-tube baby (i.e. a baby conceived via in-
vitro fertilisation), Louise Brown, was born in the United Kingdom in 1978. As noted 
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by historian Duncan Wilson, after the initial excitement surrounding Louise 
Brown’s birth, public attitudes towards IVF shifted from an initially more favourable 
stance to a more critical view of the practice (Mulkay 1997; Wilson 2011; Wilson 
2014). These predominantly negative attitudes, and the necessity to decide upon 
the fate of embryos ‘left over’ after IVF procedures164, contributed to calls for a 
tighter oversight of the practice. They also underscored the importance of deciding 
whether it was permissible to use these spare embryos for research (Mulkay 1997; 
Wilson 2011; Wilson 2014).  
At that time, embryo research was the most debated matter concerning the ethics 
of IVF (Hammond-Browning 2015; Harris 1985; Warnock 1985a). Two conflicting 
positions dominated the public debate: on the one hand, those of whom were 
outright against embryo research. On the other, those of whom were in favour of 
doing research on embryos up until it was technically feasible. The first group 
appealed to the need to respect human life from its very beginning and argued that 
life starts in the moment of fertilisation (i.e. when sperm cells fertilise oocytes) and 
must be protected. Interestingly, not all the opponents of embryo research holding 
the view that embryos are persons were arguing from a religious standpoint 
(Hammond-Browning 2015). Some of those arguing against embryo research in 
principle referred to the potentiality of the embryos to become fully developed 
persons and concluded that human life, no matter at what stage of development, 
should be granted full protection, and that embryos should not be used for research 
(Donald 1984; George & Lee 2009; Jones 2011). The opposing view, held by those 
in favour of legalising embryo research, found support from those appealing to the 
potential benefits of such research, and from those who granted inexistent or low 
moral status to the embryos. This group also referred to the potentiality of embryos 
to become fully developed persons, but concluded that potential persons (i.e. 
embryos) were different from actual persons and that this was a sufficient reason to 
allow research on human embryos (Harris 1985). Unsurprisingly, according to them, 
the potential benefits of such research, for instance an increased understanding of 
                                                 
164 These embryos are not implanted in utero but frozen for further implantation. When a successful 
pregnancy is established, it had to be decided what do with these supernumerary frozen embryos. 




early human development, better IVF procedures, and treating infertility and 
pregnancy losses outweighed the costs of embryo research (Harris 1985). 
There are some differences between the 1980s debate on embryo research and 
today’s newly emerged debate. Perhaps, the main difference is that, whereas 
previously research beyond the 14-day mark was scientifically untenable, it has 
recently become technically possible. When the limit was decided upon, scientists 
were not able to keep the embryos alive in vitro for longer than the limit allowed. 
The experiments reported in the two recent articles prove that scientists are now 
able to keep embryos alive for up to 12-13 days and possibly longer. In addition, IVF 
as an assisted reproductive technique has significantly improved and many of the 
technical advances in this technique are owed to embryo research. It is in this sense 
that, while the 1980s debate focused on the question of whether embryo research 
should be allowed, the current debate occurs against the backdrop of the advances 
that allow embryo research to be made possible. Thirdly, while in the past it was not 
possible to preserve the viability of the embryos employed for research, today there 
are technical solutions that allow scientists to obtain embryonic stem cells for 
research that do not result in the destruction of the embryo (e.g. embryo biopsy165). 
Lastly, whilst previous research was carried out on early human embryos only, 
today, and potentially increasingly in the future, embryo research could be done on 
artificial entities that bear sufficient resemblance to embryos to be suitable for such 
research. To name a few methods, these entities would be created through, for 
instance, altered nuclear transfer (ANT) or parthenogenesis of oocytes (de Wert & 
Mummery 2003; Devolder 2015; Hurlbut 2005)166.  
                                                 
165 For a detailed analysis of this alternative and of its limits, see the work of Devolder (2015). 
166 It must be noted that these two alternatives have been criticised for a number of reasons. For 
instance, it is unclear whether parthenotes are significantly different from human embryos and 
whether ANT really escapes the ethical challenges of embryo research and whether it is a 
scientifically realistic alternative (Devolder 2015). 
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2.3.1 Conflicting Moral Views on Embryo Research  
Today’s discourses on the moral status of human embryos are not so different from 
the discourses that, in the 1980s, resulted in the establishment of the IVF Inquiry, a 
committee appointed to produce an advisory report on the moral, legal and social 
issues raised by IVF, embryo research and other practices. Oxbridge philosopher 
Mary Warnock was appointed its chair. As I will show in the next sections, the 
procedural work of the committee, the views of the chair and the way the 
recommendations on how to proceed about embryo research were drafted, 
represent an important precedent for the current debate on embryo research. 
The members of the committee, including Warnock herself, were aware of the 
conflicting moral views on embryo research, and of the difficulty of reconciling them 
and establishing which one should prevail (Department of Health and Social 
Security 1984; Warnock 1985b; Warnock 1988). In addition to this, they tried to 
review as many different points of view as possible: the committee considered 
evidence from experts working in the field of human reproduction (around 300 
individuals and organisations) as well as from the public (695 letters and submissions). 
Although the evidence collected in this way was never published167 and although it 
was never made transparent how this evidence influenced the final 
recommendations, it is presumed that the committee considered all the submitted 
evidence and took into account the different views that it reflected (Hammond-
Browning 2015).  
Legitimating embryo research would have likely caused uproar from those who 
accorded full moral status to human embryos. At the same time, an outright ban on 
embryo research was perceived as problematic for two reasons: due to a concern for 
the loss of potential benefits of embryo research, and due to the perceived need to 
allow IVF to go forward only if backed up by studies on the development of early 
human embryos. A solution to this impasse was to find a compromise between these 
two positions: this is how the idea to introduce a cut-off point until which research 
                                                 
167 The submissions from the experts can be found at the House of Commons Library, but they have 
never been published.  




would be permissible came about. Introducing a cut-off was a solution of 
compromise, as it would have enabled embryo research, but only until a certain stage 
of development. Different possible limits were examined, including the 5th day (i.e. 
beginning of implantation in utero) and the 11th day (i.e. the end of implantation) 
after fertilisation.  
It was developmental biologist Anne McLaren, a member of the committee, who 
proposed using a peculiar biological event in the embryo development to mark the 
end of the permitted period of research (Wilson 2011). McLaren suggested limiting 
research to the 14th day of development because this moment signals the emergence 
of the primitive streak in the human embryo, a precursor of the brain and the spinal 
cord. At the same time, the emergence of this streak marks the beginning of 
gastrulation, a process whereby the embryonic inner cell mass starts to differentiate 
into three layers (endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm). This process also 
corresponds to the last point in which the embryo could cleave into twins (i.e. 
twinning) or in which two embryos could merge into one (e.g. tetragametic 
chimerism). McLaren argued that: “If I had to point to a stage and say ‘This is when 
I began being me”, I would think it would have to be here” (McLaren 1984). In order 
to endorse the 14-day limit and the decision to allow research up until this stage of 
embryo development, the term ‘pre-embryo’ was coined. It designated the embryo 
before the emergence of the primitive streak, and it marked a distinction from the 
‘unborn child’ (i.e. the embryo after the 14-day) (McLaren 1984; Wilson 2014). It 
was therefore a term with ethical and political significance, a term that designated 
the boundary between acceptable and non-acceptable research.  
Eventually, in 1990, the recommendations of the IVF-Inquiry comprised in the 
Warnock Report (Warnock 1985b) were enshrined into law, in what became the 
Human Embryology Act (Department of Health and Social Security 1984).  
2.3.2 How the 14-day limit came about: compromise and its critics 
Introducing a cut-off date –in this case the 14-day limit – represented an instance of 
favouring compromise between competing moral views, beliefs and values over 
questions of rightness and wrongness (Franklin & Roberts 2006; Hammond-
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Browning 2015; Mulkay 1997). Questions regarding whether or not the embryo has 
moral status, what moral status stands for and entails, and questions regarding the 
core features of personhood and the beginning of human life were overridden by 
other considerations. These considerations included the moment from which the 
embryo should be granted legal protection, what kind of society can be praised and 
in what kind of society people can live with clear conscience (Warnock 1985a; 
Wilson 2014). The decision to shift the focus from ontological questions concerning 
rightness and wrongness to more practical questions is linked to a conception of 
morality whose role is to address moral matters arising in the context of public policy, 
and to the role that the committee was created to fulfil. The IVF-Inquiry was not 
created to produce perfect philosophical reasoning and give a lesson in moral 
expertise, but rather to facilitate a process whereby scientists’ work would become 
more “socially palatable” and whereby workable regulations would be delivered 
(Anon 1983; Wilson 2014).  
The committee favoured a moral relativistic approach to embryo research and to the 
conflicting positions present in the debate. Instead of trying to establish which 
position was the most accurate one and what view came closest to an absolute moral 
truth, the committee worked under the assumption that the views of those for and 
against embryo research deserved to be equally respected and taken into 
consideration. Thus, the view of those who believed that the embryos are to be 
treated as if they were persons (and hence, they deserve full moral status) and 
research on them should be banned, and the view of those who believed that 
embryos are not more than a cluster of cells (no moral status at all) and research on 
them should go forward were equally taken into account. In this sense, the 
committee followed the assumption that the truth and standing of moral judgments 
is not universal, but relative to the social, political and cultural context in which these 
moral judgements arise (Gray 1998). Warnock and her committee experienced first-
hand the diversity of views both in her committee and in society at large. Their 
strategy was to exercise tolerance in matters of morality and moral disagreement, 
and to respect value pluralism (Warnock 1983; Warnock 1985a). Warnock 
understood the role of her committee in these terms: starting from the 
acknowledgement of the different and competing moral positions, she tried to find 




the path of greater social consensus among them (Mulkay 1997). In addition to this, 
Warnock and her committee opted to take into account not only moral arguments 
based on scientific evidence and philosophical reasoning, but also moral feelings and 
beliefs (Jones 2011). In this sense, they followed Hume’s idea that feelings, and not 
pure calculating rationality, need to be considered in the assessment of ethical 
dilemmas and that morality is ‘more properly felt than reasoned’ (Blackburn 1998; 
Hume 1738/2006). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the existing disagreement on the matter, the 
committee recommendation to allow embryo research up until the 14th day was 
highly criticised. Three committee members were outright against embryo research 
and refused to endorse the final recommendations concerning this matter 
(Hammond-Browning 2015; Warnock 1985b). Members of the conservative party, 
of the pro-life group LIFE and Christian scientists such as Ian Donald, publicly 
criticised the decision and lobbied against the report recommendation during the 
parliamentary debate on the matter (Hammond-Browning 2015; Wilson 2014). 
Generally, reactions from the more conservative side of the debate opposed this 
solution because it employed a sort of utilitarian calculus (i.e. the potential benefits 
of embryo research) instead of foregrounding considerations concerning how we 
ought to treat unborn persons.  
Interestingly, both those against and in favour of conducting research on human 
embryos agreed on some of the reasons why the 14-day limit was at least 
problematic, if not completely wrong, namely arbitrariness and dodging the most 
fundamental question. Those that criticised the decision on the grounds of its 
arbitrariness argued that it was impossible to draw a morally and legally significant 
distinction between an embryo that was 13, 14 or 15 days old. However, supporters 
and critics of embryo research drew different conclusions from this impossibility to 
draw morally consistent lines: supporters argued that embryo research should have 
been allowed until it was technically feasible (i.e. until when the scientists could keep 
the embryo alive in vitro), while critics argued that embryo research should have 
been banned altogether. Another point of convergence between supporters and 
critics was the fact that Warnock and her committee did not address the questions 
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of when life begins and when an embryo becomes a person. The decision to focus 
instead on the legal and moral rights of the embryo, without addressing the issue of 
what an embryo really is, was seen as extremely problematic by both sides. 
According to them, it was impossible to decide whether or not the human embryo 
deserved protection without establishing why it/she/he deserved protection, in 
other words whether or not the embryo was a person (Harris 1985; Jones 2011).  
In addition to these critiques, philosopher John Harris criticised Warnock and the 
committee for taking into account people’s feelings. Harris argued that not all 
feelings were moral feelings and not all of them deserved respect. According to him, 
moral feelings should be evaluated on their capacity to make the world a better 
place, to save lives and postpone deaths (Hammond-Browning 2015; Harris 1985). 
These reactions are important because they show that, back then as today, there is 
indeed a fundamental moral disagreement concerning early human life, how to treat 
human embryos and about the legitimate role of feelings and passions in public and 
regulatory discourses (Gottweis & Prainsack 2006). The reactions that followed the 
committee’s recommendations show the extent to which these views were in fact 
incompatible. However, it is important to note that those who criticised the decision 
on the grounds of arbitrariness and inconsistency in a certain sense missed the point 
of the role and function of the committee. The committee was put together in the 
first place in order to maintain public trust and be a reliable means for external 
oversight of scientific research. For this reason, the recommendations were meant 
to be a solution of compromise rather than a means to find the most consistent moral 
view.   
In the next section, I will briefly outline the reasons that advocates of embryo 
research currently put forward in favour of extending the limit, and show how these 
same reasons have played an important role in the debate on whether to introduce 
two new techniques into the clinic.  
  




2.4 The Reasons in Favour of Extending the Limit 
Scientists (Robin Lovell-Badge and Azim Surani quoted in Connor 2016) and 
ethicists (Harris 2016b; Hyun et al. 2016) reacted to the results reported on Nature 
and Nature Cell Biology by publicly calling for an extension of the 14-day limit and for 
revising the current regulation of embryo research. The argument that they used 
strikes familiar chords: embryo research is beneficial and now technically possible, 
therefore it should be allowed. The two publications in Nature and Nature Cell Biology 
(Deglincerti et al. 2016; Shahbazi et al. 2016) partially changed the narrative of the 
debate on embryo research: whereas in the 1980s it was a matter of legalising such 
research, today the debate is about extending the 14-day limit for reasons grounded 
in beneficence and technical feasibility, and thus merely adjusting the regulatory 
framework of an already legalised practice. These reasons draw upon 
consequentialist premises and the principle of utility. They imply that being able to 
carry out potentially beneficial research and not doing so would be morally 
impermissible168. 
According to the advocates of embryo research, the reasons in favour of extending 
the 14-day limit are stronger today than they were in the past. In 1984, these reasons 
relied on positive provisions of the potential benefits (i.e. the beneficence of 
research) and positive provisions of the future feasibility (i.e. technical feasibility). In 
the past, it was about faith in science and managing the uncertainties of potential 
future benefits of embryo research with certain regulations. Today, Harris, Lovell-
Badge and Surani argued, it is about certainties concerning the benefits and 
certainties of technical feasibility: embryo research has proven to be both beneficial 
and feasible (Connor 2016; Hyun et al. 2016).  
The use of beneficence and feasibility in the debate on technical innovations recalls 
another debate where similar arguments have been advanced in response to 
scientific breakthroughs. Early in 2015, the United Kingdom became the first 
country in the world to allow two novel techniques that allow women with 
                                                 
168 I have commented elsewhere that this line of argument is problematic (Camporesi & Cavaliere 
2016). 
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mitochondrial DNA diseases to have genetically related children with a decreased 
risk of developing mitochondrial diseases. Mutations in the mitochondrial DNA are 
the cause of many diseases including, for instance, mitochondrial myopathy, Leigh 
disease and diabetes mellitus, and they are normally inherited through the maternal 
line (Bredenoord & Braude 2010). Up until the approval of these two techniques, 
prospective mothers needed to turn to oocytes donors, PGD or adoption in order to 
have children free from these genetically inherited mutations (Bredenoord et al. 
2008). Although these techniques (maternal spindle transfer, MST, and pronuclear 
DNA transfer, PNT) have been depicted as involving the ‘replacement’ of the 
affected mitochondrial DNA of the oocyte of the prospective mother or of the 
fertilised oocyte with the mitochondrial DNA of a female donor, this description is 
inaccurate. What really happens is that the oocyte’s, or zygote’s, nucleus previously 
housed in a cell with deleterious mitochondria is rehoused in an enucleated cell with 
healthy mitochondria. The embryo that results from these techniques will have the 
genetic makeup of the prospective father, the mitochondrial DNA of a donor and 
the nuclear DNA of the prospective mother.  
Despite the similarities between the arguments in favour of the extension of the 14-
day limit and the arguments in favour of allowing mitochondrial replacement 
techniques (MRTs), it is important to note that there are differences between the 
current debate on extending the limit for embryo research and the recent debate on 
MRTs169. These differences concern both the content of these debates (i.e. the 
specific arguments in favour and against and the object of the controversy) and their 
potential outcomes (i.e. extending an existing limit for embryo research instead of 
allowing two new techniques to be introduced into the clinic). With respect to the 
content, the arguments against MRTs focused on concerns regarding the 
implementation of newly developed techniques and the risks that their 
implementation may pose to future children. On the contrary, the arguments against 
the extension of the 14-day limit focused on basic research rather than clinical 
implementation. In particular, they pertain to the ethics of using intrinsically 
                                                 
169 I am grateful to one of the anonymous peer reviewers for raising this point. 




valuable beings such as human embryos for instrumental purposes. In addition, these 
debates differ in terms of what proponents and opponents wanted to achieve (i.e. in 
terms of outcome). The potential outcome of the debate on MRTs was to establish 
whether these new techniques were sound from a technical and moral point of view. 
On the contrary, the debate on embryo research is about setting a new limit for 
continuing existing research and for possibly gaining new insights into embryo 
development. These are just a few of the differences between the two debates and 
a detailed analysis of such differences is beyond the scope of this article. However, 
it is important to note that despite these differences, some similarities with respect 
to the argument in favour of MRTs and embryo research can be drawn. In 
particular, arguments in favour of MRTs and of extending the 14-day limit were 
inspired by beneficence and technical feasibility in both instances.  
One of the most contested issues concerning the ethics of MRTs is whether these 
techniques would bring about changes to the human germline (i.e. changes in human 
oocytes, sperm cells or embryos that do not only appear in the children resulting 
from the procedure, but also in succeeding generations) (Newson & Wrigley 2017). 
Ethicists and scientists are divided over whether MRTs amount to germline 
modifications as changes introduced in the oocyte (in the case of MST) or in the 
zygote (in the case of PNT) concern the mitochondrial rather than the nuclear DNA 
(Adashi & Cohen 2016). In addition, as mitochondrial DNA is inherited from the 
maternal line, if only male embryos are transferred in utero, the modifications 
introduced with MRTs will not be present in the succeeding generations170 
(Newson et al. 2016). An assessment of these arguments is beyond the scope of this 
article171, but what matters for the present analysis is that up until the approval of 
these techniques, modifications of the genetic makeup of sperm cells, eggs and 
                                                 
170 In the United Kingdom, the law regulating MRTs allows both female and male embryos to be 
transferred in utero. This is different from the American approach to the clinical implementation of 
these novel techniques: the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) 
Report recommended that only male embryos should be implanted in utero (National Academies of 
Sciences Engineering and Medicine 2016; Newson et al. 2016). 
171 For insightful analyses of the MRTs debate and of the ethics of these techniques, see (Appleby 
2015; Bredenoord et al. 2009; Herbrand 2017; Palacios-González 2016; Rulli 2017; Wrigley et al. 
2015). 
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embryos were only legally possible in-vitro and never for clinical purposes in-vivo. 
Modification of the human germline (i.e. gametes, and embryos) has traditionally 
been considered a line that should not be crossed. This line was recognised as 
morally relevant in 1978 with the publication of Splicing Life, a report of the US 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research appointed to regulate gene therapies, the reasons given 
were partly scientific (i.e. it was not technically feasible) and partly moral (i.e. it was 
seen as immoral to introduce changes that would have been inherited by future 
generations) (Addison 2016; President’s Commission 1982). Modifying the human 
germline is seen as problematic because of the unforeseen effects on future 
generations, the risk of engaging in a form of new eugenics, the risk of sliding down 
a slippery slope to human enhancement, and other similar arguments (Anderson 
1985; Anderson 1989; Fletcher 1985). These arguments were already put forward at 
the very early developments of gene therapy and rehearsed in recent debates on 
MRTs and gene editing (Adashi & Cohen 2016).  However, both historically and 
more recently they have not remained unchallenged. Questions related to eugenics, 
enhancement and unforeseen effects on future generations have been widely 
discussed during the months prior to the approval of MRTs and they are still a 
matter of ethical inquiry, as shown by the increasing number of articles and reviews 
that address these issues (Palacios-González 2016; Rulli 2016a; Wrigley et al. 2015; 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2012). In addition, the public consultation (2012) and 
the extensive reviews of the scientific methods of MRTs carried out by the HFEA 
(respectively in 2016, 2014, 2013, 2011), the work of the Nuffield Council172 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2012) and the parliamentary debate on these 
techniques have considered such concerns. As briefly outlined above, it is only with 
some caveats that MRTs can be considered a break with the past. However, even 
considering these caveats, the 2015 approval of these techniques by the UK 
Parliament could be seen as a first instance of crossing an internationally recognised 
ethical and legal limit due to reasons of beneficence (i.e. children born with these 
                                                 
172 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics is an UK-based independent institution that examines ethical 
issues arising in the field of biotechnology and biomedicine. 




techniques will be free from mitochondrial diseases), but also due to the technical 
feasibility of germline modifications (prior to the parliamentary vote on MRTs, these 
techniques were not considered safe enough to be introduced into the clinic) 
(Newman 2013; Newman 2014). It is in this sense that the sum of the arguments in 
favour of extending the 14-day limit echoes, albeit only partially, those in favour of 
allowing MRTs. Mitochondrial replacement techniques represent an interesting 
case study and set an important precedent for the ethical assessment of technical 
innovation. In contrast with other instances of internationally recognised bans such 
as the ban on human cloning, the approval of MRTs shows that long-standing limits 
such as the ban on germline modifications can be redefined once scientific advances 
make it possible. The argument of beneficence to allow research on human embryos 
for longer than 14 days is the same as the one made in the 1980s. What has changed 
is that while before it was technically difficult to introduce changes in reproductive 
cells and embryos that would be inherited by future generations, and to keep the 
embryos alive in vitro for a longer time span, now both actions are theoretically 
possible. The question, therefore, is whether the potential benefits of embryo 
research and the feasibility of keeping the embryos alive for longer than ever before 
are sufficient reasons to extend the limit. 
2.5 There Is More to Beneficence and Technical Feasibility Than Meets the 
Eye  
In this section, I will show that technical feasibility and beneficence of research as 
reasons in favour of extending the limit of embryo research are not as fundamental 
as those who advocate this change in the law claim. Accordingly, I scrutinise the 
arguments in favour of the extension of the 14-day limit, while I leave unchallenged 
those presented by the advocates of a more restrictive regulatory framework for 
embryo research. The rationale behind this choice does not rest on my own view on 
embryo research, as I do not necessarily share the beliefs and values of those against 
this practice. However, it is often argued by proponents of technological changes 
that the burden of justifying one’s own claims rests solely on those who take a 
precautionary approach to technological progress (Giubilini 2015; Harris 2007; Hyun 
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2016). Against this view, I propose that both those in favour and against embryo 
research ought to share the burden of justifying their moral views.  
2.5.1 Facts, Values and Rationality 
Technical feasibility as a reason in favour of extending the limit relies (i.e. practice 
x is now technically feasible, so there are good reasons to change the rule) on the 
premise “practice x is technically feasible” to infer the conclusion “there are good 
reasons to change the rule”. However, appealing to the beneficence of research and 
to its technical feasibility is more problematic than those in favour of extending the 
limit for embryo research suggest it is. As a matter of fact, this line of arguing is 
problematic because it relies on what eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume 
considered an “inconceivable deduction” of what ought to be done from a set of is-
premises (Hume 1738/2006). Hume believed that it was logically fallacious to infer 
a normative judgment (ought-conclusion) from a set of factual claims (is-premises). 
Thus, following Hume, the normative conclusion “there are good reasons to change 
the 14-day rule” cannot be rightly inferred from the factual premise “embryos can 
now survive in vitro for longer than before” (i.e. technical feasibility of extending 
the time span for embryo research). This critique of inferring normative conclusions 
from factual claims is similar to the critique that philosopher George Edward Moore 
moved to moral naturalists (i.e. those who argue in favour of a link between moral 
philosophy and the natural sciences). Moore argued that anyone who infers that 
practice x is good from any preposition about the natural properties of x commits 
the “naturalistic fallacy” (Moore 1903). According to Moore, this fallacy shows how 
premises about some factual or natural features of practices do not support normative 
conclusions about these practices. Thus, anyone who supports an extension of the 
14-day limit for embryo research on the basis of the technical feasibility of this 
research would commit the naturalistic fallacy. According to Moore, one of the main 
problems of moral naturalists was that they relied on purely factual premises 
concerning the natural features of certain practices to infer normative conclusions 
concerning these practices. To counter this tendency, Moore suggested instead that 




normative conclusions ought to be inferred from both factual and normative 
premises.  
The argument of the beneficence of research (i.e. embryo research should be 
allowed for longer than 14 days due to the benefits of such research) is also more 
problematic than those in favour of extending the limit suggest it is. According to 
this argument, the 14-day limit should be extended because of the potential benefits 
of such research and because these benefits outweigh the costs of embryo research 
(Devolder & Savulescu 2006; Douglas & Savulescu 2009; Harris 1985; Harris 
2016b). This appeal to beneficence is common in bioethics and it is often used by 
those who take a utilitarian stance on the ethical assessment of scientific progress, 
technologies and practices (Harris 1992; Harris 2007; Hyun et al. 2016; Savulescu 
2005; Savulescu & Kahane 2009). Proponents of what I have called the argument 
of the beneficence of research rely on historical evidence to support their claim: they 
argue that since technological and scientific progress in medicine proved to be 
beneficial to humankind, it should be allowed to continue. Returning to embryo 
research, those who appeal to the beneficence of research to extend the 14-day limit 
ground their argument on the past benefits that embryo research brought about, and 
on the potential benefits that the extension of the limit could bring about (Connor 
2016; Harris 2016b).  
At first sight, it seems fairly obvious that if something is beneficial, even only 
potentially beneficial, it should be allowed. However, this approach is problematic 
for a number of reasons and scholars have criticised bioethicists, institutions and 
scientists for their often-hyped claims concerning the benefits of new technical 
possibilities (Árnason 2015; Hedgecoe 2003; Hedgecoe 2010; Marris 2015). Firstly, 
the argument of beneficence and its proponents rely on an optimistic view of 
scientific progress, research and technologies (Árnason 2015; Elliott 2005; Salter & 
Salter 2007), a view that echoes the post-illuminist positivistic ideas of science and 
technology, and that often overemphasises the potential benefits of scientific 
research (Elliott 2005; Hedgecoe 2010; Marris 2015) and its understating as a 
progressive and linear endeavour (Camporesi & Cavaliere 2016; Williams 2006). 
Secondly, the argument is problematic because it relies on a misleading estimation 
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of costs and benefits. The benefits taken into consideration for the cost-benefit 
assessment are not the benefits of embryo research for the embryos, as embryo 
research does not benefit embryos. Instead, the benefits considered are those to 
society, to existing and future individuals. On the contrary, the costs taken into 
account for the cost-benefit assessment are not those to society, but to the embryos 
used for research. Those who emphasise benefits of embryo research over its costs 
do not grant moral status to the embryos, nor do they believe that embryos are 
capable of experiencing pain (i.e. being harmed). Hence, they do not really see any 
cost associated with embryo research, and they thus conclude that benefits outweigh 
these (inexistent) costs. The substantial disagreement over the moral status of the 
embryos and the criticism moved against research on human embryos show that 
embryo research is a controversial and not-settled issue (Hammond-Browning 2015; 
Selgelid 2001). For this reason, the costs of extending the limit beyond the 14th day, 
and of embryo research more generally, might be higher than proponents of embryo 
research like to admit. Embryo research has a societal cost of offending certain moral 
feelings on the value of early human life, and not respecting certain strongly held 
convictions on how we ought to treat human embryos. Thus, individuals who hold 
such views may find themselves feeling alienated from or devalued by society 
(Deckers 2005; George 2009; Jones 2011). Possibly, proponents of embryo research 
who argue from a utilitarian standpoint, and who rely on the argument of the 
beneficence of such research, are aware of the possibility of offending moral feelings 
and strongly held beliefs, but they still consider the benefits of embryo research 
greater than the costs of offending the people who hold these feelings.  
One of the reasons why many proponents of embryo research do not grant moral 
worth to these feelings, and to the opponents’ arguments, is that they consider their 
views to be fundamentally flawed, irrational and not grounded in scientific evidence. 
Most advocates of embryo research thus dismiss the view that embryos are (future) 
persons and that embryo research would violate these future persons’ dignity on the 
grounds of the irrationality of such ontological claims. For to them, these claims are 
based on faith rather than reason and factual considerations. However, it is 
important to note that those in favour of embryo research who argue from 
supposedly rational positions do not live up to the very same standards of rationality 




that they require of their opponents. In this sense, dismissing questions related to 
human dignity and the moral status of the embryos on the basis of their irrationality 
and lack of scientific support, becomes problematic (Guyer & Moreno 2004; 
Hedgecoe 2010). Scientific evidence is often interpreted according to one’s own 
pre-existing moral convictions, so-called evidence-based claims are still influenced 
by these moral convictions and by the way bioethicists react and argue about new 
technical possibilities (Borup et al. 2006; Hedgecoe 2010; Swierstra & Rip 2007). 
Thus, irrational beliefs are not an exclusive ownership of those arguing against 
embryo research: similar irrational beliefs play a role in assessments of embryo 
research put forward by those in favour of embryo research on the grounds that it 
can save future lives173.  
2.5.2 Slippery Slope 
The slippery slope argument offers a last reason of caution against embryo research 
(Freeman 1996; Macklin 1994; Sandel 2004b). The slippery slope argument entails 
that allowing practice x (in this instance, allowing embryo research or extending the 
limit for embryo research) would initiate a process leading to unethical practices w, 
y, z. The slippery slope argument against embryo research is approximately like this: 
embryo research should not be allowed/the limit should not be extended because 
allowing research on embryos in a very early stage of their development/extending 
the limit beyond day 14 will lead to the permissibility of research on foetuses and 
new-borns. The argument voices the concern that once we become accustomed to 
research on pre-embryos, we will extend the permission for research on embryos on 
a later stage of development; once we become accustomed to this too, then we will 
allow research on foetuses and babies. ‘Slippery slopers’ believe that morally 
problematic practices such as embryo research should not be allowed, or the limit 
should not be extended, because of the difficulties of drawing a line between 
practices currently considered less morally problematic, such as research on pre-
                                                 
173 For a detailed discussion of such position in another context (i.e. the debate on human 
enhancement), see (Giubilini 2015). 
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embryos, and practices currently considered highly immoral, such as research on 
foetuses at a late stage of their development. These arguments are widely criticised 
in the philosophical arena for their lack of empirical evidence, and for not 
considering that government regulations can be used to prevent such scenarios from 
coming into being (Caplan 2005; Resnik 1994; Walton 1992). In spite of these 
critiques, they are still used in debates on technological advances, scientific research 
and policy making (Darnovsky 2013; Freeman 1996; Sandel 2004b; Swierstra & Rip 
2007). The persistence of slippery slope arguments in academic works and policy 
making seems to suggest that attempts from philosophers to discredit this argument 
have been unsuccessful. The charge of starting a slippery slope towards inadmissible 
practices is still a powerful one (Selgelid 2001; Swierstra & Rip 2007). An analysis 
of the theoretical fallacies and merits of this argument is beyond the scope of the 
paper, as is a final assessment of its validity. However, it is important to note that 
extending the limit beyond the 14th day of development will provide support to those 
who rely on the slippery slope argument to oppose embryo research. This might 
have non-negligible social consequences. For example, extension of the limit for 
embryo research would show that what is feared by ‘slippery slopers’ (i.e. that once 
a practice becomes legal it is difficult to prevent the permission of its future 
developments) can eventually become a reality. Even if the limit was extended only 
for a few days, ‘slippery slopers’ might take this extension as a sign that their fears 
are well grounded, contrary to what their critics argue.  
2.6 Is Compromise the Best Way Forward? 
Let me take stock of what I have said thus far. In the previous section, I have shown 
how the arguments of beneficence and technical feasibility in favour of embryo 
research and of extending the 14-day limit are less straightforward than their 
proponents seem to suggest. I have also suggested, using the slippery slope argument 
as an example, that extending the limit for embryo research might undermine public 
trust in scientists, regulators and overseeing bodies. In order to show the importance 
of compromise and the value of respecting pluralism in the context of embryo 
research, I will not juxtapose the arguments of the beneficence of research and of 




technical feasibility with arguments pertaining to the sanctity of human life and 
human dignity. These arguments arise in the context of fundamental disagreements 
concerning the beginning of human life, the value of personhood, and concerning 
what respect human dignity ought to entail. They are portrayed as factual questions 
by both advocates and critics of research (i.e. research beyond the 14-day should 
not be allowed/should be allowed because human embryos are/are not persons and 
doing research on them would/would not violate their dignity); however, they are 
not merely a matter of fact, but they are informed and shaped by values, feelings 
and beliefs. Regardless of one’s opinion regarding the values and beliefs of those 
defending the sanctity of life view, the burden of justifying one’s claim should rests 
both on those defending this view and on those advocating technological progress, 
contrary to what seems to be normally believed (Giubilini 2015).  
What I intend to argue in this last section is that even if the question of the moral 
status of the embryos cannot be easily settled, there are two arguments in favour of 
reaching a compromise and respecting value pluralism in the context of embryo 
research: the argument of trust and the argument of respect. I will argue that the 
argument of trust in favour of compromise, albeit being sound and widely used, 
could, in certain instances, assume instrumental and paternalistic forms. I will then 
argue that in the context of embryo research and more generally in the governance 
of scientific and technical breakthroughs it would be helpful to employ another 
argument: what I call the argument of respect. 
2.6.1 The Argument of Trust and the Argument of Respect  
The first argument in favour of reaching a compromise that, other things being 
equal, respects value pluralism is what I define as “the argument of trust”. It is 
structured as follows:  
a) Scientific research is important because it improves people’s lives and it should be 
allowed to carry on 
b) Public trust is necessary to carry on scientific research 
c) Therefore, public trust in scientific research ought to be preserved 
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Given competing views concerning the moral status of the embryo, this argument 
provides a reason in favour of finding a solution of compromise that accommodates 
as much as possible these views and avoids the risk of overriding those of one camp 
with those of the other. The argument of trust relies on premise a) to show that 
people’s lives are improved by scientific research (Savulescu et al. 2015). It relies on 
premise b) to show that public trust is a necessary condition for scientific research to 
be carried on (O’Neill 2002; Resnik 2011). Trust is needed to ensure public 
acceptance of concrete applications of research; to preserve public confidence in 
policies informed by scientific research; and to allow the investment of public 
resources in scientific research (O’Neill 2002; Resnik 2011). In the context of 
embryo research, the argument shows that, given the potential benefits of embryo 
research (premise a), and given the importance of public trust to carry on this type 
of research (premise b); there are good reasons to preserve public trust (conclusion 
c). Following this argument, it is possible to draw two conclusions: on the one hand, 
if the extension of the 14-day limit for embryo research is strongly opposed by the 
public174, then there are good reasons not to extend the limit. On the other, if 
opposing views coexist in the public understanding of embryo research, then there 
are good reasons to find a solution that strikes a compromise between these views.  
The 14-day limit was a solution of compromise between conflicting moral views 
designed to maintain public trust whilst allowing research to go forward (Franklin & 
Roberts 2006; Warnock 2002; Wilson 2014). Today, there are two questions that 
need to be addressed, an empirical and a normative-theoretical question. The 
empirical question is whether the public (or at least a vast majority of it) is against 
the extension of the 14-day limit for embryo research. The normative-theoretical 
question is whether public opinion should influence the decision to change or retain 
the current 14-day rule, and if so, to what extent. An implication of taking into 
account the empirical question is that, if the public view of embryo research has 
become more favourable, then there is at least one good reason in favour of revisiting 
                                                 
174 It must be noted that the idea that ‘the public’ is against scientific developments and breakthroughs 
is criticised for being artificially constructed (see for instance: Marris 2015). 




the 14-day rule175. In January 2017, a YouGov poll commissioned by the BBC in the 
United Kingdom, asked respondents’ views on an extension of the limit up to the 
28th day. Interestingly, 48% of the 1,740 respondents said that they would be in 
favour of extending the limit, while 19% wanted to keep the current limit. In addition 
to these respondents, 10% maintained that they would want embryo research to be 
banned altogether, while 23% did not express any of the aforementioned preferences 
(Leida 2017). In addition to the empirical question regarding public attitudes towards 
the extension of the 14-day limit, one may wonder how such attitudes would be 
towards therapies and scientific results obtained thanks to research on embryos 
beyond this limit in countries that may extend it. Currently, the 14-day limit is either 
enshrined in the laws (for instance in the United Kingdom, Canada and Spain) or 
specified in the scientific guidelines (for instance in Singapore, China and in the 
United States) of many countries. However, these regulatory frameworks may 
change in the future. Hence, if this becomes the case, it would be interesting to 
investigate public attitudes towards those therapies and other advances of basic 
research that are made possible by research in countries that allow embryo research 
beyond day 14176.  
I will not provide an answer to these empirical questions here, if only because of the 
dearth of empirical data on public attitudes towards the extension of the limit, and 
embryo research more generally. Regarding, instead, the normative-theoretical 
question (i.e. whether public opinion should influence the decision to change or 
retain the current 14-day rule) the argument of trust would indicate that the answer 
is yes: public opposition to extending the 14-day rule should prevent its extension, 
while public agreement to a proposed change (i.e. the 28-day limit or other future 
proposals) should facilitate its extension. The risk of proceeding regardless of public 
attitudes towards an extension of the limit is that policies derived by embryo 
research will not be backed up by public consensus and applications of embryo 
                                                 
175 Other good reasons include technical feasibility, public utility and so forth. 
176 A case in point is Germany, which allows research on embryonic stem cells that are produced 
abroad (i.e. in countries with less restrictive legislations) before January 2002 (when the German 
Stem Cell Law was issued), but does not allow to derivation of stem cells from supernumerary 
embryos (Devolder 2015). 
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research (e.g. therapies developed thanks to the knowledge yielded by embryo 
research) not accepted. If the importance of maintaining public trust in scientific 
research (premise b) is motivated by these considerations, then it seems that public 
trust is only valued for instrumental and extrinsic reasons. In other words, this 
understanding of the importance of maintaining public trust in scientific research 
does not value public trust for its own sake, but only for its role in allowing research 
to go forward. What is problematic of this approach to public trust is that it offers a 
consequentialist reason in favour of respecting value pluralism, a reason that pertains 
to the better tangible outcomes of respecting value pluralism over other strategies of 
governance. In addition to this, when the instrumental justification of maintaining 
public trust is associated with a representation of the public as ill-informed and with 
little or no understanding of the potential benefits of research, it could be motivated 
by paternalistic considerations. Scientists and ethicists may risk misinterpreting 
public concerns and views over embryo research as the result of a lack of expertise 
or evidence-based information rather than a matter of legitimate and genuine 
disagreement over values (Hurlbut 2017; Marks 2009).  
The second premise of the argument of trust, however, could be also motivated by 
a concern for a deliberative conception of democracy. This conception of 
democratic governance requires to both citizens and their representatives to provide 
public justifications of their views and to engage in deliberative processes. Public 
trust becomes then fundamental to allow these deliberative processes to take place 
and to foster better strategies for policy-making (Cohen 2003; Gutmann & 
Thompson 2009). These deliberative processes of mutual exchange between 
experts and the public, together with a commitment to respecting conflicting moral 
views (i.e. respect for value pluralism) provide a reason in favour of finding a solution 
of compromise that, given competing views concerning the moral status of the 
embryo, respect this plurality of views and values regarding embryo research.  These 
considerations concerning the importance of maintaining public trust echo other 
considerations employed to defend democracy as a political system and as a valuable 
form of governance. These include, for instance, equality: given the existence of 
conflicting views, values and beliefs, a good reason to respect them is that people or 
groups holding these different views will be respected by being granted an equal say 




on matters of common concern (Gutmann & Thompson 1996; Waldron 1998). 
Mertens and Pennings (2009) have argued in favour of the benefit of compromise in 
the context of different policies regulating embryonic stem cell research and have 
concluded that there is a moral obligation to respect conflicting moral views (Mertes 
& Pennings 2009). Similarly, Devolder argued that in spite of the epistemic costs of 
compromise, middle-ground positions could still be defended in the context of 
policy-making (Devolder 2015). What I suggest here is that the commitment to a 
democratic decision-making process entails a fundamental respect for value 
pluralism (Jasanoff et al. 2015). In Warnock’s and the IVF-Inquiry’s time, this 
respect for value pluralism translated into a deliberation resulting in the 14-day rule. 
Today it translates into favouring an assessment of the rule and of the potential 
reasons to change it that once again takes into account the conflicting moral views 
held in society; an assessment that cannot rest on the argument of the benefice of 
research and of scientific feasibility alone.  
2.7 Conclusions  
In this article, I have argued that the 14-day limit for embryo research is not valuable 
in spite of being a solution of compromise, but rather because of it. The idea of a 
democratic society is that even those who do not accord intrinsic value to the human 
embryo should respect value pluralism and accord moral worth to opposing views. 
For this reason, any proposal to change the 14-day rule needs careful evaluation of 
the scientific feasibility and effective benefits of embryo research; it needs an 
extensive inquiry into public attitudes concerning embryos; and it needs a 
deliberative process that takes these elements into account. It does not need 
positions that consider only the beneficence of research and its technical feasibility. 
This would be undemocratic and potentially a move not backed up by a rigorous 
assessment of the science behind embryo research. Warnock and the other members 
of the IVF-Inquiry, albeit possibly guided by utilitarian-inspired views, opted for 
valuing a solution of compromise over other solutions (Chan 2015; Nelson 2005) 
They did so behind closed doors. In this sense, the recent experiments published in 
Nature and Nature Cell Biology and the newly sparked debate on embryo research 
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represent a valuable opportunity to begin a truly deliberative and democratic debate 
on this issue (Cohen 2003; Jasanoff et al. 2015). All in all, greater technical potential 
translates into greater responsibilities and need for deliberation. 
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3.1 Abstract  
How should we regulate genome editing in the face of persistent substantive 
disagreement about the moral status of this technology and its applications? In this 
paper, we aim to contribute to resolving this question. We first present two 
diametrically opposed possible approaches to the regulation of genome editing. A 
first approach, which we refer to as ‘elitist’, is inspired by Joshua Greene’s work in 
moral psychology. It aims to derive at an abstract theoretical level what preferences 
people would have if they were committed to implementing public policies 
regulating genome editing in a context of ethical pluralism.  The second approach, 
which we refer to as the democratic approach, has been defended by Françoise 




Baylis and Sheila Jasanoff et al. and emphasizes the importance of including the 
public’s expressed attitudes in the regulation of genome editing. After pointing out 
a serious shortcoming with each of these approaches, we propose our own favoured 
approach—the ‘enlightened democracy’ approach—which attempts to combine the 
strengths of the elitist and democratic approaches while avoiding their weaknesses.   
Keywords: Genome editing | Public engagement | Public policy | Democracy | 
Moral psychology | Moral pluralism 
3.2 Introduction 
With every significant scientific breakthrough that could have significant societal 
impacts, such as the development of a new biotechnology, ethical questions 
typically arise at two levels. At the first level, there are substantive ethical questions, 
such as questions regarding the moral status of the new biotechnology and the 
ethical dilemmas that may arise from its application. Questions at the second level 
pertain to how we should regulate this biotechnology, and who should decide about 
how to regulate it. We will refer to these as ethical-political questions. 
Within society and among bioethicists, there is often significant disagreement at the 
level of substantive ethical questions, which is not surprising given that our views 
are influenced by highly diverse political, cultural, moral and religious beliefs. 
Persistent disagreement at this level is not necessarily problematic. Actually, the co-
existence of fundamentally different ethical views is not only inherent to democratic 
societies (Gutmann & Thompson 1996) it is often considered essential for them to 
thrive (Mill 1859/1979). Arguably more problematic is disagreement at the level of 
ethical-political questions, as this could hinder the policy-making process and leave 
controversial biotechnologies unregulated, or regulated in a problematic way, e.g. in 
a way that alienates a large section of society (House of Lords 2000). This is, 
arguably, what happened with the regulation of genetically modified (GM) foods 
(Adam et al. 1999; Wynne 1996). Governments and scientists have been criticized 
for not taking the public’s concerns about GM foods sufficiently seriously and for 
misidentifying the nature of their concerns, which then resulted in a lack of public 




support for the development of this technology, and in a general mistrust in science 
(Adam et al. 1999; House of Lords 2000; Wynne 1996).  
The recent debate on genome editing raises concerns previously discussed in the 
debates on GM foods and rDNA experimentation (Jasanoff et al. 2015), as well as 
new questions arising from its efficacy, precision and relatively low cost of 
application (Ledford 2015). The possibility of inserting heritable changes in human 
embryos has attracted most attention. Some argue that genome editing in human 
embryos should be pursued as it could prevent particular genetic diseases from being 
passed on from one generation to the next (Cavaliere 2018a; Gyngell et al. 2017). 
Others warn that it will be too difficult to (ever) assess the technology’s safety, and 
that, therefore, we should probably not pursue it (Baylis 2017b; Lanphier et al. 2015). 
In addition, manipulating human genes more generally has been criticized on the 
ground that it will erode the intrinsic value of what is naturally produced (Kass 2004; 
Sandel 2004a), will be tantamount to ‘playing God’177, or will result in the resurgence 
of eugenics178.  
The debate on genome editing has so far primarily focused on ethical questions at 
the substantive ethical level, that is, questions about the moral status of genome 
editing and, especially, its application in human embryos. Limited attention has been 
devoted to questions regarding its regulation179. This limited attention is 
problematic, given the pressing need to regulate genome editing technologies, and 
the potential negative societal impact of regulations that alienate large swaths of 
society.   
Since the debate on genome editing is just emerging, there is an opportunity to 
approach it with fresh eyes and to shape it in a way that includes discussions of 
ethical-political questions. In our view, such inclusion would ensure that regulations 
on genome editing take societal views into account, something which, as we will 
                                                 
177 For an analysis of ‘playing God’ arguments see for instance: Savulescu et al. (2009). 
178 Some have argued that gene editing could lead back to eugenics: see for instance: King (2017) and 
Pollack (2015). 
179 With some exceptions: see for instance: Baylis (2016, 2017b); Chan and Arellano (2016); Jasanoff 
et al (2015). 




argue, is of the utmost importance if we want to implement ethically acceptable 
policies. Discussions of ethical-political questions regarding genome editing can also 
inform wider debates on the regulation of science in democratic societies 
characterised by a plurality of coexisting views. As Sheila Jasanoff et al. (2015) have 
pointed out, genome editing raises “basic questions about the rightful place of 
science in governing the future in democratic societies”, and as Françoise Baylis 
(2017b) has suggested, genome editing offers an opportunity to rethink existing 
mechanisms of public engagement and to identify the “common interests that might 
rightfully guide policy deliberations”. 
We take on the challenges that Baylis (2017b) and Jasanoff et al. (2015) identify by 
exploring possible approaches to regulating genome editing that lie at the opposite 
ends of what we might call ‘the spectrum of public involvement in policy making’. 
We first sketch an approach that does not take into account the actual preferences 
of those potentially affected by genome editing and its regulation, but rather aims to 
derive at an abstract theoretical level what preferences people would have if they 
were committed to implementing public policies in a context of ethical pluralism; 
this is a strategy proposed by Joshua Greene. After pointing out a serious 
shortcoming of this approach, which we dub ‘elitist’, we present a diametrically 
opposed approach, as defended by Baylis and Jasanoff et al. We refer to this 
approach as ‘democratic’, as it emphasizes the importance of including the public’s 
expressed attitudes in the regulation of genome editing. We conclude that this 
approach also has a serious shortcoming and propose our own favoured approach, 
the ‘enlightened democracy approach’, which attempts to combine the strengths of 
the elitist and democratic approaches without their weaknesses. Our approach is 
inspired by the literature on deliberative democracy180. It relies on a democratic 
process as well as on expertise to identify people’s preferences and to develop 
policies that reflect them. 
                                                 
180 See for instance Gutmann and Thompson (1996); Cohen (2003); Gutmann and Thompson (2009); 
Kitcher (2001, 2011). 




3.3 The Elitist Approach  
Ideally, since we live in democratic societies and we value democracy, genome editing should 
be regulated in a way that all people can agree upon. However, universal or even 
very widespread agreement is unlikely to obtain, given that views at the level of 
substantive ethical questions tend to influence those at the level of ethical-political 
questions. Typically, those who think it is morally desirable, or even morally 
obligatory, to pursue genome editing will favour permissive regulations (Harris 2015; 
Savulescu et al. 2015), whereas those objecting to applications of the technology, or 
to the technology itself, will favour more restrictive regulations (Collins 2015; 
Lanphier et al. 2015; UNESCO IBC 2017). 
How then are we to make progress at the level of ethical-political questions?  
One approach we could adopt is to leave aside the expressed views on the regulation 
of genome editing and determine what people would agree upon under ideal 
conditions181. What these ideal conditions are is of course up for debate, but 
throughout history, many philosophers have focussed on the relevance of reason, or 
rationality, to the resolution of ethical questions.   
For example, Baruch Spinoza wrote that: 
[M]en who are governed by reason—that is, who seek what is useful to them 
in accordance with reason, desire for themselves nothing, which they do not 
also desire for the rest of mankind, and, consequently, are just, faithful, and 
honourable in their conduct. (Spinoza 1677/1996: XVII)  
The idea is that people ‘governed by reason’ will agree upon universal norms that 
would apply to themselves as well as to others. Unfortunately, moral philosophers 
who have tried to ground their proposed ethical theories on the basis of reason alone 
have failed to reach an agreement on what reason requires or on what the rational – 
and therefore the ethical – way to regulate human behaviour is. Indeed, the two 
main normative ethical theories that both claim to be grounded in rationality – 
                                                 
181 Often, moral disagreement persists even in ideal conditions, among people that are well-informed 
and fully rational. This is what Doris and Plakias (2007) refer to as “fundamental disagreement”, 
which obtains even when ideal conditions are met. 




Kantianism and utilitarianism – are often taken to lie at opposite ends of a spectrum, 
one grounding a strictly deontological approach and one grounding a strictly 
consequentialist one. How, then, could we rely on reason or rationality to determine 
how we should regulate genome editing? We could turn to political philosophers, 
but it seems like the best we can do then is to agree to disagree and to accept 
disagreement among reasonable ethical views within a framework of political 
liberalism (Rawls 1993). However, what liberal policies should admit as a reasonable 
view turns out to be difficult to establish, in particular when the disagreement is so 
deep that it involves not only substantive ethical views, but also ethical-political 
views. What kind of principles can reasonably settle a disagreement about how to 
regulate a technology whose moral status is the subject of substantive ethical 
disagreement? The answer remains unclear.    
Perhaps we could turn to moral psychology for help. Recent work in moral 
psychology, particularly with regard to the interplay between reason and moral 
intuitions and emotions in our moral and political judgments (Greene 2014; Haidt 
2012; Haidt & Björklund 2007), could potentially support ethical theories grounded 
in reason or rationality. In other words, an understanding of how moral judgments 
are formed could perhaps inform an account of how rationality could allow us to find 
some form of agreement at the ethical political level in the face of persisting and 
unresolvable disagreement at the substantive ethical level. In the remainder of this 
section, we focus primarily on how the work of Greene in moral psychology could 
underpin an approach that seeks to determine what regulations on genome editing 
people would agree upon if they were governed by reason. We do appreciate that 
Greene’s work is debated on methodological and normative grounds (Kahane & 
Shackel 2010; Nagel 2013; Wright 2013) and we do not commit ourselves to his 
particular approach to the formation of moral judgments. What we are offering here 
is merely one possible heuristic that could underpin the ‘elitist’ approach, and what 
we say is compatible with rejecting some specifics of Greene’s model.  
On the basis of fMRI studies and psychological experiments involving people’s 
responses to variations of the so-called trolley-problem (Foot 1967; Thompson 1976, 
1985), Greene has developed a dual-process model of how people’s moral judgments 




are formed182. On Greene’s model, there are two modes of making (moral) 
judgments: an automatic and a manual mode (what Daniel Kahneman would call 
“thinking fast” and “thinking slow”). In everyday situations, we normally make 
moral judgments in automatic mode, that is, on the basis of intuitive and emotive 
responses (such as the judgment that it is wrong to push a man onto the track so that 
he would stop a trolley and prevent five people from being killed). Such automatic 
mode is the result of how morality evolved to facilitate cooperation with other 
members of the small groups, or “tribes”, within which individuals used to live. 
Responding to ethical dilemmas in automatic mode has resulted in different “tribes”, 
or different moral communities, developing different intuitive and emotive responses 
(e.g. more conservative, or more liberal) to ethical dilemmas (Haidt 2012). This 
automatic mode coexists with the manual mode, which is guided by more reasoned 
reflections that can obtain once people set aside their intuitive and emotive 
responses.183 According to Greene, the manual mode is what one could and should 
rely upon when it comes to solving moral conflicts arising between different moral 
communities. Such conflicts arise frequently today because of the globalized world 
in which we live, which often requires individuals belonging to different moral 
communities to find common solutions to ethical problems arising from the 
application and regulation of new technologies. Genome editing might well be one 
example. 
Greene is convinced that if we could set aside our intuitive and automatic responses 
to the ethical questions that divide us, and reflect on these questions with the aid of 
our reflective cognitive capacities (the manual mode), we would be able to formulate 
a “meta-morality”, that is, a “shared moral standard” (Greene 2014: 290) that is 
genuinely based on reason 184. The meta-morality would be a “global moral 
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way humans make judgments more generally, see for instance: Kahneman (2011). 
183 The automatic mode is activated in trolley problem scenario in which we can save five people at 
the cost of killing one without having to actively push someone onto the tracks, something that many 
people intuitively reject. 
184 While the very same notion of “rationality” is itself difficult to define in philosophical terms, in 
psychological terms we can define practical rationality as the capacity to make decisions that are not 
based merely on unanalysed intuitions and emotions. In Greene’s words, “"Reasoning, as applied to 




philosophy that can adjudicate among competing interests of its members” and that 
would allow to “make trade-offs among competing tribal values” (Greene 2014: 15). 
In order to make these trade-offs, however, we need a common currency of value 
that all human beings can acknowledge, even if it conflicts with some of the views 
developed in automatic mode (Greene 2014). Thus, even if some people disagree on 
the shared moral standard identified (due to their automatic moral mode), everyone 
should be able to understand (due to their manual moral mode)185 this standard and its 
relevance for approaching ethical disputes.  So, how to find this shared moral 
standard? 
According to Greene, adopting the manual mode and favouring reasoned reflection 
instead of automatic intuitive responses to ethical questions allows us to appreciate 
that there are two essential aspects of a genuinely ethical approach. The first is the 
value of impartiality—the idea that, from the point of view of the universe (so to 
speak), each person is as important as any other.  Greene acknowledges that none 
of us are really truly impartial, but notes that we can all acknowledge the importance 
of impartiality as a moral ideal (Greene 2014: 201). The second aspect of a genuinely 
ethical approach is the recognition of the value of happiness, which matters to 
everyone186.  Recognizing that happiness is what ultimately matters and that, from 
the point of view of the universe, no one matters more than anyone else, lies at the 
core of utilitarianism, which Greene proposes to rename “deep pragmatism”. This is 
to emphasise that it is the approach that is most likely to work in resolving moral 
conflicts because it is the one on which people from different moral tribes could get 
to agree upon once they switch from the automatic to the manual mode of reasoning.  
So, how could an approach based on Greene’s ideas about how to resolve moral 
disagreement in a globalised world help us regulate genome editing? Policies would 
need to be developed using the utilitarian standard. In other words, alternative 
                                                 
decision making, involves the conscious application of decision rules (...). Reasoning frees us from 
the tyranny of our immediate impulses by allowing us to serve values that are not automatically 
activated by what's in front of us”, (Greene 2014: 13).  
185 Here is helpful Wright (2013) analogy of the meta-morality as “the moral equivalent of Esperanto”. 
186  This view that is shared for instance by Singer (1981) and Sidgwick (1907). 




regulatory strategies would need to be evaluated on the basis of their capacity to 
generate the greatest happiness for the greatest number, as the famous utilitarian 
slogan goes. However, whether different types of policies to regulate genome 
editing can be expected to maximise happiness is a question that is not easily settled. 
Different sorts of experts, including for instance legal experts, policy-makers, 
scientists, ethicists, and sociologists could contribute to the assessment of the 
expected consequences of potential regulatory strategies, on what ‘happiness’ could 
mean, and on how the consequences could contribute to the promotion of 
happiness. Within this framework, a relevant and philosophically interesting 
question that would need to be addressed, but which we raise here only to leave it 
aside, is one about the proper role of ‘moral experts’ 187 , i.e. people who know well 
different possible moral theories and know how to weigh conflicting moral values 
against one another in the light of those moral theories188.  Presumably, these experts 
would be people who are able to switch to the manual mode and set aside 
automatically formed intuitions and emotions. Because the proposed approach 
heavily relies on some sorts of experts, we propose to refer to it as an ‘elitist 
approach’.  
In principle, this approach could be the ethically optimal solution to the moral 
disagreement about how to regulate genome editing: it would be the solution that 
perfectly rational people would endorse. However, there are also some serious 
                                                 
187 There is a literature, both in philosophy and within bioethics specifically, about what moral 
expertise is, whether it exists at all, and who counts as a moral expert, with which we do not have 
the space to engage here. For the purposes of our paper, however, what matters is not so much how 
moral expertise should be defined and whether it exists, but the fact that the elitist model we discuss 
would have to rely on some sort of moral expertise – as well as on other kinds of expertise - rather 
than on the active participation of the population or of some representation of it. 
188 As Peter Singer says in his defence of moral expertise “[s]omeone familiar with moral concepts 
and with moral arguments, who has ample time to gather information and think about it, may 
reasonably be expected to reach a soundly based conclusion more often than someone who is 
unfamiliar with moral concepts and moral arguments and has little time” (Singer 1972: 117). Similarly, 
Harris and Lawrence (2018) argued that ““Ethical expertise” if and where it exists must consist 
principally in the ability to create, assemble, analyse or present the combination of evidence and 
argument required to establish, defend, qualify, weaken or demolish a proposition of ethical 
significance. Or, to reveal problems or ambiguities, contradictions or inconsistencies, in short 
strengths and weaknesses, in ethical positions, judgments, claims or conclusions”.  




shortcomings with this view, which make it a problematic approach to regulating 
genome editing. 
3.3.1 A Shortcoming of the Elitist Approach   
We focus our criticism on an elitist approach modelled on Greene’s proposal, but 
our arguments would also apply to other similarly elitist approaches.189 
The most serious shortcoming is that the elitist approach is not democratic, in the 
sense that the decision-making process does not require the involvement and 
participation of all those who will be affected by the decisions taken. Why is this 
problematic? 
Democratic decision-making procedures can be important for intrinsic reasons, for 
example because one values equality in political influence and sees democracy as the 
only system that can respect and preserve people’s freedom, equality, and equality 
in freedom. 
But a democratic decision-making procedure can also be important for instrumental 
reasons, because it is essential to achieve trust and legitimacy, which both have 
desirable consequences for society (House of Lords 2000). Relying on an elitist 
approach to regulate genome editing excludes large segments of the population from 
the decision making process. Expertise can often be “exclusionary and restricted” as 
it represents “the command of knowledge within a defined domain by some persons 
that is not commanded by others” (Archard 2011: 20). As a result, those excluded 
may lose trust in the policies resulting from the elitist approach and in the various 
experts that have contributed to them. Loss of trust in experts may have a wide 
societal impact. Moreover, when legitimacy190 obtains, people are more inclined to 
conform to the policies and to avoid forgoing the potential benefits the technology 
                                                 
189 For instance, these arguments would apply to elitist approaches based on the alleged moral 
expertise of religious authorities.  
190 Here we follow Dryzek’s (2001) definition of legitimacy, namely that “outcomes are legitimate to 
the extent that they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all 
those subject to the decision in question” (Dryzek 2001: 651). 




in question may bring about. As is often highlighted in the literature on trust and 
expertise, it would be difficult for science to make progress without this trust 
(O’Neill 2002; Resnik 2011) and without legitimacy (Chan & Arellano 2016; 
Gutmann & Thompson 2009; Parkinson 2003). In addition, it has been argued that 
relying on a democratic process is good because involving rival points of view is more 
likely to lead to better policy outcomes, given that different ethical and practical 
problems are more likely to be considered and analysed191.  
These reasons point to something similar: in liberal, democratic societies, public 
policies, and political decisions in general, cannot do without some form of support 
by the people who will be affected by those policies. 
3.4 The Democratic Approach 
This importance of relying on a democratic process to regulate genome editing 
echoes a shared view among the few scholars that have addressed the level of 
ethical-political questions specifically regarding genome editing (Baylis 2016, 2017b; 
Jasanoff et al. 2015; Jasanoff & Hurlbut 2018) (and indeed, some preliminary 
experiments of public dialogue in this direction have been carried out)192. It has been 
argued that an absolute condition of developing policies to regulate this technology 
is public engagement and the inclusion of public views in policy-making processes. 
Institutional bodies such as the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) or the UK 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics endorse this view. For instance, following the 
December 2015 International Summit on genome editing, the NAS Organising 
Committee released a statement that called for the establishment of an “ongoing 
                                                 
191 This view was already defended by John Stuart Mill (1979/1859). 
192 The Royal Society – a U.K. learned society – commissioned both a public dialogue deliberative 
process (2013) and launched a survey (2017) on genetic technologies’ applications to plants, humans 
(heritable and non-heritable), non-human animals (pets, wild animals and animals used as source of 
food). A report of the survey and of the public dialogue is available at: 
https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/gene-tech/genetic-technologies-public-dialogue-
hvm-full-report.pdf (last accessed April 25 2018). 




international forum to discuss potential clinical uses of gene editing”. According to 
the statement, this forum should be “inclusive among nations” and should: 
Engage a wide range of perspectives and expertise—including from biomedical 
scientists, social scientists, ethicists, health care providers, patients and their 
families, people with disabilities, policymakers, regulators, research funders, 
faith leaders, public interest advocates, industry representatives, and members 
of the general public. (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and 
Medicine 2015) 
Echoing this conclusion, Baylis (2016) emphasises the need to collectively discuss 
strategies for governance that are based on a “broad consensus” which, in turn, 
should be achieved through “broad-based participation by persons from around the 
world with a range of perspectives and interests” (Baylis 2016: 22). 
An even more radical position is expressed by Jasanoff et al. (2015), who openly 
criticise the reliance on experts to address the regulatory challenges raised by 
genome editing and argue that public engagement cannot be reduced to asking 
questions to the public that have been pre-selected, pre-approved and deemed 
appropriate by experts. They claim that: 
Even where there are calls for “broad public dialogue,” these are constrained 
by expert accounts of what is proper (and not proper) to talk about in ensuing 
deliberations. When larger questions arise, as they often do, dissent is dismissed 
as evidence that publics just do not get the science. […] The impulse to dismiss 
public views as simply ill-informed is not only itself ill-informed but is 
problematic because it deprives society of the freedom to decide what forms of 
progress are culturally and morally acceptable. (Jasanoff et al. 2015)193 
                                                 
193 Elsewhere – and in a similar fashion – Jasanoff and Hurlbut have called for a “global observatory 
on gene editing” and argued that: “Free enquiry, the lifeblood of science, does not mean 
untrammelled freedom to do anything. Society’s unwritten contract with science guarantees 
scientific autonomy in exchange for a research enterprise that is in the service of, and calibrated to, 
society’s diverse conceptions of the good. As the dark histories of eugenics and abusive research on 
human subjects remind us, it is at our peril that we leave the human future to be adjudicated in 
biotechnology’s own ‘ecclesiastical courts’” (Jasanoff & Hurlbut 2018: 437).  




3.4.1 A Shortcoming of the Democratic Approach 
Unfortunately, the democratic solutions advocated by Baylis (2016, 2017b) and 
Jasanoff et al. (2015) also have a serious shortcoming. If one of the problems with the 
elitist approach was that it sacrificed democratic values for the sake of imposed 
rationally inferred moral values, the problem with the democratic model is rather the 
opposite one: it sacrifices reasoned and well-informed decision-making for the sake 
of democratic values. The problem with Baylis’ (2016, 2017b) proposal is that due to 
the fundamental moral disagreement at the level of substantive ethical questions it 
is likely that a “broad based participation by persons from around the world with a 
range of perspectives and interests” will lead to fragmentation rather than to the 
widespread consensus that Baylis advocates. In addition to this, while it is true that 
Baylis does take into account certain conditions that need to be met in order to 
achieve her particular conception of consensus,194 consensus may not be the most 
desirable aim to pursue, both because it may be a “mask hiding relations of 
domination and exclusion” (Callon et al. 2001: 4) and because it might be reached 
“to the detriment of opponents or the recalcitrant who have been unable to express 
themselves or who have been silenced” (Callon et al. 2001: 4)195. The problem with 
the proposal of Jasanoff et al. (2015) —we contend—is instead that it challenges the 
very idea of expertise and with it, the idea of relying on experts. This is problematic 
as many people’s decisions may be uninformed or, if we may believe Greene, based 
on automatically formed and intuitive responses.  
3.5 The Enlightened Democracy Approach  
We propose that regulations for genome editing ought to be developed on the basis 
of what we call an ‘enlightened democracy’ approach, which, in our view, includes 
                                                 
194 Baylis (2016) does not really define what she means with consensus, but she is adamant in stressing 
that: “Consensus does not mean that everyone thinks that the decision made is necessarily the best 
one possible […]. What it does mean is that in coming to that decision on one felt that her position 
on the matter was misunderstood or that it wasn’t given a proper hearing” (Baylis 2016: 22). The 
author also lays the condition of mutual engagement for achieve such consensus (responsibility, self-
discipline, respect, cooperation, struggle). 
195 Callon et al. (2001) are quoting S. Jasanoff.  




the strengths of the elitist approach and the democratic approach suggested by 
Baylis and Jasanoff et al., while avoiding to the greatest extent possible their 
shortcomings. The enlightened democracy approach to regulating genome editing 
relies partly on Greene’s ideas of a shared moral standard and the relevance of 
experts in policymaking, and partly on the literature on deliberative democracy 
(Gutmann & Thompson 1996, 2009; Kitcher 2001, 2011). At the same time, our 
proposed approach takes up the challenges raised by Baylis and especially by 
Jasanoff et al. in favour of democratic deliberation and broad-based public 
engagement. Our proposal is enlightened in that it aims to include the various views 
of different categories of experts, and democratic in that it aims to open up the 
debate to various sorts of non-experts and engage with public views on genome 
editing.  
The first characteristic of our approach is that it rejects an agenda for genome editing 
that is solely based on what experts define as worth pursuing. At the same time, it 
grants experts an ancillary but necessary role in the development of such an agenda. 
Building on the work of Philip Kitcher (2001, 2011), we argue that the policies 
regulating genome editing research and implementation should strive towards the 
ideal of “well-ordered science”. According to Kitcher, scientific research and clinical 
applications are well-ordered when their agendas coincide with ideal deliberators’ 
judgments and world views, which, in turn, are representative of the diversity of 
judgments and world views co-existing in a given community. In the context of 
genome editing and its applications, this ideal entails that such applications are well-
ordered only if they align with what people—coming together and discussing their 
values and preferences—would decide in a deliberative process. The deliberations 
among people aim to provide “the most justifiable conception for dealing with moral 
disagreement in politics” (Gutmann & Thompson 2009: 10). This means that, as we 
saw above, even if disagreement often cannot be avoided, people’s preferences 
should be taken into account in order to avoid distrust and illegitimacy. In addition, 
deliberations among peers facilitated and informed by experts allow that preferences 
are perfected and epistemic flaws ironed out. A deliberative process that involves 
both ordinary people as well as experts seems to us the most desirable strategy on 
two desiderata, namely: 




[T]he degree to which policy outcomes match the substantive goals of society 
in question; and the degree to which they achieve normatively justifiable ends. 
(Parkinson 2003: 183) 
The second characteristic of our proposed approach is that it sets certain background 
conditions to participating in these deliberations (Gutmann & Thompson 2009; 
Kitcher 2011). Contrary to the proposals such as those of Jasanoff et al. (2015) and, 
also, J. Benjamin Hurlbut, people entering these deliberations should meet certain 
criteria in order to avoid the two dangers outlined above (i.e. regulations that do not 
match societal goals and that do not achieve normatively justifiable ends). 
Deliberators need to meet “epistemic conditions” (Kitcher 2011) of mutual 
engagement, which require deliberators to not rely on false beliefs about the world, 
to be aware of the consequences of the debated matter for one another, and to know 
preferences and wishes of other deliberators. With respect to genome editing, this 
means that deliberators should gain a basic knowledge of the functioning, potential 
uses, potential risks and potential benefits of genome editing. Scientific experts, as 
well as social and technology studies experts, sociologists, philosophers, and lawyers 
would assist in bringing to light expected consequences of permissive or restrictive 
regulations for genome editing and make sure that deliberators can fulfil such 
epistemic conditions.  
Other conditions for deliberators to take part in these discussions are ‘affective’ 
(Kitcher 2011), in that deliberators will be required to work towards the 
[E]xpansion of one’s sympathies, in which the perceived desires of those with 
whom one deliberates are given equal weight with one’s own. (Kitcher 2011: 
51) 
These affective conditions of mutual engagement reflect also deliberative 
democracy’s background conditions of mutual respect (Gutmann & Thompson 
2009). Only if both conditions apply is the process one of genuinely mutual 
engagement.  
Moreover, epistemic and affective conditions allow for the emergence of and 
especially the discussion of “tutored” as opposed to “raw” preferences (Kitcher 2001, 
2011). There is significant disagreement among experts about substantive ethical 




questions regarding genome editing. These differences are likely to be equally found 
in wider society, where a plurality of values obtain (Haidt 2012; Nagel 1979, Ch 9). 
Hence, deliberators may have different preferences with respect to regulations and 
their judgments may be influenced by these preferences when they come together 
and discuss different possible routes for scientific research and applications. The 
preferences that these individuals discuss should however not be “raw” preferences 
influenced by whatever inclination or temporary impulse these individuals are 
subjected to; in other words, the preferences should not be devoid of any 
background information, but rather “tutored preferences”: preferences informed by 
the current state of the art of the matter, and especially by the significance that 
potential applications of the technology in question may have for people’s lives 
(Kitcher 2001: 118). In addition to this, these preferences should be tutored in the 
sense that they will be perfected in a discussion with experts and in a discussion with 
epistemic peers (e.g. other members of the public participating in the deliberative 
processes).  
In our view, these characteristics enable a deliberative process to take place, one 
that avoids what in our view are the most problematic shortcomings of the elitist and 
democratic approach to regulating genome editing. The enlightened democracy 
approach could be criticised on practical and ethical grounds too, but we contend 
that its shortcomings should be factored against the benefits and the shortcomings 
of the alternatives thus far proposed. From a practical point of view, our proposed 
approach may still generate or fail to solve disagreement. Disagreement at the first 
level (the substantive-ethical) and disagreement at the second level (the ethical-
political) are interlinked and mutually influenced. However, even if there is lingering 
disagreement, our approach will reduce the risk of stifling policy-making processes, 
as at least epistemic flaws will have been mitigated and the different moral beliefs 
and preferences discussed. As argued by Philip Kitcher (2001, 2011), Amy Gutmann 
and Dennis Thompson (1996, 2009), Joshua Cohen (2003) and—from a different 
perspective— Jonathan Haidt (2012), the give-and-take of preferences and 
judgments allows for addressing misapprehensions and for appreciating the value of 
moral beliefs different from our own. In the best-case scenario, recognising the value 
of other points of view will help deliberators to engage with these points of view and 




perhaps to reflect on their own moral beliefs. This could help the activation of 
Greene’s manual mode and allow for a reasoned reflection to emerge. In some cases, 
the disagreement will not be resolved, and the debate will remain polarised, but the 
mutual engagement would hopefully mitigate legitimacy problems and distrust. Our 
proposed approach will be criticised by those who would grant more “power to the 
people” and those who are wary of any involvement of experts as they pre-
determine the questions that are worth pursuing and hence limit the scope and type 
of questions that are discussed in these deliberations (Hurlbut 2017). It will be also 
criticised by those who are wary of involving the public in discussions concerning 
new technologies and how they should be regulated. Without entering into a 
complicated discussion with both sides on burden of proof, we contend that our 
approach accommodates these competing views better than the alternatives.  
3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed an approach to addressing ethical-political questions 
regarding genome editing—i.e. questions about how genome editing should be 
regulated in the face of deep and persistent disagreement about substantive ethical 
questions. We have sketched a possible elitist approach grounded in the meta-
morality proposal of Greene and based on the deliberation of some sort of experts, 
and then discussed the democratic approach proposed by Baylis and Jasanoff et al. 
We have argued that the approaches each have their strengths, but also significant 
shortcomings. We have then proposed a new approach—the “enlightened 
democracy” approach—that aims to reconcile the need for a democratic 
engagement involving mutual respect for competing views on the one hand, and a 
well-informed discussion on the other. Our proposal is meant to sketch a theoretical 
framework to inform the ethical debate on how to regulate genome editing. We 
appreciate that our proposed approach would need to be further developed and 
refined. Most notably, we have not addressed the question of how such an approach 
would translate into practice. In this sense, our paper is situated within the 
scholarship in moral and political philosophy that proposes approaches to regulate 
new technologies in pluralistic and democratic societies. We believe however that a 




study of the implementation of the enlightened democracy approach would be 
worth pursuing, perhaps in another paper.  
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4 Conclusions to Part III: Compromise and Democratic Engagement  
In the two papers incorporated into Part III of this thesis, I discuss the possibility of 
extending the statutory limit for embryo research and the possibility of allowing 
genome editing applications to early human embryos. While both possibilities are a 
matter of debate and have given rise to substantial moral disagreement, certain 
conditions need to be met prior to going forward. As others argue (see for instance 
Devolder 2017; Montgomery 2017), with respect to embryo research, any case for 
extending the limit would have to show on the one hand that “significant scientific 
gains can reasonably be expected” (Montgomery 2017: 7) from such an extension. 
On the other hand, it would need to show that the proposed change would set “a 
new regulatory constraint that could play the jurisdictional role” (Montgomery 2017: 
8) identified by the current limit. With respect to genome editing, scientists who are 
currently conducting basic research with human embryos and scientists applying to 
conduct further research (and clinical research) would have to show that the current 
drawbacks of the applications can be overcome, and that the technology is safe 
enough to move to clinical research. While all these are necessary conditions to 
move forward, in my view they are not sufficient to this end. Scientific gains and 
safety should not be the only standards against which the decision to allow new 
reproductive technologies are measured. Public involvement and deliberations on 
the public value of these technologies, of how they can be implemented in ways that 
fairly distribute their burdens and benefits among people directly and indirectly 
involved, and of the “biological futures people actually want for themselves and their 
societies” (Jasanoff & Hurlbut 2018: 436) need to be part of the ethical debate too. 
It is for this reason that in both papers I discuss what my co-authors and I refer to as 
ethical-political questions at the second level (Cavaliere et al. 2019).  
In Paper 5 (Cavaliere 2017), I argue that the Warnock approach of favouring a 
solution of compromise196 between competing ethical views was the best way to 
                                                 
196 Devolder (2017) argues that the 14-day limit, albeit “defended as a compromise between scientists 
who wanted to conduct embryo research (or whose work could benefit from such research) and those 
opposing all embryo research” (Devolder 2017: 78), was not really a compromise, as to be classified 




respect the plurality of values which underpinned these competing views. In Paper 
6 (Cavaliere et al. 2019), I outline an approach to regulate genome editing that seeks 
to promote public involvement in deliberations while at the same time placing some 
conditions on the involvement process.  
Following Archard (2012), compromise is: 
[T]he making of mutual concessions by two or more parties who disagree in 
respect of some matter. An agreed outcome can only be secured if each is 
prepared to settle upon something that is for each party inferior to what was 
originally sought. (Archard 2012: 403) 
According to this definition, moral compromise is hence an “agreement in the face 
of moral disagreement”, which can secure a “morally desirable outcome” on an 
“ethically contentious issue” (Archard 2012: 404). In Paper 5, I argue that 
compromise can best respect the plurality of values and ethical views on embryo 
research and that a truly democratic approach would have to take these values and 
views into consideration197. Similarly, a democratic approach would take values, 
ethical views, and preferences (Cavaliere et al. 2019) into account, but it would set 
                                                 
as such both sides would have had to make concessions. According to the author, however, the 14-
day limit “gave scientists virtually everything they needed at the time” ([emphasis added] Devolder 2017: 78). 
While I understand Devolder’s reasoning, and I think she is right in saying that all that scientists (and 
proponents of embryo research) needed at that point in time was a limit that would allow them to 
conduct research (and it was not technically possible to sustain embryos in vitro for more than seven 
to nine days), my view is that, at that point in time, it was indeed a compromise. The compromise 
happened between those who wanted to have no line in the sand and to model regulations on 
technical capacity (present and especially future) and those opposing embryo research. The decision 
to set the limit at 14 days was more agreeable to the former than to the latter group, but it was an 
instance of compromise as both sides had to make concessions on their original positions. As Archard 
(2012) argues: “In any compromise one party can get more out of the deal relative to the claim 
originally advanced than the other manages relative to her initial claim” (Archard 2012: 403). Chan 
(2018) too refers to the decision to set the limit at 14 days as “a sort of policy compromise” between 
“groups with radically different interests and views on the moral legitimacy of embryo research” 
(Chan 2018: 229).  
197 This is also a view discussed and defended by Bellamy and Hollis (1998): “In principle, compromise 
shows a laudable willingness to see another's point of view, thereby showing a decent respect for 
pluralism. The spirit is more than one of tolerance in the weak sense of putting up with people one 
disagrees with” (Bellamy & Hollis 1998: 54). Contrary to Bellamy and Hollis (1998) and the view 
that I defend in Paper 5, critics of liberal theorists and of the tradition of political liberalism such as 
Chantal Mouffe (2000, 2013) argue instead that to be truly democratic, political systems need to 
embrace an antagonist’s perspective. This perspective does not seek to negotiate a compromise 
between competing views and interests nor seek to overcome opposition. Rather, it is a perspective 
that embraces this opposition and seeks to negotiate within democratic objectives. 




some conditions for the process – which I explore in Paper 6. Both compromise and 
our proposed ‘enlightened democracy’ approach are open to criticism. As, for 
instance, Archard (2012); Richard Bellamy and Martin Hollis (1998); and Devolder 
and Douglas (2018) note, compromise is often frowned upon and considered 
problematic198. The reasons for this are manifold and include, for instance: 
compromises’ lack of sound theoretical foundations (as the debate on the 14-day 
limit exemplifies); their “shrinking deference for the status quo” (Morely 1901: 19); the 
lack of integrity of the compromisers (as Bellamy and Hollis [1998] put it: “to 
compromise is to compromise oneself” [Bellamy & Hollis 1998: 55]); or even their 
becoming complicit in wrongdoing199; and the epistemic cost200 that defending a 
compromise can have (Devolder & Douglas 2018). Similarly, a democratic approach 
that takes into account people’s preferences can be criticised by those who worry 
about the higher potential for cognitive errors and wrongful moral convictions of the 
public (as opposed to, for instance, scientific and ‘moral’ experts), and by those, such 
as Jasanoff et al. (2015) and Jasanoff and Hurlbut (2018), advocating for reducing 
constraints on participations in democratic deliberation. More fundamentally, as 
Hurlbut (2017) argues with respect to the debate on embryo research in the U.S., 
such a democratic approach would be criticised by those who are dissatisfied with 
the standards of rationality and ‘public reason’ that a framework inspired by political 
liberalism draws upon.   
In the two papers incorporated into this part of the thesis, I have provided 
instrumental and intrinsic reasons to adopt a solution of compromise within the 
debate on extending the 14-day limit. I have also provided reasons to adopt a 
democratic approach informed by the deliberative democracy framework (Bohman 
                                                 
198 Authors have been ambivalent on compromise too (for a discussion, see for instance Archard 2012; 
Braybrooke 1982; Nachi 2004). 
199 For a discussion of these positions, see Devolder (2015); Devolder and Douglas (2018); Bellamy 
and Hollis (1998).  
200 Douglas and Devolder (2018) argue that the view that compromise is almost always problematic 
(what they refer to as “the common sense view”) cannot be defended using the currently available 
reasons to hold this view, as such reasons apply only to some compromises. By contrast, they argue 
that the common sense view can be vindicated following an “epistemic cost account”. According to 
this account, compromise can be problematic because it can “impede the future formation of correct 
ethical beliefs” (Devolder & Douglas 2018: 115). 




1998; Elster 1998; Gutmann & Thompson 1996, 2009) and by the well-ordered 
science framework (Kitcher 2001, 2007, 2011) within the debate on genome editing 
applications to human embryos. Granted, these solutions and approaches are open 
to criticism on philosophical, epistemic, moral, and practical grounds. They may 
require a pre-emptive commitment to democratic governance that philosophers 
would rightly criticise as a cheap and fallacious argumentative strategy (as this 
argumentative strategy would need to presuppose too much). Despite this, the 
ethical questions on new reproductive technologies that are the object of this part of 
the thesis are not solely theoretical-ethical questions but political-ethical questions 
with implications for debates on public policy. As Bellamy and Hollis (1998) argue: 
[L]iberals have principled as well as pragmatic reasons for embracing 
compromise. It goes together with a democratic politics informed by duties of 
mutual respect and a concern with the common good, in which the only people 
who are compromised are those who through prejudice or selective blindness 
refuse to compromise at all. (Bellamy & Hollis 1998: 76) 
In this sense, albeit far from being perfect, the approaches I have defended are in 
my view the best of all possible worlds, considering the costs of following alternative 




PART IV  
Back to Eugenics: Procreation beyond  
the Procreators’ Interests  
1 Introduction to Part IV 
In this final part of the thesis, I intend to (partially) move away from discussing the 
ethics of new reproductive technologies to focus on procreative decisions and 
procreation more broadly. As I have explained in the introduction to this thesis, 
within this project I employ the term procreation to refer to activities which result 
in bringing children into existence and to capture some of the broader, cumulative 
and far-reaching effects of these activities. My discussion takes as a point of 
departure reproductive freedom (Buchanan et al. 2001, Ch 6) and seeks to question 
the individual-centred ethical framework that underpins this principle. To do so, I 
analyse strengths and weaknesses of this individual-centred framework and those of 
(past and contemporary) alternative frameworks to address ethical challenges raised 
by procreative decisions. I also bring together critiques to this framework from 
strange bedfellows such as economists, philosophers, environmentalists and critical 
social scientists. The object of Part IV is hence to discuss questions pertaining to 
people’s interests in procreative matters (broadening the analysis of the preference 
for genetic relatedness that is the object of Part II) and an evaluation of whether 
there can be ethically acceptable limits to the satisfaction of these interests.  
Turning back to the aims of this project outlined in the introduction, this part of the 
thesis juxtaposes the methodology-oriented and the content-oriented aims. Firstly, 
it seeks to change the way authors participating in debates on the ethics of 
procreation reflect on procreative decisions and to include observations on the 
implications of such decisions. This is achieved by including other relevant insights 
pertaining to the cumulative and far-reaching effects of procreation and by drawing 
on a multiplicity of disciplinary sources. Secondly, it seeks to examine and assess 




different strategies to address ethical challenges raised by procreative decisions 
which can fairly distribute the burdens and benefits of such decisions.  
In the introduction to this thesis, I have argued that debates on the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies and on the ethics of procreative decisions more generally 
should be interpreted as debates about who should come into existence and about 
how to balance the burdens and benefits of such decisions. As I showed in Paper 1 
(Cavaliere 2018d), the relationship between new reproductive technologies and 20th 
century eugenics is fraught with controversy. Several authors hold that these 
technologies do not resemble eugenics in meaningful ways and that a comparison of 
the two is not warranted201. Many of these authors rely on the distinction between 
individual-level and population-level interventions to “draw a bright line” (Buchanan 
et al. 2001: 53) between “eugenics as an intervention on behalf of public health and 
welfare, and clinical genetics, in service of the individual” ([emphasis added] Buchanan 
et al. 2001: 53). However, the distinction between individual-level interventions as 
the defining characteristic of new reproductive technologies and population-level 
interventions as the defining characteristic of eugenics has been challenged. Both 
20th century eugenics and new reproductive technologies feature aspects that 
pertain, in different ways and degrees, to both levels (Bashford 2010; Buchanan et 
al. 2001; Löwy 2015). Despite these challenges, population-level interventions in 
procreation are still deemed more ethically troubling than individual-level 
interventions. I would argue that this happens on the one hand due to the perceived 
risk of violating people’s reproductive freedom; on the other, due to the perceived 
risk of causing harms and wrongdoings akin to those that occurred as a result of 20th 
century eugenics’ policies, ideologies and practices.  
In this final part of my thesis, I hence turn back to eugenics in more significant ways 
than in the rest of my work. I discuss whether it is possible to move from an 
individual-centred framework to reflect on the ethics of procreative decisions, to a 
                                                 
201 See Paper 1 (Cavaliere 2018dCavaliere 2018d).  
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framework that considers other people’s (than the procreators’) interests, and the 
far-reaching and cumulative effects of individual procreative decisions. 
1.1 Reproductive Freedom and the Individual-Centred Framework  
Reproductive freedom plays a pivotal role in debates on the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies. It protects people’s interests in procreative matters and 
allows them discretion in the matter of whether or not to have children, the number 
of children they have and, to a certain extent, in countries that allow assisted 
reproductive technologies, on the type of children they have (Buchanan et al. 2001, 
Ch 6; Brock 2005; Dworkin 1993; Harris 1998; Robertson 1994). It is perhaps 
unsurprising then that reproductive freedom is invoked to defend these technologies 
and to criticise restrictions to access them, such as statutory bans and other kinds of 
interferences on the part of the state. For instance, as I showed in Paper 3 (Cavaliere 
2018a) and in Paper 4 (Cavaliere & Palacios-González 2018), within debates on 
MRTs and on genome editing people’s freedom in reproductive matters is a 
powerful and pervasive argument to justify the introduction of these and other 
technologies. Similarly, a concern for people’s reproductive freedom often grounds 
authors’ defences of pre-natal and pre-implantation technologies, the right to 
terminate an unwanted pregnancy, and access to contraception and reproductive 
care. This principle sits at the core of these defences due to the relevance of 
exercising freedom in reproductive matters for people’s autonomy and well-being. 
In turn, limiting reproductive freedom is considered problematic insofar as it could 
negatively affect people’s personal autonomy and well-being. For instance, Brock 
(2005) argues that personal autonomy serves as the primary moral basis of this 
principle. In his words: 
Individuals’ interest in autonomy is their interest in making significant decisions 
about their lives for themselves and according to their own values or conception 
of a good life, carrying out those choices without interference from others, and 
being free to revise their plans of life or conception of the good over time. […] 
Because the choice of whether to reproduce has such far-reaching impact on 
people’s lives, their autonomy interest in making it is typically great. (Brock 
2005: 382) 




The other “principal moral basis” (Brock 2005: 383) of reproductive freedom, 
according to Brock (2005) and others (Buchanan et al. 2001, Ch 6; Robertson 1994), 
is people’s well-being. Following this view, having and raising children202 are core 
human activities which are “central to personal identity, to dignity, and to the 
meaning of one’s life” (Robertson 1994: 24). The recognition of and concern for 
people’s autonomy and well-being count among the theoretical successes of 
reproductive freedom. Not only that, as I have argued in Cavaliere & Harris 
(2018)203, reproductive freedom plays and has played an important performative role 
in contemporary and past political struggles to secure access to contraception, 
terminations of pregnancies, and to allow new reproductive and screening 
technologies (see also: Mills 2015). On both accounts, then, reproductive freedom 
seems to have a positive track record in terms of theoretical and practical successes 
in protecting people’s interests. Moreover, as I have discussed in Paper 1 (Cavaliere 
2018d), the history of 20th century eugenics serves as a reminder of how procreation 
was thought to be a matter of concern for the state204, which could legitimately 
exercise control over the bodies of women, ethnic minorities, disabled and poor 
people, and other vulnerable groups (see also Connelly 2008).  
2 Challenges to Reproductive Freedom 
By and large, reproductive freedom’s theoretical and political emphasis on people’s 
autonomy, dignity and well-being fits within an individual-centred framework to 
discuss the ethics of procreation. It protects people’s interests from external 
interference and it prevents (or, at least, it significantly reduces) the ethically and 
legally permissible grounds for interference by third parties. It is in this sense that, 
within the framework of reproductive freedom, procreation is often both thought to 
be a private matter and is defended for this reason. As with other freedoms protected 
                                                 
202 As well as not having children: reproductive freedom also protects people’s interest in not having 
children, and it is often defended as a right to self-determination and bodily autonomy in debates on 
the ethics of abortion (Cavaliere & Harris 2018) and contraception (Ceva & Moratti 2013).  
203 This paper is not incorporated into this thesis. See footnote 148 in Part II.  
204 See also Michel Foucault (1978) on this issue. 
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in liberal democratic societies, the freedom to decide in matters of procreation is not 
absolute and other considerations can rightfully constrain its scope (Brock 2005; 
Dworkin 1993; Cavaliere & Harris 2018). Such considerations often pertain to limits 
to reproductive freedom put in place to protect the well-being and the interests of 
the child who is born as a result of the procreative act. For instance, reproductive 
freedom protects people from interference in the choice of whether to become 
pregnant and whether to continue a pregnancy, but it would not protect them from 
interference against consuming harmful substances during pregnancy. Consuming 
substances may harm the (future) child205 and hence constitute a legitimate reason 
for third-party interference (for a critical analysis of the concept of the welfare of the 
child within decisions about assisted conception, see Parker 2005a). More 
controversial, within the reproductive freedom framework, are interferences 
motivated by a concern for the well-being of others, for their interests and/or by the 
risk of harm occurring to others. The received view on reproductive freedom 
broadly entails that third parties’ interests are less morally significant than the 
interests of the procreators, and that these interests often do not amount to justifiable 
grounds for interference (Harris 1998; Mills 2013; Robertson 1994). Other than the 
exception of the child’s welfare, defenders of reproductive freedom consider few 
grounds for interference ethically justified; curtailing or limiting reproductive 
freedom is often resisted due to the negative impact on people’s well-being and 
autonomy.  
In the next two sections, I present and discuss critiques of reproductive freedom 
which are motivated by a concern for the well-being of others, for their interests, 
and/or by the risk of harm occurring to others206. These critiques and the challenges 
                                                 
205 Parfit (1984) showed that discussions on placing moral obligations on present persons to refrain 
from harming future persons generates what he defines as the non-identity problem. This problem 
arises as present decisions about future people (such as the timing of conception or whether to use a 
technology for assisted reproduction) are identity-affecting, namely they determine who will be born. 
Consequently, discussions on the welfare of the future child are complicated as it is metaphysically 
problematic to place moral obligations on individuals regarding future people. The point here is not 
whether we can place moral obligations on prospective parents but that in debates on procreation, 
concerns for the welfare of the child are considered one of the most important constraints to the 
scope of reproductive freedom and are used as an argument to legitimately limit such freedom.  
206 Some of the critiques of the individual-centred framework and to reproductive freedom are 
motivated by a broader critique of the dominant individualistic understanding of the principle of 




they raise for the individual-centred framework vary greatly in terms of the ethical 
concerns that they voice and in terms of the proposals advanced to address such 
concerns. In my view, what unites them is that they can all be interpreted in terms 
of pointing to the inadequacy of an ethical framework that solely focuses on the 
interests of individual procreators and their close networks. My focus is on two sets 
of challenges to reproductive freedom and its non-interference clause:  
1) challenges motivated by the potential and actual harms that already 
discriminated-against groups such as ethnic minorities, women and disabled 
people may suffer  
2) challenges motivated by a concern for the size and the structure of the 
population, and by how procreation negatively affects third parties due to 
increased size or to sub-optimal structure. 
I elaborate on each of these sets of challenges in the following sections.  
2.1 First Set of Challenges: Engendering Harm to Vulnerable Groups  
The first set of challenges concerns potential and actual negative effects engendered 
to ethnic minorities, women and disabled people. For instance, Roberts (1997) 
criticises defences of reproductive freedom for their focus on abortion rights and 
promoting access to assisted reproductive technologies. She argues that, while 
                                                 
autonomy within healthcare settings (for a review and a discussion of an alternative proposal, see 
Dove et al. 2017) and the excessive emphasis on this principle in that context (Thomasma 1983). 
Other critiques take issue with an approach – within discussions on reproductive rights and 
reproductive health – that focuses mostly or solely on removing barriers of access to reproductive 
services and care, and on non-interference clauses which protect citizens from the interference of the 
state in reproductive matters (Mills 2013; Roberts 1997). Relatedly, some authors have criticised the 
language of ‘choice’ and how it masks the constraints women experience in real-life situations 
(Lippman 1999; Löwy 2015; Roberts 1997; Rothman 1985; Samerski 2009). According to these 
authors, this focus on choice and on non-interference leaves structural injustices and other legal, 
economic, social and political barriers to accessing reproductive services and care untouched (Löwy 
2015; Roberts 1997); it favours commercial rather than women’s interests (Rothman 1985; Samerski 
2009) and it renders hegemonic certain norms and ways of conduct, thereby constraining women’s 
freedom (Mills 2015). I return to some of these critiques in the next section, where I limit my analysis 
to critiques to reproductive freedom and to the individual-centred framework which are motivated 
by a concern for the interests and the well-being of others (i.e. other than the procreators and their 
close networks).  
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protecting the interests of some (wealthy, educated, white people), these narratives 
often both overlook the rights of ethnic minorities and indirectly harm them:  
Liberty only commands that the government stay out of people’s decisions, 
which individuals are free to make as long as they do not cause tangible harm. 
This means that the government need not to be concerned with social practices 
that create such vague injuries as the devaluation of Black mothers. ([emphasis 
in original] Roberts 1997: 295)  
Something similar, in terms of the harm engendered to third parties, is discussed 
within debates on pre-natal screening and on selecting against disability. Many 
authors (including myself) defend the right of women and couples to access pre-natal 
and pre-implantation testing technologies to make more informed decisions 
regarding the type of children they will bring into existence and raise (see for 
instance Harris 1998; Shakespeare 2006). This right is protected by reproductive 
freedom as it allows women and couples to make decisions which are in line with 
their preferred life-plans. People undertaking prenatal and pre-implantation tests can 
subsequently decide to ‘select out’ foetuses or embryos which may grow into 
disabled children. Disability scholars criticise these technologies for different 
reasons. Some see them as a morally problematic means to achieve otherwise good 
ends as they entail selection “in the name of disability prevention” (Asch & Barlevy 
2012: 1). Others see them as morally problematic because the decision to abort a 
foetus with chromosomal abnormalities, such as those linked to Down’s syndrome, 
is often made without an accurate and embodied idea of what it means to live with 
a disability (Mackenzie & Scully 2007). Some, crucially, see these options as 
responding to a “eugenic logic” (Garland-Thompson 2012: 339) which is part of: 
[O]ur dominant understanding that disability is something to be avoided and 
that the world would be a better place if disability would be eliminated. 
(Garland-Thompson 2012: 339)  




According to Rosemarie Garland-Thompson (2012) this logic is problematic as it 
portrays disability in negative terms while, she contends, disability should be 
considered a resource worthy of conservation207.  
Reproductive freedom is not responsible for engendering harms to ethnic minorities 
(Roberts 1997), disabled people (Garland-Thompson 2012) or women (Shahvisi 
2018; Smith 2005). Despite this, according to authors voicing the concerns just 
outlined, it protects the interests of certain people (the procreators) while failing to 
take other interests into account and to limit potential and actual harms to third 
parties. Moreover, as argued by Roberts (1997) and by proponents of the 
reproductive justice movement208 (Price 2010; Ross 2005, 2006; see also: Mamo & 
Alston-Stepnitz 2015), the reproductive freedom framework protects the interests 
of the well-off by removing legal barriers (and by limiting the interference of the 
state) to access to reproductive technologies, contraception and abortion services. It 
allows, in other words, those with financial means and who belong to certain social 
and cultural groups to freely decide in procreative matters by removing the only 
barrier between them and the possibility of exercising their freedom209. 
Reproductive freedom, especially when conceived in terms of ‘freedom from’ 
interference or ‘negative freedom’ (Mills 2013), protects against third parties’ 
intrusion in procreation. But, as Roberts (1997) argues: 
                                                 
207 A similar point is made by Gyngell and Douglas (2016), and by Jonathan Anomaly et al. (2018), 
but it is limited to cognitive diversity and, in particular, to dyslexia and Asperger syndrome.  
208 Reproductive justice is a U.S. concept that seeks to bring together the demands of reproductive 
rights activists and of social justice frameworks (Mamo & Alston-Stepnitz 2015). The driving force 
behind this project is to shift from a rhetoric of ‘choice’, a focus on negative rights and access to 
abortion to a rhetoric focusing on the political, economic and social inequalities which constrain 
women’s procreative activities and rights. According to proponents of this framework, such as 
Loretta Ross (2005, 2006; see also: Asian Communities for Reproductive Justice 2005), reproductive 
justice seeks to address structural inequalities which affect women’s lives and reproductive health, 
rather than merely channelling efforts towards removing legal barriers to accessing services.  
209 According to the proponents of the concept of ‘stratified reproduction’ (Colen 1995) outlined in 
the introduction, this analysis misses the fundamental role of power relationships and of power 
asymmetries within these discourses (see also: Ginsburg & Rapp 1995). 
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[I]t does nothing to dismantle social arrangements that make it impossible for 
some people to make a choice in the first place. Liberty guards against 
government intrusion; it does not guarantee social justice. (Roberts 1997) 
The impossibility to enjoy freedom in matters of procreation due to financial, 
cultural and social barriers, as well as due to existing racist, sexist and ableist forms 
of discrimination is one of the challenges raised against the individual-centred 
framework of reproductive freedom. The critiques outlined in this section can be 
interpreted in terms of challenges to a framework that protects certain interests 
(those of the procreators, and specifically – following the authors discussed in this 
section – of the well-off, white and able procreators) while overlooking the effects 
on third parties of protecting these interests. In other words, what reproductive 
freedom and the individual-centred framework that underpins it overlook are the 
cumulative and far-reaching effects of procreative decisions. 
2.2 Second Set of Challenges: Population Engineering  
Another set of challenges to reproductive freedom and to the individual-centred 
framework that underpins it comes from the increasing number of authors who in 
the past few years have begun to advocate for some kind of ‘population engineering’. 
Population engineering, following Colin Hickey et al. (2016), refers to “the 
intentional manipulation of the size and structure of human populations”210 (Hickey 
et al. 2016: 845). The claims of authors advocating for population engineering differ 
in terms of the policy solutions advocated, the degree of coercion that they find 
acceptable, the aims that drive them, and in terms of placing the emphasis on the 
size of the population and/or on its structure. Primarily, they make two types of 
claims: Malthusian-inspired claims regarding the size of the population (Benjamin et 
al. 2017; Cafaro 2012; Das Gupta 2014; Hickey et al. 2016; Rieder 2015b, 2016; 
                                                 
210 Throughout this final part of the thesis I refer to these categories, i.e. size and structure, as I follow 
Colin Hickey et al. (2016)’s definition of population engineering. While what they mean by 
population ‘size’ strikes me as intuitive, when I discuss population ‘structure’ I am referring to 
composition: namely to the type of people who collectively shape the population.  




Young 2001) and eugenics-inspired claims211 regarding the structure of the 
population (Anomaly 2014, 2018; Brock 2005). The first group of authors focuses on 
the toll on resources and on the environment of bringing new persons into the world. 
They maintain that there are good moral reasons to favour adoption instead of 
relying on costly assisted reproductive technologies (Overall 2012; Rulli 2014), to 
refrain from having more than one child (Rieder 2016), to pursue alternative ways to 
‘make kin’ instead of procreating (Haraway 2015) and to forgo or limit procreative 
aspirations altogether (Cafaro 2012; Das Gupta 2014; Rieder 2016; Young 2001). 
The second group focuses instead on population structure and on the costs of 
unconstrained procreation for current and future generations. Their view is that the 
problem with an unconstrained procreative behaviour is not ‘too many people’, but 
too many of a certain kind of people (Anomaly 2014, 2018; Anomaly & Boutwell 2017; 
Brock 2005).  
What unites the claims of authors concerned with the size of the population and 
authors concerned with its structure is that they challenge reproductive freedom and 
the individual-centred framework that underpins it by proposing a framework that 
pays attention to the collective effects of individual procreative decisions. These 
authors also broadly agree that the interests of existing and future people may 
constitute a pro tanto reason in favour of interfering with prospective parents’ 
reproductive freedom212 (Anomaly 2014, 2018; Brock 2005; Rieder 2016; Rulli 
2016b). In the next sections, I present and discuss their proposals for population 
engineering. I do so by evaluating the strengths and the weaknesses of the broader 
                                                 
211 I am aware that Malthusianism can be understood in terms of eugenics (following the 
understanding of eugenics that I rely upon within this thesis) and that the two phenomena are often 
not clearly distinguishable. In this final part of the thesis I use both terms as Malthusianism historically 
placed a stronger emphasis on population size, eugenics on population structure. There were overlaps 
historically and there are overlaps within the claims of the authors I discuss in this part of the thesis. 
As I argue towards the end of this final part of the thesis, population engineering programmes 
concerned with the size of the population will have to address issues concerning its structure too and 
vice versa.  
212 As mentioned above, the challenges to and critiques of reproductive freedom and the individual-
centred framework that underpins it of these two groups and the challenges and critiques from the 
point of view of disabled people, women of colour and other authors presented in the previous section 
are different in terms of the ethical concerns voiced and in terms of the proposals to address these 
concerns. Despite this, they can both be considered as pleas and arguments to reflect on the ethics 
of procreation from a broader perspective than that of the reproductive freedom framework.  
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framework that they employ: one that considers the interests of other people than 
the procreators and their close networks. 
*** 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the two sets of challenges just discussed. Firstly, 
the individual-centred framework to reflect on the ethics of procreative decisions 
does not account for other people’s ethically significant interests and for the effects 
of procreative decisions on these people (and their interests). Secondly, the current 
framework protects only certain individual interests and not those of all engaging in 
procreation (even within liberal democratic societies which respect and protect 
reproductive freedom). Looking at the effects of individual procreative decisions on 
vulnerable groups, on the environment, and on political and social institutions allows 
us to appreciate many more elements than the individual-centred framework of 
reproductive freedom can account for and to make trade-offs in terms of what 
considerations should be given priority. The question, then, is: are alternative 
frameworks to discuss the ethics of procreation theoretically and practically better 
than the individual-centred framework of reproductive freedom? In the following 
section, I outline some of the proposals that have been put forward to reflect on the 
ethics of procreation more broadly.  
3 Procreation and the Broader Framework 
Decisions of whether to procreate or not, with whom and how are protected by 
reproductive freedom, but, at the same time, inevitably affect the size and the 
structure of the population. They have effects on the third parties whose 
interference reproductive freedom protects against. That these decisions affect the 
size of the population seems relatively uncontroversial: some of us have siblings and 
some of us do not due to the procreative decisions of our parents. More generally: 
the decline in fertility rates of people living in developed countries and, to a lesser 
extent, in developing countries, affects the number of people who will inhabit our 
planet in the future, and this trend depends on the cumulative effects of the 
procreative decisions of people currently living in these countries.  




Procreation can also affect the structure of the population. The Zika virus epidemic 
that began in early 2015 in Latin America offers an example of this. Procreating 
during the epidemic meant that children had a higher risk of being born with physical 
abnormalities than, say, before or after the epidemic. Something similar can be said 
about hereditable conditions such as mtDNA diseases. Procreating ‘naturally’, i.e. 
without turning to IVF coupled with PGD or to MRTs, means that children born 
as a result of the procreative act will have a higher than normal chance of having 
mtDNA mutations which could lead to the onset of mtDNA diseases. In turn, 
relying on MRTs, PGD or seeking an oocyte donor decreases the risk of having a 
child with mtDNA mutations which could lead to mtDNA diseases.  
Naturally and humanly constituted environments of a certain geographical region 
play a role in shaping people’s procreative decisions and, consequently, influence 
the size and the structure of the population. For instance, living in a region affected 
by extreme climatic conditions or by violent conflict (say Syria between 2010 and 
2018), as opposed to living in a region with favourable climatic conditions and 
functioning institutions (say the Silicon Valley during the same period of time) can 
play a role in people’s decision to procreate or not (and of how many children to 
have) thereby changing the size of the population. These conditions however can 
also influence the structure of the population insofar as if people have children in the 
Silicon Valley instead of in Syria, the future children of these people may have 
access to different nutrients, grow up in an environment where different resources 
and institutions are available thereby changing the structure of the population (on 
this issue, see also: Del Savio et al. 2018)213. More controversially, but also 
importantly, these humanly and naturally constituted environments do not only play 
a role in shaping people’s procreative decisions. They also influence how children 
born as a result of these procreative decisions in a region with a favourable natural 
environment and functioning institutions – as opposed to children born elsewhere – 
contribute in different ways to the society they live in. Differing naturally and 
humanly constituted environments hence not only may significantly change their 
                                                 
213 Del Savio et al. (2018) is a paper that I co-authored with Lorenzo Del Savio and Matteo Mameli 
on migration and cooperative infrastructures. It is not incorporated into this thesis.  
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lives214, but they also allow them to participate in different ways in the life of the 
society where they are born and raised, affecting in turn the lives of others born and 
raised in that society. 
These are just a few examples of how the effects of procreative decisions, albeit 
protected by reproductive freedom, concern many more people than the 
procreators. They are also examples of how the individual-centred framework to 
discuss the ethics of procreation fails to account for such effects. It may seem 
puzzling that having one or more children or that having a child during the Zika virus 
epidemic has tangible effects on the overall population. It is true that such decisions, 
taken separately, do not have significant effects. Despite this, as argued by Jonathan 
Anomaly (2014):  
Reproduction is a social act. This is true because the collective upshot of our 
individual choices shapes the gene pool for all future generations, and because 
traits that are heritable will impact people who share a common environment. 
(Anomaly 2014: 177) 
Similarly, Brock (2005) acknowledges the far-reaching effects of individual 
procreative decisions and argues that:  
The effect of many individual decisions, themselves each rational and justified as 
individual choices, may be collectively undesirable [or desirable] for a group or 
society. ([emphasis added] Brock 2005: 378) 
Considering the effects of these decisions collectively as well as the implications of 
single procreative decisions on third parties brings to light the limitations of 
                                                 
214 Milanovic (2016) uses the expression “citizenship rent” (Milanovic 2016: 5) to describe the 
phenomenon whereby citizens of high-income countries have an advantage over citizens of low-
income countries irrespective of a citizen’s characteristics and socio-economic status. Belonging to/living in a 
country with favourable natural and humanly constituted environments as opposed to belonging 
to/living in a country with less functioning institutions and less favourable environments changes 
people’s ‘place premium’ (Clemens 2009), namely it (significantly) changes the expected income of 
‘observably identical’ workers of the latter countries compared to workers of the former (Clemens 
2009: 2). As we discuss in Del Savio et al. (2018), other than procreation, a phenomenon that changes 
the structure and the size of the population of a given country is migration, as migrating changes “the 
cooperative framework within which people can operate and, thereby, it changes people’s ability to 
contribute to the social production of human goods” (Del Savio et al. 2018: 5). 




reproductive freedom and of an individual-centred framework to account for these 
effects and to reflect on their ethical implications.  
I now turn to two proposals for population engineering, one primarily concerned 
with the structure of the population and the other with its size. I present them and 
discuss their limitations.  
3.1 Too Many of a Certain Kind of People and Too Many People  
One of the authors who places the emphasis on the quality rather than the quantity 
of future people is Anomaly (2014, 2018; Anomaly & Boutwell 2017). Anomaly 
considers procreation to be a social act whose implications have far-reaching effects 
and argues for the necessity of going beyond an individual-centred understanding of 
this practice. According to him, procreation needs to be thought of in terms of a 
public good215, one whose benefits and costs are enjoyed and borne by many 
regardless of their involvement in the production of the good. As he puts it: “parents 
internalize most of the cost of bearing and raising children, but the returns are widely 
dispersed” and bearing and raising children has “far-reaching effects on the genetic 
composition, cultural trajectory, and general welfare of future people” (Anomaly 
2014: 172).  
Due to these far-reaching effects, procreation needs to be organised in ways which 
are beneficial both to future people themselves and to those around them. Following 
Anomaly (2014, 2018), one way of doing so would be to influence the structure of 
the population by favouring the transmission of traits such as creativity, humour, 
productivity, intelligence and compassion, which are both beneficial for those who 
have these traits and for others216. Adopting an impartial moral standpoint leads to 
                                                 
215 A public good is a good that is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable. This means that if a person 
enjoys the good, her enjoyment of the good does not prevent others from enjoying the good, and 
people cannot be excluded from the enjoyment of the good, even if they have not participated in its 
production. For a discussion of whether children are indeed public good and whether a liberal 
egalitarian society should offer support to families for raising children, see Serena Olsaretti (2013).  
216 One could challenge the genetic essentialism underpinning these claims and the lack of empirical 
data in their support. Anomaly (2014) provides some data on the correlation between income and 
fertility, education and fertility, and IQ and fertility. Granted, this data may be neither valid nor 
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the conclusion that it is better to bring into the world people who will have good 
lives and whose lives can contribute to the well-being of others (Anomaly 2014). 
This means that, all things being equal, the birth of children who have traits which 
are both beneficial to them and to the community of people around them should be 
favoured.  
Anomaly grants that more people may translate into more producers, more welfare 
and a larger work force to support an ageing population, but stresses that people are 
not equally productive217 and that “some represent a net cost to their society, or to 
the world” (Anomaly 2014: 176). From this, he concludes that while non-coercive 
measures to encourage certain people to procreate more and others to procreate less 
should be preferred over coercive measures, procreation may require government 
action: 
 [I]f there is some risk that widely valued traits in the human gene pool are 
declining, or that the prevalence of some debilitating genetically transmissible 
disease is increasing. (Anomaly 2014: 182) 
Education, subsidised contraception, genetic screening and counselling 
programmes, incentives for “well-placed parents to have children” (Anomaly 2014: 
184) and other ‘soft’ measures should be preferred over sterilisation programmes, 
licensing programmes (see also: Hickey et al. 2016; LaFollette 1980, 2010) and other 
more coercive and costly measures.  
*** 
While Anomaly is concerned with the structure of the population, other authors are 
concerned with its size. These authors focus on the different strategies which could 
be devised to mitigate the negative effects of climate change and to reduce 
                                                 
sufficient to convincingly make the claim that procreation should be organised according to it. I 
return to this issue below. 
217 Elsewhere (in Anomaly & Boutwell 2017), Anomaly and Brian Boutwell argue: “Those who urge 
educated and compassionate citizens in developed countries to have fewer children are missing their 
target. If their call were heeded, people around the world would be considerably worse off. Imploring 
people in Spain or Norway to restrict their reproduction does nothing to solve the problem of 
precipitous population growth in Africa and the Middle East. And it does a lot to impede the 
development of new ideas, and the creation of value” (Anomaly & Boutwell 2017).  




anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Rieder (2016) and others (Das 
Gupta 2014; Hickey et al. 2016; Murtaugh & Schlax 2008) contend that the most 
effective way to reduce such emissions is to decrease the size of the population by 
changing people’s procreative behaviours, as procreation plays an important role 
with respect of the quantity of GHG emissions218 (Harte 2007; Murtaugh & Schlax 
2008; Nolt 2011). The effects of climate change on people’s well-being call, in their 
view, for pro tanto moral reasons to refrain from procreation or, at least, for reducing 
the number of children being born. For instance, Rieder (2016) argues that people 
have “procreation-limiting duties” (Rieder 2016: 9) as: 
There are too many people on earth, together emitting too much GHG much 
too quickly. […] The public health crisis of overpopulation leads to the intuitive 
conclusion that morality might demand of each of us that we do not contribute 
to such a crisis. (Rieder 2016: 10) 
Rieder (2016), Anomaly (2014) and other authors advocating for population 
engineering are aware of the relevance of freedom in matters of procreation for 
people’s personal autonomy and well-being, and of how protecting people’s 
reproductive freedom amounts to protecting morally relevant individual interests. 
They advocate for measures which seek to address the challenges of the far-reaching 
effects of individual procreative decisions, but they are cautious as to the potential 
negative externalities of curtailing people’s freedom. They also adopt different 
strategies to address the tension between the interests (and the freedom) of 
                                                 
218 Procreation has an impact on climate change: creating one more person generates immediate 
effects on GHG emissions (think about the bigger car and house, and larger quantity of food and 
water etc. required after the birth of a child), and long-term effects (that child will eventually become 
an adult who consumes, pollutes, and, above all, might well procreate thereby creating new 
consumers and polluters). Studies such as those by Paul A. Murtaugh and Michal G. Schlax (2008) 
and John Nolt (2011) show how the total of CO2 emissions saved by refraining from bringing one 
more child into the world is significantly larger than the total of life-time savings of other common 
activities aimed at reducing CO2 emissions such as recycling, decreasing carbon footprints, increasing 
the energy saving efficiency of people’s homes, etc. Also, the type of person we go on to create will 
contribute to a different extent to GHG emissions. This can be approximately calculated on the basis 
of the differing rates of GHG emission per country (Hickey et al. 2016; Murtaugh & Schlax 2008; 
Nolt 2011; Rieder 2016). These views are challenged by those arguing that is not net population 
growth (or number of people inhabiting the planet) that causes increased GHG emissions, but rather 
the systems of production of goods and the ways these systems are organised (see for instance: Angus 
& Butler 2011).  
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individual procreators and the interests of other people. Rieder (2016), for instance, 
argues that there is more to morality than what is within one’s rights and that acting 
within these rights does not necessarily translate into acting in the morally right, viz 
virtuous, manner. He contends that acting rightly entails reducing one’s own family 
size even if this is at odds with one’s own rights. Anomaly (2014) instead focuses on 
the potential challenges and costs that even non-coercive measures to carry out 
population engineering programmes might engender when state institutions are 
involved in such programmes. According to the author:  
There are three main reasons for caution in moving from social norms that 
nudge people to make socially beneficial reproductive choices, to using state 
institutions that shape reproductive choices. The first is that the science of 
genetics is still in its infancy, and our ability to manipulate genetically mediated 
traits is not yet sophisticated. The second is the value of individual autonomy, 
or the (defeasible) right to control one’s own reproductive choices. The third 
reason for caution is that agents of the state will always possess imperfect 
information and often face perverse incentives.219 (Anomaly 2014: 182)220  
The knowledge of how genes influence behavioural traits such as empathy and 
intelligence (or even aesthetic traits such as eye colour or height) and the capacity 
to edit genes to favour the expression of these traits are in their infancy to say the 
least. Despite this, I would argue, following Anomaly, the current lack of knowledge 
may not represent per se an insurmountable challenge to carrying out population 
engineering programmes. It may also not represent, as it were, an insurmountable 
(ethical) argument against these programmes. Studies on the hereditability of IQ 
date back to the beginning of the 20th century and some progress has been made (for 
a review, see for instance: Ritchie 2015). Moreover, if it becomes clear that 
population engineering and Anomaly’s aims of improving the structure of the 
                                                 
219 Even though Anomaly mentions the potential challenges arising from carrying out population 
engineering programmes, he does not elaborate on them. 
220 I discuss these reasons for caution below. Contrary to Anomaly (2014), in my view caution is 
required not only when population engineering programmes are coercively carried out by the state. 
What he refers to as ‘social norms that nudge people’, albeit less coercive, can have as ethically 
troubling effects as state-driven programmes.  




population can be achieved not through prenatal/pre-conception genetic 
interventions but thanks to controlled epigenetic influence, education, welfare 
provisions and other postnatal measures, then the question of the desirability and 
ethical standing of population engineering programmes will remain. In other words, 
the first reason for caution identified by Anomaly (2014) is a problem that can be 
conceived as contingent. With respect to the second reason for caution (the value 
of reproductive freedom), it is important to consider that even liberal defences of 
reproductive freedom allow some degree of interference from third parties to protect 
children’s interests and/or to limit harm to others (Brock 2005; Dworkin 1994). The 
question of protecting reproductive freedom would then turn into the question of 
whether harms engendered by what this principle protects warrant some kind of 
restriction on people’s procreative decisions, even considering the costs of curtailing 
their freedom. This needs to be discussed while bearing in mind also the third reason 
for caution identified by Anomaly (2014), namely the risk that third parties may 
possess “imperfect information” and may be faced with “perverse incentives” 
(Anomaly 2014: 182).  
The remainder of this final part of the thesis revolves around the question of whether 
ethical frameworks which consider the far-reaching effects of procreative decisions 
such as those just presented should be preferred to the individual-centred framework 
of reproductive freedom, considering these reasons for caution, and it assesses the 
strengths and weaknesses of said alternative frameworks. But first, I turn back to 
eugenics and Malthusianism, as they represent historical examples of population 
engineering programmes which adopted a framework to reflect on and to organise 
procreation that considered the far-reaching and cumulative effects of procreative 
decisions. 
4 A Broader Framework: Lessons from the Past 
Proposals to enact population engineering programmes and to reflect on procreation 
in ways that take into account the interests of other people than the procreators 
recall movements, thinkers, ideologies, policies, and practices of the past: 
Malthusianism and eugenics (see also: Connelly 2008; Bashford 2014). As 
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mentioned above, while the emphasis within Malthusianism was primarily on the 
size of the population, within eugenics it was primarily on the structure. I discuss 
these movements jointly in this section: both Malthusianism and eugenics fit the 
description outlined above of population engineering programmes. Moreover, both 
within Malthusianism and eugenics, procreation was conceived as a phenomenon 
that could be subjected to external control as it was a social act, an act with social, 
political, and moral dimensions that transcended those who executed it221. 
Malthusianism was inspired by the work of Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus and 
was chiefly concerned with the risk of food scarcity and famine. Malthus and his 
followers believed that whilst the population grew exponentially, food supply grew 
arithmetically. This disparity in the growth rates of food and population motivated 
the perceived need to put into place population-control measures to avoid 
widespread famine and diseases: the Malthusian catastrophe (Mayhew 2016). These 
concerns were also at the heart of the modern environmentalist movement of the 
60s and 70s (Angus & Butler 2011). During that time, some of the key issues debated 
by authors advocating for the type of population engineering described above begun 
to emerge and to be a matter of concern for activists and scholars alike. Their views 
were of marked Malthusian orientation: mass starvation was seen as inevitable and 
rapidly approaching, and the environment was perceived as being doomed to 
gradually deteriorate and be rendered inhospitable. For some authors, the origin of 
all these catastrophes was the uncontrolled growth of the population (for a 
discussion, see: Angus & Butler 2011; Bashford 2014; Connelly 2008). These were 
also the central theses of Paul (and Anne) Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (Ehrlich 
1968). Similar worries were echoed by Garrett Hardin222, author of The Tragedy of the 
                                                 
221 For a discussion of the relationship between Malthusianism and eugenics today, see for instance: 
Susanne Klausen and Alison Bashford (2010).  
222 As Ian Angus and Simon Butler (2011) show, Hardin was also a eugenicist who wrote: “Studies 
indicate that as long as our present social organization continues, there will be a slow but continuous 
downward trend in the average intelligence—there seems to be little danger of society’s being 
deprived of something valuable by the sterilization of all feeble-minded individuals—more 
spectacular results could be obtained by preventing the breeding of numerous members of the 
subnormal classes higher than the feeble-minded” (Hardin 1949: 611-612, quoted in Angus & Butler 
2011, Ch 9).  




Commons (Hardin 1968) and of the essay “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping 
the Poor” (Hardin 1974). There, Hardin (1974) employed the metaphor of a lifeboat 
to describe the U.S. He believed that ‘taking on board’ those who were drowning, 
namely people from developing countries trying to immigrate to the U.S., would 
have doomed the ‘lifeboat to sink’. While Ehrlich (1968) worried about population 
growth and advocated for birth control measures, Hardin (1974) was chiefly 
concerned by immigration fluxes and how they could exacerbate the draining of 
American resources. Malthusian themes and worries also influenced the ‘father’ of 
bioethics Van Rensselaer Potter. Potter (1971, 1988) identified in population growth 
and especially in the prevention of overpopulation both a challenge and a priority 
for bioethics (see also: ten Have 2012). According to Potter (1971), controlling 
population growth was necessary to ensure the long-term survival of the human 
species223, the challenge for and aim of bioethics.  
As discussed in Paper 1 (Cavaliere 2018d), eugenics- (and Malthusianism-)inspired 
population engineering programmes of the past were constituted by a diverse range 
of practices, policies, ideologies, movements and thinkers (Adams 1990; Bashford 
2014; Bashford & Levine 2010; Connelly 2008; Meloni 2016). Part of the long 
history of attempts to engineer the population are negative interventions such as 
forced sterilisations of people of colour and of the so-called ‘feeble-minded’ in the 
U.S. (Kevles 1985; Roberts 1997) and Scandinavian countries (Broberg & Roll-
Hansen 2005); atrocities such as those committed during the Nazi Aktion T4 
programme (Adams 1990; Buchanan et al. 2001); immigration policies aimed at 
selectively accepting immigrants depending on their geographic and racial origins 
(Kevles 1985); feminist advocacies for free distribution of birth control domestically 
(Roberts 1997) and internationally (Murphy 2017); and socialist-parties’ attempts to 
re-organise the welfare state by limiting certain groups’ procreative decisions (Koch 
2004; Paul 1984). Part of this long history are also positive interventions aimed at 
favouring the birth of strong and healthy individuals such as the American fitter 
                                                 
223 Despite exploring different avenues to reducing population growth (both coercive and non-
coercive in nature), Potter seems ambivalent about how this challenge should be addressed (see also: 
ten Have 2012). 
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family contests (Lombardo 2008), ante-natal clinics, school inspection services and 
free school meals (Porter 2005). Despite these variations in terms of ideologies, 
measures, policies and practices, the idea of changing the size and structure of the 
population in ways that would favour economic production (Murphy 2017), relieve 
poverty (Roberts 1997) and allow the breading of a better human stock through 
positive and negative interventions were shared features of these differing 
endeavours.  
As the work of historians such as Löwy (2015, 2018), Bashford (2010, 2014) and Paul 
(1984, 2017) testifies, the focus on population-wide interventions and modes of 
thinking characteristic of Malthusianism and eugenics survives within discourses on 
PND and prenatal screening (see also Mills 2015 and Buchanan et al. 2001). On the 
one hand, there are the demands of women, their wish to play an active role in 
decisions pertaining to who should come into existence and discourses of ‘choice’224. 
On the other, there are the aspirations of public health professionals of favouring the 
birth of healthy children who will grow into adults who can contribute to society 
and the recognition that procreative decisions have social consequences (Löwy 
2015; Paul 2017). In Löwy’s (2015) words: 
Numerous women wish to avoid a birth of a child with Down’s syndrome but 
the implementation of regional and national screening programmes was a top-
down, not a bottom-up, process. Moreover, this process was shaped by two 
incommensurable ‘moral economies’—or to follow Boltanski and Thevenot’s 
expression, two ‘worlds of worth’ (‘mondes de valeur’)—that shaped this 
technology, that of gynaecologists and obstetricians, committed to ethics of 
individual-centered medicine, and that of public health experts and 
                                                 
224 As Löwy (2015) argues, this “user demand argument” (Löwy 2015: 195) is an accurate depiction 
of the rationales for offering prenatal diagnosis only at a certain time in history. At its inception, in 
the 60s and 70s, PND was offered to women who, due to the birth of an affected child, were aware 
that they could pass genetic conditions to their offspring and were “concerned about the possibility 
of giving birth to a second affected child” (Löwy 2015: 195). Later on, however, healthcare 
professionals began to educate women about the link between maternal age and the increased risk of 
having children with Down’s syndrome. According to Löwy (2015), then, the user demand argument 
applies less to these kinds of interventions and rationales for offering PND. Mills (2015) points to 
something similar when she argues that both freedom and certain norms about health and diseases 
became normalised within discourses on prenatal testing and screening. 




administrators, who reason in terms of the cost/efficacy of health measures. 
(Löwy 2015: 199) 
Buchanan et al. (2001) identify this duplicity in terms of the tension between 
individual and broader interests as a defining characteristic of eugenics, but also of 
today’s public health interventions. By and large, this tension and duplicity survive 
in the work of authors advocating for different kinds of population engineering and 
interventions in procreation. As discussed in Paper 1, they also survive in the 
arguments in favour of and against new reproductive technologies. 
4.1 What Was Wrong? 
In their ‘autopsy of eugenics’, Buchanan and his co-authors (2001) consider five 
theses to address the question of why eugenics was wrong225. After a careful analysis 
of them, they conclude that the chief wrong of eugenics was not that its focus was 
on social and not individual interests but rather that it failed to fairly distribute the 
burdens and benefits of exercising control over procreation: 
The eugenics movements of 1870-1950 insisted – wrongly, as it turned out – 
that humankind faced a grave threat (degeneration) and stood to gain a large 
benefit (more able, fit people) if humans would submit to the kind of breeding 
programs that had been used to improve plants and livestock. But who would 
benefit and at whose expenses? […] The ‘underclass’ is simultaneously the 
group of people whose genes were not wanted and the people who, through 
involuntary sexual segregation, stigmatization and denigration, sterilization, 
and even murder, paid the price. (Buchanan et al. 2001: 52) 
Hence, they conclude: 
The key issue in appraising the shadow cast by the eugenics movements on 
clinical genetics is not whether those who build programs of clinical genetics 
                                                 
225 The theses are: eugenics was wrong because it was about replacing people, i.e. causing better 
people to come into existence, rather than treating existing people. Eugenics was wrong because it 
lacked a consideration for the pluralism of ideals and values. Instead, it promoted “a particular 
conception of human perfection” (Buchanan et al. 2001: 48). Eugenics was wrong because it violated 
people’s reproductive freedom. Eugenics was wrong because it entailed an unfair distribution of 
burdens and benefits (Buchanan et al. 2001: 46-52). See also: Daniel Wikler (1999) on this issue.  
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have an individual focus as opposed to a social one. The social goal is not 
automatically suspect. What matters is whether either goal is pursued justly. ([emphasis 
added] Buchanan et al. 2001: 55)  
Population engineering programmes of the past were designed in such ways that the 
burdens would systematically fall on certain groups, such as ethnic minorities, 
disabled people, poor people and immigrants, while the benefits of these 
programmes would be enjoyed mostly by the rich and the educated, many of whom 
were white. At the heart of these programmes and of the unjust distribution of their 
burdens and benefits, were epistemic and political problems which should be 
considered within any contemporary attempt to organise procreation in ways aiming 
to consider the interests of other people than the procreators and their close 
networks.   
These epistemic and political problems can be traced back, on the one hand, to how 
beliefs on the differential economic worth of people for society translated into beliefs 
of the differential moral worth of these people (Murphy 2017); on the other, to how 
they translated into problematic and often misguided beliefs of the science of 
heredity (Meloni 2016). Past population engineering programmes aimed at 
enhancing GDP (Murphy 2017) or at relieving poverty among black minorities in 
developed countries (Roberts 1997) disproportionally targeted and affected people 
from the lower classes of developed countries and people living in developing 
countries. These programmes targeted, as Murphy puts it, “the future generations 
of the precarious” (Murphy 2017: 93), which became designated as “a kind of surplus 
life: sacrificeable and unvaluable to the economy, thus better never to have been 
born” (Murphy 2017: 93). These beliefs found justification in a view of heredity that 
Meloni (2016) defines as ‘radical biologism’, which: 
[F]lattened the notion of the human and its psycho-cultural manifestations into 
its merely biological dimension. Even mental and moral qualities were seen as 
aspects of the hereditary mechanism. (Meloni 2016: 66)  
Manifestations of pauperism, disability and precariousness were linked to biological 
characteristics and hence considered heritable. These epistemically flawed beliefs 




served as a source of inspiration for policies and, at the same time, resonated with 
extant racist, sexist and ableist political beliefs (Meloni 2016; Porter 2005, Ch 10).  
That epistemically and politically troubling beliefs can give rise to ethically troubling 
strategies for intervening in procreation and to the unjust distribution of the burdens 
and benefits mentioned above is, in my view, one of the most important lessons that 
population engineering programmes of the past can teach us. This lesson is relevant 
for authors advocating for population engineering programmes today. It is also 
relevant to assessing whether reproductive freedom and the individual-centred 
framework that underpins it is preferable to the framework that informs the 
proposals of these authors. It remains open for today’s discussions whether all 
attempts to conceive procreation more broadly and to act upon this conception are 
bound to re-enact wrongs akin to those of the past226.  
5 Taking Issue with Alternative Frameworks: Harm to Others, Structure, and Size 
At the end of the section on reproductive freedom, I argued that the relevant 
question concerning the ethics of procreation is whether an alternative framework 
that considers the interests of other people than the procreators is preferable to the 
individual-centred framework of reproductive freedom. In this last section, I explore 
this question in light of the epistemic and political problems which caused an unjust 
distribution of burdens and benefits in past attempts to reflect on procreation. I first 
outline some of the shortcomings of the challenges raised against the individual-
centred framework by authors concerned with potential harm to third parties (such 
as ethnic minorities, women and disabled people). I then move to the shortcomings 
                                                 
226 Many authors argue that all attempts are bound to go wrong, but give different reasons for this 
view. Some adopt a libertarian framework and condemn any (or most of) state intervention in 
procreation due to the violation of people’s fundamental negative rights (see for instance Harris 1998). 
Others instead consider attempts to constrain and organise procreation as a violation of what is 
naturally given and as a corruption of the intrinsic value of ‘natural’ reproduction (see for instance 
Sandel 2004a). I find these approaches unsatisfactory. The libertarian approach is unsatisfactory 
insofar as it does not account for violations of freedom which do not directly depend on curtailing 
negative rights and insofar as it leaves social injustice untouched (Roberts 1997). The intrinsic value 
approach is also unsatisfactory, as its defence of the intrinsic value of natural reproduction is often 
question-begging (Buchanan 2011). 
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of the challenges to the individual-centred framework motivated respectively by a 
concern for the structure and the size of the population.  
5.1 Harm to Others and Levelling Down 
Different avenues could be explored to reduce or eliminate the occurrence of harm 
to third parties. Devaluing black mothers (Roberts 1997), disabled people (Garland-
Thompson 2012) and women more generally (de Melo-Martín 2017a) is something 
that needs to be avoided. Despite this, curtailing (everyone’s) reproductive freedom 
to minimise its negative externalities on these groups seems to be problematic too. 
Rather than curtailing the freedom of certain groups to avoid harming other groups, 
two alternative strategies could be trialled: one could factor in the costs and the 
benefits of reproductive freedom and equally distribute both these costs and benefits. 
This means that for instance devaluing people should be factored against the costs 
of reducing people’s reproductive freedom in ways that, following Buchanan et al. 
(2001), justly distributes these burdens and benefits of reproductive freedom. 
Alternatively, one could first try to extend the benefits and especially the reach of 
reproductive freedom to others who hitherto have not enjoyed it and work towards 
removing the barriers227 to this enjoyment. This would entail ‘levelling up’ the reach 
of reproductive freedom prior to advocating for its ‘levelling down’ in cases where 
the benefits cannot be properly extended or in cases where the overall burdens are 
too great. It seems that the authors who challenge the individual-centred framework 
of reproductive freedom due to its ability to incur potential and actual harm to third 
parties focus on levelling down while failing to first explore strategies aimed at 
levelling up. More on this in the next section, but this is what I take to be the main 
shortcoming of challenges to the individual-centred framework motivated by a 
concern for harming third parties.  
                                                 
227 This would not only entail limiting or eliminating third-parties’ interference and working towards 
state-neutrality in procreative matters but also working towards the removal of barriers which are due 
to cultural and socio-economic reasons, as well as discrimination of the kind denounced by Roberts 
(1997), Murphy (2017) and disability scholars such as Garland-Thompson (2012).   




I now turn to what I consider the shortcomings of contemporary proposals to 
manipulate the size and structure of the population: such as Rieder’s (2016), 
Anomaly’s (2014, 2018) and others’ (Hickey et al. 2016).  
5.2 The Problem with Engineering the Population: Structure and Size 
I identify two main shortcomings of population engineering programmes and 
proposals: acquiring reliable data on who should come into existence and assessing 
this data. With respect to programmes aimed at tackling the structure of the 
population, the first shortcoming concerns the feasibility of acquiring data on the 
type of people who could be reliably said to contribute to overall increases in the 
well-being of future people. Anomaly (2014) argues that the best suited to become 
parents are those with “favorable genetic endowment” and “the means to provide a 
rich social environment for their children” (Anomaly 2014: 174), as both 
characteristics seem to predict the birth of people whose lives have value both for 
themselves and for others. However, what counts as favourable genetic endowment 
and as a rich social environment is a complex notion: whether a given genetic 
endowment really turns out to be favourable often depends also on people’s social 
environments. In this sense, the assessment of what counts as favourable genetic 
endowment cannot be separated from the assessment of what counts as a rich social 
environment. Not only are these conditions often context-dependent, they are also 
normatively loaded as what counts as ‘favourable’ and ‘rich’ presupposes the 
adoption of a certain normative framework as a reference. In other words, in an 
assessment of whether something is rich or favourable, the impartial moral 
standpoint will not do. Different groups of people are likely to come up with 
different assessments of what counts as valuable and competing interests are likely 
to play a role in these assessments.  
This brings me to the second shortcoming. If I am right about the first, there will be 
competing assessments of what counts as valuable and different answers to the 
question of what type of people should be allowed to come into existence. Hence, 
a reliable mechanism to acquire empirical data that can assist in the selection of the 
best answers to ground future policies becomes necessary. Acquiring this data 
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currently seems again normatively loaded and complex: this data could reflect our 
current ‘status quo’ biases (Bostrom & Ord 2006), current racist and discriminatory 
attitudes (Roberts 1997, 2015) and current short-sighted or partial conceptions of 
valuable lives (Garland-Thompson 2012; Mackenzie & Scully 2007). As Kitcher 
(2001) puts it: 
[An] analytical study of the methods of trying to show genetic differences in 
intelligence brings out what would be required to support responsible 
conclusions; examination of ventures in human sociobiology exposes how hard 
it would be to do it properly. (Kitcher 2001: 99)  
There have been studies on the hereditability of IQ (for an overview, see for 
instance: Ritchie 2015) and studies that correlate high IQ and low fertility 
(Meisenberg 2009). Despite this, delving into the history of research on the 
mechanisms of human heredity allows us to appreciate that there exists a 
complicated interplay between epistemic and political forces: between the quest for 
knowledge and interventions acting upon that knowledge (Meloni 2016; Roberts 
2015). The type of questions asked, the hypotheses formulated, the data collected 
and the inferences drawn are all likely to be influenced by existing political views 
and beliefs. In addition, it is unclear who should decide what data is to be taken into 
consideration for institutional design and whose normative framework should be 
used as a reference. Should this framework reflect the values of everyone or just of 
selected groups? How would this framework be delineated? Through a majority vote 
or by a group of experts? What kind of expertise can assist in these decisions? The 
problem, then, is not (or not only) about ‘imperfect information’ and ‘perverse 
incentives’ possessed by the state, but rather about the difficulty of having reliable 
mechanisms to assess this information both in the context of state interventions and 
of shaping social norms. 
Regarding the size of the population, it may seem that population engineering 
programmes might be less problematic and that the challenges outlined above might 
not apply. Economic growth, increased levels of welfare, better educational 
provision and institutions are all viable strategies to reduce fertility rates (Sen 1994). 
Despite this, the one-size-fits-all model to reduce the size of the population seems to 




be ill-conceived if the aim is to reduce for example climate change hazards (as noted 
for instance by: Anomaly & Boutwell 2017; Haraway 2016; Rieder 2016). Not all 
people contribute equally to the worsening of climate change (Rieder 2016; 
Murtaugh & Schlax 2008) and not all people are in an equal position to produce new 
resources to confront these negative effects (Anomaly & Boutwell 2017). Hence, it 
seems reasonable to assume that it would be self-defeating to implement measures 
which seek to reduce everyone’s birth rates: population engineering programmes 
aimed at reducing the size of the population cannot be equally applied to everyone 
because this will not yield the expected results (reducing GHG emissions and 
mitigating the effects of climate change). Population engineering programmes aimed 
at reducing the size of the population cannot be easily disentangled from population 
engineering programmes aimed at influencing the structure of the population. The 
two (i.e. size and structure) cannot be completely separated today, and they were 
not completely separated in the past (Bashford 2014; Connelly 2008; Klausen & 
Bashford 2010). Contemporary attempts to reduce the size of the population are 
likely to incur the very same shortcomings identified above, as competing interests 
are likely to influence people’s assessments of what counts as valuable (i.e. who 
should procreate and how much) and the decision of who gets to decide in these 
matters influences which interests will be given priority.  
6 Conclusions to Part IV: Settling with What We Have? 
It seems that both the individual-centred framework of reproductive freedom and 
alternative frameworks228 which take into account the interests of a broader set of 
people present some limitations. The question of whether a framework that 
considers the interests of other people than the procreators or whether an individual-
centred framework is better suited to reflect on the ethics of procreative decisions 
remains open. In my view, despite critiques and challenges, both frameworks 
present strengths and weaknesses and neither should be dismissed without careful 
                                                 
228 Here, I refer to the frameworks of reference of those criticising reproductive freedom for its limited 
reach and for the harms it engenders to certain groups as well as that of those advocating for some 
form of population engineering programme. 
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consideration of what it could help achieve both in terms of theoretical contribution 
and practical significance.  
With respect to the individual-centred framework, the recognition of the 
relationship between exercising freedom in matters of procreation and people’s 
autonomy and well-being counts as one of today’s greatest achievements229. It also 
counts among the greatest safeguards against forms of interference which may 
undermine people’s personal autonomy and negatively affect their well-being. 
Indeed, contemporary critiques of eugenics are often motivated by its lack of 
concern for bodily autonomy, integrity and respect for people’s freedom in matters 
of procreation. With respect to broader frameworks, I would argue that, despite the 
shortcomings identified above, procreation can neither be considered a matter that 
solely concerns individual procreators nor a matter that solely affects them. In this 
sense, I agree with the proponents of population engineering programmes and those 
concerned with harms to third parties, public goods, climate change, migrations, an 
ageing population and other global trends that an individual-centred framework is 
too narrow to account for the cumulative and far-reaching effects of procreative 
decisions. Considering the interests of others and of how procreation contributes to 
shaping the structure and size of the population may be a starting point to foster 
conversations and devise strategies to minimise negative effects on third parties and 
to address these global challenges and trends. All this is unlikely to happen if we 
remain solely concerned with procreators’ interests and with non-interference from 
third parties.  
Would it be possible to combine the strengths of both frameworks whilst minimising 
potential negative outcomes? Ergo, would it be possible to reflect on procreation 
and take into account a broad set of interests while on the one hand respecting and 
promoting people’s freedom in matters of procreation and on the other fairly 
                                                 
229 This neither means that such a relationship is universally recognised nor that countries that do not 
recognise it need to be looked down upon. The reasons why reproductive freedom became ethically 
relevant in certain contexts and not in others has to do with complex political, cultural and social 
factors which are not explored in this thesis.  




distributing the burdens and benefits of procreative decisions? Here are some 
preliminary thoughts. 
One way would be to settle with what we have (and have achieved) and to strive to 
address the limitations of reproductive freedom and the individual-centred 
framework. In other words, if we are really committed to respecting and promoting 
freedom in matters of procreation as we recognise the significance of this freedom 
for people’s lives and the costs of foregoing its enjoyment, then it seems puzzling to 
be in favour of the exercise of such freedom only for some restricted groups. Part of 
a possible solution to the limitations of the reproductive freedom framework would 
then be to work towards inclusivity in freedom to enable ever broader groups to 
enjoy it. Defending and promoting reproductive freedom will have to be an 
endeavour that seeks to extend its enjoyment to those who currently do not enjoy 
it. It would entail working towards removing barriers to this enjoyment which are 
not only caused by statutory bans or restrictions on the part of the state but by social, 
financial and cultural barriers, and by lingering discriminatory attitudes. Given the 
importance of personal autonomy and well-being, this seems to me an ethical way 
forward both for debates on the ethics of procreation, where the focus should shift 
from non-interference and negative freedom to inclusivity in freedom, and for the 
enactment of strategies to extend this freedom beyond the groups currently able to 
enjoy it.  
Despite this, broadening reproductive freedom and extending its reach does not 
address some of the challenges identified by those who advocate for population 
engineering programmes due to the negative externalities of people’s procreative 
decisions. There may be cases, therefore, where extending reproductive freedom’s 
reach may either not be possible or may engender negative effects on third parties. 
With respect to this, any programme of population engineering would have to 
address challenges raised by what, following Kitcher (2001), I refer to as political and 
epistemic asymmetries. According to Kitcher, political asymmetry occurs if a) 
empirical data that supports certain lingering sexist or racist beliefs leads to a 
reversion to a situation in which these beliefs were widespread, while empirical data 
that contradicts these lingering beliefs does not lead to a further eradication of these 
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beliefs; and if b) empirical data that supports certain lingering sexist or racist beliefs 
leads to the worsening of certain racial groups’ or of women’s lives, while empirical 
data that contradicts these lingering beliefs does not lead to notable improvements 
for these groups (Kitcher 2001: 97). Epistemic asymmetry occurs instead when 
certain studies and certain conclusions, theories and data, despite being assigned low 
reliability, will be taken more seriously than they should be (considering the low 
reliability) if they resonate with widespread racist and sexist beliefs230. Population 
engineering programmes may end up constraining or influencing people’s 
procreative decisions and tampering with their reproductive freedom. Due to the 
relevance of procreation for people’s well-being and due to the tainted history of 
attempts to engineer the population, it is necessary to develop reliable strategies to 
make sure that political and epistemic asymmetries do not persist. This is the case 
as when the stakes are so high, “standards of evidence must go up” (Kitcher 2001: 
96). 
The history of population engineering programmes reminds us that people from the 
worse-off segments of society, women, ethnic minorities, etc., have been unduly 
and disproportionately carrying the burdens of these. If residual discriminatory 
attitudes towards these groups persist, then contemporary proposals of manipulating 
the size and structure of the population risk giving rise to similarly problematic 
outcomes. The question of whether all attempts to conceive procreation more 
broadly and to act upon this conception are bound to fail remains open. 
                                                 
230 More precisely, according to Kitcher, epistemic asymmetry occurs when three conditions are met: 
a) “There will be significant differences between the probabilities assigned to the hypothesis that 
people with C are less well-suited to R and the probabilities that would be assigned by using the most 
reliable methods for assessing evidence; the probabilities assigned to the hypothesis by members of 
the society will typically exceed the probabilities that reliable methods would yield, and the 
probabilities assigned to the negation of the hypothesis will be correspondingly deflated.”; b) “With 
high probability, the evidence obtained from pursuit of S will be indecisive, in that the most reliable 
methods of assessing that evidence would assign a probability of roughly 0.5 to the hypothesis.”; and 
c) “The bias in favor of the hypothesis is so strong that most members of the society will take evidence 
that, when assessed by the most reliable methods, would yield a probability for the hypothesis of 





This thesis began and ends with eugenics. It began with questions raised by new 
reproductive technologies, by their clinical applications, and by different strategies 
that can be pursued to regulate them. It ended with questions raised by procreative 
decisions, by the far-reaching effects of procreation, and by theorisations of 
population engineering programmes. It has been my argument throughout this thesis 
that new reproductive technologies and procreative decisions make us face 
questions concerning who should come into existence, and how to balance the 
burdens and benefits of such decisions. In other words, we are faced with questions 
concerning the ethics of eugenics.   
The research that led to this thesis sought to address questions pertaining to the 
ethics of eugenics and to pursue two overarching aims. From a methodological point 
of view, this study has taken as a point of departure a cluster of critiques and 
proposals for bringing bioethics forward (the idea of ‘critical bioethics’) and has gone 
beyond them. It seeks to contribute to debates on the ethics of new reproductive 
technologies and of procreative decisions by providing arguments for, and examples 
of how they should be informed by other disciplinary sources than moral philosophy; 
the benefits of adopting a self-reflective attitude; and of exercising polite scepticism. 
Throughout this thesis and to work towards this methodologically-oriented aim, 
debates on the ethics of eugenics have been treated as case studies and examples. 
The other aim of this project concerns, more specifically, ethical questions raised by 
new reproductive technologies and procreative decisions. This study has three 
goals: providing arguments for making these technologies more widely accessible; 
for regulating these technologies and reflecting on ways to organise procreation in 
order to fairly distribute their burdens and benefits; and for implementing new 
reproductive technologies in ways which respect the plurality of values and world-
views surrounding them.   
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1 Taking Stock: Back to the Research Questions 
Several questions guided the research that led to this thesis. The first set of questions 
pertains to a reflection on debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies 
and procreative decisions. Within these debates, eugenics is both a recurring 
reference and a widely employed rhetorical tool. New reproductive technologies, 
applications of these technologies, and proposals to implement them are often 
juxtaposed with eugenics. This move serves to condemn these technologies and 
their applications by making analogies with eugenics or to defend them by using dis-
analogies between past and present. Often, the reference to eugenics is devoid of 
engagement with the complexities of its history and it becomes a means to express 
unease (for some) or unquestioning acceptance (for others). Eugenics and its history 
replace arguments and reflections on ethical challenges raised by new reproductive 
technologies. As a result, debates on these technologies are transformed into debates 
on whether these technologies are eugenic or not and on the implications of labelling 
them as such. But these debates, prior to being about the past and the present, are 
about negotiating conflicting values and conflicting answers to the question of who 
should come into existence. These disputes are not likely to be resolved by settling 
once and for all the question of whether new technologies are indeed eugenic. They 
are not likely to be solved as the more profound disagreement lies within the ethical 
standing of eugenic decisions, both past and present. Following Paul (1992), I have 
argued that eugenics should not be treated as a cautionary tale and that the 
references to its history should not be employed lightly within debates on the ethics 
of new reproductive technologies. In this sense, it would be constructive to adopt a 
self-reflective attitude to which characteristics of both eugenics and new 
technologies motivate one’s own comparison between past and present. In addition, 
partial accounts of the history will neither contribute to debates on the ethics of new 
reproductive technologies nor foster constructive exchanges on the ethical questions 
raised by these technologies.  
Other than references to eugenics, moral disagreement is another core characteristic 
of debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies. It may be tempting to 





the risks, and the safety of a certain technology. It may be tempting, but this 
interpretation should be resisted: assessments of safety, risks, and benefits are not 
only about empirically demonstrable (and universally agreeable) facts. These 
assessments are informed by moral beliefs, by one’s position in society, and by the 
capacity to reap the benefits or bear the burdens of new technologies. I have argued 
that how disagreement should be dealt with within debates on new reproductive 
technologies depends on the aims of these debates. Focusing on refining arguments 
and sharpening one’s own philosophical reflections (and those of other authors 
participating in these debates) is an endeavour worth pursuing, but it might not 
provide a sound starting point for suggesting strategies to regulate these 
technologies. In other words, whether disagreement hinders or helps depends on 
what debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies collectively and 
individually want to achieve. This is a question that to a certain extent remains open 
but that, in my view, needs to be discussed. Reflecting on what these debates (and 
one’s role within them) ought to achieve can help to refine one’s questions and 
argumentative strategies, and to work towards specific goals.    
Moving from discussions about the ethics of new reproductive technologies to 
discussions about procreative decisions, I have presented and assessed what I believe 
to be some of the shortcomings of an ethical framework that focuses solely on 
individual procreators. This framework, which I have argued underpins 
reproductive freedom, is problematic insofar as it does not account for the far-
reaching and cumulative effects of procreative decisions. It fails to provide a 
common ground where trade-offs between benefits and burdens (and who should 
reap or bear them) can be discussed. Once again, eugenics plays a role in these 
reflections. Within 20th century eugenics, procreation was thought to be a matter 
that transcended individual interests and collectively affected third parties. The 
tension between individual interests and the common good was dealt with in ways 
disproportionally affecting and discriminating against certain groups. It was dealt 
with in ways that did not, following Buchanan et al. (2001), fairly distribute the 
burdens and benefits of attempts to engineer the population. If eugenics was the 
disease, reproductive freedom became the cure (see also Agar 2008). Unfortunately, 
along the way the relevant features of, and lessons from eugenics have been lost. 
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Eugenics represents a first, albeit ethically problematic and engendering troubling 
outcomes, instance of thinking broadly about procreation. Attempts to rethink the 
ethics of procreative decisions need to consider what could go wrong now if residual 
discriminatory attitudes continue to pervade our society.  
A second set of research questions guiding my project focuses more specifically on 
the ethics of new reproductive technologies and procreative decisions (rather than 
on discussions about them). Considering the wealth of ethical questions engendered 
by these technologies and procreative decisions, my analyses in the papers 
incorporated into this thesis have been circumscribed to two main, related questions. 
The first question concerns what weight the preference to have genetically related 
children should be given; the second concerns what limits, if any, should be imposed 
on the satisfaction of people’s interests in procreative matters. One of the main 
rationales behind the development of ever newer reproductive technologies is 
prospective parents’ desire to have children who are genetically related to them (or 
partially genetically related to them) and healthy (or healthier than these children 
would otherwise had been were these technologies not employed). IVF, PGD, 
MRTs, but also genome editing and other technologies discussed in this thesis, fit 
this description and these rationales. Authors who criticise new reproductive 
technologies often object to the deployment of resources to develop new 
reproductive technologies to satisfy the preference to have genetically related 
children. They also dismiss and criticise this preference as the result of ethically 
troubling parental attitudes, false consciousness, and genetic essentialism, among 
other reasons. While it is of fundamental importance to question the value of genetic 
relatedness and the preference to have genetically related children within debates 
on new reproductive technologies, I have argued that it does not stand as a defeating 
objection to these technologies. This would be too facile. Too often this objection 
overlooks the costs of not satisfying this preference for people’s autonomy and well-
being, and how these costs systematically fall on certain groups (who cannot have 
children for social, medical, legal, and other reasons) as opposed to others. Not all 
reproductive technologies should be developed, not all resources deployed, and not 
all preferences satisfied. Despite this, dismissing this preference should be preceded 





preference should factor but also those of not satisfying it. Something similar can be 
said about the interests of procreators. Individual-centred frameworks such as that 
underlying reproductive freedom do well in protecting people’s (i.e. the 
procreators’) interests and in focusing the attention on their relevance for people’s 
autonomy and well-being; they do less well in capturing other aspects, 
consequences, and implications of procreative decisions. Reflecting on procreative 
decisions by broadening the framework to capture the far-reaching and cumulative 
effects of these decisions, as discussed above, could be a starting point to limiting 
the negative externalities of said decisions. 
The third and final set of research questions concerns the governance of new 
reproductive technologies. These questions have guided my evaluation of different 
regulatory approaches against their capacity to accommodate the multiplicity of 
values and world-views coexisting within the societies where these technologies are 
discussed, developed, and implemented. Moral disagreement is a core characteristic 
of debates on the ethics of new reproductive technologies and such disagreement 
extends to ethical-political questions concerning how to regulate these technologies 
and who should decide how to do so. By and large, these questions raise broader 
issues such as what weight should be given to people’s values and ethical views on 
embryo research, genome editing, and other technologies in practice, as well as what 
respecting these values and views entails.  
Drawing on the debate on whether to extend the 14-day limit for embryo research 
and whether to allow genome editing applications to early human embryos, I have 
argued that some of the conflicting values and beliefs concerning these technologies 
can be explained by the idea of value pluralism, which offers both an explanation for 
moral disagreement as well as a normative reason to respect conflicting ethical views 
(Wolf 1992). It offers an explanation as to why authors participating in debates on 
the ethics of new reproductive technologies as well as members of the public may 
have different views on whether the 14-day limit should be extended and genome 
editing applications to human embryos allowed. It provides reasons for a normative 
commitment to respecting these views and taking them into account when deciding 
how to regulate these technologies. Value pluralism, in other words, provides a non-
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instrumental reason to shape regulatory strategies in ways that respect and reflect 
these conflicting views. Other than this meta-ethical and normative commitment, 
instrumental arguments pertaining to the importance of maintaining trust, ensuring 
the legitimacy of decisions on these matters, and the epistemic benefits of guarding 
against error provide reasons for considering people’s views within institutional 
design.   
When the 14-day limit was first enshrined in law, it was thought to be a solution that 
could best accommodate what were perceived to be the public’s conflicting views 
on embryo research. These views might be different today, but if there continues to 
bedisagreement on embryo research and on the 14-day limit then a compromise 
might still be the approach that best considers and respects the plurality of values 
co-existing in our societies. While compromise can serve this purpose, it does not 
settle the question of whose views should be included in democratic processes. To 
this end, I have presented and discussed an approach to regulate applications of 
genome editing technologies to early human embryos informed by the framework 
of deliberative democracy and by the idea of well-ordered science. Once again, such 
an approach could be defended both for instrumental and non-instrumental reasons.    
2 Concluding Remarks: Past, Present, and Future 
The question of who should come into existence has received different answers 
depending on the historical, cultural, social, and political contexts in which it has 
been asked, and depending on the value system of reference of those asking it. 
At the time of 20th century eugenics, the scholars, politicians, and activists who 
asked this question believed that people were not born equal and that some of them 
constituted a net cost to the overall functioning of society. These beliefs were often 
informed by misguided views on the mechanisms of heredity; by a positivistic faith 
in the science of heredity; by fears that unconstrained procreation would have dire 
effects on everyone else; as well as by nativist, racist beliefs (Lombardo 2018). 
Eugenicists’ answers to the question of who should come into existence, and the 





and led to discrimination, killings, reclusions, and other wrongs whose effects can 
still be witnessed. 
Today, some of the authors, policy-makers, activists, politicians, ethics committee 
members, healthcare professionals, journalists, prospective parents, and other 
members of the public who ask the question of who should come into existence 
worry about the negative effects of new reproductive technologies while others 
celebrate their potential. They also reflect on how new reproductive technologies 
may change our lives and value-systems, and how these technologies should be 
developed and regulated to serve the public good. They answer the question of who 
should come into existence by employing different persuasive and argumentative 
strategies and a plurality of values and beliefs inform their views. Today’s moral 
disagreement on who should come into existence and on how to balance the burdens 
and benefits of such decisions keeps debates on these questions going. It forces those 
who participate in them to consider (and reconsider) their own views; to recognise 
that different values and world-views coexist in our societies; and to avoid the risks 
of dogmatism and blindness denounced by Mill (1979/1859, Ch 2). Such 
disagreement serves as a reminder that different concerns and views may be 
informed by one’s position in society, one’s belonging to a certain socio-economic 
group, and influenced by one’s communities of reference. What is important is to 
bear in mind that the ethical questions we ask, the policy solutions that we propose, 
and our conversations need to draw on “the full richness of humanity’s moral 
imagination” (Jasanoff & Hurlbut 2018: 437): especially considering how past (and, 
debatably, present) forms of discrimination have contributed to the systematic 
exclusion of certain groups from these conversations. 
What, then, of the future? The last part of this thesis represents an attempt to map, 
and contribute to some of the conversations that I believe should keep bioethicists 
busy in the future. Scientists will keep on developing new reproductive technologies 
and our scientific knowledge and technical possibilities will expand in the near and 
far future. Hence the debates on the ethical, social, and political questions raised by 
such knowledge and technical possibilities will have to continue. Despite this, my 
hope for the future is that in addition to these debates we will devote our ethical 
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attention to questions raised by the far-reaching and cumulative effects of 
procreative decisions.  
*** 
Asking the question of who should come into existence, and learning from past and 
present attempts to answer this question helps us keep our ‘eyes on the prize’231. It 
helps us concentrate our attention and channel our efforts towards what we consider 
of value and what we believe to be worth discussing, arguing about, and going out 
into the streets for. This is the prize, which is worth all this and more. What each of 
us will consider worthy of the label of ‘prize’ may once again differ, but together we 
will find ways to live ethically on this planet and to reflect on procreation whilst 
trying to work towards inclusivity in freedom, and to justly distribute the burdens 
and benefits of our procreative decisions. 
At least, I hope so. 
                                                 
231 I owe the inspiration for this expression to John Harris. During several conversations when I was 
conducting research for this thesis, Harris kept on asking me what ‘the prize’ of this research was for 
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